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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between the safety and security measures for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup and the militarisation of urban space and policing in post-apartheid South Africa.  In 
particular, it focuses upon how the South African state and FIFA, the owners of the World Cup 
franchise, worked to present the World Cup as an event which required exceptional levels of security 
– resulting in a historically unprecedented joint police and military operation across host cities. 
However, in contrast with previous research on these security measures, this thesis aims to interrogate 
the political and commercial forces which constructed security and positions them against a backdrop 
of intensified state violence and social exclusion in South Africa. Concurrently, the South African 
case was indicative of an international militarisation of major events, with policing operations 
comparable to national states of emergency. This is representative of the ‘new military urbanism’ in 
which everyday urban life is rendered as a site of ubiquitous risk, leading to the increased diffusion of 
military tactics and doctrines in policing and policy. While the interpenetration between urbanism and 
militarism has often been studied against the context of the ‘war on terror’, in the case of South Africa 
this has primarily been accelerated by a pervasive social fear of violent crime, which has resulted in 
the securitisation of cities, the remilitarisation of policing and the intensification of a historical legacy 
of socio-spatial inequalities.  The South African government aimed to use the World Cup to ‘rebrand’ 
the country’s violent international image, while promising that security measures would leave a 
legacy of safer cities for ordinary South Africans.  The concept of legacies was also responsive to the 
commercial imperatives of FIFA and a range of other security actors, including foreign governments 
and the private security industry. However these policing measures were primarily cosmetic and 
designed to allay the fears of foreign tourists and the national middle class. In practice security 
measures pivoted around the enforcement of social control and urban marginalisation while serving as 
a training ground for an increasingly repressive state security apparatus. Security was as much a 
matter of fortifying islands of privilege and aiding a project of financial extraction as protecting the 
public from harm. 
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Chapter One: The Construction of Security and Academic Responses to the 
2010 FIFA World Cup  
Introduction 
As Mark Neocleous (2011: 192) argues, the perceived need to ‘secure insecurity’ is one of the key 
political tropes of our age and is fundamental to every aspect of contemporary society. ‘Security’ is a 
concept which occupies a central place in international, national and local political agendas. 
Increasingly intersecting and fusing both public and private institutions, ‘security’ has become a 
catch-all phrase which refers to a staggering range of activities and policies.  
But as this thesis aims to argue, ‘security’ is not a neutral, explanatory term but is a contested social 
terrain and a source of considerable political and economic power. This introductory chapter will 
begin by arguing for a theoretical framework in which security is discussed as a constructed concept 
used to advance specific political and economic projects. Central to this advancement is the 
‘securitisation’ of issues which are treated by authorities as existential threats which, in turn, are 
utilised to win public support for exceptional policy measures. This chapter will focus on how the 
discursive creation of a security ‘narrative’ is a central foundation in the deployment of these 
measures, and will use ‘terrorism’ as the key exemplar of a contemporary existential threat. This will 
use a ‘conflict theory’ approach which emphasises the role of security in upholding unequal power 
relations in society.  
The chapter then moves to a case study of how political commentators and security ‘experts’ 
interpreted the security measures for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the international tournament for 
men’s association football held in South Africa between the 11 June and 11 July, and will argue that it 
is surprising that the security measures for the tournament have inspired relatively little critical 
academic interest in South Africa. Notably, the security operations in place during the event have not 
been linked to the on-going militarisation and increased influence of the state security apparatus on 
public policy. As a comparison point, I will discuss how this absence contrasts with the large body of 
critical literature on the socio-economic and developmental implications of the 2010 World Cup. 
Instead, security was presented as a transcendent social good, which was mostly separate from 
political manipulation and economic exploitation.  
As evidence I will use the available research which analysed the security measures surrounding the 
event. In particular, I will focus on the output of the Institute for Security Studies and the South 
African Institute for Race Relations, two ‘think tanks’ often cited as expert sources in both the 
national and international media. Besides providing a survey of the literature on the 2010 World Cup 
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security measures, this will be used to show how the discursive framework for security is influenced 
and shaped by political and ideological structures, systems and assumptions. In conclusion, I will 
argue that the 2010 World Cup security measures demand a greater level of academic scrutiny and, 
with this in mind, I will formulate a research question which aims to establish a framework for 
addressing this discrepancy. The chapter is primarily based on journal articles, research monographs, 
conference proceedings and a statement made to the media, and is informed by secondary literature 
from political philosophy, urban theory, international relations and history.  
Security as Power 
Securitisation  
Traditionally, academic studies on security have largely been motivated by a set of materialist and 
instrumentalist assumptions: namely, that ‘security’ refers to already existing phenomena and that the 
role of research is to identify manners in which governments and other authorities can better control 
and combat risks (Edjus, 2009). By contrast, the securitisation model associated with the Copenhagen 
School of international relations theory focuses on security as a ‘speech act’, in which actors 
transform a particular issue into a security matter (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). Such a model 
can elucidate how a securitising agent (for example, the South African government) defines an object 
or event as being threatened (the 2010 World Cup) with the purpose of convincing an audience (the 
South African public) that an issue needs to be regarded as a security concern. The securitisation of an 
issue does not necessarily entail a state of crisis or widespread threats to public safety. For example, 
the state may securitise issues which only effect very limited groups, such as in the efforts to police 
copyrights and trademark violations. Thus, security becomes ‘a self-referential practice, because it is 
in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential 
threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 
24).  
It is also important to point out that while the term securitisation is often used as a synonym for 
militarisation, in its original iteration it was a term meant to denote a ‘nominalist signification’ 
(Bernhard and Martin, 2011: 44). Daniel Bernhard and Aaron Martin argue that securitisation goes 
beyond physical and governmental signifiers, such as the militarisation of urban areas, and into the 
complex interactions that determine how ‘threats’ are turned into security matters. They suggest that 
‘we must look to perceived threats, representations of danger, the thing declared endangered, and the 
societal consensus that allows governments to take exceptional measures and emergency action’ (43-
44).  
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Crucially, in ‘saying security’ or performing the action of securitisation, issues are presented as an 
existential threat to the state as well as the established social order. In practice, however, this often 
amounts to the declaration of emergency conditions in order to claim the right to take any available 
means necessary to control or block an emergent threat. The ‘security move’ is used to frame an issue 
‘either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’, with the concomitant effect of presenting the 
risk as beyond debate or discussion (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998:23). The importance of 
emergency measures to securitisation overlaps with Giorgio Agamben’s (2005) work on ‘exception’, 
in which the suspension of established legal, political and social checks on state power are legitimated 
by reference to their supposedly temporary and conditional nature. Once established, however, these 
‘emergency’ powers become normalised as everyday techniques of governance. As security works to 
redraw and redefine the boundaries of power and to shift the upper limit of what is permissible, 
politics can then be seen to ‘work towards the production of emergencies’ (Agamben, 2001). The 
securitisation of an issue does not necessarily mean that the state will push past established political 
and legal thresholds; rather, the discourse created around a security issue means that enough 
resonance is created for such emergency measures to be presented as a possible and justified response 
(Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998: 5).  
Positioning security in these terms allows for a move from an instrumentalist conception of security – 
in which the role of academics and theorists is to critique the actions of securitising agents in order to 
offer advice for more ‘effective’ future policing and military actions – towards a more constructivist 
approach which argues that security is not an objective area of analysis or development. Security can 
be reframed as a set of critical questions: which power relations determine how certain issues are 
securitised, and which actors benefit from this level of securitisation? Such questions become all the 
more pertinent when we consider the extent to which security serves as a legitimating factor in the 
power of a range of interlinked social actors.  
Two aspects in particular demand attention. Firstly, critical studies of security have moved away from 
the state-centric focus of the Cold War towards a more multi-faceted understanding of the diffuse 
alliances and convergences between the state and the private sector. For example, Peter Gill (2006) 
has traced the contours of ‘global security networks’ which intersect across local, national and 
transnational scales. These networks link the state, the corporate sector and communitarian actors 
(such as NGOs) who perform a range of security functions in the contexts of both military actions and 
civilian policing (30). The ‘broadening’ of security governance is ‘deepened’ by transnational security 
developments, which can have an immediate impact on the national scale (ibid). For example, the 
‘global war on terror’ has had a profound effect on security doctrines and practices internationally, 
which began almost immediately after the events of September 11th 2001. The globally interlinked 
nature of security has also been accelerated by the creation of what the Organisation for Economic 
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Cooperation and Development (OCED) (2004) calls the ‘new security economy’, as risk prevention 
services become an increasingly prominent motor for economic development. The role of the private 
sector has sparked considerable controversy due to the extent to which security is linked to private 
profit.  
However, Marcelo Lopes de Souza (2011) has argued for a more expansive definition of the ‘industry 
of fear’ by linking this industry to three key actors: 
a) Political and government groupings such as state security services, the legal system and political 
parties;  
b) The security industry, which Souza defines as including everything from the manufacturers of 
surveillance equipment to spatial constructs such as gated communities; 
c) The mass media, which circulate official security discourse and often rely on sensationalist 
reporting of risk to increase circulation. 
Security is a saleable and lucrative product and increasingly intersects the nation state with 
transnational bodies and private institutions. In addition, the manner in which aspects and elements of 
social life are treated as security concerns also has a psychological aspect, as the combined ‘industry 
of fear’ responds to political and economic anxieties and pathologies.  
The production of security  
The sheer scope of actors involved in ‘delivering’ security leads to a second key point: securitisation 
measures do not arise sui generis in reaction to objective, given phenomena but are rather identified 
and shaped by institutions and organisations. This is underpinned by the creation of knowledge, as 
actors attempt to capture public opinion and popularise security agendas. In a critique of ‘think tanks’, 
Peter Vale and Jonathan Carter (2008) argue that such institutions aim to market knowledge through 
framing social issues as security ‘problems’. Such institutions gain a great deal of traction in the 
media by offering slickly packaged ‘technical’ advice to explain complex issues, from rising crime 
rates to geopolitical conflict. However, this ‘expert’ advice often conceals ideological bias as well as 
widespread support from networks of donors and foundations eager to shift the discursive terrain of 
security in their favour. Vale and Carter contrast the proselytising of the self-interested forms of 
knowledge produced by think tanks with the ‘serious scholarship’ of ‘mainstream academic work’, 
suggesting that the public is not readily able to draw distinctions between the work produced by for- 
profit think tanks and that created by universities 
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But neither is the position of ‘mainstream’ academia unassailable. In his essay Objectivity and Liberal 
Scholarship, Noam Chomsky (1969) famously argues that the academic intelligentsia is just as often 
driven by political and ideological motives, citing the justifications used by scholars for US military 
interventions as evidence. Rather than critically and objectively studying government policy, 
academics may use specialist knowledge to legitimate autocratic rule, which is further entrenched in 
some cases by academic proximity to governments and foreign and public policy making. In 
particular, Chomsky suggests that a fear of direct democracy and public control over decision making 
is shared by elites, on both the right and the left, who may otherwise appear actively oppositional 
towards each other. In this sense, ‘security’ provides an umbrella under which competing elites can 
cohere as similar authoritarian dispositions are folded into otherwise very different ideologies and 
belief systems. Chomsky cites historical cases such as the Spanish Revolution – where liberal, 
conservative and Stalinist intellectuals all denigrated and impugned the centrality of the anarchist 
movement – as an example of this type of convergence. 
A more contemporary example can be located in the ‘war on terror’, in which the security measures 
justified by an ‘existential threat’ have been adopted by governments the world over and reinforced  
by elements of the media and academia who, in other cases, may appear to share little common 
ground on other political and economic issues. By adapting William Connolly’s (2005) model of 
‘resonance machines’, it can be suggested that the sharing of security agendas by different actors 
works to sustain and amplify a powerful assemblage of opinion. The continual re-articulation of 
opinion creates a powerful bulwark to augment official security narratives in serving to present these 
discourses as existing independently of social and political construction. The presentation of security 
as an arcane knowledge base that is interpreted and relayed by experts and pundits also performs a 
powerful control function in delimiting public discourse.  
Terrorism as existential threat 
As the securitisation thesis highlights, the declaration of emergency is used to present ‘existential 
risks’ as outside of political causality and understanding. Once again, terrorism provides an example: 
the post-9/11 panic around terrorism has ensured that commentators who write about the phenomenon 
with ‘anything less than total horror and condemnation’ may find themselves attacked as ‘conspiracy 
theorists’ or guilty of ‘moral equivalence’ (Carr, interviewed by Barrett, 2007). But as with ‘security’, 
terrorism is a fluid and often contentious concept. As Matt Carr (2007) argues in his exhaustive 
history of terrorism, the political violence used by small groups is often overshadowed by the extreme 
overreactions of governments. The official portrayal of international networks  of terror cells 
continually working to destroy civilisation, which stretches back to panics about a ‘black 
international’ of nihilist and anarchist  bombers in the late 19th century, has historically been adopted 
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by the state to increase repression, to delegitimise oppositional forces and in some cases to disguise 
official complicity in political violence.  
Since the events of 9/11, the war on terror (or more specifically, the ‘war’ on Islamic extremism) has 
become the premier existential threat of our age within global political rhetoric. Politicians and 
commentators often discuss terrorism as a static concept in which a single entity such as al-Qaeda 
controls an international network of violence. But Jason Burke (2007:13) argues that the phenomenon 
of al-Qaeda is actually fluid and protean, as it refers both to a factitious coalition of competing radical 
Islamist groups and to a particular world view and set of methods within the ‘most extreme end of 
Islamic militancy’. However, the official portrait of a linked international conspiracy has been used by 
governments to garner international support for internal repression through claiming that their 
opponents are linked to al-Qaeda (15). The securitisation of ‘terror’ transcribes specific acts of 
violence into a cosmic narrative of menace in which often unrelated phenomena are woven together. 
Political violence in Chechnya, Israel, Columbia and Sri Lanka are presented as flashpoints in a 
continuous global battlefield. Although this violence is, in reality, bounded by specific historical and 
social contexts, the idea of a transnational menace to civilisation allows security actors to package 
their own agendas into a global security narrative. The apparently boundless nature of terrorism also 
legitimates threat assessments which are grounded in speculation and imagination (Furedi, 2007).  
 
Official claims that security must be used to protect against unknowable future threats serves to 
underline and reinforce narratives of fear by communicating the signal that exceptional measures are 
required to deal with ‘serious’ yet speculative dangers (Lipschutz, 1999: 11). This often results in a 
flattening of ‘all violent challenges to established states into one-dimensional condemnation of 
insurgencies against the “civilised” norm’ which ‘are pathologised, ripped from context or reason’ 
(Smith, 2005: 159). In turn, this is used to justify exceptional measures and to pre-empt criticism by 
placing the burden of proof on accounts which challenge official narratives. The concept of security 
may therefore serve a vital role in the maintenance of political and economic power relations. 
Security as social conflict  
Increasingly, this politically constructed understanding has led critical scholars to question the idea of 
security as a discrete entity which can be separated from other aspects of state power and governance. 
For instance, Mariana Valverde (2011) has argued that even literature which is highly critical of the 
repressive uses of security has treated the concept as a singular, if polysemic entity. As a result 
projects which seek to ensure security are often unstable and contradictory. For example, the 
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increased use of home security technology creates insecurity in other areas as criminals move their 
activities to less guarded targets. As a result, different kinds of security are visible in different 
temporal and spatial scales and these projects may actively work against each other. In turn, Valverde 
(5) argues that ‘all we can know about security is what people do in its name’ and that research should 
focus on the practises of governance which are used to ensure security in different contexts.   
In an on-going series of works, Mark Neocleous (2000, 2006, 2007, 2011) has developed a critique of 
the very concept of security. Neocleous argues that ‘security’ is not a composite term to describe a 
universal human need for protection from risk and danger but is rather a political technology central 
to the construction of both the modern state and capitalism. Liberal political philosophy has often 
presented a dichotomy between liberty and security, as evidenced by contemporary debates about how 
much civil liberty society should be prepared to sacrifice to attain security in the context of the war on 
terror (Neocleous, 2007). Neocleous suggests that rather than being in conflict, security and the liberal 
idea of freedom are two sides of the same coin. Liberty (in the sense of higher production, 
maximisation of profits and the creation of new opportunities for accumulation) is reliant on security 
(in the sense of maximising state control, communications and surveillance). Security performs linked 
functions as it works both to reorder society and to contain the inherent insecurity created by the ever 
changing nature of capitalist production and accumulation (Berman, 1983). From this standpoint, 
‘police power’ is a mechanism for securing class society (Neocleous, 2000). As a result, liberal 
thinkers have often readily accepted the necessity of absolutist power to ensure both the order and the 
social subjectivity of capitalist society.   
To develop this radical claim, Neocleous argues that the central thread of security since the beginning 
of European colonialism in the 15th century has been ‘pacification’ (Neocleous, 2011). Although 
drawn from the terminology of US military planners during the Vietnam War, Neocleous deploys it as 
a euphemised term that includes the brute force of the colonial wars, which accumulated the resource 
base for the emergence of capitalism, modern military interventions and the violent suppression of 
domestic dissent. However, other forms of more subtle coercion are as important to the maintenance 
of capitalist order, particularly policies which attempt to enforce self-regulation, such as in social 
security and welfare programmes which attempt to instil thrift and ‘self-reliance’. In practical 
application, security straddles the boundaries between the domestic and the international as warfare 
abroad becomes linked to the maintenance of order at home, as can be seen in the extension of 
internal police powers legitimated by current ‘wars’ on drugs and crime. These become wars where 
the real battleground is everyday life, in which on-going ‘pacification security jobs’ (2011: 203) are 
the mechanism for the reproduction of social order. These interlinked security measures – which 
attempt to maintain order across a range of scales and contexts – suggest that security politics is itself 
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underpinned by structural violence, both overt and inconspicuous, which is central to the maintenance 
of class society. Security both enforces and orders political and economic power relations.  
In doing so, it may expose these power relations as well as the ideas, beliefs and anxieties which 
underlie them. At the urban scale, for example, Francesc Muñoz (cited in Marcuse, 2007) argues that 
security becomes: 
… a strategy for making visible, through security infrastructure and regulations, which spaces 
of the city are more valuable and which other spaces are less important or appreciable. In 
other words, which spaces are economically successful and deserve to be inhabited, visited, 
consumed and remarked on the city map.  
At the same time, the intensity and ferocity with which such containment measures are applied also 
highlights the role of security as a reaction to popular resistance and struggle. In other words, this is 
not simply a top-down imposition of control but rather an on-going civil war played out through a 
range of linked operational theatres (Neocleous, 2011). As Peter Hallward (2010:130) argues: ‘ever 
since the revolutionary upheavals in late eighteen-century France and Haiti, the history of the modern 
world has been shaped above all by the determination of our ruling classes to pacify the people they 
rule’. Securitisation reveals profound anxieties on the part of elites as efforts to exert greater control 
over social order correspond with the pre-emption of political upheaval.  
Using the rubric of class power, Neocleous argues that the conception of security as a transcendent 
goal mystifies the social processes which create instability and fear. For example, ‘environmental 
security’ obscures the role of the capitalist system in creating environmental degradation (Neocleous, 
2000). Securitisation is inherently depoliticising in the way it frames issues in terms of ‘risk’ and 
‘countermeasures’ and shifts discourse away from the political and economic roots of threat and 
crisis. The ring-fencing of an issue as ‘beyond’ or ‘above’ politics may then be used as a tool to create 
political docility (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). From this standpoint, Neocleous (2000) 
suggests that recent academic attempts to replace the dominant paradigms of national security with a 
more representative framework of ‘human security’ replicate many of the authoritarian discourses 
which they attempt to supplant, and he maintains that critical scholarship should aim to repoliticise 
issues which have been securitised. This, in turn, accords with the emerging critique of ‘police 
fetishism’ in critical criminology, which positions security services as a constituent part of societal 
violence rather than as purely ameliorating institutions (Reiner, 2007). 
The pacification model provides a useful point of departure for further research. As Neocleous ( 2011: 
192 ) argues, distinct conceptual appropriations of security within different disciplines often leads to a 
theoretical log-jam, as seen in the ‘range of work which starts with crime-fighting and war-fighting as 
distinct processes – that is, the “criminological model” and the “military model” – and then struggles 
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to work out how they might be connected’ . In other words, scholars sense that phenomena such as the 
militarisation of urban space, the privatisation of security, penal forms of social welfare and 
regulation, the increased use of surveillance systems and the expansion of punitive state powers at the 
domestic scale are linked to global processes but have struggled to articulate the exact connections.  
Academic Responses to the 2010 World Cup  
I will leave these points in the background for the time being, turning instead to a representative case 
study of how the security measures for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa were interpreted, 
discussed and criticised by  private security ‘specialists’ and within academic literature and the 
research output of security think tanks. 
In May 2004 Nick Buckles, CE of Group 4 Securicor (G4S), claimed that his company refused to 
work at the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup on the basis of concerns about the tournament’s 
organisation (Bowker, 2009). Buckles said that his company considered South Africa as the most 
dangerous country for its employees to work in, ahead of war zones in Afghanistan and Iraq: 
South Africa … is a tough, tough place to do business. The whole society is different from 
anywhere else in the world. We do what we can in terms of protecting the crew, but they get 
attacked by 16, 17 people at a time sometimes. That’s just the kind of culture they have there 
… people don’t really think that security is that key and it should be. It will get better … it’s 
about educating the market.  
Buckles’s dramatic claims were quickly picked up by the international media, which, in the lead-up to 
the first football World Cup held on African soil, circulated stories of South Africa as both exotic and 
dangerous (Hammett, 2011). This fearful portrayal was immediately denied by representatives of the 
South African government and the Local Organising Committee (LOC), who suggested that G4S’s 
position was motivated by hidden interests. Indeed, G4S’s ‘refusal’ to work in the 2010 World Cup 
may not have been a matter of choice. In 2007, trade unions around the world called for a protest 
against the company due to its labour practices in Africa. According to reports, their transgressions 
included the disregard of labour laws, abusive and unsafe conditions for employees and the refusal to 
recognise worker organisations (Alliance for Justice at Group 4 Securicor, 2007). As a result of this, 
unions called for the LOC to boycott the G4S bid to provide stadium security during the 2010 World 
Cup, with the contract eventually being granted to Stallion Security, a South African-based firm 
(Bhoola, 2009). Nevertheless, G4S has been successful in winning a 100 million pound contract to 
provide guards for the 2012 London Olympics (Gibson and Taylor, 2011). However, Southern Africa 
is not the only region in which the company has been followed by controversy. As a result of the 
companies close links to government figures, G4S was awarded lucrative contracts for the detention 
and deportation of asylum seekers and ‘terror suspects’ by the UK government. Their tenure was 
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characterised by the hiring of inexperienced prison guards, the brutal handling of suspects, losing 
defendants during transfer to trial, the falsification of records about suspect movements and the failure 
to monitor individuals they were contracted to keep under surveillance (Hughes, 2007: 25-37). More 
recently, the company acquired further unwanted publicity as a result of the death of Angolan 
deportee Jimmy Mubenga while in custody, which G4S whistle-blowers attribute to a ‘macho 
corporate culture that ostracised staff who showed compassion towards detainees or questioned the 
safety of their treatment’ (Lewis and Taylor, 2011). Despite such ‘shortcomings’, G4S is a private 
security behemoth, which is the second biggest private employer in the world and the largest in Africa 
(Careers in Africa, 2011). This incident highlights how the concept of security can be used, and 
distorted, to pursue economic or political strategies. But while this would appear to provide space for 
critical research which dissected and exposed the political and economic forces behind the 
securitisation of the tournament, this was not to be the case.  
Critical perspectives on the 2010 World Cup  
Much analysis and discussion has been done on the political and economic underpinnings of other 
aspects of the 2010 World Cup preparations. Since the tournament was awarded to South Africa in 
2004 (after a failed bid in 2000), the government maintained that the World Cup would be a seminal 
event for both the country and for the African continent. More pertinently, it was claimed that the 
tournament would leverage major developmental and economic opportunities for host cities. In 
addition, the 2010 World Cup was pictured as a symbolic victory for Africa. As former president 
Thabo Mbeki (cited in Desai and Vahed, 2010: 154) wrote in 2003: 
This is not a dream. It is a practical policy … the successful hosting of the FIFA World 
Cup™ in Africa will provide a powerful, irresistible momentum to [the] African renaissance. 
… We want, on behalf of our continent, to stage an event that will send ripples of confidence 
from the Cape to Cairo – an event that will create social and economic opportunities 
throughout Africa. We want to ensure that one day, historians will reflect upon the 2010 
World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and resolutely turned the tide on centuries of 
poverty and conflict. We want to show that Africa’s time has come.   
Such claims inspired a range of critical interventions which discussed the socio-economic impacts of 
the event. In the edited volume Development and Dreams: The Urban Legacy of the 2010 Football 
World Cup (Pillay, Tomlinson and Bass, 2009) – the only academic collection to focus exclusively on 
the tournament prior to 2010 – three main viewpoints emerged on the legacy offered by the event). As 
with other mega-events around the world, it was argued that direct contributions of the tournament to 
economic development were overstated. In particular, serious doubts were expressed about the long-
term sustainability of the stadiums built or upgraded for the 2010 World Cup. Secondly, however, it 
was suggested that government spending on transport and communication ahead of the tournament 
could create economic benefits for the host cities. Finally, despite the questionable claims made about 
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the financial opportunities, the intangible legacy offered by the 2010 World Cup offered an 
opportunity to reduce ‘afro-pessimism’ and to improve South Africa’s global standing: ‘the measure 
of success will lie not only in being able to manage the 2010 World Cup to world class standards, but 
also in the ability to assert and embrace a contemporary African culture and identity both at home and 
on a global stage’ (15). 
However, as Du Plessis and Maennig (2009) note in the same volume, the flow of benefits associated 
with a World Cup are overwhelmingly determined by the contracts which host nations sign with 
FIFA. This means, in effect, that public money was being used to finance a private project. The role 
of FIFA in determining the nature of 2010 World Cup preparations is highlighted in the book by a 
telling incident in 2007, where the organisation claimed that as a result of delayed ‘construction times 
due to strikes’, cities which had not finished stadiums by ‘required deadlines’ would not be included 
in the event (Davies, 2009: 37). While Development and Dreams acknowledges the hyperbole which 
accompanied government claims about the benefits of hosting, the political significance of FIFA’s 
ability to continually extract concessions from the South African state is never fully explored. Indeed, 
the dichotomy between the public expenditure and the profits posted by FIFA is assumed as an 
inevitable component of mega-events. This raises the question of whether the failure of the 2010 
World Cup to deliver on many of the initially stated benefits was not so much a matter of missed 
opportunities as it was an outcome predetermined by the underlying ownership structure of the event.  
A range of other work has focused on this relationship and argued that the 2010 World Cup was a 
characteristically neoliberal project in which sport and non-sport related corporate actors are able to 
determine the trajectory of public policy. For example, Scarlett Cornelissen (2010) argues that the 
lack of economic benefits for South Africa was predetermined by the proprietary structure of the 
FIFA World Cup. The political and economic structures of international sport mean that it is difficult 
for national authorities to negotiate developmental gains. Brij Maharaj (2011) argues that the 
corporate domination of mega-events prevents any direct government intervention that could 
potentially restructure tournaments to provide wider societal benefits. In the case of South Africa, he 
suggests that FIFA was subliminally presented as a philanthropic organisation, which disguised the 
fact that socio-economic benefits for the majority of South Africans were deliberately exaggerated 
(see also Du Plessis and Maennig, 2010). This is echoed by labour expert Eddie Cottle (2010:12), who 
argued that FIFA’s ‘sport exploitation complex’ results in the misuse of public resources and the 
mistreatment of stadium construction workers. In the case of South Africa, benefits were ‘greatly 
exaggerated to legitimise a major rip-off and profiteering by FIFA, its corporate partners and local 
monopoly capitalists’ in particular the construction industry (ibid).  
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As a result, it has been argued that South Africa incurred a substantial loss from hosting the 
tournament and that the exertion of more control over hosting arrangements could have leveraged far 
more direct economic benefits for the state (Sylvester and Harju, 2010). Significantly, all these works 
portray the South African state as being controlled or directed by FIFA and its corporate partners, 
rather than an autonomous participant in the planning and implementation of the 2010 World Cup.  
The apparently skewed nature of the 2010 World Cup hosting agreements also inspired several 
polemical accounts, in which FIFA was presented as an essentially criminal organisation which used 
the government as a vessel for exploitation. Ashwin Desai and Goolam Vahed (2010: 163) claimed 
that the LOC and the ANC-led government had been steamrolled by the combined power of FIFA and 
an alliance of local ‘old white capital and the new politically connected black elite who have joined 
hands in securing lucrative contracts’ and that the state’s opportunity to challenge the unequal power 
relations of international football had been missed. Putting it more bluntly, Patrick Bond (2010) 
claimed that FIFA were ‘tsotsis’, a colloquial South African term for a criminal or street thug.  
By contrast, political commentator Andile Mngxitama (2010:2) argued that the 2010 World Cup was 
the high-water mark of a neo-colonial transition in which ‘1994 was a mere change of the drivers of 
the same state system that was designed to serve a white minority settler population’ and where the 
apparent submission of the state to FIFA and its partners is  a pragmatic ‘ritual’ that is necessary for 
an elite project of ‘acceptance’ into the ‘white world’ of geopolitical and economic power . Following 
this, ‘the ANC government, FIFA, our local media, the commentators, academics, and even our own 
artists ganged up against the people to produce the most elaborate dispossession in modern times’ 
(ibid).  
Critical scholarship has dissected much of the official rhetoric around the 2010 World Cup and 
concluded that many of the stated benefits were used as a sheath for a project of corporate 
accumulation. However, this literature has paid little attention to the safety and security measures. 
Although the advertising restrictions enforced as a component of the security measures have been 
cited as an example of FIFA’s overweening influence over the state (Bond, 2010), even accounts that 
maintained a pronounced scepticism about the developmental impacts of the 2010 World Cup have 
presented security as one of the few tangible achievements of the tournament (Cottle, 2010: 6).  
Research on security measures  
By contrast, direct research on the security measures took an almost entirely descriptive and non-
analytical approach towards the unprecedented police and military mobilisation. While studies of the 
socio-economic impacts of the 2010 World Cup focused on the question of which power groups 
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benefited from the event, the literature addressing security measures pivoted around how the 
government could secure the event and whether this could make South Africa safer in the future. 
While there were critical voices around the negative socio-economic impact of the 2010 World Cup, 
the established mainstream of academic security research failed to provide a deeper analysis of the 
causes of mega-event securitisation.  
In the build-up to the tournament, research focused on how the South African government could best 
implement security measures to allay the fears of tourists and change the international perception of 
the country as crime-ridden. Ronnie Donaldson and Sanette Ferreira (2007:368) argued that surveys 
of foreign tourists found that they generally possessed negative impressions of crime in South Africa 
prior to visiting the country but, by the end of their visits, their perceptions had grown more positive. 
Through ‘merging’ safe and secure environments with tourism and leisure spaces, government could 
capitalise on the economic opportunities offered by tourism (ibid). It was imperative that security was 
ensured throughout the country during the event in order to create a ‘platform for a complete 
transformation of the tourism industry, if dealt with effectively’ (369). 
Writing in 2009, Andre Horn and Gregory Breetzke (21) speculated that, while impressive in scope, 
the ‘iron fist’ security measures that were then in the planning stages had to be constrained by 
considerations of international branding, as an overly militarised approach may ‘spoil the fun of the 
tournament for football fanatics and team supporters’. Focusing on the area around the Loftus 
Versveld stadium in the Tshwane metropolitan municipality, they contended that police measures 
could be improved by a more localised focus on crime prevention around stadiums rather than the 
replication of national plans in all host cities. Towards the end of their paper (31), an intriguing 
speculative point is raised: ‘the crime security plan for the tournament is merely a “strong arm” 
tactical plan following the iron fist approach of the existing National Crime Combating Strategy. Is 
such a police-state approach sustainable after 2010 and is it befitting a democratic society?’. This is 
presented as a uniquely South African problem due to a perceived inability of the state to formulate an 
effective crime fighting strategy. However, this significant question about the possibly negative 
implications of the security measures is not developed further in the paper. Instead, the 2010 World 
Cup is assumed to be a pivotal opportunity for South Africa. The primary focus for Horn and 
Breetzke is the extent to which organisers had incorporated specific locational and spatial knowledge 
into planning in order to create the conditions for the ‘best’ World Cup ever.  
The negative portrayals of South Africa which circulated through the international media and 
questioned the country’s ability to host a secure World Cup also inspired research which aimed at 
proving the efficacy of government security measures. The South African branch of the Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation (2010) – a research group associated with the German Left Party – aimed to 
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combat perceived stereotyping by producing a research document highlighting the level of 
preparations. Citing government and think tank information, the report suggests that despite high 
crime rates, tourists have historically been insulated from violence when in South Africa. It does, 
however, raise the speculative possibility of violence aimed at capitalising on the media attention 
created by the 2010 World Cup: 
[although] terrorism is a remote and almost unreal threat [for most South Africans] … 
terrorism as a potential menace to the World Cup could be vastly underestimated. According 
to studies, both criminals and terrorists could use the symbolic value of the event to attract or 
achieve their goals by either carrying out direct attacks, targeting citizens of specific nations 
(USA and the UK and Denmark and the Netherlands), or setting their sights on less popular 
venues such as Rustenburg or Nelspruit (3). 
The report concludes on an optimistic note by suggesting that many of the security concerns 
expressed by the media were exaggerated. As a guide to further reading, the report suggests 
information from two primary sources: the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the South African 
Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR). These two institutions both produced a substantial amount of 
literature on the security measures for the 2010 World Cup. In particular, the media traction held by 
both the ISS and SAIRR meant that their representatives were continually cited in media reports on 
the 2010 World Cup security measures. Due to their prominence in publicly disseminating, criticising 
and interpreting policing preparations to the public, their output demands a specific focus.  
The ISS and the 2010 World Cup  
The ISS is an applied policy research institute with offices throughout Africa. Its self-proclaimed 
mission (ISS, n.d) is to influence ‘decision makers’ through ‘providing timely, empirical research and 
contextual analysis of relevant human security issues to policy makers, area specialists, advocacy 
groups, and the media’. The ISS produces a formidable output of books, monographs, reports and 
magazines covering the entire range of security issues in Africa. Notably, its personnel are often asked 
to comment on security concerns in the South African media. The ISS is registered as a non-profit 
trust, and its funding partners (as of 2009) include the European Union, the governments of China and 
Japan, and the United Nations (ISS, 2009). The ISS was founded by ex-members of the former South 
African Defence Force (SADF) in the early 1990s: originally called the Institute for Defence Policy, it 
changed to its current name in 1996 (Cilliers, 2009).  
The ISS maintains strong institutional links to the South African security services, and their 
conferences on security in South Africa are often attended by high ranking police and military 
officials. As a result, the ISS is often privy to insider information which is not available from other 
sources. For example, in the period before the 2010 World Cup, its 2007 ‘Policing in South Africa 
Conference’ saw detailed presentations on operational planning and strategy by SAPS officials, while 
15 
 
a follow-up conference in 2010 was addressed by the Minister of Police Nathi Mthethwa and the 
Deputy National Commissioner of the South African Police Service (SAPS), Andre Pruis. This level 
of access also entailed that ISS researchers were able to detail many of the problems accompanying 
security planning. While the government and the LOC would publicly claim that their coordination on 
security was seamless and that all role-players were totally committed to success, one ISS monograph 
(Omar, 2007: 66) recorded that the original liaison committee between the security services and the 
LOC’s security directorate ‘fell away’ due to officials not attending meetings and a lack of follow-up 
on agreements. This candid admission was communicated directly by the South African Football 
Association’s (SAFA) national head of safety and security. 
As early as 2006, the ISS held a seminar on safety and security during the 2010 World Cup, which 
was addressed by the divisional commander of the SAPS’s operational response services (ISS, 2006). 
Johan Burger (2007) – an ISS researcher and former assistant commissioner in the SAPS – argued 
that the 2010 World Cup was a ‘golden goal’ for South Africa. While confident that the security 
services would be successful in light of their past record of deployment around events such as the 
2003 Cricket World Cup, he warned that internal restructuring within the SAPS ‘should not be 
allowed in any way to impair the ability of the police to perform according to their proven ability’ (6). 
In a follow-up seminar, Burger and fellow researcher Bilkis Omar (2009: 9) concluded that while 
there was some concern about the capacity of the SAPS to deal with crime as well as ‘the protests, 
strikes and the xenophobic violence which breaks out from time to time’, the planning and success of 
security services during the 2009 Confederations Cup boded well for the following year. Burger was 
cited as an expert on World Cup security by major international media outlets such as the BBC 
(2010a), where he maintained that the ‘impressive’ policing measures put in place would, for the most 
part, contain criminal violence within specific, poor ‘social context[s]’.  
In 2007, the ISS organised a conference on key issues in South African policing ahead of the 2010 
World Cup with the full participation of the SAPS, including presentations by international and 
national police officials. Superintendent Helmut Bayerl (2007) of the Munich Police addressed the 
audience on the security experience of the 2006 World Cup in Germany. In particular (9), he claimed 
that security preparations and exercises which tested ‘the limits of feasibility’ prior to the event 
ensured the success of the coordinated police and military measures. These policing measures focused 
on crime, hooliganism and terrorism. Notably, this included pre-emptive surveillance on ‘persons 
classified as dangerous in terms of Islamic extremism/terrorism’ (10). According to the presentation 
given by SAPS director Frans Gibson (2007:11), the government had already compiled an operational 
plan ‘based on FIFA’s standards’ and were determined to use security to ‘change the image of the 
country’ .  
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ISS researchers also produced specialist studies on South Africa’s vulnerability to terrorism. In an 
online article Anneli Botha (2010) claimed it was prudent to ‘rather overestimate than underestimate’ 
the threat of terrorism, as attackers often target ‘the event and not the country’. Botha speculated that 
ethnic communities within South African society could become an internal breeding ground for 
terrorist organisations, such as Tamil communities sympathetic to violent separatist groups in Sri 
Lanka or Afrikaners who support white supremacist groups. Specifically, she expressed ‘concerns’ 
about South Africa’s Muslim community and suggested that ‘pro-Palestinian’ sentiment ‘could be 
exploited by extremists’. In addition, South Africa’s ‘soft stance’ on counter-terrorism and its 
commitment to ‘principles associated with a liberal democracy’ raises the possibility that ‘sleeper 
cells’ have identified the country as an easy target. Botha suggests that people with close relationships 
to ‘potential suspects’ should attempt to identify tell-tale signs of terrorism, which include ‘isolation 
and detachment from friends and family members … sudden change[s] in behaviour’ and ‘irritability’. 
Spectators at venues are urged to notice suspicious individuals exhibiting ‘nervous behaviour’ and 
wearing ‘excessive clothing’. While Botha presents her piece as a pragmatic, albeit speculative, guide 
to potential risk, it reveals the racism and paranoia that often accompanies the discourse of counter-
terrorism. Entire groups, and in particular South African Muslims, are presented as a potential enemy 
within. The unexamined assertion that ‘pro-Palestinian’ sentiment is some form of precursor to 
supporting al-Qaeda reflects how the war on terror has been used to delegitimise certain political 
struggles. In this case, armed Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation is falsely conflated with 
an apparent ‘pan-Islamic’ conspiracy to ‘impose a Taliban style theocracy on the Western World’ 
(Carr, 2007:320). Botha also recycles the claim that civil liberties may undermine counter-terrorism 
methods. These suppositions are based on admitted over-estimation, using unsubstantiated claims 
legitimated through an appeal to expert knowledge.  
However, other ISS research alluded to the gap between fear and reality which accompanies 
securitisation, and how this ambiguity can be exploited by particular interests groups. Chandre Gould 
and Marlise Richter (2010) argued that the several anti-sex trafficking campaigns which had started 
ahead of the 2010 World Cup were based on an exaggerated projection of risk. In the case of the 2006 
German World Cup, the media claimed that 40,000 women and children would be trafficked into the 
country for the event, but researchers were able to find evidence of only 5 actual cases of trafficking. 
Similar claims were cut and pasted into the South African context with the ‘STOP 2010 Human 
Trafficking Campaign’, whose glossy internet advertising claimed that 100,000 people would fall 
victim to trafficking as a result of the tournament. Although the concerns about sex trafficking may 
have been well-intentioned, Gould and Richter argue that such inaccurate claims distort the public 
perception and discourse surrounding crime. This specific case raises a significant point about how 
security knowledge serves as a commodity, as the exaggeration of threat may be used to achieve 
legitimacy for the projects of institutional actors. If this can be applied to NGOs attempting to gain 
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attention, then it can reasonably be assumed that this also holds true for state and corporate projects. 
In particular, security ‘facts’ released by governments and the private sector should be treated with 
circumspection, as they may employ the same level of exaggeration and dissimulation to advance 
their institutional agendas. 
Towards the end of the 2010 World Cup, the ISS hosted a conference called ‘The Sum of All Fears: 
Crime, Security and the World Cup Crisis That Was (n’t)’ which featured contributions from its 
researchers and the then Deputy Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula (Spector, 2010). The researchers 
on the panel concluded that the event had been a security success but that this approach needed to be 
reconfigured into everyday policing. This corresponds with the stance taken by the ISS towards the 
2010 World Cup, as researchers aimed to contribute towards the national effort by suggesting areas of 
the security strategy which could be improved, while also offering counters to negative portrayals of 
the government’s preparations. However, as seen in Botha’s piece on terrorism, such a technocratic 
approach to security, which focuses exclusively on issues of practical implementation, may disguise 
the power structures which create security and serve instead to further justify and reinforce accepted 
political wisdom. The proximity of researchers to state institutions may also circumscribe the 
parameters of accepted discussion. 
The SAIRR and the 2010 World Cup  
While the ISS generally presents itself as an information clearing house which assists the South 
African government, the South African Institute for Race Relations has a much a more overt and 
confrontational ideological standpoint. The SAIRR describes itself as an ‘independent think-
tank…[who] seek to use a small amount of private donor money to influence the more effective 
spending of much larger amounts of public money’ (SAIRR,2011a). Unlike the ISS, it focuses 
exclusively on South Africa and produces information on the spectrum of local political and economic 
affairs: ‘We benchmark ourselves on telling our subscribers today what they will read in the media in 
two or three years’ time’. Its local donors include foundations set up by powerful business and 
industrial interests including the Anglo-American Chairman’s fund and the Oppenheimer Trust 
(SAIRR, 2011b). International funders include the US-based National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED) and one of its beneficiary organisations, the International Republican Institute (NRI). The 
NED is funded by the US Federal government and was set up by the Reagan administration to channel 
funds into influencing elections and civil society in developing countries, which was part of a 
diplomatic shift away from overtly supporting military dictatorships and client regimes (Robinson, 
1996). The NED both funds and promotes advocacy groups and political parties sympathetic to US 
political and corporate interests. The SAIRR has received funding from the NED since 1994 (Hearn, 
1999: 8). In addition, its NRI sponsor is affiliated to the Republican Party and has been accused of 
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fomenting and funding the 2004 coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Haiti 
(Blumenthal, 2004). Interestingly, for a non-profit ‘democracy advocacy’ group, the NRI spent $17 
million a year on hiring guards from the private military firm Blackwater/Academi to protect its 
employees in Iraq (Scahill, 2009). 
The SAIRR maintains a neoliberal stance on South African politics and advocates the lowering of 
corporate taxation, the reduction of the social welfare system and labour rights, the privatisation of 
state assets and the abandonment of the minimum wage (Jeffery, 2010). The SAIRR is particularly 
critical of the ANC, which in its publications is often described as corrupt, racist and incapable of 
managing a liberal democratic society. Indeed, SAIRR analysts have a tendency to describe South 
Africa as perilously close to social and economic collapse and advocate greater power for the private 
sector to avoid this dystopian scenario (Cronje, 2010a). Fundamental to this analysis is a polarisation 
between the roles attributed to the state (which is assumed to be bureaucratic and inept) and the 
corporate sector (which is presented as dynamic and self-regulating).  
This was reflected in its employees’ commentaries on the security situation ahead of the 2010 World 
Cup. According to John Kane-Berman (2006), Chief Executive of the SAIRR, the ANC has exhibited 
a callous indifference to security and it was ‘a pity that the world soccer authorities did not make a 
drastic reduction in violent crime a condition of awarding the 2010 World Cup to South Africa’. In 
another opinion piece (2007), Berman predicted that while policing measures would be successful for 
the event this would result in the ‘redeployment’ of crime elsewhere, thus adding to the impression 
‘that the safety of visitors to the country is of more concern to the authorities than the safety of South 
Africans’. Ironically, this observation seems closely connected to the left wing critique of the 2010 
World Cup as a raid on public spending. After the tournament, however, Berman (2010) praised the 
safety and security measures for ensuring ‘bobbies on the beat’ and the expeditious assessment of 
‘what might undermine the World Cup and [the] steps … taken to minimise the threats’. This success 
is not attributed so much to the South African government but to the positive ‘colonial rule’ of FIFA, 
which Berman depicts as enforcing a regime of high standards which had to be adhered to. What this 
analysis does not make clear is the extent to which FIFA’s ‘regime’ was itself dependent on state 
planning and resources. Berman echoed a comment made by controversial politician Julius Malema, 
who the SAIRR has often described as the bête noire of decency and stability in South Africa. 
Malema labelled the tournament as an ‘imperialistic activity [by] which people the people come here 
to exploit the resources of our country’ but added that this was ‘no problem’ as it highlighted South 
Africa’s capacity to host major events  (IOL, 2010a).  
In the aftermath of the January 2010 machine gun attack on a bus transporting Togo’s national 
football team by a separatist militia in Angola, in which the driver, assistant coach and team media 
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liaison were killed, deputy CEO of the SAIRR Frans Cronje (2010b) produced a widely disseminated 
piece on the threat posed to South Africa by terrorism . According to Cronje, porous and unguarded 
national borders and a ‘corrupt’ intelligence service meant that South Africa was an attractive target 
for an attack. Furthermore, the ‘strong Islamic influence’ running along the African coastal belt from 
Somalia to Cape Town ‘provides ample opportunity for the concealment of terror cells’. Cronje is 
quick to qualify that this should not be taken to imply that South African Muslims are complicit in 
terrorism and that ‘in almost every respect the factors that South Africa can control in arranging the 
World Cup appear to be well under control’. His conclusion reveals an underlying security logic in 
which the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence: 
That is not to say that such an attack will occur or that it is even likely …. But international 
terrorism is not something over which we have the capacity to exercise much control. In 
addition, one of the most effective assets that any terrorist group can possess is to convince its 
next target that they are no longer at risk. South Africans should therefore be a little less hasty 
to dismiss the risk of the World Cup being targeted and realise that the scourge of global 
terror applies to all societies and particularly under circumstances such as those pointed out 
above.   
As a result of this piece, Cronje was cited as a ‘security expert’ in media reports on terrorism and the 
2010 World Cup. For instance in May 2010, Saudi born Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani was 
detained by the Iraqi police. The Iraqi security services revealed that a note found in his house 
detailed plans for an attack on the tournament and al-Qahtani claimed that ‘We discussed the 
possibility of taking revenge for the insults of the prophet by attacking Denmark and Holland. The 
goal was to attack the Danish and the Dutch teams and their fans. If we were not able to reach the 
teams, then we’d target the fans’ (Abdul-Zahara, 2010). However, al-Qahtani also said that the plan 
had not been presented to al-Qaeda leadership, while the Iraqi police noted that no steps had been 
taken to organise for an attack. South African police officials claimed that the Iraqi authorities had not 
contacted them about any possible attack, while FIFA deferred comment to the South African security 
services. Essentially, the plans appeared to be nothing more than a wish list, and the highly fantastical 
nature of the threat undermined the credibility of an al-Qaeda-related security scare at the tournament 
(Chulov, 2010).  
Despite this, Cronje maintained that South Africa was under threat compounded by its apparent pariah 
status in the international intelligence community due to corruption, as well as former Intelligence 
Minsters Ronnie Kasril’s public criticism of Israel’s occupation of Palestine (Kirk, 2010). In 
particular it was suggested that the public displays of security readiness which were being held 
simultaneously in tournament host cities played into al-Qaeda’s hands: 
One does not fight terrorism by abseiling down buildings with machine guns and playing 
cowboys. One fights terrorism in back rooms in operations that are never made public. Once 
an attack or hostage situation is under way it is already too late. The terrorists have won. … 
20 
 
These demonstrations would be closely watched by them or other terror groups. Every 
weapon, tactic and minor movement they see in the demonstrations gives them an edge. They 
will count every stun grenade and magazine that is carried. Thanks to these childish public 
displays, any terror group knows what they are up against. 
As a security ‘expert’, Cronje’s pronouncements on the inner workings of both intelligence services 
and Al-Qaeda were relayed through the media as unassailable, objective knowledge. At the same 
time, he also claimed that terrorism is ‘not something over which we have the capacity to exercise 
much control’ (Cronje, 2010b). Indeed, in the case of the 2010 World Cup, security commentators 
used this lack of knowledge to argue for ever more radical and comprehensive government policing 
measures (Lipschutz, 1999). As a result, ‘security’ is presented as a hermetic body of knowledge 
which is interpreted for the public. More often than not, this interpretation will result in dire 
predictions of risk and arguments for greater securitisation. As the case of the SAIRR shows, 
however, this is not neutral knowledge but is conveyed through specific political and ideological 
biases. In particular the Institute’s researchers focused exclusively on the role of the state and 
presented its capacities to deliver security as being highly debatable.   
However, as Berman’s panegyric to FIFA betrays, the private sector was by no means an absent 
constituency in the construction of security during the 2010 World Cup. Instead, the ideological 
standpoint and institutional links of the SAIRR entail that the government must invariably be painted 
in a negative light, while the private sector is valorised. As can be seen in the case of Cronje’s (2010b) 
references to continental ‘terror belts’, this approach is informed by a neoconservative view of global 
security, which configures the world in terms of a fundamental struggle between the ‘West’ and 
‘Islam’. But crucially, and despite their inherent pessimism about the ANC-led government, SAIRR 
researchers cohered with the idea that the 2010 World Cup was an exceptional event which required 
the utmost level of policing. 
The post-2010 implications of security measures  
The small amount of research conducted on the security measures was also constrained by temporal 
factors. As this was produced before the tournament took place, it took on a speculative bent and often 
focused upon worst case scenarios. Furthermore, these were often partial and focused upon specific 
threats or areas of preparation. However, since the end of tournament van der Spuy (2010) and 
Cornelissen (2011) have both produced surveys which attempt to provide an overall synopsis of the 
security governance of the 2010 World Cup. Because of the difference in focus and scope, these two 
studies will be assessed in greater detail in Chapter Six of the thesis.  
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But what is clear is that the research cited above presented security as an unquestionable public good. 
This stands in stark contrast to an on-going public debate about the trajectory and consequences of 
state security and policing in post-apartheid society. Notably, the World Cup was presented as 
somehow separate from many of these developments. However, this is an omission which is not 
exclusive to academic research. In a filmmaker’s statement accompanying the release of the 
documentary The Uprising of Hangberg, which records the police violence accompanying the 
attempted eviction of the titular Western Cape community in September 2010, Aryan Kaganof and 
Dylan Valley (2011) wrote: 
The extent of the atrocities perpetrated by the police is entirely out of kilter with the “Proudly 
South African” image of the country that was displayed to the world during the recently held 
World Cup. The mask has been lifted. Naked terror is now the order of the day. This tendency 
must be stopped at all costs.  
The ‘tendency’ to which they refer shows the extent to which civil society in the post-World Cup 
period has become increasingly concerned with a perceived epidemic of police violence and state 
repression. Most notably, efforts to remilitarise the South African Police Services (SAPS) have been 
regarded as a sinister return to the systematic abuses of the recent apartheid past. For example, after 
the fatal shooting of protester Andries Tatane in Ficksburg in April 2011, the Democratic Left Front 
(DLF) (2011) – a national umbrella group for social movements – issued a statement condemning the 
‘securitisation of South African politics’. Discussing the increased influence of the security services in 
government decision making, the statement argued that:  
The DLF believes that this restructuring of the security cluster has taken place because the 
Zuma administration came to office on delivery promises that it is unwilling or unable to 
keep. They realised that protests would increase: hence the need for a cluster that is more 
effective at crushing dissent. Unless the security cluster is brought under democratic control, 
rather than the control of the ruling party or even a faction of the ruling party, the killings will 
continue, as they are not simply a result of rogue police, but an inevitable consequence of the 
securitisation of the state.  
As the documentary statement above suggests, this concern regarding a heightened climate of state 
repression due to an increasingly securocratic turn within government was often countered with the 
image of South Africa displayed during the 2010 World Cup. In particular, the SAPS aimed at 
projecting an appearance of competent but ‘hands off’ policing which stood in stark relief to the 
pictures of policing relayed to the South African public in the preceding year, most notably the 
disturbing footage of Tatane being beaten to death by crowd control officers which was shown on 
national television the same night. Tatane’s death was seen by many in civil society as the logical 
outcome of the militarisation of the police, in which crowd control methods become a lethal 
expression of state power (DLF, 2011).  
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When the size and scope of the security measures for the 2010 World Cup are taken into account, 
however, it would seem surprising that the event would be regarded in isolation from other 
developments within government’s security services. The 2010 World Cup was marked by the largest 
state security mobilisation in the post-apartheid period. Notably, in light of concerns about the 
increased militarisation of civilian policing, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
assisted the SAPS under the auspices of ‘Operation Kgwele’  [a SeSotho word for ball], which was 
the largest internal deployment of the military  in the post-apartheid period (Makwetla, 2010). 
Within a wider discussion of the state control of protest, Jane Duncan (2010a) cites the government’s 
attempts to issue an unlawful blanket ban on public protests during the 2010 World Cup as one 
example of this repressive turn. This has both national and international dimensions. At a global level, 
security measures which control protests during mega-events have become at once more sophisticated 
as well as more overtly paranoid, as states are prepared to go to extreme lengths to police the image of 
stability which dissidents are assumed to undermine (14). At a national level, Duncan (23) frames the 
‘blanket ban’ against the context of the militarisation of police, a government ‘obsession’ with 
national security and the increased power of the state security apparatus on policy making.  
Conclusion 
The approach taken by Duncan, which implies that the 2010 World Cup was implicated in a broader 
authoritarianism within the South African state, contrasts dramatically with the ‘consensus’ view on 
security traced in this chapter. Most notably, we can unpack a series of generalised assumptions which 
were evident within almost all of the literature. Firstly, there was a consensus that the 2010 World 
Cup was an exceptional event and that this required the highest level of security available to the state. 
While exception in the sense used by Agamben (2005) has generally been portrayed as leading to a 
dangerous extension of state power, in the case of South African researchers the beneficial nature of 
security measures were portrayed as a given. From this standpoint, the research on security served as 
a ‘resonance machine’ (Connolly, 2005) which amplified official justifications for both the scope and 
intensity of security measures. Even groups such as the SAIRR cohered with the belief that security 
measures could leverage both tangible and intangible benefits for South Africa. Bernhard and Martin 
(2011) suggest that this is characteristic of much of the academic response to the security operations 
at mega-events. While scholars may be highly critical about perceived abuses such as overspending or 
the use of draconian tactics, the idea that mega-events require exceptional measures is assumed as a 
fundamental, self-evident truth.  
Secondly, it was assumed that the 2010 World Cup was vulnerable to existential threats, particularly 
crime and spectacular terrorist attacks. Security is regarded as separate from context and manipulation 
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and is assumed to be applicable on all scales: global, national and local. Although the low probability 
of many of these scenarios is acknowledged, the belief that no event can ever be too safe is taken as 
axiomatic. As Lipschutz (1999:418) argues, these hypothetical tales of threat are authored by the state 
and are in turn authorised by experts and knowledge sources which are presumed to have a privileged 
insight into the veracity of risks. This in turn legitimates the extension of legal and material 
infrastructures of risk prevention.  
Thirdly, the political and economic construction of security is not explored. Most notably the role of 
FIFA and its corporate partners as institutional actors in the securitisation of World Cup is absent. For 
example, Berman (2010) refers to FIFA’s ‘colonisation’ of South Africa but does not explore the 
significant implications of such a power arrangement. Such gaps contrast with the literature on the 
socio-economic impacts of the event, which has attempted to interrogate the implications of such a 
relationship. Indeed, for the most part, the available literature has treated security as an unproblematic 
public good which is seen to transcend economic interest and political manipulation. Put more clearly, 
this ignores how securitisation is intrinsically linked to the self-interest of institutions. 
Additionally, the substantial integration of the police and military as a result of the 2010 World Cup 
security measures has, with the exception of Duncan’s piece, been treated in isolation from other 
developments within the state security apparatus. Indeed, as seen in the statement made by Kaganof 
and Valley (2011), the 2010 World Cup was contrasted with the aggressive behaviour of the SAPS in 
the period following the tournament. While Horn and Breetzke (2009) question whether such 
securitisation is befitting of a democracy, this is simply left as a point of speculation. Indeed, their 
analysis suggests that the primary danger of a militarised approach was that it may have been off-
putting to tourists rather than indicative of autocratic developments within South Africa.  
The bulk of literature focused on the procedural question of how security measures could be utilised 
after the tournament but did not explore the implications of this as a possible radicalising factor for 
state coercion and violence. Finally, much of the literature alludes to the necessity of implementing 
‘world class’ security measures, but the linkages between the South African and the global context are 
not pursued. The question of political and economic determinates of the militarisation and 
securitisation of mega-events at an international level is not raised in the available literature. Rather, 
the security measures are treated in isolation as a particular response to South Africa’s violent 
international image.  
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Research Question  
In contrast, the aim of this thesis is to examine the political and corporate structures which undergird 
the securitisation of the 2010 World Cup, and to consider the implications for the future of security in 
South Africa. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of these structures in creating the spatial and 
governance regimes utilised in South African cities during the 2010 World Cup. Attention is directed 
to the relation between security ideas, strategies and fantasies and the material implementation of 
security measures.  
The objective of this research can be expressed in the following research question: 
How was the security governance of the 2010 World Cup used to advance elite political and economic 
interests and what are the long term implications for the militarisation of policing and urban security 
in South Africa? 
The wording of this research question was chosen in order to avoid the sense that the aim of the 
research is to simply uncover security ‘networks’. Rather, the primary aim of the research is to 
examine how the security governance of major events is used to advance elite political and economic 
projects under the banner of public safety and the creation of security legacies. In particular, I will 
consider how the militarisation of urban space which accompanies mega-events is as much about 
maintaining the pristine image of the event brand and public ‘perception management’ as it is about 
responding to threats. 
In order to clarify the exact task of this research, the question can be disaggregated into a number of 
further components, which will be discussed through both primary research and secondary literature. 
a) Why did the South African government place such an emphasis upon ensuring exceptional levels 
of security as part of a project of state branding?  
b) What is the relationship between sporting bodies and their corporate partners and host 
governments? Is this relationship hierarchical or does it involve mutual collusion? 
c) How were these measures influenced and supported by transnational policing institutions and 
non-state actors, such as the private security industry? 
d) Given South Africa’s authoritarian past and current problems of police and state violence, were 
the 2010 World Cup security measures a unique phenomenon or did they entrench well-
established governmental trends? In other words, did the measures concretise and make visible 
these trends or were they truly exceptional? How was this reflected in both national and urban 
security?  
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e) What were the outcomes of security preparations during the 2010 World Cup? Did security 
measures create a safety legacy to benefit ordinary South Africans or were they a form of 
perception management which prioritised image?  
The structure of this thesis flows from these questions. Using a wide range of interdisciplinary 
literature, Chapters Two, Three, Four and Five provide a theoretical platform for the thesis and will 
establish its research methodology.  
Chapter Two discusses the growing body of critical research on the security operations at major 
sporting events. Although this work focuses upon a wide array of different host nations and cities, the 
chapter argues that it is possible to identify a set of broad themes which link these contexts. Notably, 
it will be argued that the security exception of mega-events is as much a product of elite interests as 
the result of the apolitical dissemination of security practices.  
Chapter Three will frame the securitisation of mega-events against the backdrop of transnational 
developments in urbanism. It will be argued that the fortification of the built environment and the 
securitisation of urban governance are intimately linked with efforts to create ‘world-class’ 
spectacular cities.  
Chapter Four will continue this debate and suggest that contemporary cities are marked by the 
increased diffusion of military concepts, tactics and equipment into everyday life. With specific 
reference to the South African context it will be argued that a historical legacy of military urbanism 
has been cemented and entrenched by contemporary fears about violent crime. The chapter will 
conclude by addressing the less explored issue of corporate–state crime and suggest that officially 
supported practices may be as detrimental to society as other forms of illegality. 
Chapter Five will outline the methodology of the thesis.  
Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine will focus on the 2010 World Cup and discuss and develop 
different parts of the research questions.  
Chapter Six will outline the security governance of the 2010 World Cup and will identify the different 
institutions and actors which worked through the state apparatus to police the tournament.  
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Chapter Seven will discuss how these different actors securitised the tournament in line with their 
institutional objectives. This was legitimised through the presentation of the 2010 World Cup as a 
security exception. It will be argued that this worked through an open-ended definition of security to 
which different actors could affix their aims. In turn, this went beyond issues of public safety and into 
the enforcement of commercial monopolies and social control.  
Chapter Eight deals with how the commercialisation of security measures, and in particular FIFA’s 
perceived dominance over public policy, was interpreted from within South Africa as a kind of 
‘occupation’. Working through this concept, the chapter will argue that this portrayal of hierarchical 
domination is inaccurate. In practice, FIFA and the state cohered around the idea of pacifying space to 
produce spectacular cities. Rather than being a colonial power, FIFA’s accumulation strategy was 
dependent upon the coercive powers of the state. It will be argued that an unintended side-effect of 
spectacular security was that it renders in stark relief how state security and private interests are 
increasingly indistinguishable.  
Chapter Nine deals with the militarisation of the World Cup. Using Stephen Graham’s work on 
military urbanism as a conceptual basis, it will be suggested that the governance of the tournament 
embodies the phenomenon discussed in his work. In particular, the state promoted its ability to 
enforce a technologically advanced command and control system to control the flows of people and 
capital within host cities. But the chapter will challenge the idea that this represented an enhanced 
legacy of crime prevention and will argue that the World Cup served to intensify both the 
militarisation of police and urban space.  
Finally, the conclusion of the thesis will argue that the 2010 World Cup exposed the current trajectory 
of urban governance in South Africa, which pivots around the creation of linked, fortified nodes of 
wealth and access. It will be argued that the academic focus on legacy is a conceptual dead end which 
mystifies how insecurity in South Africa is in fact linked to this fortification of privilege amidst 
inequality. As a result, events like the World Cup may actually serve to reinforce the causes of both 
urban crime and fear. The conclusion will call for an ‘anti-security’ (Neocleous, 2011) approach 
which dissects the political, social and economic causes of fear, rather than offering solutions to aid 
the war on crime. 
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Chapter Two: Emerging Critical Perspectives on Mega-Event Security 
Introduction 
In an opinion piece on the website of news broadcaster Al Jazeera, the political sportswriter Dave 
Zirin (2011) detailed some of the on-going governance measures being implemented in Brazil ahead 
of that country’s sequential hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics. 
According to the piece, this has included efforts to pacify and evict residents from favelas, the 
sprawling slums which surround Brazilian cities. Zirin describes these actions against an international 
context in which major sporting events are accompanied by dramatic changes in the host cities and 
quotes Christopher Gaffney, an academic based in Brazil who has written extensively on mega-
events:  
It’s like a free-fall into a neo-liberal paradise…. We are living in cities planned by PR firms 
and brought into existence by an authoritarian state in conjunction with their corporate 
partners. These events are giant Trojan horses that leave us shocked and awed by their ability 
to transform places and people while instilling parallel governments that use public money to 
generate private profits. Similar to a military invasion, the only way to successfully occupy 
the country with a mega-event is to bombard people with information, get rid of the 
undesirables, and launch a media campaign that turns alternative voices into anti-patriotic 
naysayers who hate sport and “progress”. 
Gaffney’s vivid description purposefully deploys military terms such as ‘shock and awe’ and 
‘bombardment’ to hint at the on-going militarisation of mega-event planning, logistics and operations. 
But in contrast to the assumed necessity of securitisation presented in the preceding chapter, this is 
presented alongside a range of antagonistic appellations. There are the concepts of ‘invasion’, of 
‘occupation’ and of ‘Trojan horses’. Notably, he alludes to the forced installation of ‘parallel 
governments’ and the pre-emption of criticism extending the parallels between mega-events and the 
political and psychological manoeuvrings of modern warfare. Finally, the image of a ‘free-fall into a 
neoliberal paradise’ echoes a larger body of critical urban geographical studies which has focused on 
the creation of spaces of consumption and consumerism, which are fortified and securitised to 
disguise and minimise the presence of inequalities (Davis and Monk eds,2007).  
This chapter will argue that Gaffney’s quote can be read as a summary of an emerging body of critical 
and interdisciplinary literature which has attempted both to dissect the political and corporate 
structures which undergird the securitisation of mega-events and the broader linkages of this process 
to the increased scholarly interest in the ‘militarisation of the urban question’  (Souza, 2009:29). 
Using a survey of the available literature, I will argue for two connected threads which link the studies 
of specific mega-events. Firstly, critical studies have focused on how the spatial manifestations of 
mega-event security (at land, air and sea) are themselves emblematic of the political and economic 
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forces, such as state marketing, sporting bodies and multinational corporations, which drive 
securitisation regimes. Secondly, the literature has problematised the influence of these power 
assemblages and argued that security measures, while presented as a necessity for protecting the 
public, are more often structured by an exclusionary and authoritarian logic which results in elite 
benefits at the expense of public space, spending and civil liberties. Indeed, the exceptional measures 
installed during mega-events may continue to impact on everyday urban governance long after the 
events have ended, and serve as experimental sites for dramatic extensions in the power and reach of 
the state security apparatus.  
However, while wary of attempting to force an artificial homogeneity on different hosting 
environments and terrains, this chapter will argue for a stronger position than simply alluding to some 
general trends discernible across environments. In particular, it will maintain that mega-event security 
has become a conceptual template, in that consistent procedures and tactics are applied across 
contexts and scales. With this in mind, the chapter will not deny the important role of local and 
practical contingencies. Mega-event security is not static and evolves due to application and context. 
Indeed, as later chapters will argue, the public relations image of perfect functioning and response 
described in event propaganda belies the reality of miscommunication, bureaucratic mishaps and 
human error ‘on the ground’.  
As argued in the previous chapter, the mainstream academic approaches towards the safety and 
security measures for the 2010 World Cup were based upon an uncritical and technocratic approach 
towards the issue of security. Primarily, this body of research focused on issues of how the South 
African government could best enforce measures which achieved the standard set at previous World 
Cups. But this approach treated security as a managerial, apolitical good (Boyle, 2011) and ignored 
how these standard operating procedures are structured by prevailing political and economic power 
structures. As this chapter aims to highlight mega-event security is as much about the projection of 
state power and the commercial projects of franchise owners as it is about ensuring public safety 
against probable risks. Consequently this chapter exhibits a pronounced scepticism towards the 
security ‘legacies’ of mega-events.  
Killing events  
The specific idea of the necessity of mega-event securitisation arguably has a historically determinate 
origin: September 5, 1972. The infamous ‘Munich Massacre’, in which the Black September 
organisation killed 11 members of the Israeli national  team,  not only overshadowing  the 1972 
Summer Olympics but also creating  a resilient association  of mega-events as potential ‘killing 
events’ (Tulloch, 2000). The images of masked gunmen holding hostages which were relayed around 
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the world seemed to prove that mega-events were not safe from global conflicts. Prior to Munich, 
militarism and security had often been side-shows to the apparently ‘apolitical’ celebrations of 
athleticism. Indeed, repressive regimes had historically aimed to disguise or ‘soften’ the visible 
presence of their security apparatus during major international events, with the 1936 Berlin Olympics 
being one of the most notorious examples. The events of 1972 began a process in which event 
security became increasingly prominent and expensive, as each subsequent host city or nation 
attempts to outmatch the extent and size of their predecessor’s arrangements (Bennett and Haggerty, 
2011:4).  
Indeed, prior to the 2010 World Cup, the pre-tournament publicity about several other host nations, 
was dominated by heightened fears around crime and violence. These include Spain 1982 (concerns 
about violence from the Basque separatist group ETA), Mexico 1986 (drug gangs) and Italy 1990 
(organised crime). The linkage between large sporting events and violence has also circulated through 
popular culture, such as in the 2002 blockbuster film The Sum of All Fears, which depicted the 
explosion of a nuclear device at the annual American Super Bowl competition. Most recently the 
cinematic trailer for the 2012 Batman film The Dark Knight Rises featured the destruction of a sports 
stadium by terrorists as its centrepiece. This cultural trope was also recycled in the 2010 British satire 
Four Lions, which parodies an unsuccessful attempt to bomb the London Marathon.  
But while security planners have focused on the external threat of terrorism, most political violence 
which has occurred around mega-events has not actually targeted event venues or tourists, such as the 
actions of the Greek group, ‘Revolutionary Struggle’, which bombed (with no fatalities) a courthouse 
and police station in the months prior to the Athens Olympics (Fussey and Coaffee, 2011: 71). 
However, there have been several recent instances of political violence which have specifically 
targeted sports teams, such as the attacks on Sri Lanka’s national cricket squad and the Togo football 
team, in 2009 and 2010.  
The post-9/11 context 
Arguably, the most crucial catalyst in entrenching and radicalising the securitisation of mega-events 
was the events of September 11 2001, and subsequent official fears about large-scale terrorist violence 
aimed at major infrastructure. While the trend towards intensified security measures predates 9/11, 
panic around terrorism has had the effect of seriously recalibrating notions of security 
‘proportionality’ (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011). Increasingly, a ‘total security’ (2) approach, 
equivalent to a state of national emergency, is implemented for the policing of ‘civilian’ 
entertainment. The nature of panics about terror means that security planners are concerned with 
attacks which would have major consequences but have a low probability of occurring. In essence, 
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since 9/11, officials have found themselves in an ‘environment unconstrained by the established 
likelihood of attacks’ (8). The kind of attacks envisioned by planners in the post-proportionality era 
are based on the idea that even small-scale or so called ‘lone wolf’ attacks perpetrated by individuals 
would create ‘considerable mayhem’ (Finoki, 2007a). Cities are regarded as hazardous sites of risk, in 
which violence could occur at any time, location or context. This looming sense of threat encourages 
planning based on a perpetual state of anticipation (ibid).  
The profound effect that this has had on mega-event security measures was evident in the first war on 
terror-era FIFA World Cup, in Japan and Korea in 2002, which saw the introduction of stringent 
counter-terror procedures (Murakami Wood and Abe, 2011). Within the US itself, major sporting 
events such as the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics and the New Orleans Superbowl (both 2002) were 
declared ‘National Security Special Events’ (Warren, 2002). In line with the shift away from 
proportionality, no expense was spared, with over $300 million being spent on securing the Winter 
Olympics alone. Non-sporting entertainment events also experienced such heightened scrutiny. For 
example, the 2002 Academy Awards were extensively patrolled for ‘terrorist hiding places’ as the 
elite of the film world gathered in Los Angeles (617). 
The intensification of security governance has led to increased scholarly interest in these procedures 
and their political and social implications. A growing body of research has dealt with the problems 
and opportunities associated with the staging of mega-events and how this has been catalysed by 
broader urban shifts (Yu, Klauser and Chan, 2009: 390). Two kinds of studies can be distinguished 
within this field. One genre focuses on the role of mega-events as an economic opportunity and deals 
with mega-events from a developmental perspective while the other tends to be more interpretative 
and refers to the sociological, political and cultural impacts of these tournaments (ibid). However, it is 
only recently that specific critical research has gone into the causes and effects of security issues at 
mega-events.  
Mega-events have become enormous security operations, marked both by the adoption of a pre-
emptive logic and the ballooning of security budgets. For example, the security costs of the Summer 
Olympics went from $79.4 million in Los Angeles 1984 to $1.5 billion by Athens 2004 (Coaffee and 
Murakami Wood, 2006: 513). Security measures draw upon a consistent repertoire of tactics and 
equipment. These include: 
The increased use of video-surveillance at prominent or vulnerable sites: uses of secure 
perimeter fencing, criminal background checks for employees, volunteers and athletes, 
vehicle monitoring, the usage of radio-frequency identification devices (RFIDS) on passes 
and tickets, biometric identification measures, satellite monitoring, the designation of special 
fan parks for collective viewing of events, the regulation of protest and dissent, overhead 
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unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), mobile fingerprinting identification systems and enhanced 
controls at land, sea and air borders (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:1) 
For Giulianotti and Klauser (2010), these mobilisations pivot around three major fields of perceived 
risk. Firstly, the possibility of terrorism encourages militarised forms of planning and pre-emption. 
Secondly, the congregation of masses of spectators in host cities leads to a focus on crowd control. 
Crowd controls entails three areas of risk identification and mitigation. The possibility of violence 
arising from the comingling of rival fans leads authorities to implement measures such as travel bans 
to reduce the outbreak of hooligan violence. The presence of large groups in host cities has 
encouraged the emergence of fan parks and public viewing eras, which allows the authorities to focus 
control measures on areas of mass congregation. Finally, the issues of protest and direct action which 
aim to capitalise on the international visibility afforded by mega-events legitimates coercive pre-
emption and heightened monitoring of activist groups. .  
The control of protest is closely linked to the final tier of Giulianotti’s and Klauser’s taxonomy: 
attempts to manage the interlinked issues of urban crime and social division. In the run-up to 
tournaments, hosting authorities are pressured to reduce, or at least minimise, the scope and visibility 
of urban crime and disorder. For example, it is suggested that security measures adopted for the 2010 
World Cup focused on controlling the interactions between local visitors and the local population 
(53). Giulianotti and Klauser conclude by suggesting that critical theory on mega-events has 
underplayed the sociological elements of this wide-scale securitisation. In particular, they argue for a 
more comprehensive appraisal of how risk is constructed, how security actors use risk and how this 
intersects with the focus of critical urban theory on the linked militarisation and commodification of 
space. Notably, they suggest that the increased frequency with which Southern countries are hosting 
major events raises questions about the comparative nature of security issues and procedures between 
the global North and South (52). This accords with a point made by Klauser, in his earlier 
collaborative article with Yu and Chan (2009:390-39 1), which is that there is a ‘major research 
lacuna’ regarding the question of how mega-events act as a ‘catalyst in the making of urban-centred 
security’. In other words, how do the temporally and spatially bound exceptional circumstances of 
mega-events shape everyday urban security after the tourists and cameras have left?  
Unitary spectacle and exception  
Perhaps the most striking aspect of mega-events is the extent to which they have become states of 
both exception and spectacle (Passavant, 2006). Comparable to the use of crisis to dramatically extend 
the political power of the state (Agamben, 2001), hosting authorities legitimate temporary measures 
such as a heightened police presence, the suspension of legal norms and dramatic alterations to the 
urban fabric with reference to creating a space free from ‘threat’ of any kind which would include 
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crime and terror, along with the potential disruption of political protest. This twinning of spectacle 
and exception gives mega-events a unique status, as they exist somewhere between a state of 
emergency and a festival. On the one hand, planners exhibit a ‘total security’ approach comparable to 
war planning: for instance the operations during the 2008 Beijing Olympics were described as the 
‘combat phase’ of planning (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:2). The war metaphor extends beyond 
discursive parallels. It has been estimated that over 1.5 million people were forced to move as a result 
of the 2008  Olympics, leading Stephen Graham (2010:125) to suggest that mega-events have become 
associated with ‘warlike levels of eviction and erasure’.  
However, on the other hand, this bellicosity is constrained by the factor of spectacle: while security is 
intended to create reassurance for visitors, organisers do not want an overly militarised approach to 
overshadow the event. Indeed, Hinds and Vlachou (2007) caution that the adoption of ‘high 
consequence’ aversion, which plans for all conceivable contingencies, can be both financially reckless 
and result in overly militarised events. As a result, planners adopt a bouquet of combined 
‘preventative’, ‘engaging’ and ‘repressive’ security strategies (Yu, Klauser and Chan, 2009). Used 
alongside preventative measures, such as training and simulation exercises, and repressive ones, such 
as arresting ‘unwanted’ elements, engaging strategies include public communication. Authorities 
prioritise the projection of events as sporting festivals rather than as exercises in security (Fussey and 
Coaffee, 2011: 77-78).  
The mega-event security complex 
Despite relying on the state security apparatus, mega-events transcend the parameters of national 
security. Firstly, mega-event securitisation is about protecting the franchises (Theoderaki, 2009) of 
global sporting bodies. Secondly, mega-event governance enrolls the participation of ‘cosmopolitan 
roaming armies of specialists’ (Graham interviewed by Finoki, 2007b) from the public and private 
sectors. The security for events involves the participation of local, regional and national government, 
international and local sports federations, national business, the private security industry and foreign 
governments. The complex interaction between these actors has led to the emergence of a mega-event 
‘security complex’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) or alternately what Molnar and Snider describe as a 
‘mega-event security development nexus’ (cited in Bennett and Haggerty, 2011:20). For Boyle 
(2011:330), this complex creates a security ‘knowledge network’ in which different actors work to 
exchange and build upon templates and standard operating procedures for mega-events. But rather 
than circulating in ‘flat, apolitical space in accordance with the rational intentions of policy makers’ 
this is a market of ideas and templates structured by prevailing political and power structures.  
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These networks intersect, overlap and change in march with the mega-event industry, which renders 
any attempt to map them unavoidably partial (333). Nevertheless, Boyle argues that three key 
institutional networks are identifiable, namely: state institutional networks, transnational networks and 
non-state institutional networks. State institutional networks consolidate the efforts to secure mega-
events within the boundaries of the nation state, as knowledge is coordinated between a predefined 
web of state agencies. Transnational networking telescopes outwards, as the agencies of different 
countries share information and expertise, such as observing mega-event preparations in other 
countries (336). International governance and non-state organisations are also becoming active 
players in these networks. For example, the IOC coordinates its own institutional knowledge network, 
while the United Nations uses the International Permanent Observatory on Security during Major 
Events (IPO), which offers security planning models for member nations (339). As suggested by 
Graham above, there is also a roster of experts who serve as consultants based upon their prominent 
roles at previous events (340). The private security industry is also increasingly asserting its role as 
knowledge brokers who offer event-specific planning and technology. These companies also deal in 
human capital by recruiting public officials with mega-event experience, which is consistent with the 
corporate strategy of using the personal and professional contacts of former government officials 
(341). Mega-events are also considered as useful points of entry into the security markets of 
developing countries (349).  
The process of knowledge exchange is not seamless. For example, public authorities and sports 
organising associations may hold divergent views on the organisation of security (344). Institutional 
rivalries and animosities also play a role. For instance, government authorities may regard the private 
security sector as ‘opportunists’ who ‘overstate’ their role in previous events in order to procure future 
contracts (ibid). Furthermore, while the official discourse may stress cooperation and convergence on 
mega-event models, these processes are hindered and structured by logistical factors (such as the 
capacity of the host state) and prevailing political relations (such as whether a host country has a 
centralised or a federalised system of government). However, stressing the incorporation of 
international practises has a performative and communicative value, as authorities use this to ‘reassure 
a variety of audiences that all foreseeable risks are being actively minimised’ (346). Asymmetries in 
global power may also play a role here, as Boyle gestures towards (but does not engage with) the 
‘pedagogical function’ (331) played by mega-events in importing security expertise within the cities 
of the global South.  
Despite the role played by institutional tensions and bureaucratic structures in hindering the creation 
of a homogenous global model of mega-event security, Boyle suggests that policy models that support 
and consolidate dominant political and economic paradigms are likely to ‘travel easier’ (350). The 
idea of positioning mega-events as a catalyst for security legacies appeals to a number of dominant 
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interests. For the state, legacy represents an opportunity to maximise returns on expensive outlays for 
a one-time event. Sporting bodies have an implicit interest in promoting ‘or at least not discouraging’ 
(351) the legacy approach as a means of identifying positive benefits of expensive security measures 
for governments and the public. Mega-events also provide a powerful vehicle for expansion by the 
security market while legacies chime with the developmental and capacity building discourse of 
institutions such as the United Nations, NGOs and the media. It is this confluence of interests which 
make mega-events ‘powerful sites in the production and globalisation of security expertise’ (ibid). In 
contrast to the literature presented in the previous chapter, Boyle argues that security is not a level 
playing field, in which tested best practice is apolitically exchanged between institutions. Instead, it is 
moulded and shaped at all times by a variety of political and economic forces.  
In practical application, the coupling of the desire to ensure exceptional events with the institutional 
prerogatives of a floating network of security actors provides scope for ‘ill-conceived buying sprees, 
deliberately padded budgets and in some cases graft’ (ibid). For example, during the 2004 Athens 
Summer Olympics, officials claimed that substantial security cost over-runs were the inescapable 
concomitant of living in a potentially dangerous and interlinked global environment (Floridis, 2004). 
However, in his analysis of the security preparations, Minas Samatas (2007) argues that exorbitant 
costs were the result of external pressures and internal political manoeuvring. As the first post-9/11 
Olympic host, the financially weak Greek government was subjected to pressure from both foreign 
governments and the security industry to install a ‘super-panoptic’ (221) experimental centralised 
surveillance integration system or C4I. The system was intended to concentrate all relevant 
information into a vast, city-wide network of computers and sensors, which would theoretically allow 
the security services to gain real-time, 24-hour coverage of all Olympic venues (225). After a 
competitive bidding war, a $300 million contract was awarded to a consortium of the US-based 
SAICS and General Dynamics and the Greek/German Siemens conglomerate (228). However, this 
much vaunted system was plagued by serious software and technical problems. The system was only 
partially operational during the Olympics and the consortium was unable to make it work even after 
the Games. The Greek government relied on conventional forces for the Olympics: ‘The more 
problems that emerged in implementing C4I, the more efforts were made to show off draconian 
security and surveillance measures to both deter terrorists and pacify the public. Both the public and 
potential terrorists were ignorant of C4I’s failure’ (230). Amazingly, SAICS has promoted this costly 
failure as a ‘gold medal security achievement’ (226) for future mega-events.  
Samatas argues that the Greek government’s commitment to the expensive and ineffective system was 
the product of confluence of institutional interests .The Greek state wanted to use the system to 
recalibrate its position as an international security player, to pacify international anxieties about 
terrorism at the Olympics and to entrench its position as a security partner of the United States and 
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NATO in highlighting its bona fides as an ally in the war on terror. The system was also viewed as 
having long-term internal applicability (223). The government was subjected to pressure by the US, 
which questioned the suitability of Greek security, which in turn led to the deployment of the CIA, 
FBI and NATO during the Olympics. The security consortium used concerns about Greece’s 
territorial proximity to a supposed Middle Eastern arc of instability to leverage the purchase of its 
product (ibid).  
In a follow-up interview (Molnar, 2011), Samatas concludes that the Athens Olympics is an example 
of the potentially negative consequences of mega-event security:  in Greece itself, the Olympics was 
used as a pretext to implement draconian security measures to control a fractious civil society while 
the ‘outrageous’ costs of the event were major contributors to the state’s current financial crisis and 
near bankruptcy. The Athens example serves as a cautionary tale: while the cast of security experts 
and tourists can move to the next venue, it is public services and ordinary people who have to pay the 
social and financial costs of ill-advised security expenditures. 
The political economy of mega-event security  
While the above accounts have focused on the general manoeuvrings between governments and 
business, recent scholarship has attended to the specific role of organisations such as FIFA and the 
IOC in determining the security agenda for mega-events. In particular, there has been focus on how 
security measures are used to shape urban space for the benefit of these organisations and their 
various corporate partners.  
Eick (2010:293) argues that FIFA World Cup tournaments have become a paradigmatic example of 
the ‘wedding’ (293) of securitisation and commercialism. For Eick (280), the security gurantees 
signed by host countries are used by FIFA to shape urban form for the duration of the events. In turn, 
these measures are themselves shaped by the already existing urban and policy factors of host 
countries (ibid). One of the most crucial aspects of this is the advertising restrictions implemented 
during World Cups, which use legal restrictions and security deployments to regulate competition for 
FIFA’s benefit (293). These measures include banning orders for individuals deemed to be in 
violation of advertising prescriptions (289). Eick (291) maintains that while host states retain the 
monopoly of the use of force, the integration of private security personnel and FIFA volunteers into 
security measures normalises the perception that private interests determine the trajectory of security 
governance. For example, the creation of fan parks and fan walks is not primarily intended to create 
public space for non-ticket holders. Instead, it was introduced to ensure that ‘exclusive rights for 
ground advertisement space are safeguarded for FIFA sponsors’ (285).  
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This has seen urban ‘disorder’ treated as a criminal and security issue (289), which in turn legitimates 
expensive crowd control measures. For Eick (ibid), FIFA’s regulations accord with this shift as they 
enforce measures which attempt to filter rules down to the individual level. Security measures are 
used to enforce crowd behaviour consistent with what FIFA regards as the desirable image of the 
World Cup. This has also capitalised on other forms of punitive neoliberalism. For example, in the 
case of the 2006 German World Cup, FIFA benefited from ‘workfare’ forms of welfare as the long-
term unemployed were hired as additional security staff (294).  
 
FIFA’s capacity to enforce spatial regimes is bundled into the hosting agreements of tournaments: 
‘FIFA forces all applicants for hosting the World Cup (nation states as well as respective host cities) 
to accept all branding conditions, commercialisation interests and security demands laid down in the 
so-called FIFA Regulations even before the applicants would know whether they will be allowed to 
host the World Cup’ (285). FIFA’s ability to take over the control rights of public space from local 
authorities is presented by Eick (289) as part of a paradigmatic shift towards ‘rowing’ rather than 
‘steering’  policy on the part of the nation state. Under the conditions of global neoliberalism, the state 
manages rather than directs urban space, for the benefit of corporate power. However, an organisation 
such as FIFA complicates this figuring because, as Eick notes, it has since the 1970s reconfigured 
itself as a body run along corporate lines (283), which in terms of the Swiss law under which it is 
registered is legally recognised as a non-profit organisation (287).  
Indeed, as Maharaj (2011) observes, this legal status allows the organisation to erroneously present 
itself as a charitable endeavour. Rather than operating under ‘free market’ conditions, FIFA exerts an 
‘exploitation monopoly’ (Eick, 2010: 286) over the World Cup brand. Security measures are central 
to enforcing this monopoly, both in maintaining the desired image of the World Cup and in ensuring 
the exclusive rights of its sponsors. Eick (285) thus suggests that FIFA can be understood as a ‘market 
proxy’ which uses its monopoly to structure urban space and public policy for the interests of its 
corporate backers, while simultaneously increasing profits for its national member associations. This 
embodies a ‘neocommunitarian’ (294) variant of neoliberalism, in which state power is used to limit 
free competition for the benefit of private actors.  
FIFA uses this highly regulated process to shape urban form, as is evident in the extent to which its 
realms of spatial control have extended, since the 2002 World Cup, beyond the perimeters of stadiums 
and into the wider host city (292). Eick suggests that other stakeholders exploit these measures for 
their own benefit, such as hosting governments looking to upgrade and increase their security 
apparatus. However, the influence of FIFA, which Eick argues can dictate to nation-states, results in a 
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new form of ‘contractual relationship’ (294) in which the state is prepared to subjugate itself to a 
hierarchical relationship in which FIFA is dominant: indeed this subjugation is a precondition for 
hosting. Finally, the security measures for World Cups may normalise the perception that private 
stakeholders – both ‘non-profits’ such as FIFA and its commercial affiliates – define and control the 
terms and uses of urban space (ibid). Using this as an entry, FIFA makes itself a shareholder whose 
influence can stretch from urban morphology to politics and propaganda. For Eick (ibid), this 
amounts, albeit temporarily, to the ‘spatialised suspension of democracy’, as the measures enabled by 
authorities serves as the mechanism for the corporate domination of cities.  
The state seems to play a paradoxical role in Eick’s work: on the one hand, it’s judicial and police 
apparatus is crucial to the regulation needed for FIFA’s spatial regime, but on the other, it is 
continually involved in a ‘ritual of submission’ (Mnxigtama, 2010:2) as it accedes to FIFAs 
micromanagement of space. Klauser (2007, 2011) agrees that the contractual, transient arrangements 
between FIFA and host governments is hierarchical but argues that this security relationship provides 
scope for interpretation and flexibility. For Klauser (2007), the security operations of mega-events are 
downplayed by the media during World Cups: the public is shown images of ecstatic fans, not police 
with semi-automatic machine guns and security fencing. Offstage, however, mega-events are marked 
by the coming together of security politics and business interests, to impose the desired spatial logic 
on host cities (1).  Much of the mega-event literature has downplayed or ignored the role of business 
in creating security, which for Klauser, ignores two key aspects of World Cups. Firstly, security risks 
are seen by planners not only to endanger the safety of visitors but as threats to the carefully 
constructed marketing image of safe World Cups (3). Secondly, as much as this image campaign is 
important to host governments, the World Cup is above all the commercial product of a single entity: 
FIFA. Even though World Cups are financially supported by governments and host cities and 
organised by local federations, they are officially organised by FIFA. In the case of the German 
World Cup, the organisation continually reminded the press that the country was effectively  
‘FIFAland ’ for the duration of the event: as federation  President Joseph ‘Sepp’ Blatter put it: ‘This is 
not Germany’s World Cup, but FIFA’s’ (1-3).  
From this standpoint, Klauser argues that World Cup security measures entail that ‘urban space 
became invested, differentiated and hierarchically organised by combined security operations and 
commercial interests with FIFA’s interests prioritised above all else’ (4) . The spatial differentiations 
of security during World Cups correspond not only to functional and logistical differences, but to 
different degrees of commercialism. While this was most evident in fan sites and in the security rings 
around stadiums, these measures are becoming more extensive, penetrating into the management of 
city centres and even into airspace restrictions (6). World Cup security measures pivot around a 
reconfiguration of urban governance into small and hierarchically organised spatial entities for both 
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security and commercial purposes, symptomatic of a wider cluster of security preoccupations. 
Ironically, the measures taken to produce commercially attractive cities can produce new forms of 
public anxiety and uncertainty. Klauser cites the case of a hoax letter distributed during the 2006 
World Cup, which informed residents of the city of Dortmund living within a three kilometre radius 
of stadiums that they would be required to purchase permits to access their homes and were forbidden 
from buying any products other than those of official sponsors. The city’s helpline broke down 
because of the massive number of phone calls from residents concerned about not being able to fulfil 
these conditions. The combination of security and commercialism, dramatically enforced in urban 
space, seems to assert that ‘nothing is impossible’ (7) for unaccountable business interests asserting 
their dominance over both public and private life. 
However, Klauser (2011) also argues that the imposition of security measures during mega-events is 
not the simple outcome of a fusion of government and business interests. Rather, security must be 
‘positioned within a complex field of agencies, driving forces, motivations and understandings, 
including a range of international interests and stipulations, as well as a series of converging and 
diverging national and local predispositions and impulses’ (8). Klauser (3) suggests scrutinising the 
‘security meanings’ associated with fan zones and stadiums from the perspectives of three key actors: 
sporting bodies, local political authorities and the police and security services. Using the concept of 
‘interpretative flexibility’, which stresses the different layers of meaning held by ‘socio-technological 
assemblages’ for different groups, he identifies three key areas of meaning (ibid). The circulation of 
global best practise for mega-event security intersects the multiple purposes of branding, place 
marketing and security (4). Indeed, while the framework may be dominated by private organisations, 
it succeeds because it responds to a wide range of institutional aspirations ‘leaving little reason ... to 
suggest that this will be challenged at future events’ (12).  
Gaffney (2010) argues, however, that the security projects of governments and local authorities goes 
beyond affixing their political and social aspirations onto the framework laid down by hosting bodies. 
Although the term ‘mega-event’ is a useful placeholder, he suggests that the term is something of a 
misnomer. The actual events are the cumulative product of: 
... lengthy disciplinary processes that incorporate mechanisms of power into spatial and social 
forms. These mutually reinforcing mechanisms have economic rationality and social control 
as their end goals. The multitude of practices and techniques that produce and result from the 
mega-event process are nearly impossible to describe in their entirety as they encompass 
multiple layers of governance, massive urban change, staggering sums of public and private 
money, and function as historically situated festivals that appeal to a global audience. The 
discursive frameworks that drive this process are also historically contingent. The host city or 
country adapts the dominant discursive framework of the governing institution (e.g. IOC, 
FIFA) while adding specific elements that maximize the uniqueness of place while at the 
same time appealing to the perceived universality of the mega-event and the appropriateness 
of its articulation in a particular time and place (8). 
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For Gaffney, the central point of this project aim of this project is to portray a ‘neoliberal dream 
world’ (Davis and Monk eds, 2007) to international media and potential investors: festival cities 
where social antagonism and urban violence are replaced by scenes of mass enjoyment. However, this 
dream image relayed to the world during mega-events is a false paradise in that the methods used to 
secure them may be the antithesis of utopianism: the suspension of democratic processes, the 
militarisation of urban space and the reshaping of cities in the image of global capital (Gaffney, 
2010:8). While the production of mega-event security is dictated by sporting organisations and 
multinational corporations, this combines with the state’s project of creating disciplined, consumerist 
space (27). This accords with the adoption of urban neoliberalism, in which public money is 
channelled into projects that will attract transnational business elite, tourists and the ‘upper strata’ of 
local society (28), often at the expense of social welfare. In effect, governments ‘fix space’ (26) for 
the purpose of capital accumulation: while the state channels funds into prestige projects, sporting 
bodies are effectively ‘issued a blank check’ (26) for event-related spending. This is leveraged 
through the creation of various organising associations which function as ‘temporary, extra-legal 
forms of governance’ (27). Made up of local political and business elites, these organisations use 
public money to fund mega-events and to issue tenders and contracts: not only do they keep their own 
books, but they are dissolved as soon as tournaments end. While cities assume debts, there is no legal 
option for those displaced or harmed by the mega-event: put bluntly, there is no institution left from 
which to seek legal recourse.  
Inverting the war metaphor used by authorities, Gaffney argues that this has more in common with a 
military occupation. As Naomi Klein’s (2007) concept of the ‘shock doctrine’ proposes, political, 
economic and environmental catastrophes are used to forcefully ‘neoliberalise’ societies. Central to 
this transformation is the establishment of temporary, extra-legal regimes which dissolve once the 
crisis is over, such as the Coalition Central Authority (CPA) in post-war Iraq which disbanded only 
after outsourcing large sections of the country’s economy and handing out billions of no-bid contracts 
to foreign companies (Gaffney, 2010:27). Despite these ‘eerily similar’ (ibid) governance structures, a 
crucial difference is the context under which mega-events ‘occupations’ take place. Rather than being 
depicted as crises, mega-events are spectacles which are linked to a combination of nationalist pride 
and civic boosterism in which ‘the raiding of public coffers to stimulate private enterprise’ (ibid) is 
presented as a patriotic obligation.  
Gaffney concedes that not while not all the developments associated with mega-events are completely 
negative, such as upgrades to transport infrastructure, for the most part they serve to divert funds and 
attention away from chronic urban problems and may in turn entrench many of these social ills. The 
sophisticated manufacture of a nationalist consent around mega-events also creates an amnesiac 
circuit which aids these rapid, extractive projects. While the media may raise issues of graft and 
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overspending, which invariably occur in the lead-up to mega-events, these scandals are eventually 
forgotten (ibid), especially once the plans and measures prove successful for the four weeks of 
spectacle. The exceptional nature of mega-events is used to facilitate these dramatic alterations to 
cities. Indeed, Hagemann (2010: 735) argues that the ‘state of emergency’ which accompanies these 
shocks is not just a rhetorical device contoured to the specific ends which elites wish to accomplish 
with mega-events, as instead  ‘this rhetoric has already become an autonomous force to legitimate, 
practice and establish all possible extraordinary measures under the exceptional circumstances of the 
event. This strategy provides a basis for the restructuring both of governance and security apparatuses 
and for the spatial reconfiguration of the cities’.   
Mega-event security and state power 
Critical accounts of the political economy of mega-event security have argued that these security 
measures are delivered by a ‘security complex’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2011) which consists of 
transnational corporate and government actors. This depiction of security governance, in which the 
state is one of a network of actors, accords with the recent academic focus on nodal and networked 
forms of security (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011). Indeed, the accounts presented above would suggest 
that governments are often in a weaker position than corporate actors, in that security measures are 
used to ‘row’ (Eick, 2010:23) mega-events towards the goals of transnational capital. While Klauser 
elaborates on how governments package their own projects into pre-existing hosting requirements, it 
is clear that this is a reactive adoption in that meaning and aspiration are packaged into the criteria 
laid out by sporting bodies. Gaffney’s trope of occupation entails a more central role for the state, in 
that its apparatus and institutions are the central mechanism for an elite-led project of accumulation.  
However, these vast projects of social and spatial ‘discipline’ (Gaffney, 2010) are performed by the 
state with the mutually reinforcing goal of instilling an economic rationality through social control. 
Indeed, the spatial arrangements created by mega-event security would seem to prioritise the interests 
of foreign capital. While security measures are used to ensure a profit for these private actors, the 
benefits for the state are more ambiguous: they denude resources from regular policing and are 
expensive to organise and maintain. Within the media and civil society discourse around mega-event 
security, the state would appear to be in caught in a double bind: criticised for not spending enough on 
measures and subjected to scrutiny when the real cost of acquisitions are brought to light. Most 
notably, it would appear that mega-events entail a partial outsourcing of the state security apparatus 
for the pursuit of private projects. In many ways these arrangements would appear to substantiate the 
idea that nation-states have been hollowed out, as security becomes more ‘liquid’ (Zedner, 2006) and 
implemented by a diffuse web of public and private governance.  
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However, as Bernhard and Martin (2011) argue, the size and scale of mega-event security can only be 
delivered by a handful of relatively wealthy nation-states. Using analogies taken from international 
relations theory, they argue that hosting mega-events is comparable to building nuclear weapons and 
space programmes in that it requires the full mobilisation of all the resources a state has at its disposal 
(57). Furthermore, this requires the state to coordinate activities across a broad coalition of 
stakeholders from municipal politicians to security companies who support the mega-event aspirations 
of the host government. From this standpoint, mega-events may serve as a unifying factor for 
transnational and local political and business elites who under less exceptional circumstances may be 
in competition. While the urgency of countering mega-event security threats is normally presented as 
self-evident, Bernhard and Martin (38) use the securitisation thesis to ‘denaturalise the claim to 
exceptionalism’. In order to account for the measures which ‘clearly exceed the exigencies of 
protection’ (39), they attempt to extract the security mind-set which underpins planning and 
operations. These measures go beyond reassuring public anxieties about the state’s efforts to 
guarantee safety and entail dramatic interventions which even surpass requirements for many risk 
scenarios (51).  
However, Bernhard and Martin argue that this is not just the result of paranoia: instead security itself 
becomes an affirmation of state prestige and modernity, as relatively few states possess the wealth, 
technological base or organisational resources to deliver a standardised ‘world-class’ security regime. 
They argue that mega-event security is treated as a sui generis area of securitisation which transcends 
rational and materialist calculations of the probable threat to people or buildings. In contrast, they 
problematise the belief that 9/11 changed the entire context of mega-event security. While the idea of 
a large-scale terrorist attack on mega-event infrastructure or on crowds has been used to legitimate 
states of mega-event exception they suggest that governments are successful at protecting people and 
property from such speculative threats in normal times and at a much lower cost (46-7). In its excess 
and overreach, mega-event security reveals a security mind-set which corresponds to criteria beyond 
practical and financial considerations.  
For Bernhard and Martin, the primary feature of the exceptionality of security measures lies in the 
role played by mega-events as a mechanism of elite affirmation. The architecture and arsenals of 
security are prominently featured as a ‘as a parallel manifestation of the excellence and competence 
that the act of hosting ... works so hard to demonstrate’ (59). These security demonstrations are 
monumental: cities are saturated with thousands of regular security officials and volunteers, 
expensive, high visibility technology and military hardware is put into action and complex 
organisational acumen is required to coordinate efforts across a range of scales and locations and 
between an array of institutions. Furthermore, opulence and excess is central to these displays: in the 
case of the Olympics: ‘no security measure is too expensive for the Games. To host an Olympics 
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without Ares, the Olympian god of warfare, would be to miss the point, no matter how much they 
charge’ (54).  
The demonstration that a host government can leverage extensive security measures is used for both 
domestic and international affirmation, as it signals the state’s position as a first class ‘global citizen’. 
As with nuclear proliferation, states may forgo some of their direct economic and logistical interests 
for the sake of prestige, as grand projects, which may have little or no knowable benefits, serve as a 
spectacular announcement of modernity (58). This works at both domestic and international scales. 
Within domestic politics, mega-event security can be used to advance political and bureaucratic 
interest and to reconfigure the state’s relationship with political and business stakeholders (57). At the 
international level, countries use mega-events to assert and formalise their position within global 
security hierarchies: for example, despite initial concerns about Athens, Greek officials were later 
incorporated as advisors to the Beijing Olympics (59). Bernhard and Martin concede that owing to the 
veil of secrecy which surrounds many aspects of mega-event security it is impossible to conclusively 
identify the main concerns of planners (50). However, they conclude that that the symbolism attached 
to mega-events is used to necessitate a state of exception which is ‘far greater than that provoked by 
concerns for human safety or the protection of property, both of which are adequately addressed by 
the security provisions of normal life’ (60).  
The monumentalism of security operations, which can only be provided by strong governments 
working in conjunction with other actors, highlights the state-centred dimensions of mega-event 
security. A potent example of this is provided in the case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, referenced by 
Bernhard and Martin throughout their chapter and which has been described by Broudehoux (2007) as 
the culmination of China’s experiment with a new form of authoritarian, state-directed capitalism. The 
unprecedented scale of Olympic developments and preparations in Beijing signalled China’s arrival as 
a great power committed to marketisation against the backdrop of a police state (88). Indeed, the 
repressive power of the state enabled the extravagance of the event in facilitating and expediting 
dramatic dislocations in the urban fabric such as mass evictions to make way for Olympic facilities 
and the jailing of activists (92-4). However, inasmuch as the highly public display of state power was 
used to project force, it also revealed the anxieties of China’s governmental elites. The Olympics was 
used to manage and contain the contradictions and social unrest which have accompanied China’s 
meteoric rise to great power status (98). Most notably, growing inequalities have increased social 
tensions. The Olympics provided a patriotic rallying point around which to marshal a divided 
population, along with serving as an ‘instrument of pacification by mystifying Chinese citizens 
through a grandiose spectacle’ (99). 
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Security and anxiety 
This highlights a profound ambiguity in mega-event security. On one hand, as Bernhard and Martin 
(2011:57) suggest, these events serve as one of the most overt articulations of contemporary state 
power, short of warfare and the splitting of the atom. But they also reveal what Murakami Wood and 
Abe (2011) describe as an anxious ‘spectacle of fear’. Mega-events serve as an ‘exemplary interface’ 
between local, national and international forms of social ordering and create a ‘crucible of 
governmental anxieties’ (137). These anxieties may be temporarily dispelled by the creation of 
security displays. In their case study of Japan, Murakami Wood and Abe suggest that the internal 
security discourse about security which accompanied the 2002 World Cup reflected social fears about 
foreign ‘others’ and perceptions of  Japan’s declining global significance. On one hand, the co-hosting 
of the World Cup with South Korea was meant to reconfigure the historically controversial 
relationship between the two countries at a formal level, and pave the way for a ‘future directed’ 
arrangement which could reduce long-standing historical tensions deriving from Japan’s occupation 
of the Korean peninsula in the first half of the last century (145). This formal relationship did not, 
however, end the popularity of racist and nationalistic discourses about Koreans (ibid). The fear of 
foreigners was also present in moral panics, which imagined hordes of European hooligans and illegal 
traders from neighbouring countries descending upon Japan. In the context of the latter, the 
government secretly installed facial rejection technology in two main airports: ‘although it detected no 
threats, the face-recognition system was rather more interesting as part of a discursive construction of 
racial difference: really, it was about whose face didn’t fit in Japan’ (153). Such authoritarian 
responses reveal more than just xenophobia because, as Murakami Wood and Abe suggest, the 
‘foreigner’ stands in for a more generalised anxiety about a loss of control and the undermining of the 
‘socio-cultural conformity of Japanese society’ (158) a fear which also comes from other sources such 
as internal radicalism and non-conformity.  
Although the case study is grounded in the promotion of a specific national ethos by the state, the 
interface between the national and the global that occurs through mega-event security may signal 
future upheavals in global security governance (161). The security islands which spring up around 
mega-events are the harbingers of a new security ‘package’ which accompanies the neoliberal global 
economy (139). Murakami Wood and Abe imply that the central anxieties evident at both mega-
events and international summits are an elite fear of the linked consequences of growing inequality 
and unpredictable globalisation. This emergent security assemblage is ‘not imposed on unwilling 
states but shared and translated between a transnational ruling class’ of which national elites are 
merely the ‘local variation’ (161).  
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Legacies  
Boyle (2011) argues that the elite usage of mega-events security measures are legitimated and 
mediated through the concept of legacies. While legacies are used to justify and excuse what may 
otherwise be politically unpopular security measures, the lengthy and complex nature of mega-event 
preparations invariably results in the augmentation and extension of host city security systems and 
infrastructures.  
Giulianotti and Klauser (2010:54) identify six security legacies associated with mega-events: 
1)  Security technology: this includes the purchase and adoption of surveillance systems, police and 
military hardware and other equipment, which is piloted and implemented during mega-events.  
2)  New security practices: new practices and techniques are adopted for mega-events and extended 
into other areas of policy, such as new partnerships with the host states and other national security 
forces or private security companies.  
3)  Governmental policies and new legislation: these are introduced during events and remain in 
force afterwards, such as restrictions on the movement of individuals who have been put on ‘no 
fly’ lists.  
4)  Externally imposed social transformations: these have some mega-event-related security focus, 
such as the eviction or clearance of ‘undesirable’ individuals or groups.  
5)  Generalised changes in social and transocietal relationships: these follow after mega-events, such 
as different relationships between the security services and local communities as a result of 
strategies used or incidents occurring during mega-events.  
6)  Urban redevelopment: these have a connection to, or consequences for mega-event security, such 
as evictions or gentrification of specific localities.  
For Fussey and Coaffee (2011), these legacies entail the juxtaposition of globalised security practices 
with the ‘idiosyncratic geographies’ (70) of the different cities in which they are applied. Although 
homogenous security strategies attempt to extract events from their contextual geographies and bear 
remarkable consistencies and commonalties across space and occasion, local contexts mean that these 
are applied in uneven ways (ibid). Using London’s preparations for the 2012 Olympics as an example, 
it is argued that national and local hosting measures both accord with and add novel developments to 
the process of event securitisation. In the case of the English capital, Olympic securitisation has 
continued a governmental practise of creating fragmented, security islands (such as the ‘Ring of Steel’ 
around the financial district), using technological strategies, such as surveillance, to combat crime and 
terrorism, and an institutional legacy of counter-terror policing. Thus the city ‘already exhibits many 
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of the characteristics comprising standardised Olympic security programmes’ (ibid). In particular, a 
combination of counter-terrorism and the adoption of neoliberal discourse about ‘dangerous’ urban 
populations has created a security praxis of   building high profile  enclaves ,which, ‘whilst not 
physically gated, are symbolically and technologically demarcated from their surrounding 
environments’ (82). Central to this strategy is the use of ‘distanciated forms of technological control’ 
(90) such as CCTV and facial recognition software. This approach harmonises with the Olympic 
security template, which encourages discrete forms of security that do not detract from the primacy of 
the sporting event. In other words, while mega-event security is invariably impacted by localised 
security practises, the movable state of exception has become standardised, homogenous and 
transferable (92-93), which leads Fussey and Coaffee to conclude that legacies will invariably be 
uneven across host settings. In the case of London, they suggest that while some elements of the 
Olympic ‘Ring of Steel’ will dissipate, other aspects will be entrenched and accelerate the 
maintenance of high-tech security enclaves.  
Discipline  
Although tracing the spatial, infrastructural and legislative legacies of mega-events can be done by 
tracking the post-event deployment of procedures, laws, institutional relationships and technologies, 
ascertaining the changes in social relationships created by security measures remain more elusive. 
However, following Gaffney’s (2010) reframing of mega-events as complex, overlapping, lengthy 
disciplinary processes, it can be argued that mega-events serve a security process above and beyond 
leaving specific policing and military legacies. In particular, they are used to assert and reinforce 
order within society, which chimes with Neocleous’s (2006) argument that securitisation can be 
applied to most areas of public policy. Carolyn Smith (2010) argues that mega-event related social 
disciplining takes place on a variety of scales. On one hand, the intensification of police powers may 
be used as a tool of political repression during and after mega-events (1.3). The national political, 
business, media and civil society consensus on the desirability of hosting mega-events ensures that 
they are elevated as transcendent national goals beyond political and social conflict and antagonism 
(3.3). Mega-events are presented as a communitarian spectacle which links different strata of society 
in a celebration of both the actual sport and the national prestige attached to hosting such an event. 
For Smith, this entails a layered process of depoliticisation and mystification: the citizen is 
encouraged to identify with the transcendent ideas of both the event and with the nation-state. 
Through the constant reiteration of this apparently transcendent consent citizens are fixed as 
spectators, entailing a shift from cynicism towards the state to affirmative support for its capacity to 
host a mega-event (3.3).  
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Indeed, mega-events provide a focal instance of the ‘morality’ (2.1) of the contemporary state: a 
symbiotic role with corporate power, militarised security and citizens as pacified consumers. 
Southwood (2011) argues that mega-events are packaged to present a generic experience of 
participation, ‘fake unity and compulsory inclusivity’. This entails a state process of image 
management and containment in which social antagonisms (Smith, 2010) are disguised with an 
idealised version of host cities and states. Following Fussey and Coaffee (2011), it can be suggested 
that security strategies which serve to remove events from the social conflicts within their contextual 
geographies and contexts are instrumentalised to enforce this idealisation. 
The communitarian discourse which accompanies mega-events may also play a part in this wider 
social disciplining in working to inhibit and restrict public discussion on mega-events and the related 
issues of private control of public space and policy and the militarisation of security. Gaffney 
(2010:23) argues that this is accompanied by a deliberately vague and cryptic rhetoric of development 
in which citizens are assured that mega-events are a necessity in capturing access to the capital flows 
of the global economy: ‘the notion of developmental acceleration is at the forefront of the bid, but the 
forms of the plan and the requirements is left deliberately vague.’ This may serve to obfuscate the 
real, uneven trajectory of actual mega-event development, which is weighted in favour of private 
interests. Indeed, Gray (2009) suggests that the paternalistic discourse of mega-event development 
masks undercurrents such as the stigmatisation of ‘problematic’ groups and territories and the 
continued move towards the private domination of urban space.  
 
 
Security as spectacle and reality management 
The extent to which the disconnection between the elite driven and autocratic application of mega-
event security and the discourse of development is managed through public relations and sloganeering 
indicates how mega-events reflect another central dimension of contemporary security and warfare: 
namely, spectacle. For example, as Gaffney (2010:27) notes in his discussion of ‘the shock doctrine’, 
the ‘main differences between the selling of public utilities and the hollowing out of state services’, 
which Klein identifies as integral components of ‘shock’ and the staging of mega-events, is that in the 
latter, the shock is not perceived as trauma but ‘as a highly securitised festival and spectacle’ (my 
emphasis). It should also be noted that Klein (2007) includes military invasions, occupation and 
international policing and peace keeping as additional elements in the shock repertoire.  
The concept of spectacle as originally articulated by Guy Debord, the most prominent thinker within 
the Situationist International in the 1960s, held that political and social life within both the capitalist 
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‘West’ and the communist ‘East’ had been  overtaken  by appearance and representation (Debord, 
1988). The texture of daily life was subjected to a dissemination and constant bombardment of 
images, slogans, false promises, images and instructions delivered by a confluence of bureaucratic 
governments, the media and advertisers (Retort, 2004:8). For Debord, this served as a tool of social 
control which alienated and distracted people from politics, anesthetised them with representation and 
eroded the capacity for individual and collective action.  
It should be noted here that Debord’s usage of spectacle is contested within academic literature. On 
one hand, it has been argued that the incorporation of his ideas into post-modern theory has denuded 
them of much of their political impact by focusing exclusively on the mass media aspects of spectacle 
(Retort, 2004: 6). On the other, it has been argued that the concept of spectacle is rooted in the 
historical specifics of post-war European society and has little contemporary analytic value (Aufheben 
Group, 2009). While acknowledging these debates, the parameters of this chapter entail a focus on the 
more generalised depiction of how mega-event security embodies many of the features of 
representation and appearance noted by Debord. Indeed, in his later Comments on the Society of the 
Spectacle (1988), Debord wrote that  
We should expect, as a logical possibility, that the states’ security services intend to use all 
the advantages they find in the realm of the spectacle, which has indeed been organised with 
that in mind for some considerable time: on the contrary, it is the difficulty of perceiving this 
that is astonishing, and rings false.  
For example, the informational and psychological aspects of security operations have become a 
central aspect of military and police doctrine. Security operations are aestheticised and calibrated to 
have the maximum amount of media impact (Graham, 2010:71). Contemporary military doctrine aims 
to dominate space through a combination of ‘speed, shock, communication, interoperability’ 
(Blackmore, 2005:105), which is both organised with reference to and incorporates the multiple 
dimensions of media. For instance, the US military doctrine of ‘shock and awe’ bombing, used to 
devastating effect  during the initial stages of the  invasion of Iraq, entails spectacular displays of 
overwhelming power and force to paralyse an opponent’s will to fight. Graham (2010:71) argues that 
a similar logic was employed by the 9/11 hijackers, whose attacks were designed to ensure maximum 
media exposure through the creation of imagery, intended to leave viewers unsettled, awestruck and 
disorientated    
This may create a profound gap between representation and reality.  ‘Shock and awe is a carefully 
staged media event’ in which media attention is diverted to precision bombing rather than civilian 
deaths and maimings (72). For Klein (2007), this engineering of shock provides opportunities for the 
reworking of societies. Following Gaffney (2010:27), it can be speculated that mega-events invert this 
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process to the same end. Rather than a theatre of destruction, mega-events are portrayed as a festival 
of celebration. Rather than a state of exception imposed through crisis, emergency measures are 
legitimated as the precondition for an affirmative national project. Although achieved through a 
discourse of participation rather than through the blunt application of trauma, it may be as successful 
in reorganising urban space for elite interests. This speculation will be discussed in detail in later 
chapters.  
Boyle and Haggerty (2009:259) argue that Debord’s notion of the spectacle oversubscribed to the 
notion of a seamless global spectacle. By contrast, they suggests that spectacle ‘involves on-going 
processes whereby social life is processed and packaged for mass visual consumption in a society 
increasingly orientated to appearances in the services of capital’, entailing ‘degrees in the 
spectacularity of different phenomena’ (ibid). Mega-event security entails a paradox: authorities 
continually detail the minutia of their security preparations while also proclaiming the invisibility of 
these procedures: ‘if we are doing our job, no one sees us’ being a common operational motto 
expressed to the press (263). For Boyle and Haggerty, this apparent paradox is reflective of the 
tendency for security to become spectacle. The embracing of ‘zero tolerance’ and ‘total security’ 
models is indicative of a ‘self-conscious semiotics of policing’ (ibid) in which governments shift their 
focus away from controlling the objective harms of a crime to the  control of  widely defined 
‘disorder’.  
The regulatory force provided by these ‘total’ models accords with the interests of sports bodies and 
their corporate sponsors, as it provides a justification for the policing of a broad array of people and 
behaviours. Open-ended definitions of disorder mean that mega-event policing is used to ban or 
remove people who do not conform with the desired image that sporting associations and corporations 
wish to project. In effect mega-events promote a  ‘censorship of human kinds’ in which a wide range 
of people, from panhandlers to fans wearing the wrong logos are excluded because their ‘presence 
signifies disorder to preferred clientele’ (ibid).  
This is accompanied by the adoption of high visibility procedures which convey the control of urban 
space and aim to foster a subjective sense of safety among the desired audience. The representation of 
total security is fashioned using media templates such as the use of security liaisons who detail the 
cost and size of measures (264) and entails the relaying of familiar images of security: armed riot 
police, buildings bristling with police snipers, bomb disposal units in key sites, etc. As a form of 
public relations, it is not necessarily important for security systems to work to the proclaimed standard 
but that rather that they convey the message of reassurance using ‘readily available cultural templates’ 
for the audience to draw upon (ibid). However, spectacular security is constrained by the need to 
ensure that security does not disrupt  circuits of consumption or create connections between corporate 
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sponsors and authoritarian policing: security measures are aimed at being reassuring rather than 
frightening to the people they are intended to attract (265). Indeed, overly repressive policing could 
create the impression that the event is threatened by extreme danger.  
Boyle and Haggerty further argue that officials may risk creating an image of security which resonates 
with the iconography of fascism, the governmental form which most embraced the spectacular 
symbolism of security (ibid). Planners aim for mega-event security to be an ‘absent presence’ which 
is apparent for the purposes of reassurance but which does not undermine the image sponsors and 
organisers aim to convey (265). Spectacular security has two purposes for mega-events: the actual 
mitigation of perceived risk and the fostering of a sense of total security (264). Indeed, despite the use 
of exceptional powers, authorities attempt to create an image of urban space as tamed, homogenous 
and ‘normalised’. 
However, Hagemann (2010) argues that mega-events may provoke a sense of estrangement from this 
desired image of normalcy. With reference to Debord, she suggests (733) that mega-events represent 
the ultimate form of commodification, as the diverse experience of urban life is packaged into a 
consumable form for the benefit of corporate sponsors, presenting an image of urban space which is 
‘standardised and robbed of any actual quality’. The ceding of certain parts of host cities to organisers 
and sponsors, which is in turn managed by a massed display of the security state, may display a highly 
concentrated version of what are normally ‘subtle and hardly noticed processes’ (735). Ironically, 
security may present an image of modernity which provides a disturbing contrast to the benevolent 
discourse of the authorities. Rather than being open-spaces of festival cities are revealed to be 
fragmented and hierarchical with ‘barricades, fences, velvet ropes, signs or invisible legally defined 
borders’ (ibid) demarcating the conditions of accessibility for different individuals.  
Taking this exclusionary logic to its extreme, the novelist Iain Sinclair (2005) pictures a near future 
scenario of:  
Airport roads the same everywhere, and highly visible tanks patrolling the perimeter fence. If 
an English cricket team ventures to Pakistan, it will be accorded, so the relevant diplomat 
assures us, the highest level of security: “head of state”. That is to say, public roads in 
Karachi will be entirely cleared between five star hotel and stadium. The city of the spectacle 
is deserted, crowds under curfew, so that the sport of the people can be performed, at a time 
suitable to the television networks, in a massively guarded redoubt. 
Sinclair’s depiction of an emergent dystopia suggests that mega-event security attempts to manage the 
gap between the ideal city projected by elites and a diffuse anxiety about urbanism. Butler (2011) 
suggests that this is the ‘new normal’, in which ‘you can have the glass and dazzle of the Olympics 
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but be wary that the tin smiles and hollow luxury are now so precarious that the only guarantor is an 
ever more frenzied and powerful state’.  
Conclusion 
In a world of rapid security developments it is impossible to provide a synoptic overview of all the 
issues that arise within mega-event security measures (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 257). However, the 
literature described above has noted several linked trends: the adoption of pre-emptive measures; the 
overlapping of commercialism and security; the move towards transnational governance networks; the 
entwinement of the international and domestic and the fortification of urban space. At the same time, 
as the preceding sections have shown, security is seen to apply across an enormous range of scales, 
activities and policies, from attempts to control individual behaviour to the actions of nation- states.  
As a result, mega-events link efforts to shape urban space for the purposes of capital accumulation 
and political prestige. These measures are produced through wide-scale state and private mobilisations 
which are comparable to national states of emergency. But, while this may entail security 
deployments similar in scale to military combat operations, they are both temporary and constrained 
by the dictates of conveying the desired urban ‘brand’. For Bennett and Haggerty (2011:9), the end 
result is that:  
the factors that became most prominent in limiting the level of security were their costs and 
the degree of security presence that corporate sponsors were willing to stomach—both of 
which were ratcheted upwards. Security preparations have now reached the point where they 
are more appropriate for fighting a conventional war than protecting a soccer match from 
what most security analysts acknowledge would only be at most a handful of assailants that 
would be difficult to identify and thwart, even with the most elaborate security preparations. 
As this chapter has suggested, the constant intensification of security measures is not necessarily in 
response to unprecedented dangers. Indeed, the security exceptionality of mega-events appears to 
have as much, if not more, to do with enforcing transient archipelagos of social control and 
commercial extraction as with the technical and logistical difficulties of protecting large crowds of 
people. 
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Chapter Three: Mega-Events and the Fortress City  
Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that despite the exceptional scale of mega-event, the accompanying 
security measures also draw upon (Fussey and Coaffee, 2011) and even project a concretised 
representation (Hagemann, 2010) of existing security preoccupations within hosting environments. As 
a result, this chapter will develop this idea and frame mega-events against the backdrop of 
increasingly globalised forms of urban security which combine metropolitan entrepreneurialism and 
marketing with militarised forms of containment and spatial control.  
In particular, this chapter will suggest that the manner in which similar mega-event security 
procedures ‘pop up’ (Warren, 2002:614) in host cities and nations is indicative of how urban security 
is becoming increasingly decontextualised and homogenous (Coafee and Murakami Wood, 2006). 
Much focus has been placed on the role of urban neoliberalism in creating more fragmented and 
exclusionary urban environments. This has been accompanied by state actions which coalesce around 
projects of securitisation, in which policing, criminalisation and security become paradigms of social 
policy and control (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 144). While it has been argued that the prominence of 
privatised and exclusionary urban space is indicative of a government withdrawal from planning and a 
fragmentation of the state’s monopoly on security, this chapter will argue that there is little evidence 
to suggest that the role of the state as the primary enforcer of security has been supplanted. By 
contrast, it will be argued that neoliberal policy and practise has increased the coercive powers of 
nation-states, which can be observed in cities throughout the world. In light of this, the chapter will 
conclude that corporate and business interests cohere with state security through a shared vision of 
pacified urban space.  
The neoliberal turn 
Despite the symbolic importance of 9/11 in catalysing the increased securitisation of mega-events, 
this process must be understood against the wider backdrop of profound changes in urban governance 
and morphology which have occurred throughout the world. Firstly, mega-events have been shaped 
by epochal political and economic shifts in which tournaments have become events of global 
significance both for their commercial viability and for their symbolic promotion of the urban ‘brand’. 
Secondly, security measures have been influenced by the intensified interconnectivity of urban 
security in which similar procedures, tactics and technologies are visible across regional, national and 
transnational scales. 
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The size and symbolic prominence of mega-events is a strategy of ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ 
(Harvey, 1989) in which hosting authorities promote their city ‘brand’ through the management of 
major sporting spectacles. This is politically legitimated through the assertion that this will create 
‘trickle down’ opportunities for tourism and investment as well as increasing  hosts’ stature as major 
commercial and political centres or ‘world class’ cities (Davis, 2007, McDonald, 2008). Indeed, the 
importance of mega-events within both inter-urban and national competition provides a significant 
impetus for security measures which are perceived to transcend the success of their predecessors. The 
linkage between mega-events and urban redevelopment strategies is indicative of the global 
dominance of neoliberalism since the late 1970s (Hall, 2006). This has amounted to the reorganisation 
of political governance and society through the imposition of market relationships and has been 
characterised by social disruption, economic instability, a massive growth in both national and 
consumer debt, the decline of social safety nets and the transfer of public funds into private hands 
through the privatisation of state assets and tax concessions (Harvey, 2005). Swyngedouw (1997) 
argues that urban policy has become focused on creating space for market-driven economic growth 
via attracting nomadic capital and investment. However, this strategy of socio-economic development 
has been linked to increased inequality, polarisation and social tensions between the wealthy and the 
middle and poor classes (Davis, 2006). It is also noticeable that mega-events are treated as a non-
negotiable area of state spending even when other parts of public budgets are viewed as targets for 
austerity measures and spending cuts. Even in the midst of a global financial downturn, governments’ 
enthusiasm for profligate mega-event spending has not waned, despite the long-term economic and 
social risks entailed (Butler, 2011).  
The increased governmental support of free trade, deregulation, capital mobility and an enabling 
attitude towards private institutions has also recalibrated the relationship between hosting 
governments and sporting bodies. Organisations such as FIFA and the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) have capitalised on financial deregulation, the mobility of capital flows and the 
integration of private institutions into public planning and policy. For example, an organisation such 
as FIFA has been transformed from an ‘old boys’ network’ (Eick, 2010: 279) into a streamlined 
global business able to impose rules and regulations which host nations are obliged to implement. One 
of the key areas of regulation is safety and security, as public and private space is managed for the 
dual purpose of serving certain corporate interests while restricting others.  
War all the time 
The securitisation of mega-events occurs against a globalised militarisation of urban society and 
planning at both discursive and operational levels, such as the ‘wars’ on crime and terror and the 
adoption of military methods by police forces ( Souza, 2010a:458). While fear of both internal and 
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external risks has historically been an important factor in the shaping of cities, many theorists argue 
that the magnitude and complexity of contemporary securitisation is unprecedented, as urban planning 
and governance responds to the perception of city life as an on-going ‘molecular civil war’ 
(Enzensbeger, 1993). This has been accompanied by a move towards more fragmented urban 
environments with the proliferation of secure enclaves. As the influential urbanist Mike Davis (1990) 
argues, the militarisation of urban space merges policing and architecture to both contain and 
criminalise ‘dangerous’ classes and spaces and to fortify affluence. Fragmentation and fortification 
have become global paradigms of spatial organisation (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006) including 
architectural augmentations and innovations (electrified and barbed-wire fencing, gates, checkpoints 
and gated communities) the increased use of advanced surveillance and information technologies 
(CCTV, biometric scanners) and securitised zones within cities (airports, embassies, financial and 
commercial districts).  
The enclave city  
While some security features, such as digital surveillance and ‘homeland security’ measures, are more 
visible in the global North the process of fragmentation through security is arguably most entrenched 
in semi-peripheral countries such as South Africa and Brazil (Souza,2011). In these regions, the sense 
of risk generated by the interconnections between inequality and crime leads to the creation of ‘cities 
of walls’ (Caldeira, 2000) segregated and partitioned along security lines. For Giuseppe Campesi 
(2010) this reflects an interface between internationally circulating doctrines and tactics and locality, 
and he argues that the importation of what are perceived by officials to be world class measures 
amplify and stimulate neo-authoritarian pressures, particularly in countries which have undergone 
recent transitions from police and garrison states into democracies with a strong neoliberal bent. 
While Campesi grounds his work in Latin America, his conclusions are clearly relevant to 
contemporary South Africa.  
For Abourahme (2009) the result is that the global South has become a spatial laboratory for forms of 
enclosure and exclusion replicated throughout the world. However, he cautions against reading this as 
a response to unique cultures of post-colonial violence and instead foregrounds the epochal nature of 
neoliberalism in spatialising homogenous security tactics and architectures. Despite the extent of the 
privatisation of some areas of security, such as in the increase of private security contractors and gated 
communities, Abourahme maintains that the state remains the central enforcer of security. 
Pacification  
The display of the state’s coercive power is perhaps most evident in the adoption of ‘revanchist’ 
(Smith, 1996) urban policing which targets the poor and marginal. Neil Smith (ibid) argues that such 
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forms of policing are explicitly linked with neoliberal policies, as the preconditions for the 
gentrification of cities is state mobilisations which are intended to pacify new ‘urban frontiers’.  
Wacquant (2008) maintains that the deregulation and diminution of social welfare nets leads states to 
pursue policies of ‘punitive containment’ to manage dispossession under increasingly polarising 
socio-economic conditions. The poor are regarded as an internal enemy by authorities, reflected in 
combative police raids and tactics: the effect of all these measures is that the control of urban 
marginality is militarised (66).  
However, Campbell (2010) suggests that Wacquant paints an over-generalised depiction of the links 
between neoliberalism and containment, which may be too theoretically abstract to account for the 
historical, political and institutional variations which mark countries. Furthermore, ostensibly 
progressive accounts of how poverty is securitised may run the risk of subscribing to an overly 
bifurcated picture of urbanism relying on totalising visions of mega-shanties fenced off from walled 
gated communities, entirely disconnected from the enclaves of the rich (Angotti, 2006). Aside from 
presenting a bleak and hopeless account of urbanism, this dualism  may obscure the complex social 
relations within cities through the depiction of  ‘monstrous pictures of huge undifferentiated 
neighbourhoods filled with hopeless underemployed masses’(962), ironically echoing the same 
discourses it sets out to counter. Indeed, Rodgers (2007:138) suggests that instead of the withdrawal 
of islands of wealth within poverty, urban morphology is characterised more by partition and ‘the 
constitution of … fortified network[s]’ (138) which extend throughout cities. Rather than absolute 
barriers, urban form is a palimpsest in which new security tactics are adopted and reinterpreted 
according to historical and social context (ibid). But Rodgers cautions that such networks may 
encroach on public space in a far more intensive way than enclaves, in subtly removing large swathes 
of the urban fabric from their wider setting.  
However, without denying the specificity of context, it would seem clear that urban security globally 
has become increasingly bundled with the aesthetic and cultural dimensions of city branding. 
Particularly in cities with high rates of crime and violence, security policy is used to enforce 
‘makeovers’ (Hylton, 2007) in which policing is central not only for improvements in everyday life 
but its ability to change perceptions – both internally and externally. In effect, security becomes 
image-conscious and theatrical due to the parallel ‘rise of the fantasy city alongside the rise of the 
caceral city and the panoptic city’ (Samara, 2010:640). As one of the major platforms for urban 
branding, mega-events are a key example  of the ‘festivalisation’ (Stienbrink,Haferburg and Ley, 
2011) of cities, in which authorities highlight their ability to provide reassuring and congenial spaces 
for leisure, tourism and consumerism.  
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New borders 
Securitisation entails a definition of certain phenomena as potential hazards, and the last few decades 
have been marked by a host of ideas and practices which effectively portray all aspects of urban life 
as the object of protection and security operations.  As Souza (2010a:457) notes, critical approaches 
towards urban security are far less influential than the ‘conservative’ policies and ideas which 
articulate and agitate for the continued securitisation of urban space.  
Since the end of the Cold War, concepts of national security have been recalibrated and rescaled, with 
practices that once focused on protecting national borders penetrating into everyday urban life 
(Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006). Eyal Weizman (2004) argues that the study of contemporary 
urban securitisation belongs to a more fluid concept of geography than the linear demarcations of 
nation-state spatiality: ‘The border is in fact everywhere: around every public and private property 
and infrastructure, taking the form of local and regional fortifications and security apparatuses 
epitomised by today’s roadblocks, checkpoints, fences, walls, CCTV, safety zones’. 
Stephen Graham (2010: 144-145) suggests that many contemporary cities are fragmented into a series 
of countless borders and passage points which aim to manage the mobility of people and capital 
flows. Using both architectural and electronic security, secured borders are set up around trading 
zones, enclaves, entertainment districts, production sites, airports, sports events and political summits. 
While these zones are connected to transnational market and supply chains they are increasingly 
detached from the cities around them, marking a combination of global connection and local 
disconnection (ibid).  
 
Battlespace 
Military planning increasingly pivots around conceptions of asymmetric war, which imagine nation 
states pitted against small groups in low-intensity urban-based conflicts. Rather than fixed battles 
between states, military scenarios envision technologically advanced standing armies fighting 
insurgents who use ‘hostage taking, suicide bombing, improvised explosive devices, and fierce, fast, 
evaporating street battles’ (Blackmore, 2005:37). Concepts and doctrines such as ‘Military Operations 
in Urban Terrain’ (MOUT), ‘Fourth Generation Warfare’ (4GW) and ‘Command and Control’ pivot 
around a conception of cities as an open-ended and continuous ‘battlespace’ (ibid). The density and 
extensiveness of urban space leads security planners to view cities as treacherous and confusing sites 
whose dimensions need to be exposed and made legible to ensure effective control: battlespace 
extends the spatiality of security indefinitely. Writing with reference to Israel’s occupation of 
Palestine, Weizman (2007) describes how contemporary military tactics aim at control of both the 
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horizontal and the vertical dimensions of space. While the airspace is militarised above, natural and 
built factors on the landscape below are instrumentalised for domination and control. Although the 
‘battlespace’ concept was originally formulated by the US military, it has been adopted by security 
services around the world (Carr, 2010). Many of these concepts have been imported into the global 
South as a form of modernist planning which offers ‘best practice’ to control highly complex urban 
ecologies (Adey, 2010). The application of militarised rationalities and systems into domestic 
contexts encourages a forced homogenisation in which cities are viewed as ‘security-scapes … 
reducing variations to functional categories that correspond to the needs and biases of the operators, 
not the targets’ (Wall and Monahan, 2011: 240).  
 
State and corporate security: withering or symbiosis?  
Giorgio Agamben (2001) argues that as states have relinquished control of the commanding heights of 
economic planning, security has become the key yardstick of state power as governments attempt to 
crisis manage highly diverse and fractured societies. Crisis management asserts itself through the 
continuous deployment of states of exception, which are presented as central to the maintenance of 
social order (Peters, 2011). Put more broadly, the state cannot offer the citizenry protection from the 
dislocation and crises of the global economy but can win plebiscitary support through offering 
protection from crime and terrorism. However, Jensen (2005:552) suggests that such a model may be 
reductionist in offering an artificial demarcation between economic development and security, as well 
as failing to account for how neoliberal policies are appropriated within particular contexts. In the 
case of South Africa ‘security and development have always been intertwined’ (568) ranging from the 
apartheid preoccupation with securing cities from ‘invading natives or non-whites’ (554) to 
contemporary government initiatives which coach poverty alleviation as increasing social stability and 
security (558).   Rather than being a reaction to state withdrawal,  the promotion of ‘zero tolerance’  
security has occurred alongside  increased government interventions in health and welfare: ‘the 
welfare state has not in fact been rolled back: rather fiscal and state resources have been reprioritised 
and deracialised’ (564).  
Indeed, as Michael Foucault’s (2007) posthumously published lectures on neoliberal 
‘governmentality’ argue security is crucial in managing and harnessing the activities necessary for 
economic order. The ‘neoliberal state’ appears to encourage openness and circularity but relies on an 
archipelago of disciplinary institutions, including both policing and social welfare. Large areas of 
public policy, distinct from the work of the police or military, may in fact be securitised in that they 
become necessary to the ‘fabrication’ (Neocleous, 2006) of economic order. In other words, the 
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freedom of the market is continually dependent on a massed layer of coercive props, both subtle and 
overt.  
In the last few decades, many theorists have decentred the role of the state and have subscribed to 
more diffuse conceptions of security governance implemented by a host of non-state agencies and 
groups. One of the most focused upon, and indeed controversial, areas of study has been the growth of 
the private security sector both at the domestic level of guarding and policing and the incorporation of 
private militaries into interstate conflicts. The growth of this sector has been interpreted as marking a 
return to a pre-Westphalian conception of power, in which the state is one amongst a range of security 
providers (Singer, 2004). However, as Hughes (2007) demonstrates in a study of private sector 
involvement in the war on terror, the outsourcing of security functions is contingent on such 
institutions winning access to the state rather than as serving as a parallel source of power. This often 
operates through a ‘revolving door’ as personnel move between the public and private sectors, which 
allows companies to maintain key linkages within the political system.  
 
 
For Conner O’Reilly (2010), this intersection between public and private security is indicative of the 
links between the worlds of ‘high politics’ and ‘high finance’. Rather than a dichotomy between 
public and private spheres, he argues (200) that security actors have zealously embraced neoliberal 
tenets of outsourcing, ensuring that state and corporate actors view ‘their futures through the lens of 
interconnection’. This entails economic and security reciprocity: while security and intelligence 
services will work to enhance the competitiveness of key national industries, the state will 
reciprocally incorporate and harness corporate expertise and technology. O’Reilly argues that 
transnational policing and security can be viewed as an example of ‘state-corporate symbiosis’ in 
which the outcome for one is closely connected with that of the other (197). Within a context of 
shared backgrounds and informal ties, state and corporate security employees maintain a similar 
outlook with regards to a ‘global discourse of insecurity’: as producers of security knowledge, their 
power stems from defining the future sources of insecurity and creating tactics for managing them 
(191-2). In terms of the symbiotic relationship, the links between private and state security may often 
become dysfunctional and parasitic, characterised by private sector overbilling and dependency on the 
state. However, this relationship for the most part serves to mutually reinforce the insecurity discourse 
which frames public debates while opening new markets for expansion (203). The security 
marketplace has also been hybridised, as state and corporate security become active players in the 
‘security bazaar’ (ibid). Most notably, the interests and objectives of the state and corporate sector 
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have ‘become progressively indistinct’ (ibid), as corporate actors assume increased responsibility 
within state security and the state prioritises national security as central to ensuring economic growth.  
21st Century Leviathan  
This cautions against approaches which regard the state as one nodal point in a security network or 
‘only in the distance as the ultimate repository of legitimate coercion and legal title to property rather 
than as the central agency of social control’ (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011: 142). Indeed, rather than a 
diminution in power, Hallsworth and Lea argue that the war on terror has been accompanied by a 
‘massive surge in coercive state intervention’ (141). Tracing the contours of this reconstructed 
‘Leviathan’ (141) they identify three mutually reinforcing areas in which this new security state is 
emerging.  These includes the transition from ‘welfare’ to ‘workfare’ social policies, which entail 
greater surveillance and risk management of the poor, and a corresponding blurring between warfare 
and crime control. The third tier is the debordering of the national and international scales, as policies 
designed to fight organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration create a transnational intersection 
between police and military agencies.  
From this perspective, non-state actors have ‘tooled up’ (146) the state security assemblage. At the 
urban scale, private institutions facilitate state efforts to create ‘safe spaces’ for capital through 
providing surveillance, additional policing forces and ‘hardened’ architecture (ibid). Problematically, 
the perpetuation of open-ended (and functionally endless) ‘securocratic public safety wars’ (Feldman, 
2004) on terrorism, crime, drugs and illegal immigration are used to legitimate the gradual hollowing 
out of access to public space and civil rights (Hallsworth and Lea: 153). Rather than one actor 
amongst a wider network, Hallsworth and Lea conclude that the security state is the pre-eminent 
political model of our time, in which the security entanglements between governments and private 
security companies may lead to dramatic extensions in state power.    
In a discussion of Lefebvre’s analysis of state form, Brenner (2001) discounts both the instrumentalist 
conception of the state as a tool of multinational capital and the state decline thesis. By contrast, he 
argues that state institutions are the essential role player in the production, regulation and reproduction 
of capitalist space (792). The centralised state’s capacity to regulate and channel long-term 
investments gives it a privileged position within the spatialisation of capitalism. Brenner argues that 
the idea of state retreat is inaccurate because it ignores the ‘hyper-productivist’ (799) role of the state 
in organising and configuring space. However, this has been accompanied by a dissociation of the 
state from social redistribution and democratic accountability. From this standpoint, ‘currently 
emergent patterns of authoritarian statism entail a significant enhancement of the state’s role in 
60 
 
mobilising space as a productive force – coupled with a major recalibration of the social power 
relations mediated in and through the state apparatus’ (ibid).  
This cautions against reductionist accounts of the state as the vessel (or perhaps vassal) of capital, 
which may implicitly suggest that popular pressure or partnership on the state apparatus could reverse 
the repressive aspects of urban securitisation (Souza, 2010b: 320). By contrast, Souza (329) argues 
that in many cases ‘the state is not a ‘partner’… the state apparatus as such is an enemy, even if it is 
sometimes (dialectically) more or less genuinely open to pressures from below as a government’ . 
Indeed, Brenner (2001) suggests that much left-wing discourse narrows the political discussion to the 
issue of how the state can best promote economic development and growth within a capitalist 
framework, thus sidestepping the state’s constitutive role within an autocratic political economy. For 
example, a discussion document issued by the Unemployed People’s Movement (2011), one of South 
Africa’s social movements of the radical poor, argues that the left in this country has a tendency to put 
economics before politics. This may result in the application of a technocratic and limited 
developmental paradigm which ignores issues of popular emancipation and democratisation. For 
example, the discourse of ‘service delivery protests’ ignores how community struggles are nestled 
within deeper battles to achieve popular autonomy (Ibid).  
Such perspectives accord with work that has regarded neoliberalism as primarily a political and class-
based restructuring of the state apparatus rather than as an externally imposed response to dominant 
economic forces. The notion of neoliberalism as a global class war entails that measures to 
‘neoliberalise’ society were motivated by a shared perception of political and social crisis among 
elites (Hall, et al., 1978. Parenti, 2000. Mattelart, 2010). The social turmoil and rise of adversarial 
forces, from the student and rights movements in the advanced capitalist countries and insurgent 
forces in the Third World, encouraged the belief among political elites that the post-World War Two 
Keynesian settlement within advanced capitalist countries had benefited too many people and was 
leading to a crisis of over-democratisation and popular involvement. The ‘planetary challenge to 
authority’ (Mattelart, 2010) created a sense of fear amongst political and economic elites that the 
fabric of social order was being undermined by popular demands. Combined with a crisis in the global 
economy, the twinned political and economic states of siege were used to implement dramatic policy 
interventions which served to reduce many of the social welfare nets regarded as encouraging 
adversarial popular behaviour. By increasing the market’s influence over its citizens, the state also 
attempted to restore social discipline as increased competition and insecurity simultaneously served to 
reduce demands for more direct political control. Such policies acted to transmit elite fears about the 
consequences of challenges to the established order into the everyday lives of the ruled (Robin, 2004).  
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One of the central political doctrines of the last three decades has been the Thatcherite slogan: ‘There 
is no alternative’, in which the supposed external constraints of the global economy are seen to be 
objective and transcendent forces which are autonomous from political decision making  (Brenner, 
2001:802). This has profound impacts on the democratic nature of state institutions. The claim to 
transcendence has been used to roll back democratic mechanisms ‘won over a century of popular 
struggle’ (801). Dean (2009) suggests that neoliberalism allows the state to decouple its political 
legitimations from the rhetoric of democratisation, as the supreme reference point for government 
interventions becomes an abstracted ideal of the market. For Fisher (2009), the ‘naturalisation’ of 
neoliberalism as the supreme political ontology, or reality system, of our era, entails an additional 
process of disavowal. While neoliberalism presents an escape from bureaucracy and statism, the 
reality may be that these processes are intensified and less inhibited. As the preceding section has 
shown, the marketisation and commodification of urban space is contingent not merely on 
securitisation but on the coercive apparatus of the state. Contrary to the idea of the ossified state 
withering away under the dynamism of the market, ‘ultra-authoritarianism and capital are by no 
means incompatible ... internment camps and franchise coffee bars co-exist’ (Fisher, 2009:2).  
Sieges 
One of the most dramatic examples of this ‘tooled up’ (Hallsworth and Lea, 2011:146) security state 
are the policing and security mobilisations around international political and economic conferences. 
Since the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999, when the adoption of confrontational tactics by protesters 
unexpectedly shut down the World Trade Organisation meeting, summits have been marked by a pre-
emptive militarisation of urban space (Smith, 2007). Authorities use similar procedures and tactics to 
those seen at mega-events, including the creation of temporary security zones, building barricades, 
and saturation policing (Fernandez, 2008:92-93). However, despite drawing from the same repertoire, 
one crucial area of difference is that policing is intended to disrupt and hinder the mobility of 
protesters rather than to facilitate the movement of tourists. Fernandez (15) observes that such 
policing methods oscillate between ‘hardline’ and ‘softline’ tactics. ‘Soft’ tactics including public 
relations strategies, laws, codes and regulations are mixed with the ‘hard’ use of ‘non-lethal’ crowd 
control technology, mass pre-emptive arrests and ‘overzealous police action’ (ibid). Martin (2011) 
argues that such police displays are indicative of the showcasing of cities, as hosts assert their 
suitability to hold future events. However, this often entails prioritising elite political and economic 
interests over civil liberties, thus lending support to the argument that the police are ultimately the 
armed wing of the state whose central task is ‘obediently doing the government’s bidding’ (43).  
In summary, the policing of urban space has undergone drastic shifts in the last few decades. Three 
key areas stand out. Firstly, the pressures exerted by global neoliberalism leads governments to take 
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measures which maintain the ‘appearance of total security’ (Martin, 2011:29).  Secondly, since 9/11, 
security planners increasingly ‘think the unthinkable’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009: 262) and use a  
total security approach  to prepare for worst case scenarios, which in turn leads to dramatic extensions 
in the powers and capacities of the security state. Thirdly, while these processes are subject to national 
and local permutations, the interconnectivity of these developments is indicative of a global security 
‘style’. Central to this is the blurring of the demarcations of policing and military activities, functions 
and policies. This has occurred in time with the extension of urban securitisation, as architecture, 
technology and governance pivot around ‘designing out’ (Coaffee, 2005) crime and terrorism. Such 
measures reinforce the fragmentation of urban landscapes, ‘creating radicalised and increasingly 
complex patterns of segregation and displacement, and of inclusion and exclusion’ (449).  
Conclusion 
Mark Neocleous (2011:203-204) suggests that the  array of security assemblages at the urban scale, 
whether state based or private, combine to create a kind of low intensity social warfare: 
These are wars in which the battleground is the security of everyday life: wars in which the 
gloomy old everyday practices of some lives must be destroyed and replaced with brighter 
new lives, wars against suspect communities defined as such by the state itself and said to be 
making the territory insecure, wars in the form of acts of security in which the state reasserts 
itself as being a state by insisting on itself as the political mechanism for the fabrication of 
social order … these are the changes connecting everyday insecurities with the nomos of the 
earth, changes enabling the production of political docility in the name of security, changes 
revealing the war on terror to be a war of pacification securing capital accumulation and thus 
to the insecurity of bourgeois order, changes, that is, for the permanent pacification of us. 
As discussed in the opening chapter, Neocleous suggests that pacification is the central security logic 
of both capitalist order and the nation state. At the urban scale, this can be witnessed in the rise of 
‘revanchist’ (Smith, 1996) policing which targets the urban poor, the proliferation of borders and 
enclaves and the temporary state of sieges which emerge around the conferences of transnational 
elites. However, this is as much about the creation and sustainment of economic development as it is 
about control and the ‘destruction’ of suspect communities and ways of life. Under this ‘militarised 
market regime’ (197) governments and their various private stakeholders work to make cities safe for 
profit and consumerism. However, the subtext of this vision of urban modernity is the containment 
and stigmatisation of ‘insecure’ groups and territories.  
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Chapter Four: Cities of Fear and the New Military Urbanism  
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have linked two key arguments. Chapter Two argued that the securitisation of 
mega-events, in which prestigious sporting tournaments are treated as the reference point deserving of 
exceptional policing operations, corresponds to a series of overlapping political and economic 
projects. Chapter Three suggested that, despite their unusual scale and intensity, these temporary 
security measures may be understood as concrete versions of the ‘everyday’ trajectory of urban 
governance. By their nature, many of these evolving trends would appear to elude a synoptic 
overview, but the chapter argued that it is in fact possible to discern a series of security 
preoccupations which are translated throughout the world. In particular, it asserted that urban 
entrepreneurialism, festival and spectacle are supported by militarised forms of social policy, 
surveillance and containment.  
However, this requires a clarification of the concept of militarisation. Although ‘militarisation’ may 
serve as dramatic shorthand to describe increasingly belligerent or authoritarian forms of policing and 
social management, an unsubstantiated definition of what is meant by the term runs the risk of 
diluting its analytic power.  
With this consideration in mind, the chapter will turn to the concept of ‘military urbanism’ as a 
structuring idea under which to subsume the interlinked phenomena described in the previous 
chapters. And, with reference to mega-events, it will be suggested that   the central organisational 
preoccupation behind governance measures is combination of restrictions and mobility. However, this 
chapter will also argue that due to their origins in the global North, many of the critical approaches 
towards urban studies have tended to focus upon how often exaggerated, and in some cases even 
phantasmagorical, official fears about violent crime and terrorism are used to extend the 
‘militarisation of the urban question’ (Souza, 2009). It will be argued that this underplays the extent to 
which legitimate fears about violent crime in the global South may be instrumentalised to the same 
ends. This idea will then be explored within the specific context of post-apartheid South Africa. 
Finally, it will argue that while contemporary security revolves around protecting the stability of 
political and economic systems from crime and disorder, the interactions between the state and 
corporate institutions in some cases embody forms of criminality. Indeed, it will be suggested that the 
crimes of the powerful may be as much a cause of social dislocation and deprivation as the more 
commonly understood variants of risk, disorder and violence.  
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Mega-events and the new military urbanism 
In a wide-ranging body of work, collected in the book Cities Under Siege (2010), British geographer 
Stephen Graham describes the emergence of the new military urbanism, marked by a paradigmatic 
shift in which the logic of war becomes the one of the structuring forces of urbanism. Catalysed by a 
host of broader, overlapping trends, this includes the ‘stealthy militarisation’ (xiv) of policy debates, 
popular culture and urban landscapes and the diffusion of military ideas, templates and procedures 
into the management of urban space. For Graham (89), this combines the profusion of ‘hard, 
militarised borders’ between states and within cities with the mobility of the ‘transnational and urban 
circulations which surround globalisation’.  
The militarisation of urban space is not a new phenomenon. For example, the course of the second 
half of the 20th century was arguably decided in the ruins of Stalingrad and Berlin, as competing 
armies used total war to decimate the cities of their opponents. The Cold War was characterised by 
the fear of nuclear annihilation of cities. Indeed, many of the technologies central to modern cities 
have their origins in Cold War military research, from the internet and wireless communications to 
microwaves and containerisation (65). However, Graham argues that the current trajectory is 
reflective of the ‘polarising worlds’ (4) within cities themselves as a product of growing inequalities 
exacerbated by the dominance of neoliberal forms of governance. Power in many contemporary cities 
is about separating and protecting spaces, privileges, mobilities and ‘risk free’ individuals and groups 
from ‘risky’ surrounding populations and infiltrations (143).  
Graham identifies five key features which entrench the ‘colonisation’ of cities by military doctrine 
and practice. Firstly, the increased use of militarised techniques of tracking and targeting, such as 
surveillance and the pacification of  ‘threatening’ populations, which are disseminated into urban 
security policy in both the ‘homeland’ cities of the North and the world’s ‘neo-colonial frontiers’ 
(xiv). This synergy between domestic and foreign security leads to the second key feature, which 
following Foucault, he calls  a ‘boomerang effect’ in which ‘models of pacification, militarisation and 
control honed on the streets of the global South, are spread to the cities of the capitalist heartlands in 
the North’ (xvi-xvii). These ‘boomerangs’ are not transferred from a single source but are articulated 
through sprawling transnational complexes which intersect government agencies, the technology, 
security, surveillance and entertainment industries and academia who all offer security ‘silver bullets’ 
(xxii) to solve social problems. These complexes both police and profit from the management of 
polarities (9). Inequality and insecurity are mutually reinforcing: perceived risks encourage a security 
logic based on pre-emotion and speculation and the deployment of institutional and technological 
‘quick fixes’ (67, 74).  
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However, the efforts to create bordered and totally secure cities belies the increased interconnectivity 
between the North and South. ‘Western’ cities serve as the primary conduits for the orchestration of 
forms of acquisition and accumulation which are parasitic on the South: ‘the new military urbanism is 
thus linked intimately with the neo-colonial exploitation of distant resources in an effort to sustain the 
richer cities and wealthy urban lifestyles’ (xxiii). This is linked to the increased centrality of cities as 
the medium for warfare, as both state and non-state actors attempt to target the dense infrastructures 
which underpin modern life, from electricity utilities to cellular phone networks. Finally, the new 
military urbanism enrols aspects of popular and material culture. For example, the Sport Utility 
Vehicles (SUVs) popular with the wealthy all over the world derive from military vehicles and are 
resold into the civilian market as offering protection against threatening urban environments. In turn, 
the SUVs’ profligate use of oil is enabled by military efforts to forcibly secure natural reserves in the 
Middle East.   
Graham suggests that the blending of commercial and military practises resonates within a civilian 
culture in which the mobility of consumer capitalism is perceived to be accompanied by perilous 
security risks (67). The attempt to secure and manage the proliferation of transnational flows shifts the 
geographical limits of the nation state. On one hand, borders have been ‘hardened’ and militarised 
amidst the proliferation of increasingly mobile transnational and urban circulations of people and 
capital (89). Security within cities has been sustained by complex new borders sustained by security 
architecture and surveillance. These ‘jittery enclaves’ (100) attempt to create and police a boundary 
with the urban outside. In extreme cases, this includes foreign trading and export zones, which operate 
as ‘quasi-autonomous realms bordered off from their host cities and nations’ (101). In a less dramatic 
variant, the proliferation of gated communities and street closures, as evident in South Africa, creates 
new forms of ‘passage point urbanism’ (106).  
Internally, the overlaps between policing and the military, the quick translation of technology into 
tools of social discipline and the imperatives of gentrification result in a shift towards an increasingly 
powerful security state (23). These new spaces of state power go beyond internal control and 
pacification. The power of the state to reconfigure or erase urban space in the name of security is 
central to the propagation of wider geographies of accumulation. Following Klein (2007), this uses 
exception to profit from shock and dislocation. Crucially, military and policing doctrines which 
subscribe to a ‘seductive geography’ (35) of urban order versus chaos echoes the ‘catastrophic failure 
of the world’s political and economic elites’ (ibid) to address the root causes of the polarisation and 
violence created by neoliberalisation and growing inequality. This also entails a shift in the role of the 
nation state away from guarding defined national borders into ‘internationally organised systems’ 
which separate people and circulations (89).  
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Two aspects of the broader trends which characterise military urbanism have a direct bearing on the 
research concerns of this thesis. As security has taken on an increasingly pre-emptive logic, the line 
between the police and the military is increasingly blurred. On one hand, police agencies use tactics of 
urban warfare to manage domestic cities, adopting SWAT teams and automated drones (98). At the 
same time, militaries are increasingly incorporated into urban policing, notably in the context of 
‘special event security’ at summits and sporting events (ibid). The array of private security providers, 
which augment the state, add an additional layer of urban securitisation. The upshot is that ‘high 
intensity’ or zero tolerance policing merges into a kind of ‘low intensity warfare’ (96). As the police 
and military gear up to target risks, the absence of a ‘uniform wearing enemy’ (ibid) means that urban 
publics become the primary target. In the global South, the target for state violence often becomes 
informal settlements, whose residents are considered a threat to the official goal of achieving world 
class modernity (112). Such spaces are becoming international testing grounds for experiments with 
new forms of ‘securocratic warfare’ (113). The upshot is that policing becomes central to managing 
the boundaries of privilege and power, protecting those who are considered risk free, while also 
enforcing the ‘warehousing’ (96) of risky populations.  
The enforcement of these ‘jittery enclaves’ is revealed in spectacular fashion during the pre-emptive 
militarisation which accompanies major international events. The creation of security islands mimics 
and adopts templates from both the protection of ‘valuable’ urban spaces and actual warzones. For 
Graham (121), the security displays at mega-events are reminiscent of ‘Baghdad’s militarised “Green 
Zone” carved to help protect occupying forces and Western journalists from the spiralling violence 
outside’ (121). The overlaps between mega-events and armed conflict also extends to the destruction 
caused by the evictions and displacements which have characterised some events (125). However, 
these securitisation efforts are intensely theatrical and spectacular, ‘as much about managing global 
branding and TV imagery as it is about keeping risks at bay’ (ibid). Security measures are ‘in a sense 
theatrical, in that their purpose is as much to stage performances of highly visible military and 
security power as it is to prevent protest, terrorism or unrest’ (148).  
As Matt Carr (2010) argues, military urbanism is paralleled by the ‘military futurism’ of the planning 
scenarios with which security establishments imagine future risks. These scenarios have taken an 
apocalyptic turn, imagining future threats emerging from resurgent ‘populism’, environmental 
collapse, resource wars and ‘feral’ or failed cities in the global South. Security forces, and especially 
the military, increasingly present securitisation as the antidote to emergent social and political 
problems (28). The dark scenarios and fantasies about tomorrow are used as a justification for 
militarisation in the present. As Graham (2010: xxvi) suggests, these fantasies reinforce the spatial 
hardening of urban space: cities are not ‘passive backdrops to the construction of security ... the way 
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cities and urban space are produced are seen actually to help constitute these strategies and fantasies, 
as well as their effects (and vice versa)’.  
Graham argues that these fantasies are often grounded in a Manichean view of urban life: cities are 
divided into enclaves of progress and zones of disorder: the valuable versus the surplus. These 
divisions are seen to exist both between countries and regions and within cities themselves. However, 
these imaginative divisions ignore both the extent to which urban wealth is contingent on the 
exploitation of peripheries and the manner in which contemporary urbanism blurs such easy binaries. 
For example, Alsayyad and Roy identify (2006:17) coexisting modes of ‘modern nationalism, 
mediaeval enclaves and imperial brutality’ all within the framework of transnational urbanism. 
Attempts to ensure ‘total security’ over cities are inherently permeable and partial, as the mass and 
density of cities means that notions of absolute security are tenuous ‘fantasies of control’ (Graham, 
2010: 146).  
Phobopolis 
While broadly in agreement with the military urbanism thesis, Souza (2010a: 461) argues that Graham 
unintentionally relies on an overly binary distinction between ‘North’ and ‘South’, ‘developed’ and 
developing. This underestimates the intense divisions which persist within semi-peripheral countries 
such as Mexico, Brazil and South Africa, which combine advanced capitalist infrastructures with 
massive social and economic inequality (ibid). And, indeed, linked to these disparities are long 
histories of authoritarian urban security, control and surveillance. While Graham’s work is marked by 
an effort to escape what he perceives as politically reactionary and dangerous distinctions between 
North and South, through showing the complex security exchanges and ‘transnational architectures of 
control, power and wealth’ (interviewed by Finoki,2007b)  which blur such distinctions, his work 
does tend to focus predominately on the ‘homelands’ of the USA and Europe. By contrast, Souza 
(2011:7) suggests that:  
... from a global North-based perspective, terrorism and the experiences of certain countries 
such as the USA and UK have been often privileged, although ordinary criminality still is a 
crucial component of the discursive landscape and a key market for the security market 
especially in the USA. ... In contrast to this from a global South-based viewpoint, ordinary 
criminality and its connections with the above mentioned three pillars of the “industry of 
fear’’ has understandably deserved more attention (although terrorism is sometimes not 
completely absent as a real or potential threat to the existing socio-spatial order).  
Despite differences between social, historical and regional context, urbanism is globally characterised 
by the perception of city life as war. In what Souza describes as the ‘phobopolis’ [city of fear] (2010a, 
2011), urbanisation is decisively influenced by the fear of violence. While Graham argues that 
attempts to control the mobilities and flows of global capitalism provide the undergirding structure for 
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the various facets of military urbanism, Souza suggests that militarisation within semi-peripheral 
countries is motivated by the proximate reality of violent crime. The fear of violence and its 
responses, from self-segregating gated communities to increasing public support for zero tolerance 
policing, is especially concentrated in semi-peripheral countries and is reflective of a ‘socio-
psychological atmosphere’ ( Souza, 2011: 6) of anxiety. Such fear transcends class, particularly as it 
is the poor who are most vulnerable to predation (Souza, 2009). Souza thus avoids the tendency 
within some critical literature to overemphasise the security fears of the elite and the privileged. 
While Graham acknowledges the existence of an often fearful civilian culture, Souza’s work expands 
on how this background of fear is prevalent across societal strata.  
However, legitimate concerns for public safety can be ‘instrumentalised to reinforce militarisation – 
as it has largely been by the three pillars of the contemporary capitalist “industry of fear”: the mass 
media, the political system and the security market’ (Souza, 2011: 4). Ever radicalising security 
invigorates anxiety and entrenches the perception of dangerous cities, leading to greater social 
fragmentation and mistrust, increased violence between the state and criminals and a more overtly 
hostile and paranoid urban landscape. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter (Campesi, 2010) argues 
that these anxieties result in calls for the transfer of security ‘best practice’ to semi-peripheral 
countries. In turn, these may meld with and augment long-standing facets of authoritarianism, control 
and pacification. The transnational exchange of security suggests that the tactics and doctrines of 
homeland security in the global North are vectored into the global South under the rubric of crime 
control. 
Crime, security and post-apartheid cities  
The fear of urban crime has particular relevance to South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup. 
During the build-up to the tournament, South Africa’s notorious reputation for violent crime was 
viewed by the media as the greatest impediment to the success of security measures. But as some 
researchers were quick to point out, tourists are proportionally far less likely to experience criminal 
victimisation (Rosa Luxemborg Foundation, 2010). However, the image of South Africa as a 
particularly dangerous country has remained powerful. In the following section, I will discuss how 
this image and the everyday reality of criminal violence (or phobopolisation) have served as a 
powerful legitimating force for the extension of variants of military urbanism in South African cities.  
South African cities are marked by the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which created 
an exceptionally violent and brutalising urban environment (Kynoch, 2008, Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation, 2009). Practising an intensely focused form of internal colonialism, 
white authorities historically worked to secure the ‘European’ space of inner cities and suburbs from 
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‘African’ areas, combining the maximal control and exploitation of blacks as a cheap pool of labour 
with the minimising of their freedom of movement (Ballard, 2002). Policing was ‘quasi-military’ 
(Steinberg, 2008:29), deployed almost exclusively as a tool of political repression, including the use 
of torture, death squads and close links between the police and military (Cawthra, 1993). The police 
were viewed as an occupying force by many South Africans, leading to a legacy of popular mistrust 
and resentment (Steinberg, 2008). Along with the deployment of the army during what the 
government euphemistically called ‘unrest’, township planning itself became militarised, with the 
building of wide roads to facilitate the fast deployment of military vehicles and floodlights and 
watchtowers for panoptic surveillance. The apartheid government was prepared to ignore and even 
tacitly support violent crime as long as it did not encroach into ‘European’ areas, resulting in a 
situation where, as Steve Biko (2004:82) observed in the 1970s, whites ‘sun tanning on exclusive 
beaches or relaxing in their bourgeois homes’ were insulated from the true extent of crime.  
In other words, as a post-colonial society, South Africa has a long history of many of the aspects of 
military urbanism identified by Graham, in which security is intimately linked to the maintenance of 
privilege and the pacification and warehousing of ‘dangerous’ populations. Furthermore, the linkages 
between state and criminal violence also mean that the disorder of the post-apartheid period cannot be 
studied in isolation from the political violence which preceded it. As Ellis (1998:296) notes, ‘one of 
the conclusions we may draw from a survey of the last 30 years of South African history is that 
politics and crime are inter-connected and are not always amenable to conventional analyses, one in 
the discipline of political science, the other in criminology’.  
The beginning of the official desegregation of space, as apartheid urban controls began to collapse in 
the late 1980s, saw unregulated access to public space and increased black residence in formerly 
white areas (Rule, 1996). The transition to democracy in the early 1990s, coincided with a dramatic 
upsurge in violent crime, exacerbated by the continuation of political violence into the post-apartheid 
period and the full reintegration of South Africa into the global economy, as the wide circulation of 
consumer goods became targets for crime and organised gangs consolidated their positions (Centre for 
the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009, Hubschle, 2010). While the pattern of victimisation 
has been largely determined by a legacy of skewed sociospatial distribution, as formerly white areas 
are disproportionately affected by property crime while violent contact crime is concentrated in ‘poor 
black social groups and areas’ (Lemanski, 2004:104), the fear of crime has been used to legitimate the 
continuation of racist anxieties into the post-apartheid period. As Hansen (2006: 279) puts it, ‘this 
spectre was completely racialised and the fear had a colour: black’. At the same time the fear of crime 
is pervasive throughout society, especially as the poor bear the brunt of criminal violence (Zikode, 
2007).  
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Simpson argues (2004) that post-apartheid crime is a continuation of the social dislocations created by 
colonialism and apartheid, which effectively criminalised a substantial part of South Africa’s 
population and forced them to live in deprived, abrasive settings. South Africa’s uneven socio-spatial 
development has allowed for the flourishing of a range of criminal pathologies, unresolved traumas, 
alienation and the creation of identities which are grounded in everyday violence as a way of life (5). 
In turn, this suggests that other forms of political and economic practise cannot be ‘cleansed’ or 
absolved of the ‘criminal pathologies of South Africa’s distinctive social development’ (7). The 
upshot is that crime is not just a policing problem, or even just a socio-economic problem, but is 
intimately linked to the ‘experiences of race, class, gender, and the complex identities and historical 
traumas of ordinary South Africans’ (5). This, in turn, accords with Souza’s observation (2009:29) 
that the roots of ‘phobopolisation’ are ‘much more of a social challenge than a mere task for the 
police – and by no means is it a military problem’. 
Since 1994, the ANC-led government has attempted to negotiate between transforming the police 
from an iron hand of political repression into a trusted public service, while also trying to robustly 
reduce rates of violent crime (Altbeker, 2007). Efforts to civilianise the police through inculcating a 
human rights based approach within the ranks have often been resisted by an institutional culture 
which regards this as tantamount to allowing criminal impunity, while the militarisation of some 
crimes, such as cash-in-transit hijackings, which in many cases are orchestrated by former combatants 
from South Africa and neighbouring countries, has fuelled calls for proportional response (Hansen, 
2006). This has been characterised by the incorporation of internationally voguish policing concepts 
such as ‘zero tolerance’ and the ‘war on crime’ (Jensen, 2005). On one hand this has seen the 
continuation of historically embedded  practices within the police service with Legget (2005) 
observing that since at least 2000  the SAPS has reverted  to  wide scale militaristic policing. At the 
same time Samara (2003:37) has argued that ‘ the elements of the old police, from the carry-over of 
officers from apartheid to the deeply entrenched culture of counterinsurgency are not going to be 
removed by the type of influences coming from the United States and other Western powers. Instead 
they will mutually reinforce each other’.  
Efforts to fortify and harden the state’s crime fighting apparatus have been used both to manage state–
society relationships and to pursue foreign policy objectives. The apparent ineffectiveness of national 
policing in reducing high rates of crime has become a major policy issue which opposition parties, the 
media and civil society use to challenge the legitimacy and capability of the governing ANC. In turn, 
the authorities will often adopt high profile actions and aggressive rhetoric to assert the state’s 
capacity to ensure security. As a semi-peripheral country and aspirant sub-regional world power, 
policing is also an important mechanism for the South African state to showcase its power, prowess 
and modernity to the outside world.  
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Despite the centrality of the war on crime to the national political agenda, it would be an exaggeration 
to suggest that violence threatens the long term stability of the state. Indeed, ‘since 1994 the incidence 
of crime has remained more or less stable, albeit at an unacceptably high level’ (Jensen, 2005, 552). 
The backdrop of post-apartheid normalisation against which the war on crime is pursued both 
contrasts and shares similarities with the internal warfare of the recent past. For example, Frederikse 
(1986) characterised South Africa as being in a ‘different kind of war’ which pitted mass resistance 
and guerrilla actions against the apartheid security state and a white population obsessed with the 
perceived threat of ‘urban terrorism’. From the state side, Stiff (2001) discusses how the apartheid 
government was engaged in ‘warfare by other means’ during the 1980s and early 1990’s including 
counter-insurgency warfare, biological weapons development and ‘destabilisation’ campaigns both 
internally and in neighbouring countries. Crucially this centred on the pursuit of internal foes rather 
than ‘external threats’, like terrorists and illegal immigrants (Souza, 2010a:461). In a sense the post-
apartheid state has inherited aspects of this internal war, except that it is officially aimed at dangerous 
criminals rather than political opposition. As Jensen (2005: 568) puts it crime is the ‘enemy within’: 
‘this time, however, the enemies are located within the townships, and there is no readily identifiable 
outside enemy’.  
However, the role of the state’s security forces goes beyond crime control. Most notably, the police 
(and increasingly the military) are used to enforce social order. This facet is most explicit in the crowd 
control tactics and practices which accompany the ever present, and occasionally violent, community 
protests which occur in South Africa. The state response to the ‘revolt of the poor’ has often 
embodied disturbing parallels with the authoritarian practises of the recent past, including the killing 
of unarmed demonstrators (Bofelo, 2011, Pithouse, 2011). This has been accompanied by government 
efforts to label radical community movements as criminal, which in some cases has been used as a 
legitimation for state violence and illegality. State violence against demonstrators occurs against a 
context of the everyday incidents of police harassment and criminalisation which the urban poor 
experience. This is especially true at local and municipal levels where policing is often highly corrupt 
and compromised, as officers serve as the enforcers of local business and political interests. 
‘Phobopolisation’ has a marked impact on the form of post-apartheid cities. Municipal authorities and 
commercial developers have followed the global trend of building world class cities, marked by the 
creation of securitised city improvement districts, malls, casinos and stadiums (Buccus, 2008, 
McDonald, 2008). Gentrification projects which aim to control ‘disorderly’ (Murray, 2008) cities 
have often reinforced spatial segregation, penalising the urban poor under the cover of ‘development’ 
(Samara, 2010). The built environment has become more fortified and hostile, with the proliferation 
of gated communities, access control boom gates, electrified fencing and razor wire, replacing 
apartheid’s absolute partitions with a more fragmented and defensive micro-geography of fortified 
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and enclave spaces. As Kempa and Singh (2008: 335) argue, South Africa renders global trends in 
‘stark relief’, as international moves towards enclave urbanism fuses with historical and institutional 
legacies of spatial exclusion. While the creation of security passage points may be used to manage the 
fallout from massive levels of inequality, it also dramatises the extent to which South Africa remains a 
country of two worlds, perhaps best captured by the Ballardian Danifern ‘golfing and lifestyle estate’ 
outside Johannesburg, whose faux-Tuscan village simulations border on the densely populated 
Diepsloot township and informal settlement.  
This has been reinforced by the emergence of an often heavily armed private security sector, which 
has mushroomed in the post-apartheid period and which substantially outnumbers the police (Kempa 
and Singh, 2008). It is a common sight to see cash-in-transit guards in body armour with sub-machine 
guns at ATMs, normalising the perception that crime in South Africa is equivalent to a low-level war 
(Bremner, 1999). The emergence of this sector is often perceived as marking the retreat of the state, 
due to an inability to reassure the middle and wealthy classes that it can control violent crime. 
However, as Carr observes (2007:207), this sector predates fears about post-apartheid crime. With its 
roots in white anxieties about political violence, ‘terrorism’ and reprisals from black South Africans in 
the wake of the Soweto uprising, the 1970s saw the emergence of one of the world’s first ‘homeland’ 
security industries.  
Furthermore, within the context of post-apartheid security, the relationship between public and private 
policing is often porous and symbiotic (O’Reilly, 2011). The two sectors work in conjunction with the 
state subcontracting functions to the private sector. For example, the ‘Red Ants’ of the Wozani 
security company, who have gained a notorious reputation for violence, are used to perform housing 
evictions and slum clearances (Murray, 2008). In turn, the state has the capacity to provide control 
functions which the private sector does not have the legitimacy or the desire to perform. For example, 
Gibson (2011) argues in the context of evictions of informal settlements that private developers often 
rely on the police power of the state to perform demolitions and removals.  
From this perspective, the state is not a neutral agent which provides security but rather acts to 
enforce an often skewed social order. It would be disingenuous to claim that this is comparable to the 
police state that existed less than two decades ago or to deny that heavy-handed policing in South 
Africa often maintains a degree of popular support because of legitimate fears of violent. But it may 
be equally myopic to deny that this can rapidly transmute into repression and the perpetuation of 
inequality.  
While crime may be viewed as a factor which arrests economic development in South Africa, many 
facets of the post-apartheid, neoliberal transition have served to augment and reinforce certain fields 
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of crime. The growth of a large-scale, sophisticated consumer economy in the midst of serious 
inequality has led to the circulation of goods which are a prime target for crime (CSVR, 2009: 8). As 
recent high-profile cases, such as the linked ‘assisted suicide’ of disgraced mining magnate Brett 
Kebble and the imprisonment of former police commissioner and INTERPOL president Jackie Selebi 
on corruption charges have revealed, organised crime is often closely linked to political and business 
power, in networks of complicity that problematise the strict distinctions between the legal and illegal 
(Weiner, 2011). As Standing (2004) argues, mainstream criminological paradigms regard organised 
crime as a kind of anti-social virus existing in opposition to the legal world of business and 
government. By contrast, in the context of a study on gangs in the Cape Flats, he observes that the 
success of organised crime is contingent on gaining strategic access to individuals and institutions 
within the state (39). Furthermore, such gangs serve as a form of criminal governance in areas where 
the state has withdrawn or did not exert much authority to begin with. The entrepreneurial strategies 
of criminals often display, albeit in exaggerated and violent form, aspects of capitalist development 
within ‘mainstream society’, such as the assertion of power through the control of urban space and the 
monopolisation of markets and access to state institutions. Rather than acting as the antithesis of 
legitimate economic development, Standing (53) concludes that ‘insofar as the Cape Flats are 
characterised by a gross polarisation between power and wealth, between an elite and those they 
exploit, organised crime can be seen as a form of predatory capitalism, increasingly characteristic not 
just of South Africa but of the wider global economy’.   
State-corporate crime and neoliberalism  
Indeed a growing body of critical literature has attempted to link such predatory forms of 
accumulation to the increased corporate dominance over public policy. At the legal scale of 
interactions between nation-states and corporate actors, neoliberalism has created opportunities for 
new forms of ‘state-corporate crime in which one or more institutions of political governance pursue a 
goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and distribution’ 
(Welch, 2006: 263). While these alliances are forged for financial interest, they are sustained by 
political dynamics which serve to resist the designation of these actions as unethical and illegal, and 
afford impunity against prosecution (ibid). However, rather than aiming to provide a normative 
evaluation of this kind of elite criminality, this section will use the literature to provide a conceptual 
model of how economic projects fuse with political dynamics. Such a model provides a useful 
framework from which to construct a picture of the governance structures evident in the securitisation 
of mega-events.  
Snider (2000) positions an upsurge in state-corporate crime as a direct outcome of the neoliberal 
‘counter-revolution’ and argues that the state’s punitive regulation of the corporate sector has all but 
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disappeared. She argues (171) that the knowledge claims of neoliberalism entail that government 
regulation inhibits the maximum efficiency of the market. In turn, the state is expected to provide 
persuasions, rewards, tax breaks and publicly-funded free goods, such as safety and security, to attract 
capital. This is sustained by the claim of ‘trickle down’ benefits, in which wealth and development 
can only be created and maintained through the creation of favourable conditions for private 
investment. Such knowledge claims provide a legitimation for most forms of acquisition and profit 
making and leads to a growing incapacity on the part of the state to regulate the behaviour of 
corporate actors. However, Snider (192) argues that neoliberal ideas have succeeded not because they 
produced a superior approach to managing economic development but because they were compatible 
with the concerns of hegemonic interests: these ideas ‘had legs propelling them off the computer 
screens of academics and into corporate board rooms, editorial offices and Parliament because these 
ideas were useful to the most powerful players in the world’.  
This highlights the limitations of approaches to state corporate crime, which ‘black box’ (Tombs and 
Whyte, 2009) the state as a conceptual reference point whose role is assumed rather than discussed 
and analysed. Tombs and Whyte (2009) identify three dominant theoretical approaches to the state 
regulation of capital: the compliance school, the neoliberal perspective and capture theories. All three 
approaches treat the state and corporate sectors as distinct and separate from each other. The 
compliance approach holds that regulation is dependent on the cooperation of the corporate sector. 
The state has to recognise that it has limited power over business and that overly punitive regulation 
could be counter-productive and actively harmful to the state. The neoliberal approach inverts this: it 
is the state whose interventionist tendencies obstruct the rational play of the free market. The 
neoliberal worldview holds the idea of ‘deregulation’ and the withdrawal of state intervention as key 
tenets of socio-economic advancement. In contrast, the capture theory sees the state as being 
vulnerable to ‘hostile takeovers’ by business. The influence of corporate lobbying and an elite 
consensus on neoliberalism serve to institutionalise corporate control of the mechanisms of the state. 
This view has become popularised through the so-called ‘alter-globalisation’ literature, which 
describes the erosion of democratic control of the state by the voracious power of multinational 
capital. All three approaches, despite their clear differences, share a common view of the state and 
corporations which is based on opposition and externality – two sets of institutions which, depending 
on one’s views, are antagonistic or beneficial in relation to each other.  
However, the externalising of these relationships often relies on an artificial binary distinction 
between the state and capital. For example, in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, Ashman, Fine 
and Newman (2010:37) argue that:  
The financial system and the state are bound together by the minerals–energy complex. As we 
understand it, the complex is a close partnership between the state and private capital, with 
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state-owned capital playing a major role…  [The post-apartheid South African state] has 
chosen to adopt neo-liberal orthodoxy in deference to private capital’s global goals, rather 
than coaxing or coercing private capital to invest in order to achieve economic growth and 
structural transformation. … Capital has disengaged itself quite successfully from the social 
crisis in South Africa and engaged fairly well with international business trends. 
Rather than an external or forced imposition of policies or regulation, this entails state collusion and 
complicity (Leys, 2005). For example, in the context of state regulation of private security, Zedner 
(2006: 283) argues that ‘reference to the ostensible subjects of regulation as partners and stakeholders 
firmly disabuses any notion that regulation here takes the form of hierarchical imposition of norms’. 
The state effectively panders and ‘pimps’ (267) to the industry. This process also entails direct 
institutional and personal alliances between governments and the private sector, as evidenced in the 
‘revolving doors’ which exists between  state and private personal (O’Reilly, 2010). Bassey (2010:91) 
argues that ‘shock’ capitalism circulates through a series of ‘slick alliances’ which link national 
political and security elites with external and transnational players. This allows private actors to ‘hide’ 
behind the localised military and institutional ‘shield’ provided by the state (ibid). In turn, this 
relationship provides substantial opportunities for enrichment by state elites and politically connected 
local economic players.  
Whyte (2007) argues that the contemporary capitalist social order is characterised by a tension 
between the practical need to enforce a rule of law which preserves the viability of the economic 
system and ideological criteria which place the values of the ‘free market’ and accumulation above 
legal restrictions. The second impulse finds concrete expression during ‘shock therapy’ experiments 
which are accompanied by the ‘creation of liminal and relatively hidden spaces which provide fertile 
locations for corruption involving private enterprise’ (180). Whyte cites the occupation of Iraq as an 
example of shock par excellence. The US-led CPA issued a series of orders which attempted to 
refashion Iraq’s political and economic structure into a neoliberal ‘paradise’, including the 
deregulation of wages and the labour market, the privatisation of state enterprises, the eradication of 
import tariffs and trade barriers and legal immunity for foreign contactors (181). Not only did this 
allow foreign companies to extract record profits from the country but the scale and intensity of 
appropriation, particularly of oil resources, saw an unknown amount of wealth accumulated through 
embezzlement, bribery and overcharging.  Whyte (177) concludes that the attempt to transform Iraq 
into a massive ‘free enterprise zone’ was one of the ‘most audacious and spectacular crimes of theft in 
modern history’. The conditions for this ‘spectacular’ theft were paved by another form of ‘shock and 
awe’: the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by the United States and its coalition allies. The 
radical experiment in privatisation was packaged into a dramatic expression of state power by the 
most powerful military apparatus in human history.  
76 
 
Indeed, Welch (2008) positions the Iraq war within a greater reconfiguration of state power. On the 
one hand, policing is being fragmented through the greater incorporation of private actors, seen in the 
mercenary companies who gained such notoriety during the occupation. However, this ‘decoupling’ 
of policing from governance is accompanied by a greater authoritarianism within the state, as 
corporate actors are removed from legal obligations via executive decree (361). This suggests that the 
outsourcing of some aspects of state security actively entrenches the power of governments in 
reducing the democratic accountability and public visibility of certain policing actions. As Hallsworth 
and Lea (2011) have argued, the privatisation of aspects of security augments rather than supplants 
the state, through increasing the number of actors who enforce social order. To return to O’Reilly 
(2010), it can be argued that the divide between public and private security actors is often an artificial 
separation, as the relationship between the state and corporate actors is characterised more by 
symbiosis than opposition.  
Writing in the context of the beginning of neoliberal reforms in the early 1980s, Walter Karp (cited in 
Marcus, 1989:138) suggested that the aim of these policies was to  
... release capitalism from its republican bondage ... to become what Karl Marx thought it 
would be by nature – the transcendent force and the measure of all things, the power that 
reduces free politics to trifling, the citizen to a worker, the public realm to the state, the state 
to an instrument of repression protecting capitalism from the menace of liberty and equality, 
with which it grew up as Cain grew up with Abel.  
While neoliberal ideology claims to free individuals from the grip of overweening state power, in 
actual application, the privatisation and commodification of both urban space and policing has been 
accompanied by a marked intensification of intertwined corporate and state power throughout the 
world. As Klauser (2007) has suggested, within the context of mega-events, this has been a marked 
cause of social anxiety, as private interests wield the ability to rapidly restructure and enforce new 
boundaries upon urban space. The examples provided of corporate–state crime show that this logic is 
not the exclusive property of sporting organisations but extends even into inter-state conflicts and 
geopolitics.  Political and economic actors may present their actions as public safety measures, from 
surveillance to paramilitary forms of policing, necessary to protect their citizens from domestic and 
international threats. However, there are many cases where the collaboration between the state and 
corporate actors extorts public funds, subverts the law and can leave damaging social legacies. In the 
most extreme cases, this reduces democracy to a mere procedural sheath for plutocratic enrichment.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the governance of mega-events serves as a concretisation of several 
overlapping themes within urban security. This links the commodification of public space with the 
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increased corporate-state symbiosis on security issues and a global shift toward militarised and pre-
emptive forms of policing. Arguably, this is undergird and radicalised by a psychopolitics of 
insecurity generated by the increased socio-economic polarisation of cities. To return to Neocleous’s 
(2011:292) argument that studies of security are often limited by a reliance on distinctions between 
policing, militarism and social ordering, I have used military urbanism as a linking device to highlight 
how these are interconnected at the urban scale. In the case of mega-events, it has been suggested that 
the accompanying security measures actively bring to the surface many of these interrelated trends. At 
the same time, these shows of strength actively betray profound anxieties on the part of transnational 
elites about the social consequences and dangers created by the global political and economic order.  
In contrast to the research described in the introduction, these chapters have attempted to problematise 
the idea of mega-event security as an unmitigated social good. Indeed, it has argued that security is 
more than just a response to risk but is linked to political and economic projects, representations and 
perception of dangers and threats and a transnational elite consensus on creating world class cities. 
These chapters have taken a critical stance on mega-event security, which maintains that governance 
is constructed to facilitate and fortify privilege and power within host countries. Most notably, it has 
argued that the corporate influence over security, as highlighted by the ownership structures of mega-
events, is aligned with the entrenchment of authoritarian and militarised state security at the urban 
scale. However, due to the theoretical nature of this section, these developments have been discussed 
in abstracted and generalised terms. With the international context sketched out, the following 
chapters will turn to a focused study of the security operations for the 2010 World Cup.  
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
As outlined within the first section of the opening chapter, this thesis adopts an interpretative 
epistemological approach towards security. Using the concept of securitisation (Buzan, Waever and 
de Wilde, 1998) as a methodological base, the thesis aims to explore how security is constructed by 
political, economic and social processes. In particular, this contrasts with the ‘realist’ approach of 
previous literature on the governance of the 2010 World Cup, which focused on security as ‘a political 
and ontological given, an objective fact and/or desire of all human beings and states’ (Neocleous, 
2007: 133).  
As an emergent, inter-disciplinary field of research, there has yet to be a specific study of the 
methodological challenges of collecting primary material on mega-event security. Generally, critical 
research has used a two-pronged methodological strategy. Firstly, (Klauser, 2011:4) this has entailed 
the critical analysis of official reports, such as parliamentary minutes and police documents, and the 
collection of archival material from local, national and international media. Secondly, some 
researchers have been able to conduct interviews with a broad range of security ‘stakeholders’, such 
as high ranking police officials and ‘on the ground’ personal (ibid).  
While this thesis has adopted this methodological approach, it has overwhelmingly focused on the 
first aspect of compiling an archive of reports, statements and media information. This was a matter of 
necessity due to the persistent difficulty in gaining access to ‘stakeholders’ in government and the 
private sector. From August 2009, I attempted to secure a series of interviews and site visits to the 
then uncompleted stadiums. In most cases, my efforts to organise interviews with SAPS and 
government representatives were unsuccessful. Although my initial requests for interviews met 
positive responses, in all cases agreed upon dates and times for interviews were cancelled and 
indefinitely postponed. As this fieldwork was conducted during the preparations for the tournament, 
respondents also claimed that various operational details could not be discussed. However, while 
unsuccessful in obtaining face-to-face interviews, I was able to conduct several interviews via email. 
Within this time period I was also able to secure a copy of the confidential OA/NATJOINTS security 
concept document from one of the coordinators of the Durban security preparations. Through a 
personal contact with a Sony subcontractor, I was allowed to conduct a walk-about of the main public 
area of the Nelson Mandela Bay stadium but this access did not extend to the operational rooms 
within the complex.  
Similar problems were experienced in attempting to conduct interviews with members of sporting 
associations and the private security industry. FIFA and SAFA declined interview requests and only 
one private security contractor replied to my initial questions. After the 2010 World Cup had ended, I 
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filed unsuccessful interview requests with the Minister of Police as well as attempting to use informal 
channels to interview the Commissioner General of Police. However, I was more successful in 
gaining an in-depth interview with a POPCRU steward. Finally, I was also provided with the phone 
number details for one of the stewards hired by Stallion Security for the 2010 World Cup, but after 
multiple attempts was unable to contact her. 
However, according to a researcher from the investigative television programme Carte Blanche who I 
consulted with, getting interviews with police officials is generally difficult, even for well-established 
media production companies (personal correspondence with Leila Dougan, 22 September 2011). 
Furthermore, this may also be indicative of increased restrictions on academic and media access to the 
security services and government documentation (Duncan, 2011). This also created the practical 
problem of verifying police acronyms and titles, which are sometimes used in a flexible way within 
official documents, and the difficulty is further compounded by the change in ranking system. For 
example, from early 2010 some police media statements began referring to the SAPS by its former 
apartheid name the ‘South African Police Force’ (SAPF). However, this seemed to be only used in 
some reports and as of early 2012 appears to have been abandoned. As a result, this thesis refers to the 
‘SAPS’ throughout.  
As van der Spuy (2011: 6-7) suggests, the research methodology of policing and security studies in 
South Africa is often contingent on gaining ethnographic access to government institutions. This has 
focused on ‘constructive engagement’ with policy and attempts to create ‘intellectual partnerships’ 
between the police and researchers (6). In recent years, this has seen the growth of ‘on the ground’ 
research, which details the ‘raw, actual experiences’ of policing (7). However, while greater access to 
the police and military would have been desirable, this thesis focuses on the overall securitisation of 
the 2010 World Cup rather than exclusively on the South African state. Depicting the security 
governance of the 2010 World Cup requires a study of how this was planned and operationalised at 
national, provincial and urban scales, which is further complicated by the extent to which security 
measures are not just confined to a national setting but entail overlapping and multiple spatialities and 
levels of securitisation. For the duration of the tournament, South Africa’s national security measures 
were linked up with a ‘global security edifice’ (Cornelissen, 2011:3229), which involved the 
participation of transnational policing networks and the use of benchmarks applied at prior mega-
events. This ‘research terrain’ (O’Reilly, 2010:183) is made even more ‘fuzzy’ by the security 
interfaces which occur between state security and high-level corporate actors from transnational 
sporting bodies and their advertising sponsors. Due to the secrecy which accompanies security 
measures, it may not be possible to identify all the involved parties and institutions.  
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This in turn, places restrictions on efforts to create a comprehensive survey of the governance process 
and of the institutional forces and security actors which undergird it. On the one hand, attempting to 
capture the multi-scalar and transient features of World Cup security may promote a focus on the 
national scale of tournament mobilisation. However, this may force researchers to rely on 
generalisations and to downplay the importance of regional and urban contexts. In addition, the 
secrecy associated with national security results in a situation in which much of the information about 
operations and deployment is not publically accessible. With regards to the 2010 World Cup, this is 
somewhat mitigated by the combination of security with state branding , which entailed that many 
aspects of security preparations, such as police numbers, expenditure and equipment procurement, 
were not only made public but actively promoted by the government. However, this presents its own 
problems as the rhetoric of security used by officials and disseminated through the media and 
academia may entail futher generalisations. In turn, it may simplify complex institutional ecologies, 
local specificities internal power struggles and underestimate the role of accident and chance, active 
official dissemination and exaggeration. 
While the SAPS were the primary security agency for the tournament, security measures were both 
internationally ordered (Graham, 2010) and temporary. In order to capture the different nodes of this 
‘complex’, the thesis adopted an investigative methodology (Hughes, 2007. Turse, 2008.), which used 
primary research to highlight the exchanges, collaborations and ‘revolving doors’ between the state, 
private sector and transnational institutions. This approach was used to identify the political 
economies which undergird security operations at the 2010 World Cup and to signpost the 
interactions between public policy and security technology and strategies.  
As a result, the lack of access to official contacts was an advantage in certain respects. The 
positioning of researchers as ‘partners’ to government institutions may encourage an uncritical 
approach towards ‘national security’ and identification with the dictates of power (Chomsky, 1969).   
This thesis is thus intended as a critical analysis of security politics, rather than an in-depth record of 
the practical experience of policing the 2010 World Cup or as a series of policy prescriptions.  
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Chapter Six: The Security Governance of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, South 
Africa.  
Introduction 
Despite the research constraints noted in Chapter Five, Cornelissen (2011) and van der Spuy (2010) 
have both produced comprehensive surveys which identify the actors, operational deployments and 
logistics involved in the 2010 World Cup security measures. But while both of their articles provide a 
thorough framing of the security measures, and anchor the South African example within wider 
processes of mega-event governance, their respective analyses raise as many questions as they 
answer.  
Cornelissen describes the World Cup security measures as a political project of fortifying the state 
undertaken by elites (3222) in a context in which the speed of post-apartheid socio-economic change 
has been accompanied by high levels of criminal violence and an attendant public mistrust in the 
ability of the state to provide security. While the South African World Cup occurred against an 
overarching political and economic structure of mega-event securitisation, the tournament was given 
an additional significance in that it preceded the staging of mega-events in Southern countries such as 
Brazil, which have comparable security dynamics and challenges (3222). However, Cornelissen 
argues that efforts to use the World Cup to fortify the state for the benefit of ordinary South Africans 
were circumscribed by the institutional framework dictated by FIFA, which served as a constraining 
factor that determined the parameters of state deployment (3227). The fixed nature of FIFA 
regulations meant that South African temporarily became part of the aforementioned ‘global security 
edifice’ (3229), which included FIFA, foreign security services and private security companies. 
However, FIFA used a combination of fixed frameworks, which provided little leeway for direct 
intervention by national and urban authorities, to ensure that security measures derived from its 
commercial and institutional preferences. Although this echoes some of the critiques of FIFA’s role in 
South Africa outlined in Chapter One, Cornelissen suggests that the association’s ‘interventions’ were 
marked by a ‘desire to ensure adequate logistical and infrastructural readiness’ (3228) rather than an   
focus on securing profits (Eick,2010).  
In some cases, this enforced South Africa’s skewed socio-spatial legacies by ensuring that World Cup 
venues were in gentrified and securitised retail and leisure areas (3231). From this standpoint, it 
remains to be seen whether the security infrastructure of the tournament left a legacy of improved 
urban security for all, or if it intensified exclusion (3235). Due to the exceptional nature of the 
tournament, it would be difficult for the state to maintain such a high degree of operational readiness, 
giving credibility to the argument that security measures failed to provide a durable legacy for 
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ordinary South Africans (3233). Cornelissen suggests that the World Cup may then have long-term 
implications for the intensification of the ‘privatised securitisation’ of enclaves, access control and 
surveillance, in which the ‘state has tended to be a bystander’ whose sovereignty is undermined by the 
involvement of private and international security actors (3235). However, despite these concerns, she 
suggests that there are grounds to remain optimistic about the ‘accumulated knowledge practices and 
freshly piloted surveillance practices’ (ibid) of the World Cup leaving a positive security legacy, 
although conceding that this  may have remained in already exclusive and securitised urban areas.  
However, the figuring of the South Africa government as a security ‘bystander’ does not square with 
the ‘hyper-productivist’ (Brenner, 2001) role that the state played in delivering World Cup security. 
Despite the involvement of external actors, the South African government remained the statutory and 
operational platform for security, while the human, technological and financial resources deployed 
during the World Cup would have not been possible without significant state intervention. Put 
broadly, Cornelissen’s account of the South African government as a ‘politically fragile’ (3235) host 
serving as a mechanism for FIFA fails to account for the extent to which the security measures during 
mega-events require infrastructural developments and human resources which only a select number of 
countries are capable of mobilising (Bernhard and Martin, 2011).  
By contrast, van der Spuy (2010:106) lauds the show of state power during the 2010 World Cup, and 
suggests that it reinforced the state’s political and organisational authority and served symbolically as 
a ‘bold assertion of the role of the state in the fractured world of modern security’. This broad 
affirmation of sovereignty was dependent on the role of a ‘centralised and militarised security 
machine’ (107), coordinated at urban, regional, national and transnational scales. The generous 
allocation of state resources allowed for the creation of a ‘war machine’ operating at horizontal and 
vertical levels, which was pre-emptively responsive to a range of threats, from crime to ‘domestic 
extremism’, including protests and strikes (112). Van der Spuy suggests that the penalties for security 
failure, and by extension the failure of the government to meet its security guarantees to FIFA, would 
have had ‘dire consequences’ but does not elaborate on their content and implications. While it is 
conceded that there were concerns about the extent to which the security measures and criminal 
justice system appeared to zealously protect the commercial interests of FIFA, it is suggested that the 
regulatory framework of the tournament maintained a strict distinction between national security and 
the policing of FIFA’s interests.  Van der Spuy acknowledges that while tournament security may 
have had ‘illiberal tendencies’ (109) such as the displacement of the urban poor and clampdowns on 
labour action, the ultimate barometer of the success of security measures is the extent to which the 
institutional legacies of the ‘war machine’’ (112) can be utilised in everyday policing. This, she 
concludes, is dependent on the question of accountability and the extent to which the security 
expenditure can be justified, based on long-term applicability. In particular, she argues that the focus 
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created by a shared security project can transcend the ‘sectarian impulses’ (109) which undermine 
institutional cooperation. More exactly, this would entail ‘political, financial and social accountability 
for the decisions made regarding the prioritisation of the security concerns of some over others’ (120).  
What is not considered is that the securitisation of mega-events itself can be used to justify 
extraordinary and exceptional measures which provide a legitimation for an official lack of 
accountability. Indeed the role of an extra-national organisation such as FIFA in influencing the 
trajectory of national security is unexplored. In contrast to Cornelissen, van der Spuy prioritises the 
role of the state. However, the role of the government in enforcing commercial restrictions on the 
behalf of FIFA is sidestepped, or rather, regarded as a secondary concern to the issue of how security 
measures can be best maximised for post-tournament application. She concludes that the test of the 
success of security measures will be in their applicability to ‘ordinary’ security governance: it is 
surprising then that while she describes the measures as a militarised war machine there is no mention 
made of this being accompanied by parallel efforts to militarise the everyday role of the SAPS. In this 
sense it may be posited that inasmuch as ‘excessive’ responses are created by special circumstances, 
these may equally have been indicative of a broader governmental trajectory.  
Although Cornelissen and van der Spuy provide detailed and wide ranging accounts of the 
chronology, extent and scope of the World Cup security measures, their analyses cohere on the idea of 
security as an unquestionable good (Neocleous, 2000). For the former, the question is how to ensure 
that security legacies become more accessible to the broader public, while for the latter the ultimate 
test is how to ensure the best deployment into post-World Cup policing. Essentially, the central 
question remains of how the state can best be aided in improving security. The presentation of the 
World Cup as an event which required exceptional security measures is assumed as a self-evident 
truth. Furthermore, it is assumed that different actors wanted to implement a ‘flat, apoltical’ (Boyle, 
2011) form of security practice, centred on protecting crowds against real threats of terrorism and 
crime. For instance, while Cornelissen acknowledges that the ‘discursive legitimations’ (3225) for 
mega-events may justify intrusions into the rights of citizens, it is implied that this could be positive if 
it can be proved to ‘have bolstered the state’ and its ability to fight crime (3235).  
Notably, Cornelissen and van der Spuy both adopt a figuring of the relationship between the state and 
capital which is based on externality and opposition (Tombs and Whyte, 2009). While Cornelissen 
argues that the state’s efforts to provide durable security for all South Africans was limited by the 
frameworks mandated by FIFA, van der Spuy suggests that the World Cup served as a bold assertion 
of state power in the midst of a more privatised security landscape. Despite these differences, they 
both share the assumption that the state’s role in security has been reduced and superseded by private 
actors. In this sense, it is implied that the bolstering of the state’s coercive powers are in fact social 
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goods. However, this underestimates the extent to which the state security apparatus can itself be a 
force of oppression and a cause of social anxiety (Souza, 2010b: 320)  
So while Cornelissen and van der Spuy cite some of the research discussed in Chapter Two, they 
underplay the more critical aspect of this work. For example, Cornelissen (3222) references 
Giulianotti and Klauser (2010) and Gaffney (2010) as evidence of how countries like South Africa 
provide a ‘complex securitisation terrain’. Van der Spuy (108) alludes to Boyle and Haggerty’s 
discussion of spectacular security (2009) to describe how mega-events maintain an ‘expanded logic’ 
of risk prevention.  
But neither of them addresses the aspects of these theoretical templates which problematise the 
normalisation of mega-event exceptionality. In varying degrees, the works cited above argue that the 
intensification of mega-event security is as much indicative of contemporary political power as it is of 
a pragmatic response to increasingly dangerous urban environments. The policing measures of mega-
events may entail the temporary establishment of extra-legal forms of security governance, dramatic 
amplifications of state power, the denial of civil liberties, and usage of the rhetoric of exceptionality 
to leverage social compliance. Cornelissen and van der Spuy hint that these may be outcomes of 
security governance, but these are presented as unintended consequences rather than structural facets 
of these temporary security assemblages.  
As a result, both accounts underestimate the extent to which the concept of security may be enfolded 
into a range of institutional agendas and projects which go substantially beyond protecting publics 
from risk. In turn, this leads to the question of how the 2010 World Cup was securitised or presented 
as a referent object demanding exceptional protection (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 1998). As 
Bernhard and Martin (2011) argue, this requires an overview of the political and societal processes 
through which security is constructed. However, the size and import of this question requires its own 
study, which will be provided in the next chapter. While this chapter will present evidence which 
suggests that the institutions involved in governance are not merely neutral security providers, the 
focus is squarely on describing the size and scale of deployments. This chapter is intended to create a 
contextual and historical backdrop against which later, more overtly theoretical chapters can be 
framed.  
This chapter will thus take a different route in describing the security governance of the 2010 World 
Cup. Although this process did entail differences and conflicts between the government and private 
actors, these were overshadowed by a far greater degree of collaboration between FIFA and the South 
African government. It will be argued that the while the World Cup security measures enrolled a 
multiplicity of agents and organisations, and worked upon a set of security templates and procedures 
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outlined by FIFA, these were actualised through the state security apparatus. Furthermore, it will 
challenge the idea of this as a politically neutral reassertion of the state’s ability to deliver security for 
its citizenry. While van der Spuy and Cornelissen both omit the remilitarisation of the SAPS from 
their account of security governance, this chapter will propose that this process was in fact linked into 
the preparations for the 2010 World Cup. This is intended to begin a repoliticisation (Neocleous, 
2000) of the security operations for the 2010 World Cup which will be developed in subsequent 
chapters.  
Chapter Summary  
In the six-year lead-up period to South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the issue of 
security drew more scrutiny than any other area of preparation. Most notably, international media 
coverage was characterised by scepticism about the state’s capacity to successfully orchestrate and 
manage an incident-free event. Although issues such as terrorism were raised, the bulk of the focus 
fell upon the country’s violent crime situation. This chapter will consider how the South African 
government, with assistance from FIFA, foreign states and the private sector organised and 
implemented safety and security measures.  
Heightened, and in many cases exaggerated, security risks are common to events of such magnitude 
and, in the case of South Africa, most of these concerns stemmed from the country’s reputation for 
high rates of violent crime. Although this provided impetus to extensive security operations, this was 
planned within the confines of a legislative and regulatory framework mandated by FIFA. As a result, 
the 2010 security measures reflected the spatial and governance characteristics established in previous 
tournaments.  
While the primary statutory policing responsibilities rested with the South African government, the 
SAPS and the LOC, security measures also enrolled the participation of regional and transnational 
policing bodies such as INTERPOL. In addition, the South African government worked with the 
policing and intelligence bodies of other countries, whose representatives were deployed in the 
country during the tournament. Finally, the security network also extended to the participation of the 
private security sector, which was active in a variety of capacities.  
With the SAPS as the primary operational lynchpin, national government drafted a security plan 
which was replicated at provincial and local levels. In particular, the creation of the National Joint 
Operational and Intelligence Structure (NATJOINTS) was used to coordinate the mobilisations of the 
SAPS, the national defence force (SANDF), state intelligence, metropolitan police services and 
private security employees. Although initial plans entailed that the LOC was responsible for safety 
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within the 10 designated event stadia, the state took over these duties after a series of wage disputes 
with the company subcontracted to provide stadium services. Security measures also entailed the 
cooperation of various government departments, metropolitan emergency and health services and the 
intensification of security measures around national ports of entry. In practice, this entailed that a 
wide remit of public policy normally considered distinct from policing, such as health, transport and 
energy was incorporated into security. Using a militarised command and control structure, 
government institutions worked to install an unprecedented public–private policing operation 
throughout designated urban geographies. 
Along with the supranational and national factors which determined the security regime implemented 
during the 2010 World Cup, host cities implemented their own plans. Although these were largely 
standardised, in accord with the host city agreements dictated by FIFA and national security plans, 
urban authorities used the resources provided by tournament preparations to augment their existing 
security and surveillance resources.  
The sophisticated, albeit temporary, ‘war machine’ established during the World Cup appeared in 
tandem with the state’s attempts to remilitarise the SAPS. This chapter will argue that the pre-World 
Cup ‘war talk’ on the part of the state may have been as much a public relations enterprise as a 
coherent strategy. However, even if the reasoning behind remilitarisation lacked a coherent 
articulation at a policy level, a concurrent rise in police violence suggest that the concept of 
remilitarisation has disturbing ramifications for the role of the police in post-apartheid society, which 
threaten to roll back the moves made towards civilianisation.  
While the months prior to the 2010 World Cup saw concerns raised about  the threat of criminal and 
political violence, owing to events such as the Cabinda terrorist attacks on the Togolese football team 
and the murder of Eugene Terreblanche, the actual event was characterised by the relative absence of 
major security incidents. From the perspective of both FIFA and the South African government, the 
2010 World Cup was considered a security success. However, at many points this success was reliant 
on the use of repressive measures such as restrictions on protest.  
The research for this chapter is based on interviews, planning documents, parliamentary minutes and 
news reports. However, it should also be noted that the methodology is restricted by the nature of 
national security, in which many details of planning are not publicly available as they are considered 
to be ‘sensitive’ information by the state. 
87 
 
State Branding  
Security fears: South Africa and the international context.  
As with other mega-events, the lead-up to South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup was 
accompanied by often highly critical local and international media coverage of the government and 
LOC’s preparations. Not only was South Africa the first African country to host an event of such 
magnitude but the country’s high rates of violent crime meant that much coverage suggested that the 
country was not a safe destination for prospective tourists. Furthermore, reports exhibited a 
pronounced scepticism about the state’s capacity to secure the event, particularly in light of the 
stringent security criteria which have come to accompany mega-events. 
This negative reporting was given credence by statements made by sporting and political officials 
who appeared to echo this scepticism. For example, in 2006, Eric Bost, the US ambassador to South 
Africa publicly suggested that the crime situation would discourage visitors (News24, 2006). A year 
later, FIFA secretary general Jerome Valcke also claimed to be concerned about the crime situation in 
the country and said that security was a more pertinent issue for South Africa than with previous 
hosting countries (News24, 2007). This was accompanied by allegations that FIFA had considered 
Australia as the ‘Plan B’ host in the case of a major security incident in South Africa (MacGregor, 
2009).  
The media prominence attributed to the tournament allowed stories which linked crime to the 2010 
World Cup to garner a substantial amount of coverage. For example, in January 2010, the local e-TV 
network broadcast a clip of two self-described vehicle hijackers announcing their intention to commit 
armed robberies during the tournament. Later in the same week, much coverage was given to an 
British-based company Protektorvest, which offered ‘stab proof’ body armour for prospective visitors. 
While the LOC denounced the company for attempting to capitalise on fear, one investigative report 
suggested that the story may have been an elaborate hoax (Mouton, 2010). The impact of the media 
reporting on security was regarded as an issue of central importance to the organisers of the 
tournament. City of Cape Town official Richard Bosman, who coordinated the Western Cape Security 
stream, admitted that the 2010 tournament preparations were conceived of as a trial by media: ‘we 
consistently looked at what the media were saying, and aimed to change some of these negative 
perceptions… security is not just about crime, it also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service 
delivery is also a part of our security planning’ (interview, 20 July 2010). In the face of such negative 
publicity, the organisers were quick to disassemble and question the legitimacy of such portrayals. 
The Proterktorvest incident was denounced as shameless profiteering from fear, with official police 
magazine Rivoningo claiming that ‘the risk of indiscriminate stabbing is very low for an individual 
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who attends a soccer match at a stadium, or at any of South Africa’s tourism venues’ (Shabangu, 
2010: 22).  
Former Deputy Minister of Police, Fikile Mbalula, further argued that negative reporting deliberately 
chose to present South Africa as a ‘war zone’ (ibid). The characterisation of crime in South Africa as 
a kind of low-intensity civil war was a trope which gained much media traction in the lead-up to the 
World Cup and is indicative of how the country has garnered an international reputation for violence. 
In turn, the extent to which South African cities have been presented as ‘phobopolises’ (Souza, 2011) 
was to provide a powerful impetus for a stringent security regime.  
Organisers also maintained that many negative media reports were reflective of underlying racist 
stereotypes about Africa as a continent defined by violence, war and immiseration. For example, 
when reports emerged which claimed that political violence in Angola could disrupt South Africa’s 
security plans, the President of the LOC, Danny Jordaan, argued that such stories were based on a 
warped colonial geography in which Africa is viewed as a homogenous whole: 
If there is a war in Kosovo and a World Cup in Germany, no one asks if the World Cup can 
go on in Germany; everyone understands the war in Kosovo is a war in Kosovo. The world 
must be balanced and must not apply different standards when it comes to the African 
continent. Our World Cup is secure and we are confident because we have employed a lot of 
resources to safeguard the event in our country (Smith, 2010a). 
South African organisers cited a prior institutional record of hosting major events such as the 1995 
Rugby World Cup and the 2003 Cricket World Cup. Indeed, the SAPS was able to plan and 
implement successful security measures for the 2009 Indian Premier League (IPL) cricket series in a 
matter of weeks after the tournament was hastily moved to South Africa from India owing to concerns 
about terrorism. During the bidding process for the World Cup, South African organisers brought 
attention to this record and in particular cited the case of the security measures for the 2002 UN 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, which were subsequently adopted as a 
blueprint for UN summits (SAFA, 2003a:9:0). However, as Yasmin Sooka (2003:58) described it, 
‘One would have thought that South Africa had gone to war during the Summit’. The police using 
stun grenades to disperse a candlelight procession and armed soldiers performed crowd control during 
a march by the Social Movements Indaba from the Alexandra Township to the convention centre in 
upmarket Sandton (ibid). However, while Sooka describes this policing exercise as echoing apartheid-
era practices, it can also be argued that such tactics also reflect a globalised repertoire of reactive 
crowd control at major political events (Martin, 2011).  
Indeed, the implementation of national security measures during mega-events cannot be separated 
from a wider transnational context of mega-event securitisation. In the case of the 2010 World Cup, 
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the state’s institutional experience in enforcing national security was combined with procedures 
applied at previous mega-events throughout the world. In this sense, mega-events governance stands 
as an example of ‘debordered’ (Coaffee and Murakami Wood , 2006) security, in which a broadly 
homogenous set of policing procedures are implemented at regional and urban scales, although 
institutional and resource factors may result in substantive differences in deployment within different 
contexts. 
Security and Commercialism  
FIFA’s security frameworks and legislation  
As a consequence of this, the nature of policing operations was profoundly impacted by a fixed 
legislative framework, mandated by FIFA. Furthermore, this incorporated standardised operational 
templates and arrangements employed at previous mega-events rather than wholly created by national 
and local conditions. In particular, the security framework which the government implemented as per 
its guarantees as a host country paid specific attention to the commercial and intellectual property 
rights of FIFA and its business partners. FIFA is the owner of all World Cup-related marketing, 
media, ticketing and licensing rights. FIFA’s sponsors are divided into tiers. The top tier ‘FIFA 
partners’ are at the highest level of sponsorship: Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates Airline, Hyundai, Sony 
and Visa. These six were granted certain exclusive marketing rights during 2010: for instance 
advertising boards inside stadiums, having their corporate logos appear on TV screens as background 
to the score line during actual matches, etc. The other sponsors who had limited rights during the 2010 
World Cup include Anheuser-Busch (the maker of Budweiser), Electronic Arts (creators of the 
popular official FIFA video game series) and McDonalds. The South African national corporate 
supporters were First National Bank, Telkom SA, BP Africa, NeoAfrica and Prasa.  
The 2003 Bid Book  
Prior to the awarding of hosting rights in 2004, the official South African Bid Book (SAFA, 2003a) 
outlined how the specific security provisions for the event would align with FIFA criteria. Security 
measures detailed in the Bid Book range from counter-terror protocols, such as emergency provisions 
for the discharge of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, to the designation and restriction 
of commercial activities.  
The Bid Book promised an exhaustive security approach  to the World Cup and details how the 
NATJOINTS (National Joint Operation and Intelligence Structure) structure would be used to 
organise policing at ports of entry, aerial and maritime defence, inner city and stadium security, close 
protection of FIFA delegates, football teams and political dignitaries and overall crime prevention. 
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The book lists the SAPS as the primary operational driver and co-coordinator of World Cup security, 
but notes that this was intended to be a collaborative process with the LOC. In turn, the LOC security 
directorate was to be made up of representatives from state security, organised labour and 
representatives of the private security industry (9.2). The security operations outlined in the Bid Book 
provide a good example of the post 9/11 mega-event planning environment, in that it details an 
exhaustive series of counter-measures to prevent urban terrorism and crime while proposing that these 
were to be undertaken in a ‘people friendly’ environment (ibid). However, the Bid Book leaves the 
exact size and scale of national security measures undeclared.  
The proposed measures also incorporated the ‘protection of FIFA property rights’ (9.3.5) through the 
spatial ‘sterilisation of non-official advertising’ (9.3.15). Furthermore, the safety and security section 
of the Bid Book concludes with the acceptance of liability from any safety and security incidents 
arising from the 2010 World Cup by SAFA and the relevant government departments (9.6). This was 
accompanied by the concurrent extension of indemnification to FIFA and its commercial affiliates 
(ibid).  
The Organising Agreement 
Security was included as one of the 17 guarantees which the South African government signed with 
FIFA in July 2003, prior to the awarding of hosting rights (9.3.5). In turn, this was mirrored by the 
signing of host city agreements after the bid was awarded in 2004. The contractual obligations of the 
state security services were codified in the Organising Agreement between FIFA and SAFA 
(FIFA/OA, 2004). Under the agreement, SAFA was required to establish a local organising 
committee, whose primary role was to act as FIFA’s agent in negotiating and lobbying for the 
collaboration of national and local government in ensuring infrastructural, administrative and legal 
support (28). In terms of security measures this entailed that:  
The Organising Association, in accordance with the respective governmental guarantees shall 
at all times be fully responsible for and guarantee the general security, safety and personal 
protection especially of the FIFA delegation, media and spectators, as well as all people 
involved in, participating in and/or attending the Championship throughout their entire stay in 
the host country. This shall at all times include the security of people at airports, inside and 
outside controlled access sites, hotels, stadiums, official training sites, the international 
broadcast centre, media centres, any official areas and other areas where they are present in 
the host country before, during and after the championship (87).  
The LOC was further delegated the responsibility of drafting a security plan by 30 June 2009 based on 
FIFA guidelines and prior mega-events to ensure the ‘highest possible level of security at all times’ 
(88). In addition, the Organising Agreement ensured indemnity for FIFA and its commercial affiliates 
and stipulated that all security costs were to be borne by the Organising Association and the South 
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African government (ibid). While government’s NATJOINTS structure was given the responsibility 
for providing a national security plan, the LOC’s safety and security directorate was responsible for 
the safety plan of the event. This utilised joint planning to ensure the integration of national security 
and event safety (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:9). In terms of practical deployment, this was supposed to 
entail a delineated spatial separation of security duties. The government was obligated to provide 
national security, a spatially and conceptually widely-framed definition which included the creation 
and activation of joint structures for the event alongside ordinary law enforcement duties. The LOC 
was responsible for event-related safety and access control in and around stadium precincts, fan parks 
and walks and other FIFA designated venues.  
In other words, while the state maintained an official monopoly of the use of coercive force, such as 
the powers of arrest and access to weaponry, the LOC was allocated the duty of performing the 
monitoring and regulation of tournament-related commerce and crowd behaviour. This also entailed 
that FIFA became the primary authority within stadium exclusion zones, a temporary arrangement 
which only lasted for the duration of the World Cup. According to the Bid Book, the LOC was to 
ensure that stadiums were handed over to FIFA for a period of exclusive use after meeting a series of 
agreed upon security regulations. For example, while the Bid Book notes that South Africa has not 
had a history of spectator violence, making it ‘unnecessary to install the oppressive permitted fencing 
used elsewhere in the football world’ it promised that ‘applicable fences or moats would be installed 
for the tournament’ (SAFA, 2003a: 10.1.5). 
However, despite this demarcation, the original government guarantee included a security ‘trapdoor’. 
The guarantee stipulated that the state was to ensure ‘all security measures necessary for the World 
Cup’ including at ‘stadiums’ and ‘any official area and other areas where accredited persons and/or 
spectators are present’ ( 4.5), implying that the government would be expected to perform inner 
stadium duties in the case of the LOC defaulting. Indeed, this would prove to be the case during the 
actual tournament, when the SAPS took over stadium policing at half of the World Cup stadiums.  
2006 Special Measures Act  
The guarantees were formalised in 2006 with the promulgation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Special 
Measures Act (Republic of South Africa, 2006). In addition, under the terms of the Merchandise Mark 
Act of 1941, the 2010 World Cup was declared a ‘protected event’ entitled to an exceptional level of 
commercial protection by the state. The Special Measures Act brought into law both proscriptions and 
suspensions of regulations, which FIFA indicated as being essential to the successful purveyance of 
the championship. The Act allowed the LOC, in conjunction with the SAPS National Commissioner, 
to declare stadiums, public viewing areas and other 2010-related facilities as designated areas which 
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could not be accessed without accreditation (16), and allowed the LOC to identify exclusion zones 
which prohibited unlicensed commercial activity (ibid). The Act also created ‘traffic free zones’ 
within exclusion zones and enabled ‘peace officers’ search and seizure powers for vehicles and 
persons within these zones (19).  
The Act’s creation of a legal framework for the establishment of an archipelago of exclusion zones 
was accompanied by the temporary suspension of certain restrictions. These included suspensions of 
some of the marketing and distribution restrictions on liquor within stadiums and on some of the 
prohibitions on unregistered medicines. While the former was for the benefit of commercial affiliates, 
the latter was intended to facilitate the accreditation of the medical contingents accompanying host 
teams.  
In practice, the Act laid the framework for the commercial restrictions which were spatially enforced 
by state security. By the time the tournament began, the initial exclusion zones laid out in the Act 
were accompanied by commercial restriction zones. Exclusion zones pertained to the area within 
stadium precincts that were strictly the domain of FIFA and its partners and in which no unofficial 
trading was allowed (Cape Town Partnership, 2009). Commercial restriction zones were ‘invisible but 
nonetheless demarcated areas’ (Ibid) outside of stadiums, including areas in and around fan parks, fan 
walks and public viewing areas. The SAPS worked in conjunction with FIFA’s rights protection team 
to look for examples of counterfeit goods, unauthorised traders around stadiums and ambush 
marketing (Joburg Host City, 2009). Ambush marketing restrictions defined a large swathe of 
activities as illegitimate including: 
branded, private fan parks and amusement areas (for example, no branded beer gardens – 
unless it’s Budweiser!), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in 
visible to the street), branded hospitality areas (eg: branded in plain public view – as in visible 
to the street), aerial advertising (blimps, balloons, or other airships), unauthorized street 
trading or vendors, any political and religious demonstrations (Cape Town Partnership, 2009). 
OA/ NATJOINTS General Security Concept 2008 
The confidential LOC and NATJOINTS General Security Concept (GSC) (2008), which was 
presented to all ‘stakeholders’ as a preliminary to the detailed deployment plan of 2009, clearly 
illustrates that government’s conceptualisation of security for the tournament identified the 
institutional agendas of FIFA and its commercial partners as one its key priorities. Planning for the 
South African context used prior FIFA security ‘traditions’ and ‘international best practice’ as a 
benchmark (5). Based on integrated planning between the LOC and NATJOINTS and consultation 
with provincial and urban authorities, the GSC promised to coordinate ‘cooperation’ and ‘support’ for 
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the World Cup in which ‘maximum security will be planned for, but proportionally implemented’ 
(10). 
In turn, FIFA requirements functioned as the mitochondrial base for security planning. Each host 
province was required to produce a detailed operational plan which reflected the minimum standards 
outlined in FIFA’s list of requirements and the guarantees which government had signed with the 
organisation in 2003 (13). At a national level, the SAPS identified cooperation with the LOC on the 
enforcement of FIFA rights and the protection of its delegates as one of its key national priorities, 
alongside crime prevention and law enforcement (16). An entire section of the GSC is dedicated to the 
safety of high-ranking members of the FIFA ‘family’, with the president, vice presidents and secretary 
general each being allocated officers from the SAPS Protection and Security Service Division , which 
provides security for government officials, visiting politician and national strategic sites and 
installations.   
Host city by-laws  
In addition, each of the nine host cities was obligated to enact a series of FIFA-driven by-laws. These 
dealt with a range of issues, from city beautification drives to advertising restrictions, and were 
adopted prior to the World Cup and remained in effect until two weeks after the tournament had 
ended (eThekwini Municipality, n.d.). The by-laws were used to enforce the spatial and advertising 
restrictions mandated by FIFA and gave legal force to each cities establishment of exclusion zones 
and controlled access areas around stadiums. Notably, this entailed substantial restrictions of 
advertising around stadiums, fan parks, and around airports and train stations: these prescriptions also 
extended to private property (25-6).  
In effect, security by-laws extended throughout host cities, including the demarcation of special lanes 
on public roads for emergency use by the FIFA delegation and participating teams (40). The 
beautification requirements included were exceptionally stringent and included the prohibition of 
visible signs of major construction near tournament venues, major transport centres and entertainment 
areas (31). Under the by-laws, municipalities were empowered to suspend construction work, without 
compensation, for the duration of the tournament.  
Cornelissen (2011:3228) argues that while the legal agreements were standard operating procedure for 
FIFA events, the association took a more overtly intrusive stance towards the South African 
government’s preparations than during past tournaments. For example, she cites the case of FIFA’s 
attempts to forestall the implementation of the Safety at Sports Events and Recreation Events Bill, 
which aimed to enforce standardised stadium security in South Africa in the wake of the 2001 Ellis 
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Park stadium disaster in which 43 spectators died. FIFA asked the government to defer the 
implementation of the Bill, which they claimed would place overly stringent constraints on the 
organisation of the tournament. Although the Bill was passed in early 2010, the World Cup was 
granted a special exemption. 
In other cases, FIFA intervened in the selection of match venues against the initial preferences of host 
cities, such as insisting that Cape Town move its main venue for the upgraded Athlone stadium to a 
new stadium in the wealthier Green Point area (ibid). According to a report in one South African 
newspaper, FIFA had objected to the initial plan because the low-cost housing around the Athlone 
venue did not provide a suitable media backdrop for the tournament, with one delegate allegedly 
claiming that ‘one billion television viewers do not want to see poverty on this scale’ (The 
Antidote,2007).  
Although the government worked to publicly present a unified and seamless working relationship 
with FIFA, there was at least one instance where a high-ranking police official expressed frustration 
with how the sporting body dealt with security issues. In May 2010, National Police Commissioner 
Bheki Cele claimed in parliament that, in the wake of the Cabinda shootings: 
On 27th January we received an SOS call from FIFA. We were a bit annoyed that they were 
calling us like a schoolboy called by the principal, but understanding the seriousness of the 
World Cup we complied and met the secretary general of FIFA at OR Tambo Airport. The 
secretary general was almost in tears because of the pressure he was under to withdraw the 
World Cup from South Africa (IOL, 2010b).  
Urban authorities were faced with the difficulty of patterning local security planning into the wider 
FIFA framework. For example, the Mangaung Muncipality, which was responsible for preparations in 
the host city of Bloemfontein, said that their communicative strategy with the media was constrained 
by having to get permission from FIFA before it could publicly release details to the press (PMG, 
2006a). 
There also appeared to be lack of clarity as to the ramifications of many of the commercial aspects 
contained in security measures. While concerns were raised about local business being excluded from 
capitalising on the tournament during the parliamentary deliberations on the Special Measures Act, 
this occurred after the host city agreements had already been signed, thus committing urban 
authorities to the implementation of commercial restrictions (PMG, 2006b). Host cities and 
institutions such as the Defence Force claimed that they had not been informed of the scope and 
ramifications of commercial security restrictions and that they were obliged to plan for their 
enforcement without prior consultation (PMG, 2006b). Gaps in institutional communication also 
occurred within the South African government. As late as March 2010, the parliamentary defence 
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portfolio committee had yet to be briefed on the role of the military during the World Cup (Jordan, 
2010). Furthermore, committee members claimed that they had not been given access to the security 
guarantees which the government had signed with FIFA.  
While the organisation did appear to take a directly interventionist stance with regard to issues such as 
stadium venues, in other cases it appeared to leave the operational details up to the relevant hosting 
authorities, as per the hosting agreements. For example, all inquiries into security matters were 
automatically referred to the South African government and the LOC (automatic email response by 
FIFA, 18 March 2010). Furthermore, while planning documents promised continual coordination 
between the LOC and NATJOINTS, in practice there appeared to be significant gaps in 
communication between the two bodies. As Omar (2007:68) notes, the original liaison committee 
between NATJOINTS and the LOC’s security directorate ‘fell away’, owing to officials not attending 
meetings and a lack of follow-up on agreements. In particular, the LOC’s outsourcing of private 
security for stadiums proved to be highly problematic. During the Confederations Cup in 2009, the 
SAPS had to perform stadium duty after Stallion Security withdrew, alleging that the LOC was only 
paying R300 for 12 hour guard shifts (Basson and Tolsi, 2010). However, Minister Mthethwa claimed 
that the LOC had performed an exceptional job during the Confederations Cup (Gabara, 2009). 
Despite concerns from NATJOINTS, the company was again contracted to perform inner perimeter 
duty for some stadiums during the 2010 World Cup.  
In September 2010, Mthethwa claimed that the SAPS would seek remuneration from the LOC for the 
additional duties performed during the World Cup, and blamed the committee for not concluding 
proper security contracts (The Star, 2010). However, this was complicated by the fact that Mthethwa 
was himself a member of the LOC’s board of directors (Who’s Who SA, 2010). Indeed, the individual 
composition of the LOC board problematises the idea of a strict distinction between the LOC and the 
government. Joining Mthethwa were the Ministers of Justice and Constitutional Development, Home 
Affairs, Human Settlements, Transport, International Relations and Cooperation and the Deputy 
Minister of Finance. Also on the board were Zwelinzima Vavi, the General Secretary of the Congress 
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), three former cabinet ministers and prominent figures 
from soccer administration, business and the media. In addition, the head of the LOC’s security 
directorate, Linda Mti was the former Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Affairs, who 
had left government in 2006 amidst allegations of tender irregularities. While the initial agreements 
stipulated that the role of the LOC was to ‘lobby and/or petition the government’ (FIFA/OA, 2004:28) 
as directed on FIFA’s behalf, the actual composition of the LOC executive blurred this distinction, 
through actively enrolling the participation of state officials directly responsible for security measures 
during the 2010 World Cup. 
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Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector  
Regional and continental cooperation  
The security measures also involved state centred forms of cooperation, including intelligence 
exchanges, observer missions and training. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
which coordinates relations between fifteen Southern African states, held meetings of its respective 
security services to better coordinate efforts through the creation of a regional security plan (All 
Africa, 2010a) while an undisclosed number of policeman from member states were deployed in a 
support capacity during the World Cup. In addition, the annual meetings of the Southern African 
Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation (SARPCCO) were used as a platform for 
cooperation and information sharing in the lead-up to the tournament (SARPCCO, 2010). The 
Southern African Standby Brigade, consisting of troops and police officers from SADC states, was 
also placed on alert during the World Cup (Department of Defence, 2010: 81). South Africa 
maintained close operational links with adjoining states during the World Cup. For example, the 
government established joint operating centres with Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique to 
monitor activities at national borders (IOL, 2010c). 
 
INTERPOL  
At the international scale, policing cooperation involved the direct participation of INTERPOL. As 
part of the security arrangements, the South African government was given access to INTERPOL’s 
Stolen and Lost Travel Documents Database, to ‘identify security risks’ at national points of entry 
(Mail and Guardian, 2010). INTERPOL liaised closely with both the SAPS and FIFA, which included 
a security meeting at FIFA headquarters in Zurich ‘the first of its kind in FIFA’s history – bringing 
together INTERPOL, Chiefs of Police, Heads of Security and police liaison officers from all 32 
participating nations, providing a vital opportunity to share a comprehensive planning approach and 
coordination of security’ (INTERPOL, 2010).  
In the lead-up to the tournament, INTERPOL coordinated raids on illegal soccer betting syndicates in 
several Asian countries, and has subsequently strengthened its relationship with FIFA, with the 
football body providing the largest ever private donation in INTERPOL’s history to establish an anti-
match fixing unit (FIFA, 2011a). During the World Cup, INTERPOL was actively involved in joint 
operations with the SAPS through the biggest ever single deployment of its Major Events Support 
Team (IMEST). This included screening passengers at airports and transnational borders, conducting 
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600,000 spot checks against INTERPOL databases and providing criminal intelligence to the SAPS 
which led to the arrests of individuals on INTERPOL’s wanted lists (INTERPOL, 2010).  
IMEST was stationed at the ‘world first’ International Police Coordination Centre  at Burgers Park 
Hotel in Pretoria, which included 225 foreign police officers from the 27 participating teams 
(defenceWeb,2010a). Although these officers had no arresting powers, they were deployed in both 
uniform and plain clothes in and outside stadiums, performing support roles such as liaising with their 
national spectators and identifying disruptive behaviour (NATJOINTS, 2010a). Collaboration with 
international institutions extended to the United Nations. South Africa’s counter-terrorism strategies 
and capacities were reviewed by the United Nations Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate 
(CTED) (Botha, 2008). The government also consulted with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) on the detection of ‘dirty bombs’, which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive 
material (Global Security Newswire, 2010).  
Policing support and exchanges  
In addition to the use of foreign police officers in a support capacity, the national teams of Brazil, the 
USA, Denmark, France and Brazil were accompanied by their own security staffs. For example, the 
British team was shadowed by undercover agents from the Special Air Services (SAS) and the 
Control Risk security company, itself made up of former South African special forces soldiers 
(Potgieter and Powell, 2010:1). These team-specific detachments were complemented by additional 
contingents of intelligence officials for foreign dignitaries (ibid). The presence of high-profile 
political officials created additional security challenges for the SAPS. Bheki Cele publicly alleged that 
the FBI was vacillating on the question of whether President Barack Obama would attend the World 
Cup, claiming that ‘our famous prayer is that the Americans don’t make the second round. We are 
told that if it goes to the second or third stage, the US president may come. At the moment we have 43 
heads of state provisionally confirmed. That 43 will be equal to this one operation’ (TimesLive, 
2010). In any case, Obama would ultimately not attend the tournament, although Vice President Joe 
Biden was present at the opening ceremony.   
In the build-up to the World Cup, South African observers were also dispatched to major sporting 
events in Korea, Japan and Brazil (van der Spuy, 2010:111). Police officials were represented at the 
2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany, 2008 UEFA tournament in Austria and Switzerland and the 2008 
Beijing Olympics (Mthethwa,2010a).  
At the inter-state level, security expertise was brokered through a host of linkages with other national 
governments and urban authorities. The SAPS maintained close links with the British police 
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throughout the preparatory stages of the 2010 World Cup, including sharing information on counter-
terrorism, crowd management and hooliganism. Aspects of the City of London’s Project Griffin 
model were incorporated into security planning (Timeslive, 2007). Originally designed as a counter-
terrorism strategy to protect London’s financial district, the project has since been given wider use in 
crime prevention and crowd control through coordinating police and private security. In addition, 
SAPS officers received training from members of New Scotland Yard’s counter-terrorism command 
(SAPS Journal Online, 2009a). South African experience of security planning during the 2010 World 
Cup may have been of particular interest to British police owing to its proximity to the 2012 London 
Olympics. 
In the lead-up to the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS received training from the French gendarmes in 
crowd control ‘methodology’ (Metswamere, 2009). This was motivated both in terms of the specific 
French experience of policing the 1998 World Cup tournament and a general ‘experience’ with rioting 
and social upheaval. This transference of skills is part of a wider agreement between the South 
African  and  French governments which aims at reinforcing the SAPS’s capacity to ‘respond to 
terrorist threats and tackle international criminal networks’ through the ‘training of members in 
specialised fields, procurement of specialised technical equipment, as well as the sharing of expertise 
in the field’(Ndawonde, 2009a). The collaboration extended to the presence of French officers at a 
series of exercises outside of stadiums during which, ‘The SAPS Public Order Police Service and 
members of the TRT [Tactical Response Team] effectively dealt with the riotous behaviours using 
SAPS recruits as the pawns in the simulation exercises’ (SAPS Journal Online, 2010a).  
The government also maintained a series of security relationships with the United States. The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation assisted in training police on issues of terrorism financing and money 
laundering (McKenzie, 2008). Although not widely reported in the South African media, joint police 
and military exercises were conducted with SOCOM (Human, 2010), which coordinates the various 
Special Operations Forces of the US military. SOCOM’s responsibilities includes secret and 
specialised ‘black op’ missions, such as  assassinations and the ‘rendition’ of high priority terror 
suspects (Turse, 2011). The series of simulations which accompanied ‘Exercise Monastery’ included 
elements of the SANDF, SOCOM, SAPS ‘counter-assault’ teams and Public Order Police units. This 
rehearsal exercise aimed to test the ‘interoperability’ of military and police special forces ahead of the 
World Cup (Human, 2010:16-17). Monastery tested a range of major event ‘storylines’ from a 
hostage situation to maritime operations and focused on ‘grouping of forces’ at ‘urban, airborne and 
maritime scales’ (17).  
Although the transnational exchanges which were made publicly available appeared to have been 
primarily state-centric, it is reasonable to assume that the World Cup generated interest amongst 
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international homeland security companies and defence contractors. For example, SAPS officials 
attended several of the annual ‘Sports Security Summits’ held in London by the sports management 
company Rushmans (2007, 2008). Organisations which have been represented at the summits include 
sporting organisations such as FIFA and the IOC, security companies such as G4S and SAIC, and the 
major defence contractors BAE systems (who are alleged to have bribed South African officials 
during the controversial 1999 arms deal) and Northup Grumman, the fourth largest aerospace and 
defence company in the world (Rushmans, 2008). 
Private security  
According to Terry Scallan, the chairman of the South African Institute of Security, an industry 
regulatory body, the involvement of private security in the World Cup security measures was limited 
to support functions for the SAPS (interview, 1 April 2010). Overall national safety and security 
remained the statutory function of the state. Private security guards were deployed at stadiums, fan 
parks, fan walks and other key sites, but were not granted powers of arrest or access to weaponry. 
According to one security company spokesperson, their role during the World Cup was to provide 
support in maintaining the enjoyable atmosphere of the tournament: ‘If one of our guys sees a chip 
packet lying on the ground that could potentially house an explosive device, he has to be diplomatic 
and gently move the danger out of the way without the fans even knowing it’ (The Event. 2010). 
While this accorded with the proportional implementation ethos espoused by NATJOINTS and the 
LOC (2008: 10), it also ensured that the signature of coercive force and violence, such as weaponry, 
would remain the preserve of the state. Indeed, as early as 2006, the SAPS informed FIFA officials 
that while they would be allowed to bring personal security to the tournament ‘they would not be 
allowed to carry any weapons and would have no power whatsoever’ (PMG, 2006a). The private 
security industry was particularly involved in providing stadium safety and in the close protection of 
‘VVIPS’. In one trade industry publication, the Dynamic Alternative groups, a specialist ‘in third 
world environments’ lists its activities as authoring the initial training package used by the LOC to 
train stewards, providing intelligence to ‘international organisations’, security for two of the primary 
event sponsors and the deployment of close protection services for VVIPS ‘including people on the 
Forbes 10 richest list’ and entertainment celebrities (Schneider and Sinclair, 2010, 32-3). The 
company was joined by several other operations offering similar services to wealthy and anxious 
tourists (Plantive, 2010). In addition, four of the security teams contracted to visiting teams were 
allowed to obtain temporary firearm licences after negotiations with the police (Potgieter and Powell, 
2010).  
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Figure One: Safety hard hats in the boardroom of the Nelson Mandela Stadium, 2009 
 
Figure Two: SAPS officers inside the Cape Town Exclusion Zone 
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National and Urban Security  
The War Machine  
The South African government promised a World Cup ‘war machine’ which consisted of:  
... 41,000 police officers specifically to ensure the safety of visitors to the country during the 
2010 World Cup. There will be one police officer for every 10 foreign tourists expected for 
the duration of the event. Government plans to increase the number of police officers in the 
country to 192,000 by the end of 2009/10. To maintain safety and security during the 2010 
World Cup and comply with FIFA requirements, an additional amount of R665.6 million was 
allocated to the Department for Safety and Security in the 2007 Budget for the procurement of 
operational equipment such as helicopters, CCTV, radio communications, roadblocks and riot 
and other technical equipment …. The plan is to make available police escorts for teams, 
referees and members of the FIFA delegation; and to provide security at land, sea and air 
borders, routes and venues namely stadiums, hotels, events and tourists attractions. The SAPS 
also plans to patrol routes to and from the airports, and into the cities and to provide video 
feeds to the operational headquarters in Pretoria using command vehicles and helicopters 
equipped with cameras (Republic of South Africa, 2010).  
According to Police Lieutenant General Andre Pruis, this was to be enforced by a series of spatial 
cordons in the ten kilometres around stadiums with a ‘focus on preventing domestic extremism, 
including strike actions and service delivery protests’ (World Cup 2010 South Africa, 2010). In 
addition, fighter aircraft would be used to patrol airspace ahead of matches, national borders would be 
monitored by military satellites, while cruise ships would be escorted by naval frigates from twelve 
nautical miles out to sea, alongside the navy conducting underwater sweeps of host city harbours. 
Several special emergency management points were set up along major national highways while 
perimeter security was prioritised at ports, airports and military airbases. Particular attention was 
placed on participating teams, with implementation of security protocols at hotels, the application of 
‘match day’ security procedures at publicly open training matches and the demarcation of special 
emergency transport routes. The cost of these security operations substantially inflated during the 
preparatory period. While the Bid Book claimed that safety and security measures would cost  R94 
million (SAFA, 2003a: 7.7), by 2010 President Zuma announced that what he called the security ‘war 
chest’ cost over R1 billion (Ndlangisa, 2010).  
To ensure coordination and the exchange of ‘real time’ date between government departments, private 
security companies and foreign intelligence and security agencies, security measures operated through 
the establishment of the NATJOINTS system, which was based on the NATO C3 (command, 
communication and control) model of coordinating forces across horizontal and vertical scales  
(OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:11). Under the chairpersonage of the SAPS, the NATJOINTS structure was 
filtered down and replicated at provincial (PROVJOINTS), local (LOCJOINTS) and venue 
(VOCJOINTS) levels. In terms of the security structure, NATJOINTS was responsible for strategy, 
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PROVJOINTS allocated operational resources and LOCJOINTS enforced tactical application (Ibid). 
During the tournament NATJOINTS operated out of the ‘war room’ at Air Force Headquarters 
outside Pretoria (Makhubela, 2010).  
The SAPS  
As the main operational locus for the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS embarked on major recruitment and 
acquisition drives. In particular, this focused on the improvement of its crowd control apparatus, 
including joint training missions between the police and the French gendarmes. Other purchases 
included six Robinson Raven 2 helicopters linked to mobile command centres, sniper rifles, new 
cameras for the SAPS Air Wing, flexible body armour and water cannons and eight bomb disposal 
remote operated vehicles (ROVs) ‘used extensively by US forces in Iraq’(Nel, 2009:39)   However, 
attempts to purchase unmanned aerial drones (UAVs) were unsuccessful: while  it appears that the 
SAPS were adamant that they would be buying a fleet for surveillance purposes, opposition from the 
South African Civil Aviation Authority (SACAA), owing to concerns about the legality of automated 
drones in civilian airspace, scuppered the plan (Africa, 2009). Mechanised equipment was also 
complemented by the use of horse and sniffer dog units (City of Johannesburg, 2009: 332).  
The importation of new security hardware served to support a massive deployment of police 
‘software’. Highlighting the exceptional status of the tournament, all police leave was cancelled for 
the duration of the World Cup, allowing for a boosting of the force levels available to the state (van 
der Spuy, 2010:116). As one internal government report (Public Service Commission, 2010) describes 
it particular attention was paid to augmenting police resources in the police stations closest to host 
venues and ensuring that the areas around stadiums saw a reduction in the ‘trio’ crimes of vehicle 
hijacking and residential and business robbery.    
However, the same report (ix) found that as planning had been centred at a national level and that 
many of the local police stations did not have access to the SAP’s internal ‘Integrated 2010 Soccer 
World Cup Strategic Plan’, and had inadequate personnel numbers, budgets, vehicles and functioning 
CCTV equipment to ‘meet the demands of the 2010 World Cup’ . For example, in terms of the much 
publicised equipment drive, the report noted that:  
The inspection team that visited the SAPS National Head Office found that specific kinds of 
vehicles have been purchased for the 2010 Soccer World Cup and these include high speed 
vehicles, highway patrol cars and luxury cars. The findings suggest that police stations were 
not briefed about the vehicles that were being procured to handle the demands of the 2010 
Soccer World Cup (ibid).  
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At the national level, preparations also paid close attention to the incorporation of specialised and elite 
units from the SAP’s SWAT-style Operational Response Service (SAPS, 2011a). These included the 
paramilitary Special Task Force, responsible for counterterrorism and hostage situations and the 
National Response Unit. Notably, the World Cup marked one of the first public deployments of the 
new Tactical Response Team (TRT), an elite squad piloted by then National Commissioner Cele. 
Such special forces blur the line between policing and military combat as they are trained for high risk 
situations and may be provided with access to more powerful arsenals than ordinary civilian law 
enforcement officers. In addition, specialised units such as bomb disposal and the SAPS air wing were 
deployed around stadiums.  
SANDF  
An additional blurring of the line between civilian law enforcement and preparations for urban 
warfare was evident in the involvement of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). 
Under ‘Operation Kgwele’, the four tiers of the defence department, the military, air force, navy and 
medical services, were tasked with offering support to the SAPS. Through the NATJOINTS structure, 
the SANDF also worked in tandem with national government and INTERPOL, using its Geographical 
Information System (GIS) to provide mapping and satellite imagery along with deploying ‘the latest 
technological devices’ to screen visitors at national points of entry (Rakoma, 2010: 19). Indeed, 
Operation Kgwele marked the ‘most extensive and biggest deployment on home soil’ (Makwetla, 
2010) of the Defence Force since the transition to democracy in 1994.  The SANDF’s duties during 
the World Cup included patrolling outer perimeters and guarding roadblocks with the SAPS, putting 
aircraft on standby, joint deployment with the SAPS Special Task Force and aiding emergency 
services with chemical, biological and radioactive reaction teams trained for ‘detection,casualty                                               
evacuation and mass evacuation’ (Tlhaole, 2010:21). As with the SAPS, the Department of Defence 
used the World Cup to leverage additional resources from national government. In 2009, the SANDF 
received additional funding from the government after claiming that resources were being ring fenced 
by the SAPS and that the military needed R335 million for tournament-related ‘command-and-
control, maritime situational awareness, airspace control, no-fly zone enforcement, aerial surveillance, 
airlift, landward reaction forces, infrastructure and specialist support including biological and 
chemical defence teams’ (Engelbrecht, 2009a). 
State intelligence 
While the role of the intelligence services during the World Cup was publicly acknowledged by the 
government, the exact parameters and extent of this involvement is for the most part inaccessible. 
However, the annual report of the parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (Republic 
of South Africa, 2011), gives some idea of the contours of this involvement. The committee oversees 
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the various entities which constitute South Africa’s domestic and foreign intelligence services. As of 
2012, the State Security Agency includes the South African Secret Service (SASS), which is 
responsible for non-military foreign intelligence, the former National Intelligence Agency (NIA), 
which runs domestic intelligence, and the National Communication Centre, which performs signal 
intelligence (SIGNET) or surveillance and eavesdropping.  
While the report does not go into any operational specifics, it concludes that ‘working toward a 
successful World Cup must be the main focus of the country … all the intelligence agencies have 
prepared well and will be actively involved in the security of the country and its people’ (40). With 
the SAPS as its main client, the state-run Office for Interception Centres (OIC) was enrolled to 
monitor telephonic and cellular conversations, text messages, e-mails and IP addresses (13-4). 
Although South African law entails that judicial warrants are required for intercepts, the state does not 
divulge the contents of these intercepts: therefore, while the report list 416 intercepts in the 2009-10 
financial year, it does not list their targets. However, the report does note that the NIA used the OIC 
for the World Cup draw in December 2009 (23). It can therefore be assumed that SIGNET functions 
were used as part of the World Cup security measures. The role of intelligence services added 
additional measures to the efforts to implement spatial control of land, airspace and water by 
monitoring the electromagnetic spectrum.  
The report also reveals that the NIA was actively involved in the planning and coordination of 
security measures for the World Cup and that it shared intelligence with all ‘relevant’ role players, 
which presumably included FIFA and foreign governments (20). The report also notes ‘the support’ 
and assistance of the SASS in providing foreign intelligence (21). Domestically, state security claimed 
that the biggest internal ‘concerns’ which needed to be addressed ahead of the tournament were the 
country’s capacity for disaster management, border security, monitoring of criminal syndicates, 
‘foreign nationals from neighbouring countries’, electricity provision and ‘mechanisms to control 
possible strikes and protest actions’ (31). Indeed the report also claims that in a ‘global world that is 
intertwined into a small village’ intelligence support was instrumental in ensuring domestic ‘stability’ 
and ‘border safeguarding’ for the World Cup (33).  
Departmental involvement 
The NATJOINTS structure further entailed the involvement of other government departments. 
Departments represented as ‘stakeholders’ within the structure included Home Affairs, 
Communications, International Relations and Cooperation, Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Health 
and Sports and Recreation. The Department of Justice was instrumental in creating a punitive 
apparatus for the event through its implementation of a special dedicated courts system which was 
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designed to expedite the arrest and court appearance of tournament-related offences (van der Spuy, 
2010:114). This fast-track justice system was also targeted against violations of FIFA’s commercial 
restrictions. 
Preparations included the implementation of security measures by departments outside of the security 
and criminal justice tiers of national government. For example, the Department of Home Affairs 
(2010) implemented an electronic Advance Passenger Programming (APP) system to bar 
‘undesirables’ such as tourists on INTERPOL’s football hooligan list from entering the country and 
installed a Movement Control System (MCS) database at 34 priority points of entry to track the 
movement of visitors in and out of the country .The state-owned electricity supplier ESKOM, applied 
heightened security measures to energy infrastructure. An ESKOM spokesperson told a parliamentary 
committee that ‘security would be provided to national key points. Power lines to neighbouring 
countries would be secured. Security personnel would be deployed one week before the start of the 
World Cup’ (PMG, 2010a). The spokesperson did not reveal which lines had the highest priority, as 
‘this could give information to potential saboteurs’.  
State of spectacle  
The state’s rollout of a centralised war machine through the medium of NATJOINTS was also 
planned with aesthetics in mind. According to the OA/NATJOINTS Security Concept, the image of 
South Africa enabled by security measures was as important a yardstick of success as the pre-emption 
of risks. For example, the document stresses that the first impression of the country created by visitors 
entering the country was crucial: ‘operational planning shall concentrate on the security operations at 
all airports to ensure that the all-important first impression that is created is one of a safe, secure and 
stable country and region’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:30). 
The centrality of image also extended into the actual logistical and operational preparations for the 
tournament. In the years prior to the World Cup, the police and military engaged in a series of 
preparatory exercises in and around host cities, which tested their capacity to respond to scenarios 
from hijackings to hostage situations. The media was actively encouraged to witness these operations 
with the idea of providing positive coverage for the security measures. For example, the press release 
for one of the ‘Operation Shield’ series in Bloemfontein issued a call for registrations to:  
The media briefing will take place at Tempe Airbase. The media will then be moved outside 
to witness one of many spectacular displays of the security forces’ competence. These 
simulations are not practiced in advance. Scenarios are confidentially scripted and 
‘renegades’ enact possible threats to which teams made up of experts from various units 
within the security services must react and neutralise. It is imperative to RSVP as security 
around the airbase is strict during this exercise (NATJOINTS, 2008a).  
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During ‘Operation Shield 3’, two media personalities became active participants in the exercise, 
which in addition provides an idea of how the government imagined a successful response and 
resolution to a worst case scenario:  
5fm radio presenter Gareth Cliff and Maurice Carpede from 94.2 Jacaranda FM were dragged 
out of a briefing by two armed masked men and forced into a South African Police Service’s 
(SAPS) Cessna Sovereign Citation jet at Swartkops air force base outside Pretoria. During the 
drama, the South African Air Force (SAAF) scrambled two Hawks which intercepted the 
hijacked plane and forced it to the ground where police vehicles and emergency personnel 
were waiting to assist the injured. The hijackers had no option but to give in and land the 
plane. Fully armed Special Task Force and the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) members cautiously and strategically surrounded the plane and negotiations began. 
After the intensive hostage negotiations, victims were freed and the hijackers were 
immediately arrested with the help of members of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). 
To avoid unanticipated explosions, police deployed trained dogs to search bags and parcels 
for any explosives. An armed robot, operated via remote control, was also sent in to 
thoroughly search the parcels. Despite the bad weather, the joint exercise between the SAPS, 
the SANDF, NIA, SAAF and government departments left international reporters, Cabinet 
ministers and visitors [sic] stunned as it revealed South Africa’s security skills and 
readiness… The thrilling exercise was part of honing security-related skills to ensure a safe 
environment in host cities and other areas during major events, including securing the 
national airspace (Ndawonde, 2009b).  
On the verge on the tournament, ordinary South Africans were exposed to the spectacle of security. In 
a May 2010 operation, the police and army, accompanied by a large crowd of onlookers and a police 
marching band, ‘occupied’ the Sandton financial district in Johannesburg, with ‘a convoy of dozens of 
vehicles and staged mock operations by elite security forces, including a helicopter drop of 
commandos onto a car hijack and abseiling down the side of a media building’ (Potwela, 2010). 
Finally, South Africans were offered a chance to participate in the security ‘experience’ through the 
FIFA volunteer programme and assisting the security services in offering translation and direction 
services for tourists, informing spectators of prohibited items and directing fans around stadiums. 
However, after the tournament, volunteers struggled to receive the daily stipend they were owed by 
the LOC (Morkel, 2010). Indeed, the lack of payment may have created an unexpected breach in 
FIFA’s ticketing system: during field research I found that on the 14 June 2010, the day of the match 
between Italy and Paraguay at the Cape Town Stadium, volunteers were openly touting their match 
tickets around the stadium precinct. 
Urban governance  
Under the umbrella of the national security plan, host cities created their own institutional set ups 
while linking national plans into ‘city-specific programmes and longer-term visions’ (Cornelissen, 
2011:3230). At the planning level, cities based their deployments on NATJOINTS approved 
‘responsibility matrixes’ and the various safety and security agreements between the government, 
LOC and FIFA (interview with JP Louw, 2 March 2010). This entailed a parcelling of security 
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responsibilities between national, provincial and urban authorities. As explained by JP Louw, an 
official with the City of Cape Town: 
SAPS are the lead agents and the City supports the safety and security plans. The Provincial 
Priority Committee was established, which the City’s safety and security forms part of. The 
priority meeting is chaired by SAPS. The City is responsible for traffic, enforcement of the 
bylaws, fire and rescue, and disaster risk management, which forms part of the overall safety 
and security plan.  
Provincial measures were organised by safety and security committees headed by the SAPS. This 
meant that the security footprint of the World Cup extended beyond host cities. For example, in the 
case of the Western Cape, the SAPS established a ‘blanket of security’ for teams staying in Knynsa 
and George, which are both situated substantial distances from Cape Town (SAPS Journal Online, 
2010b). In turn, each host city created interdepartmental reaction teams, which included the ‘national 
security forces’ of the SAPS, SANDF and the NIA along with local metro police, traffic, health and 
emergency services (Tlhaole, 2010:20).  
National, provincial and local funding was utilised to augment existing security resources. For 
example, The City of Cape Town:  
... procured various additional vehicles and equipment as well as appointing additional safety 
and security staff which will be utilised during as well as post World Cup, e.g. we have 
procured 7 new fire agents, appointed 122 fire fighters, 70 additional traffic officers, etc. All 
these new equipment’s [sic] will be available post-World Cup (Interview with JP Louw, 2 
March 2010).  
The City of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape established joint operation centres to coordinate 
activities with authorities in the non-host cities of East London and Mthatha, established a terrestrial 
trunked radio system (TERTA) (or walkie-talkie) system for use at its harbour and airport, launched a 
special investigation group to reduce crime before the World Cup and purchased new cameras for its 
CCTV network, and new breathalysers and traffic patrol vehicles (Barry, 2010). However, 
Cornelissen (2011:3231) argues that the deployment of city security measures throughout the country 
overwhelmingly kept to the spatial legacy of security created by apartheid, in that it tended to keep 
away from poorer areas and focused on increasing the security footprint around already securitised 
and gentrified spaces, such as Cape Town’s Atlantic seaboard.  
Furthermore, the FIFA access control and commercial restriction by-laws which had been 
implemented by host cities reduced the opportunities for informal traders to capitalise on their 
proximity to stadiums. However, after the city of Johannesburg attempted to evict traders from around 
the Soccer City venue in February 2010, informal traders began a campaign of marches and protests 
which prompted the city to allocate selected traders with designated vending areas outside of 
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exclusion zones (Lopes-Gonzalez, 2010). While this still marked substantial restrictions on trading, it 
did allow informal venders to capitalise on the influx of personnel around stadiums; ironically, one 
trader noted that police and emergency medical staff provided the bulk of their customer base (ibid).  
The remilitarisation of the SAPS  
The resemblances between the security measures and a state organising for war were paralleled by 
efforts to remilitarise the SAPS. The civilianisation of a militarised and repressive policing system 
was a major policy objective for the government after the transition to democracy, but from 2000 
onwards the SAPS began to take on the increasing semblance of a paramilitary force, which the police 
claimed was necessitated by high rates of violent crime (NPC, 2011:355).  
Beginning in 2009, police and government officials began to make bellicose public statements about 
how the SAPS needed to fight ‘fire with fire’ when confronting dangerous criminals (IOL, 2008). 
Government officials proposed an amendment to Section 49 of the Criminal Procedures Act, which 
would increase the parameters of the SAPS’s ability to use deadly force, claiming that the original Act 
put the lives of officers at risk by placing too high a discretionary burden on police. This was 
accompanied by the use of an overtly martial rhetoric, which described policing as a form of combat. 
For example, Deputy Police Minister, Fikile Mbalula, said in parliament that the war on crime would 
invariably result in collateral damage: ‘When you are caught in combat with criminals, innocent 
people are going to die, not deliberately but in the exchange of fire’ (Ferreira, 2009). This stance was 
verbally linked with the preparations for the World Cup, with Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa  
(2010b) remarking that:  
As we continue to feel it, we caution those who want to distract our jovial moods, that indeed 
they will feel the police fire, for it is already burning. For those criminals who want to put us 
on a litmus test, we dare you and you will find us ready. And mind you, these are just 
simulations, but for those who ignore our warnings and are later found engaging in criminal 
activities, they will not experience simulations but the wrath and real umlilowamaphoyisa 
[police fire].  
The discursive focus on a newly intensified prosecution of the on-going ‘war on crime’ was 
complemented by the total security approach proposed for the 2010 World Cup. In late 2009, Bheki 
Cele suggested that an aggressive stance towards crime would reinforce the state’s ability to assert 
spatial order throughout the country:  
South Africa must be safe for 2010 and beyond …. We will keep the structures to make sure 
we chase the tsotsis. We chase them in the houses. We chase them in the hills, in the 
mountains, in the valleys, in the rivers. And I’ve been told we will be chasing them in the 
churches too (Mouton, 2009).  
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In particular, the funerals of SAPS officers who had been murdered in the line of duty became 
emotive spectacles, as Cele used his eulogies to call for extensions to the legal parameters of police 
force and lethality.  
The increased discursive focus on fighting criminal ‘enemies’ was formalised in the announcement 
that the SAPS would be returning to the military ranking system which had last been used under 
apartheid (for example the National Commissioner was  referred to as ‘General Cele’ under the new 
ranking system). The Minister of Police claimed that this was in line with international trends. ‘Police 
forces around the world are referred to as the Force and their ranks are accordingly linked to such 
designations’: instead of a service, the SAPS would become a force, with an accompanying ‘change in 
attitude, thinking and operational duties’ (SAPS, 2010a). A central tenet of this conception of the 
police ‘force’ was a focus on ‘re-igniting discipline’ within the ranks through the application of the 
military concept of ‘command and control’ (Mthethwa,2010c). Faull (2010) argues that the focus on 
creating more forceful, militarised SAPS was partly a public relations exercise as it inferred that a 
‘disciplined’ police force would win public support for an organisation which has developed a 
reputation for corruption and inefficiency. 
 
However, SAPS management were equivocal about the planned extent of militarisation, with 
Mthethwa claiming that these moves had been:  
… misinterpreted as merely the militarisation of the police … [rather than] as part of our new 
approach of being fierce towards criminals, while lenient to citizens’ safety and maintaining 
good discipline within the Force. This is a people’s war against criminals. For any Force to 
discharge its tasks effectively there needs to be a commander because wars are led by 
commanders (SAPS, 2010a). 
Cele made the link between the SAPS and the military more explicit in the official letter which 
informed SAPS staff of the new ranking system:  
... [f]or protocol, command and control purposes including the need to ensure mutual respect 
between members of the South African Police Service and the South African National 
Defence Force, who are on a regular basis involved in joint operations, it was deemed 
appropriate to adopt some of the military ranks utilised by the South African National 
Defence Force, which ranks are also used by some police forces across the world (cited in 
Burger, 2010).  
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However, these proposals were met with much apprehension and criticism, both from within the 
service and in civil society. The Police and Prisons Civil Union (POPCRU), the main union within the 
criminal justice system, presented an official memorandum totally rejecting the new ranking system. 
POPCRU (2010) argued that the imposition of a military management structure marked a return to an 
apartheid-era conception of policing, in which ‘command and control’ reflected an institutional 
culture of blind obedience to authority and violence against the public. Indeed, the union suggested 
that the proposed ranking system would make the job of the SAPS more difficult in ‘reducing the 
scope for innovative, community and socially-based crime prevention strategies’ and would reverse 
efforts to turn the police into a ‘respectable’ public service (ibid).In turn, the promotion of 
annihilationist rhetoric against internal criminal enemies occurred against the backdrop of a 
substantial recorded increase of deaths by police shooting and torture, along with allegations of extra-
judicial execution of so-called ‘cop killers’ (NPC, 2011: 356).  
Throughout the country, civil society groups claimed that the policing of municipal protest and dissent 
in the lead-up to the World Cup became more overtly hostile and authoritarian, including allegations 
that ANC local government officials in Durban were involved in planning violent attacks on the 
Abahalali baseMjondolo shackdwellers’ movement (Tolsi, 2009). While it remains debatable to what 
extent violent clampdowns on grassroots social movements were merely local or part of a wider 
strategy, one round-table discussion on the attacks in the Kennedy Road informal settlement 
concluded that the  government’s promotion of bellicose war talk created a national tone which gave a 
‘green light’ to local state repression (Churchland Program, 2011: 5). For some activists, this was 
reminiscent of the apartheid government’s adoption of ‘counter-insurgency’ and ‘low-intensity 
conflict’ strategies during the 1980s (10).  
The World Cup may have provided a further legitimation for repressive policing. Duncan (2010b) 
argues that the proximity of the World Cup provided the state with an impetus to brand dissent as a 
national security threat. In turn, the SAPS’s promotion of a martial rhetoric against loosely defined 
criminals raised worrying signs of a concurrent criminalisation of political dissent. Indeed, some of 
the security rhetoric used by the state in promoting its World Cup preparations explicitly labelled 
potential ‘strike actions and service delivery protests’ as ‘domestic extremism’ (World Cup 2010 
South Africa, 2010). The term ‘domestic extremism’ has become a common phrase among police 
services in the US and the UK since the 9/11 attacks, but rather than having a set official or legal 
definition it appears to be vague catch-all for ‘individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts of 
direct action in furtherance of a campaign’ (Evans, Lewis and Taylor, 2009). However, activists in the 
UK have argued that this open-ended definition provides the police with a widespread licence for 
surveillance and intimidation of organisations whose activities remain within the bounds of the law 
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and carries echoes of the Cold War era monitoring of the anti-apartheid movement in the UK, which 
was legitimated by the alleged presence of ‘subversive’ individuals within activist groups (ibid). 
For Mabake Masweneng (interview,12 October 2011), a former stop steward for POPCRU, the 
proposed militarisation of the police was an elite project, intended as much to reassert hierarchy 
within the ranks and to manage public image as it was to fortify the crime-fighting capacity of the 
SAPS . While rank and file officers supported efforts to increase the use of force, as ‘criminals are 
allergic to the blue uniform’ and present a daily threat to the safety of officers, he said that the 
changing of the ranking system ‘... came out of nowhere. POPCRU began to hear rumours about it at 
the end of 2009, but we were never consulted. They went and told the media before us … The ranks 
just changed’. According to Masweneng, the idea of restoring discipline was used to ‘instil a sense of 
fear and to undermine the influence of unions within the SAPS’. In turn, this had made station 
commanders ‘arrogant’.  
Much of the impetus behind the militarisation was driven by international marketing as the SAPS 
hierarchy attempted to assert its ‘world class’ status: ‘That is why Cele’s units [referring to the 
Operational Response Service] are dressed in soldier’s uniforms; they want to be like the Americans’. 
Alongside this international influence, private actors may have played a role in the changing of the 
ranking system: ‘Everything goes with a tender. Look at the new emblems that came with the new 
ranks. Management kept their lapels. But the rank and file kept got new ones … that’s thousands of 
people. There’s a lot of money in that’.  
He was equally sceptical about the World Cup:  
Police weren’t getting properly paid for overtime. Some commanders were using it for divide 
and rule. At OR Tambo airport they were paying some officers but, others weren’t. The 
working class members of the SAPS were excluded from benefiting from the World Cup… I 
think that it was a useless exercise. They did it out of self-interest, so that Cele could look 
good to police in the rest of the world. Things took a nasty turn with him. The police 
mentality against strikers, for example, it has got worse. The idea of militarisation is still very 
dangerous.  
The issue of police remilitarisation has proved to be contentious long after the World Cup has ended. 
Many of the proposed changes seem to have done little to improve the SAPS’s domestic image. 
Between 2010 and 2011, the SAPS paid out R106 million in civil costs arising from assaults, 
shootings and unlawful arrests (Mashaba, 2011), while Bheki Cele became the second consecutive 
police commissioner to be suspended for allegations of corruption. In November 2011, government’s 
National Planning Document (2011), which charts its long-term developmental plans until the year 
2030, called for a return to the civilianisation of the police. The report claimed that militarisation had 
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both increased police violence and eroded professionalism: in other words, militarisation had proved 
to be an ineffective response to the war on crime. Indeed, some of the commentary on remilitarisation 
criticised its perceived ineptitude as much as its attendant violence. For example, Stokes (2011) 
compared the SAPS’ handling of social unrest unfavourably with the UK government’s clampdown 
on the August 2011 riots:  ‘That’s what swift justice should look like! And that’s the kind of response 
we’d like to see from local police. … Trouble makers rounded up – without a shot being fired – and 
having their day in court almost immediately!’  
By contrast, de Vos (2011) argues that the militarisation of the police is part of a wider continuum of 
state violence, in which for many ordinary South Africans, and particularly the black poor, the SAPS 
is already in effect a paramilitary force, in that some of its members’ use of violence, assault and 
intimidation amounts to a ‘war with the very community they are supposed to serve’. For de Vos, 
institutional lawlessness, the serving of political factions within local government through 
clampdowns on protests and the legitimation of a militarised outlook toward civilian policing threaten 
to turn the SAPS into an institution which serves specific elite political goals rather than the South 
African public.  
The issue of remilitarisation proves especially contentious in South Africa’s case because of a recent 
history of militarisation in which the police, army and intelligence services cooperated as instruments 
of oppression. The remilitarisation of the police appears to bear some resemblance to the 
militarisation of society under the apartheid government of the 1980s. However, a crucial element 
missing in the debate about policing is that the official war talk and the changes in the police ranking 
system were accompanied by the security measures for the World Cup, which saw joint deployments 
of the police and military and the utilisation of a national command and control structure. While the 
upper management of the SAPS were attempting to inculcate a military mind-set within the service, 
they were simultaneously engaged in the creation of a nationwide, if temporary, ‘war machine’ (Van 
der Spuy, 2010: 112) for the 2010 World Cup.  
 Outcomes 
In the months prior to the tournament, the reports about South Africa’s crime situation were joined by 
media claims  that the World Cup would be targeted by terrorist attacks, both international and 
domestic, and repeats of the xenophobic riots which occurred in several provinces in May 2008. In the 
wake of the criminally motivated killing of Eugene Terreblanche, the leader of the far right Afrikaner 
WeerstandsBeweging (AWB), which in the early 1990s had posed a substantial risk to the transition 
to democracy and were responsible for a significant amount of political violence, one UK tabloid 
predicted that the 2010 World Cup would become better known as the site of a ‘Machete Race War’. 
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In addition, the Iraqi police reported that they had captured al-Qaeda fighters who were planning to 
attack World Cup matches: however, these reports were quickly rescinded as Iraqi authorities 
announced these threats as being highly fantastical claims made under police interrogation (Chulov, 
2010).  
In stark contrast to some of the circulating dire predictions, the tournament proceeded with few major 
incidents. The SAPS final crime statistics for the World Cup (Mthethwa, Mbalula and Cele, 2010) 
focused on crime levels within a 1, 5 km radius around tournament related venues. According to the 
figures, 704 crime-related incidents were reported in the area around stadiums during the 25 match 
days of the tournament, the majority of the cases being petty theft. This meant that of the estimated 
3,082,514 people who attended matches only 0.02% were affected by crime on match days. In the 
stadiums, there were 290 reported incidents of crime, meaning that only 0.0009% of fans were 
affected by criminal incidents within stadiums. Although the specific nature of these incidents was not 
listed in the official figures, these statistics presumably included ambush marketing offences, as 
stewards were obliged to report these to the SAPS.  
Furthermore, the statistics listed all criminal incidents reported to the police, meaning that not all 
resulted in a police docket being opened, which suggests that many of the reported incidents were not 
of a serious criminal nature. 1,712 incidents were reported in the areas around fan fests, while 76 
incidents were reported inside the various venues, representing 0.0005% of the 1,271,500 fans listed 
as attending the stadiums and various fan sites. Nationally, the SAPS opened 1,002 case dockets for 
World Cup-related crimes, which led to 447 arrests being made: 266 arrestees were South African and 
181 were foreign nationals. The majority of these arrests were for non-violent theft (Cele, 2010). 106 
people were arrested for FIFA rights protection offences and the SAPS claimed to have seized R45 
million in counterfeit goods. However, the overall effect this had on national crime rates is difficult to 
determine. The SAPS 2011 crime statistics, which covered the period of April 2010 to March 2011, 
reflected an overall reduction in the reported rates of violent crime and continued a downward trend 
for crime rates (ISS, 2011). However, because national, provincial and police station statistics only 
list overall annual figures, it is not possible to disaggregate the exact statistical impact of the month-
long World Cup. The SAPS (2011b) report which accompanied the release of the national statistics 
suggests that reduced rates of armed robbery could ‘probably’ (19) be linked to high visibility 
policing as a result of the World Cup, but also notes that ‘these high levels of visibility may not have 
had any noticeable effect on social contact crime’ (9).  
Serious crimes were swiftly and quickly punished. For example two ‘lunatic scoundrels’ 
(NATJOINTS, 2010b) who robbed the hotel rooms of foreign journalists shortly before the 
tournament began were arrested, convicted and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment within 48 hours 
114 
 
of the robbery, although no force was involved in the crime. A similar zero tolerance approach 
applied to infringements on FIFA’s commercial rights. For example, a Nigerian citizen received a 
three-year sentence for attempting to sell thirty match tickets (BBC News, 2010b). Police 
clampdowns during the World Cup were also used to display interdepartmental interoperability and 
precision. On June 16th, the SAPS conducted a dawn raid on a hostel in Pretoria to arrest 17 
Argentinean fans who had been identified as trouble makers during match day surveillance and who 
were subsequently handed to the Department of Home Affairs for deportation (NATJOINTS, 2010c). 
Security measures were also incorporated into the production of entertainment spectacle. For 
example, the SAAF both patrolled airspace and provided air displays as part of the opening and 
closing ceremonies at Soccer City.  
However, some aspects of security measures drew criticism for being ‘overzealous’. The extent to 
which security measures appeared to prioritise FIFA’s commercial interests gained much attention 
when 36 female Dutch supporters were arrested for wearing orange dresses (the colour worn by Dutch 
football supporters) which allegedly promoted a rival  beer company. The women also claimed that 
they had been manhandled and threatened by stewards and the police (Laing, 2010). This led the 
German Ambassador to South Africa to express his concerns about ‘judicial overkill’ accompanying 
the security measures (van der Spuy, 2010: 120).  
de Voss (2010) argues that while the special World Cup courts did highlight how the criminal justice 
system could be streamlined and run more effectively, the penalties for theft and commercial 
restrictions were excessive and out of step with proportional sentencing. However, the sentences also 
may have reflected some of the long-standing class biases within the criminal justice system: for 
example, while one Johannesburg man was sentenced to five years for stealing a celluar phone from a 
tourist, after the American heiress and media celebrity Paris Hilton was arrested for drug possession, 
FIFA officials were allowed to bring her fast food in court, where all charges were dropped (ibid).  
The most prominent security incident during the World Cup did not involve any criminal or terrorist 
outrage, but in fact occurred because of the preparations made by the LOC. In a larger-scale repeat of 
what had occurred during the Confederations Cup, stewards from Stallion Security went on strike a 
week after the World Cup began, over a wage dispute. As a result, the stewards were fired by the 
LOC and the SAPS had to rapidly deploy student constables from police training colleges to stadiums 
in Cape Town, Durban, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg and Soweto. The SAPS spun this event in its 
favour, with officials citing the institution’s ability to secure stadiums without advance warning as 
evidence of the depth of its security training and preparations (Mthethwa, Mbalula and Cele, 2010). 
However, this ‘security training’ also extended to running battles between riot police and the striking 
stewards in Durban with the SAPS using rubber bullets, teargas and percussive grenades to disperse 
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the stewards (Libcom, 2010). According to the stewards, the strikes were provoked by legitimate 
grievances over wages, as the LOC had promised R1,500 for daily shifts but were only giving 
workers R205 a day. (Figure Three). 
 
Figure Three: Stallion Security guards preparing to go on strike, Cape Town 
Van der Spuy (2010: 106) describes this as further evidence of the state’s capacity to respond to 
‘labour threats… In doing so, the state re-asserted its political authority and organisational capacity to 
take charge of security ’. However, Cornelissen (201: 3231) notes that while this helped to resolve a 
potential security crisis, it left an additional security cost, resulting in a  ‘war of words … between the 
police and the LOC and FIFA over whose responsibility it was to pay extra expenses’. But while 
Cornelissen acknowledges that this created additional security costs, she does not account for the fact 
that while Nathi Mthethwa was allegedly engaged in a ‘war of words’ with the LOC, he was 
simultaneously a member of its executive committee. Not only does this imply a potential conflict of 
interest but it also occurs against the backdrop of security guarantees (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:8) 
which compelled the government to take over LOC responsibilities in the case of the body defaulting. 
The LOC may then have had little motivation to resolve the on-going security dispute, as it was aware 
that the legal structure of the event ensured that the state would provide a windfall in the event of a 
walkout.  
After the stewards’ strike, the World Cup continued without major incident. Indeed, the most serious 
event which occurred in connection the 2010 World Cup was in Uganda, where suicide bomb attacks 
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by the Somalian extremist group al-Shabab killed over 60 people as they were watching a live feed of 
the final match. The apparent success of security planning within South Africa though, led Sepp 
Blatter to publically announce that South Africa had achieved a near perfect, ‘9 out of 10’ World Cup 
(BuaNews,2010a). 
Conclusion  
Although the draconian sentencing regimes of the dedicated courts system and the aggressive 
response to the stewards’ strike revealed a less congenial aspect of policing and the criminal justice 
system, these events were mostly footnotes to the barrage of international coverage. Therefore, from 
the state and FIFA’s perspective, the World Cup was a success because the media and the public 
focused on the unfolding team rivalries and impressive displays of athleticism which occurred on the 
stadium pitches rather than the ‘war machine’ in operation throughout the host cities (Boyle and 
Haggerty, 2009).  
 
While the funding, logistics and human resources were provided by the government, this was 
structured around new by-laws and guarantees to FIFA. In addition, governance measures became an 
international security project which saw the deployment of foreign officials, training exercises and the 
sharing of expertise.  What is immediately striking is the sheer magnitude of these operations, which 
entailed years of preparations, involved almost all tiers of the South African government and a 
substantial, indeed inflationary, financial expenditure.  
 
NATJOINTS functioned as the main operational locus for governance measures which promised an 
unparalleled degree of security in host cities. The South African government promoted its capacity to 
secure against ‘every conceivable threat’ (Interview with Trevor Teegler, 28 October 2009) as 
NATJOINTS planned measures which ranged from the minutiae of individual behaviour to the 
apocalyptic spectre of nuclear attack. In both conception and operational planning, security measures 
blurred the divide between war and civilian planning: deployments were coordinated through a NATO 
inspired ‘command and control system’ to ensure ‘interoperability and integration’ between the 
police, military and government departments. Further emphasising this comparison, a dedicated ‘war 
chest’ (Ndlangisa, 2010), funded pre-emptive measures against a range of anticipated threats from 
terrorism to ‘domestic extremism’.  
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The militarisation of World Cup logistics occurred in tandem with attempts to officially remilitarise 
the SAPS. Cornelissen (3235) suggests that the ultimate test of success of the World Cup security 
measures is the extent to which they have ‘bolstered the state’. However, as the remilitarisation of the 
SAPS has shown the fortification of state capacities is not an apolitical social good. Indeed, evidence 
suggests that the remilitarisation has been used to achieve explicitly political goals, such as violent 
clampdowns on dissent. Furthermore, even voices from within government have suggested that the 
entire exercise has been futile and impractical, increasing police violence towards the citizenry while 
eroding the SAPS’s capacity to effectively reduce crime rates. Attempts to militarise the ranks also 
appear to have been an elite prerogative within the SAPS, which has been used to enforce internal 
order within the service and to increase the institution’s international status. 
Van der Spuy (119) argues that  ‘political, financial and social accountability for the decisions made 
regarding the prioritisation of the security concerns ’ is central to ensuring the long term legacy of the 
2010 World Cup. However, the security legislation for the 2010 World Cup entailed a non-negotiable 
prioritisation of FIFA’s security concerns as the precondition of hosting the tournament. The series of 
guarantees, laws and special measures ensured that national and local security services were 
contractually obliged to enforce FIFA and its sponsor’s intellectual and commercial property rights. 
These obligations were a mandatory component of hosting the World Cup. Indeed, this framework 
was already established before South African gained hosting rights in 2004, through the signing of a 
series of government guarantees in 2003. In turn, this left no space for a public discussion on the 
ramifications of government departments enforcing private contractual security measures. It is 
surprising that van der Spuy does not explore the issue of how the government’s non-negotiable 
obligations to FIFA impacted upon the form of security deployment.  
Despite their differences in approach, Cornelissen and van der Spuy both conclude that the ultimate 
barometer of the success of this ‘war machine’ will be measured in its contribution to a durable 
security legacy for ordinary South Africans. Cornelissen rightly questions whether an elite-led project 
which seems to prioritise spaces of wealth and privilege can be turned to the benefit South Africa’s 
poor majority, but suggests that security expertise and technology can be deployed to public benefit 
after the World Cup. While van der Spuy (2010: 107) is more optimistic about the durability of 
security measures she also notes that it may result in the extension of the security ‘panopticon…  In 
the name of event security, as we have witnessed in the run up to the 2010 World Cup, the homeless 
may be swept off the streets, street vendors displaced to peripheral locations, and the fires of domestic 
labour unrest quickly smothered – at least for the duration of the event‘(although the final 
qualification of ‘at least’ makes it unclear whether she thinks that this is wholly negative outcome). 
Despite these significant differences in conclusion, both share a perspective on the governance of the 
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2010 World Cup which regards security as an inherent good, which through proper forms of 
management can be filtered down to ultimately make the country safer.  
However, while this approach may be well-intentioned in trying to identify how security governance 
can be improved in the future, it runs the risk of uncritically subscribing to the official security 
narrative. Albeit with different degrees of emphasis, both accept the idea that ‘labour unrest’ and 
protest were parts of a continuum of security threats which the state was obliged to respond to. As a 
result the exceptionality of the tournament is assumed as a given fact and as a product of the security 
pressures of governing an event of such magnitude.  
Cornelissen and van der Spuy focus upon securitisation as the process of organisation and deployment 
around palpable threats. However, this omits how securitisation is not just about the staging of police 
actions but entails the societal process through which ‘referent objects’ are deemed worthy of 
emergency measures (Bernhard and Martin, 2011: 43-4). In leaving out this process, the security 
interests of the actors identified in this chapter are flattened to a shared agenda of ensuring the 
maximal level of public safety. However, can the sudden criminalisation of commercial activities or 
restrictions on the democratic right to protest exclusively be understood as politically neutral, 
managerial necessity? Furthermore, can the role of commercial interests really be seen as an issue 
which had little bearing upon the form and practices of policing? It is with these questions in mind 
that the following chapter will argue for a revision of how the security governance for the 2010 World 
Cup has been understood by focusing upon how security exception is used to pursue institutional 
agendas.  
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Chapter Seven: Manufactured ‘Exception’ and the Securitisation of the 
2010 World Cup.  
Introduction  
The securitisation of mega-events, or the process through which different institutions and actors, 
cohere around a  framing of events as a referent point which demands unique measures of protection, 
works through a shared idea of exceptionality. Bernhard and Martin (2011:39) argue that 
governments, sporting bodies, the private security industry and transnational policing and military 
networks share a mind-set which holds that mega-events require policing measures which far exceed 
normal ‘exigencies of protection’.  For Boyle (2011) the exceptionality   of mega-events is further 
consolidated through a paradigm of ‘security legacies’ translated between the public and private 
actors which constitute mega-event ‘knowledge networks’. The security templates which govern 
mega-events ‘travel easier’ because they support domestic political objectives while also servicing the 
commercial interests underlying mega-events (350). For example, legacy presents an opportunity for 
the state to capitalise on the expenses which accompany mega-events, while sporting bodies promote 
legacies as a public spin off from their private projects (351). Legacies also cohere with the 
developmental discourse of domestic governments and transnational bodies as security measures can 
be justified as a form of long-term capacity and institution building. 
 As a result security budgets for mega-events have an inherent tendency to inflate due to ‘exceptional’ 
circumstances (Samatas, 2007, Bernhard and Martin, 2011:54). Firstly, mega-event security 
assemblages become part of a ‘self-conscious’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) display of security which 
aims to highlight a host city or countries ability to respond to any number of contingencies, regardless 
of their likelihood. Secondly, Bernhard and Martin (2011) suggest that mega-events are as much 
about elite psychologies of power as about sustainable security legacies. While mega-events are used 
by host states to pursue economic goals, such as attracting capital, they also function as a form of 
‘elite affirmation’, a psychological goal which defies explanation in terms of an economic calculus of 
direct financial benefit and loss. As mega-events serve to demonstrate a host state’s competency, 
merit and capability, national political elites may be prepared to forgo direct economic or 
developmental interests for the sake of short term prestige. Furthermore, the international nature of 
mega-events entails that hosting arrangements are marked by a crucible between national and 
international anxieties (Murakami Wood and Abe, 2011) providing an interface which gives 
momentum to efforts to ensure total security (Bennett and Haggerty, 2011).  
However, Klauser argues that an exclusive focus on the projection of state power (2007) underplays 
the role of business and more specifically within the context of the World Cup, FIFA, in security 
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politics. Such an omission can neglect the relationships between massive state security efforts and the 
association’s business interests which are mediated through their ownership of the World Cup brand.  
Along with Klauser (2007, 2011), Eick (2010) and Gaffney (2010) have also explored the role of 
corporate ownership in structuring the securitisation of mega-events. Their discussions propose 
conceptual models which range from the ‘wedding’ of security and commercialism (Eick, 2010), the 
idea of ‘interpretative flexibility’ between the state and private actors  (Klauser,2011) and 
comparisons between mega-events and the application of neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ (Gaffney, 2010).  
Eick (2010) argues that the mega-event governance represents the ‘wedding’ of security and 
commercialism. While measures can provide opportunities for participating security services to 
replenish their arsenals and experiment with new procedures, the terms and usage of mega-event 
governance are defined and controlled by private stakeholders. Indeed for a period, public security 
policy is explicitly managed to benefit these actors. Eick suggests that this is characteristic of the 
neoliberal ‘turn’ as the role of state security forces has increasingly been informed by attempts to 
‘steer’ or manage urban space for business interests. But rather than opening spaces for transnational 
capital, the World Cup is marked by efforts to restrict free competition for the exclusive benefit of 
FIFA and its corporate partners. Within this dominant framework, host governments affix themselves 
to a ‘contractual relationship’ (294) hierarchically managed by FIFA.  
While Klauser (2007) agrees that mega-events may enforce the idea that business interests determine 
the form of security measures he argues that this is successful because its contours into the specific 
agendas and projects of local security authorities (2011:3). It is suggested (11) that mega-event 
security models maintain an interpretive flexibility which is highly responsive to the aspirations of a 
range of actors. The intersection between commercial branding, place marketing and crowd control 
entails a shared interest in creating security measures which can maintain the ‘carefully constructed 
marketing image of an enjoyable, safe and secure World Cup’ (2007:3). For example, from a security 
perspective, the creation of commercial fan zones not only serves as a site for advertising but becomes 
a security feature in its own right (Klauser, 2011) as it provides an opportunity to focus policing 
measures in high density public areas. As a result, while security measures may be externally 
governed their form is locally adopted. 
However, Gaffney (2011) argues that the relationship between the private sector and state forces is 
more intimate in that they share comparable, reinforcing security objectives. He argues that mega-
events are characterised by the scale and density of state interventions and depicts mega-events as 
‘lengthy disciplinary processes’ (8) which combine economic extraction and the enforcement of 
domestic social control. Working within a dominant governance framework dictated by sporting 
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organisations the state use security measures to ‘fix’ urban space, in which public funds are directed 
into expansive projects that attract transnational capital, tourists and local elites. While this may be a 
project initiated by domestic governments it functions to remake cities into an image which is 
desirable to the interests of transnational capital. The size, expense and multi-scalar levels of the 
changes which  ‘produce and result from mega-event processes’(ibid) overlap with efforts to 
restructure economies,  political systems and urban space in the wake of political and economic crisis 
(Klein, 2007).  
In particular, Gaffney (27) suggests that sporting associations, working  through organising 
committees, ensure that the host state establishes ‘temporary, extra-legal forms of governance’ which 
are issued ‘blank checks’ for event spending comparable with the creation of similar structures in war 
zones and disaster areas. This is accompanied by the deployment of a developmental discourse which 
keeps the ‘forms and requirements of hosting deliberately vague’ in order to legitimate (or to disguise) 
extraordinary security measures which simulate private enterprise at the expense of public spending 
(23). In turn, the invocation of nationalist benefit and shared opportunity is used to side-line potential 
criticism. But rather than fear being used to enforce political and economic power relations, through 
the implicit threat of coercive action or punishment, (Robin, 2004) this project relies on invocations of 
socio-economic development. Hagemann (2010) argues that this rhetoric becomes an autonomous 
force in its own right, which can be used to justify a range of interventions, from sweeping 
concessions to franchise owners to extensions in the power of security forces which would be less 
permissible under ‘normal’ conditions.  
Despite identifying different hierarchies, all these accounts cohere on the idea that exceptionality 
(Agamben, 2005) is central to the security governance of mega-events. At the same time the impact 
on spatial and scalar relations reflects broader processes which have realigned the nature of urban 
security. From the work listed above we can identify such issues as the relationship between 
commercialism and security and the linkages between spectacular cities and the policing measures 
adopted to secure the urban ‘brand’. This is indicative of broader debates within critical urban theory 
and criminology. For instance while some argue (Eick, 2010) that governments have become the 
administrators of global capital who manage urban space for the upwards benefit of economic elites, 
others (Boyle, 2011) identify a convergence on policy models between the ‘security state’ and 
commercial partners. For Smith (2011) the security operations for various Olympiads reveal the 
outline of an authoritarian, neoliberal state form in which efforts to regulate consumerism are 
accompanied by the roll out of police and military interventions.  
These debates indicate a broader question about the power relations within security governance which 
will be addressed in the next chapter. Following Klauser (2011) this current chapter aims to unpack 
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and identify the various ‘meanings’ of security for the implicated state and private actors. As a result, 
this chapter will argue that a combined discourse of exceptionality and legacy was used to legitimate 
an elite project of securitisation in the lead-up to the 2010 World Cup. Rather than an ‘apolitical’ 
(Boyle, 2011:330) response to risk it will be argued that the security measures were adopted because 
they serviced a series of intersecting political and economic goals. More specifically, the declaration 
of exceptionality allowed these political and economic goals to become security issues.  
FIFA, the South African government and other security actors cohered their institutional projects 
around the deployment of ‘no expenses spared’ and ‘no holds barred’ security measures. Instead of 
exclusively revolving around tropes of insecurity, this was projected as an opportunity for socio-
economic development. In particular this chapter will propose that the 2010 World Cup can be 
understood as a ‘national security spending spree’ organised and subsidised by the South African 
government. While this was litigated with reference to the concept of security ‘legacy’, this chapter 
will propose that there is little evidence to suggest this was in fact an outcome of the 2010 World Cup. 
Instead, it will suggest that legacy can be understood as a form of public relations used to justify 
massive public expenditures on a costly, one-off project. 
Chapter Structure 
The first section will begin by assessing how the security measures, and more specifically there key 
role in governing the 2010 World Cup were discursively framed by the government. The World Cup 
was defined as both a national security event and as a transcendent national goal. This was deployed 
through an open-ended developmental discourse which promised to respond to public aspirations for 
improved security and policing. At the same time, the fluidity of these justifications was also used to 
pre-empt criticism and to frame political grievances against the government as a potential security 
risk. 
But while the government utilised an expansive rhetoric, FIFA had a far more narrow understanding 
of security. Along with the protection of the World Cup brand, FIFA defined commercial violations of 
its brand as security threats. Furthermore, it will be argued that from an institutional perspective FIFA 
regards the protection of itself and its corporate partners from liability and risk as a ‘security’ issue. 
While the association deployed developmental tropes to frame its aspirations for the 2010 World Cup, 
this chapter will argue that this public stance is incompatible with its organisational practice.  
Foreign security agencies also used their participation in World Cup planning to advance their 
institutional agendas within South Africa. This involvement was accompanied by various tiers of the 
global security industry. But while some bodies worked to align their interests with the exceptional 
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measures of the World Cup, others attempted to capitalise on fears about the government’s perceived 
inability to enforce these measures. 
At the national and local scale, the proximity of the 2010 World Cup was used to pursue a variety of 
projects under the banner of preparations. For example, some security institutions used it as an 
opportunity to circumvent tensions within their ranks. Urban authorities also used the World Cup as 
an opportunity to fast track long-standing infrastructural projects and to replenish security arsenals. 
However, despite the developmental discourse, host city preparations may have actively capitalised 
on existing socio-spatial inequalities.  
Finally, this chapter will suggest that while this worked to secure the World Cup, the often bombastic 
security rhetoric sharply contrasts sharply with the far more limited immediate legacy of the event.  
  State Branding 
The World Cup as exception  
The security preparations for the 2010 World Cup were integrated into a political narrative which 
presented the tournament as an unparalleled opportunity to showcase South Africa. For example, 
Commissioner Cele said that for the duration of the tournament ‘the rest of the world will almost 
cease to exist – South Africa will be the world’ (NATJOINTS, 2010a). While technically remaining a 
FIFA-owned event, the government defined the tournament as a national security issue. Cabinet 
declared the World Cup as a ‘major event’ as ‘the success of the event is of international interest’ and 
required exceptional levels of interdepartmental cooperation (Kempen, 2010). More specifically the 
SAPS (SAPS Strategic Management, 2005:37) listed the World Cup (and the securing of major events 
in general) as an issue of ‘national intervention’.  Under its National Crime Combating Strategy this 
was listed as a situation which required coordinated national deployment as part of a continuum of 
special circumstances including violent civil disorder, ‘high crime areas’ and disaster management 
(ibid).  
 
The figuring of the World Cup as an exceptional event was aided by a party political consensus about 
the necessity of ensuring the conditions for a successful tournament. ANC MP B Komphela 
(PMG,2010b) said that ‘security is ready in this country… and I want to say this today as we close 
this chapter, that there was never a dissenting view, from the opposition, for it being right that that the 
tournament was given to South Africa because it was judged and adjudicated on a fair basis’. This 
was accompanied by a wider elite consensus about the importance of hosting a world class event 
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which entailed substantial support from domestic business. Anglo-American, SAB Miller and 
Vodacom were official supporters and suppliers of the hosting bid (SAFA, 2003a: 6.8). These 
companies were joined by the local subsidiaries of Adidas and Phillips, which are both FIFA 
commercial partners and who provided sponsorship for the hosting campaign (6.5). The privately 
owned broadcasters Supersport and the publically funded SABC were also enrolled as official media 
partners (ibid). Notably, the LOC also included media mogul Koos Bekker on its board of directors. 
Bekker is the CEO of Naspers, a major South African based multinational media company, which 
owns seven of the country’s major daily newspapers and Media24, the largest online and print 
publisher in Africa. 
The substantial support of major corporate players projected the image of the World Cup as an 
unprecedented and indeed exceptional societal mobilisation. One DA Member (PMG, 2010b) of 
parliament explicitly compared the World Cup to the national mobilisations which accompany war: 
Now, however, comes the biggest spectacle and biggest opportunity to achieve a common national 
identity. As South Africans, we are destined to achieve great things and that togetherness must be 
forged in the burning excitement which is the World Cup. Never mind the costs that we will have to 
carry, we as South Africans can use sport to achieve what other nations have done through war.  
This presents a paradigm of conflict as an opportunity for social cohesion and vaguely defined ‘great 
things’: a functionally open definition which could presumably include socio-economic development. 
Rather than an appeal to a sense of national endangerment or of crisis, security measures were 
presented as aiding a project of national construction and reconstruction, prestige and future benefit 
(Neocelous, 2011:197). In turn such projection revolved around a ‘touchy feely’ (Ibid), affective 
sense of national cohesion.  
Legacies 
Explicitly this framed issues of budgets as unimportant when contrasted with the opportunity for 
national renewal. Indeed, this same argument was utilised when the SAPS had to take over stadiums. 
According to Cele, under such an ‘emergency’ the priority of the SAPS was to ‘first do the work, and 
then discuss how do we deal with those matters [of payment].... The money issues, we are discussing 
them... For now, allow us to serve and protect’ (Sapa, 2010a).  
Furthermore, these expenditures were presented as part of a wider developmental project in which the 
World Cup would leave a tangible legacy of improved policing and equipment upgrades. SAPS 
management adopted a wide ranging definition of legacy and claimed that while 2010 was 
exceptional it was planned in accordance with an on-going strategy of combatting crime. For instance, 
during parliamentary questions the police minister described the equipment drive for the tournament 
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as pertaining to an almost inexhaustible range of improvements in technical, operational and human 
capital (SAPS Journal Online, 2010c). This extended from an increase in available officers to crowd 
control and surveillance equipment. It also included less visible procurements such as headlight units, 
cartridges and ammunition ‘to mention but a few’ (ibid).  
International rebranding  
Security operations were also packaged into the pursuit of a range of interlinked domestic and 
international objectives. Most prominently, preparations were utilised to signal the safety of South 
African cities to the international community. In the short term security measures were intended to 
create the organisational conditions for an incident free World Cup, while it also aimed at installing a 
lasting positive impression for potential tourists and corporate investors. For example, President Zuma 
used his official state visits abroad to reiterate the official message that government had proactively 
worked to implement a comprehensive security plan, which would ensure that the World Cup would 
‘come and go without any bad event’ (Gibson, 2010). The security services promised to maintain an 
exceptionally high standard of policing with Police Minister Nathi Mthethwa claiming that ‘South 
Africa will host the safest and most secure FIFA World Cup.... That is the message we shared with 
South Africans over the past year and that we will be articulating to our 2010 visitors. Police will be 
everywhere, ready to respond to any eventuality’ (Shaw, 2010).  
Security was thus linked into a wider communicative effort in which the authorities aimed at being 
seen to visibly manage both the country’s crime situation and ‘wild cards’ such as terrorism or 
hooliganism. The ability to prepare for prospective internal and external threats was viewed as an 
opportunity to reframe the lingering international perception of South Africa as a dangerous country 
for tourists and investment. In particular this was packaged as a ‘total security’ (Bennett and 
Haggerty, 2011:2) effort which was prepared for all eventualities, including those which may have 
had a low probability of occurring. A comprehensive planning approach was offered as the best 
means of defeating scepticism in the international arena about the state’s ability to manage the 
complex security requirements of the World Cup.  
This also offered a chance for the state security apparatus to recalibrate its international standing. The 
high visibility of the tournament provided a media platform for the SAPS, as the primary operational 
locus of World Cup security, to highlight its ability to implement first rate procedures for a mega-
event. Furthermore, government spending provided an opportunity for the state to restock the 
weapons and technologies available to the national security services. The exceptional circumstances 
of the event facilitated procurement for equipment which would be harder to purchase under other 
conditions, by leveraging funding which went above government’s routine security budget. The 
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resources made available by what President Zuma described as the security ‘war chest’ 
(Ndlangisa,2010) for the tournament allowed  government institutions to catch up with developments 
in wealthier countries. For example, according to a representative of the Airports Company South 
Africa (ACSA), the preparations for ‘every possibly known eventualities that have been identified 
with the global aviation industry through its history’ were intended to allow South African airports to 
‘compete on a global level with airports in developed countries without having to rely on external 
expertise’ (Interview with Trevor Teegler, 28 October 2009). The World Cup therefore provided an 
opportunity to fast track security development.  
Following Bernhard and Martin (2011), this suggests that security technology and practices have 
become bound up with international perceptions of modernity. In leveraging resources to provide an 
increase in both the police arsenal and security at key infrastructural points, the state was highlighting 
its status as a Southern country which can compete with the North in the deployment of world class 
security. Successful security measures would allow the government to present its mobilisation as an 
operational benchmark for future mega-events, thus winning the security services a greater 
prominence within international policing circuits. Indeed, government’s Justice, Crime and Security 
cluster (JCPS), an interdepartmental structure responsible for streamlining the criminal justice system, 
has identified ‘special operations’ at future public gatherings as one of the capital projects of the 
SAPS (GCIS, 2008: 202).  
The government also publicly strove to present the 2010 World Cup as a defining moment for the 
entire African continent. The government funded International Marketing Council (2009:2), 
responsible for running the international ‘Brand South Africa’ campaign, listed the reinforcing of the 
‘position of the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup as a Pan-African project’ as one of their key 
communication exercises ahead of 2010. Security therefore offered an additional opportunity to 
rebrand negative perceptions about the African continent as atavistic, violent and backward through 
highlighting a Sub-Saharan state with the capacity to implement the rigorous security measures 
associated with mega-events. At the same time, it also served to underscore South Africa’s status as 
an emerging regional power within the global South, as the largest economy on the continent and as a 
gateway for accessing other African markets. The marketing of security measures was used to signal 
South Africa as a favourable and safe environment for the launching of commercial ventures into the 
continent. Policing measures aimed at capturing capital by highlighting the state’s ability to safeguard 
transnational passage points and economic mobilities (Graham, 2010:132). However, there was 
ambivalence at play in the public image of the World Cup as a Pan-African event. On the one hand, 
the government instituted special procedures to facilitate the entrance of visitors from Africa at the 
border posts with Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, and Botswana (AllAfrica, 2010b). On the other, the 
lead-up to the World Cup saw an increased fortification of the physical borders with surrounding 
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countries, including the phased transfer of border patrol and security from the SAPS to the Defence 
Force.  
Domestic goals  
From the domestic standpoint, security had several interlinked state building goals. The security 
measures were used to reinforce the state’s capacity and ability to fight crime to a domestic audience. 
Cornelissen (2011) argues the World Cup was firstly a ‘political mega-event’ which was undertaken 
by national elites to fortify the state. Crime and the apparent insufficiency of national security 
services, and in particular the SAPS, have been a persistent image problem for government. Most 
prominently it has been a continual policy challenge for the ruling ANC. The World Cup offered a 
chance for security services to assert their capacities to the public and for the state to project its 
sovereign power as the central public mechanism for national security and policing.  
The access to resources provided by the World Cup ‘war chest’ was also used to finance a 
procurement drive for new equipment, training and recruitment. World Cup security operations were a 
‘capital project’ for the JCPS which served to coordinate actions between the security services with 
the aim of establishing a ‘new, modernised, efficient and transformed criminal justice system’ (GCIS, 
2008: 197). The coordination of the military and police during the World Cup provided a stage for 
testing and strengthening joint operational capacities.  
World Cup security preparations were packaged into a wider communicative effort in which the 
SAPS has identified ‘crime perception management’ as central to building a positive domestic image 
of the service (Department of Police, 2010). One of the pivots of the governments ‘perception 
management’ [originally a US military euphemism for psychological warfare but now widely used by 
governments and business throughout the world- see Guma, 2005] strategy is the concept of ‘visible 
policing’ which relies on the announced presence of officers to increase public feelings of safety and 
to create ‘crime free zones’. In the case of the 2010 World Cup, the government identified the 
tournament as its largest visible policing operation to date (GCIS, 2009: 408).  
The image of its officers which the SAPS aimed to project combined what Fernandez (2008: 15) 
describes as the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects of policing. For example, a series of posters which were 
produced ahead of the tournament by SAPS Corporate Branding and Design (2010) as part of the 
‘Security Readiness and Good Ambassadors Campaign’ exemplify this combination (See Figure Four 
A and B). One set of posters emphasised community policing in picturing a desk officer assisting a 
member of the public and urged officers to be ‘good ambassadors for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and 
beyond’. The other depicts police in full riot gear pointing guns and brandishing batons, the high 
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pursuit vehicles purchased for the World Cup and officers in new body armour. It also shows a picture 
of members of the military’s Special Forces Brigade preparing to jump off an SAPS helicopter’s 
landing struts. Such imagery focused on the SAPS as a paramilitary force, including the incorporation 
of military weapons and personal, with the intention of foregrounding the strength and capacity of the 
service. Faull (2010) argues that the focus on creating more forceful, militarised SAPS was a project 
of perception management, intended to create a new image for the service.  In turn, this accorded with 
the government’s emphasis on highlighting police professionalism and capacity during the World 
Cup. 
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Figure Four A and B: Two faces of policing 
Securitisation can also be applied beyond policing and military actions and into state efforts to ensure 
social cohesion and consent (Buzan, Waever and Wilde, 1998). The act of securitisation entails that 
powerful actors move to present a key issue as transcending politics (23). From this perspective, 
mega-events can be seen to enrol patriotic discourses and the additional promise of future 
developmental benefits to leverage societal consensus. Alongside material upgrades to policing and 
security infrastructure, the government aimed to use the World Cup to promote national identity 
among South Africans. According to a parliamentary briefing on the ‘2010 World Cup and Social 
Cohesion’ (PMG, 2008) the tournament offered an opportunity to reduce the ‘social fragmentation’ 
which has manifested ‘itself as domestic violence, crime … and declining levels of social solidarity’. 
The basic premise of this was that non-tangible aspects of the World Cup mobilisation, such as 
patriotism, could protect and fortify South African society by challenging the social underpinnings of 
violent crime.  
As reflected in the security landscape of post-apartheid South Africa, the country remains divided 
along a series of racial and class lines (Kempa and Singh, 2008). Under these prevailing conditions, 
the creation of a shared sense of citizenship has proved difficult. World Cup security measures were 
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aimed at bridging this gap by increasing a popular sense of safety, winning greater support for 
government institutions and creating enthusiasm for the tournament as a shared national project.  
The SAPS discursively linked the security mobilisation to the wider government project of creating 
domestic enthusiasm for the event. Police Minister Mthethwa (2010d) called on all South Africans to 
participate in the ‘Football Friday’ programme of wearing the regalia of the national soccer team and 
‘to create buzz and show support for the soccer spectacular’. The official slogan of ‘Feel it, it is here’ 
used to encourage domestic excitement ahead of the World Cup was further incorporated into 
policing, with Mthethwa (2010b) saying in May 2010 that ‘The police leadership is feeling it. Police 
management is feeling it. All the 190,000 police members are feeling it. It is here’. However, the 
discourse of inclusivity may also have been used to disguise antagonisms within South African 
society and to delineate the boundaries of acceptable political protest and opposition. In April 2010, 
the Minister said that the SAPS would ‘show “no mercy” to criminal acts that are disguised as service 
delivery protests or labour related demands …. We will unapologetically deal with such criminal acts 
decisively and we require no permission with [sic] anyone’ (Biyela, 2010).  
The conflation of political protest with security risks reflects how the securitisation of mega-events 
attempts to enforce a suspension of social antagonisms under the guise of preventing ‘criminal 
actions’: the World Cup was presented as an exceptional national project above ‘normal’ politics. 
Such statements saw the deployment of patriotism to justify exceptional measures, with the 
underlying subtext that South Africa’s internal social conflicts should not be allowed to interfere with 
the World Cup. Immediately prior to the tournament, President Zuma visited several areas which had 
experienced particularly intense community protest to ‘investigate’ conditions on the ground. But 
according to Balfour based community activist Lifu Nhlapo (2010), these official visits to the ‘most 
militant and dissatisfied areas’ were intended to:  
... make sure that, come the World Cup tournament, marginalised people don’t protest and 
embarrass South Africa in front of an international media spotlight. What he is doing is like 
locking your children in a room so that they don’t cry that they are hungry in front of a guest. 
He actually just wants service delivery protests not to erupt when the rest of the world is in 
our country.  
However, it remains to be seen if this was motivated by the practicalities of managing an event of 
such magnitude or if it was an attempt to enforce an image of social harmony for the benefit of the 
state’ s branding exercise. What is notable is that security measures were linked to broader political 
goals rather than being exclusively applied to the management of risk. The definition of protests as a 
threat to national security also entailed that security operations took on aspects of a state of 
emergency. As Duncan (2010b) notes within the context of restrictions on protest, ‘Only under a state 
of emergency can derogable rights like the right to assembly, demonstration and picket be suspended, 
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which lend credence to the argument ... that there is an undeclared state of emergency in force for the 
duration of the World Cup’.  
Commercialism and Security 
What FIFA wanted  
Although the government adopted an all-encompassing definition of security, which intersected 
development, image making and social cohesion, FIFA adopted far less expansive criteria for security 
‘success’. In particular, the association’s assessment of South Africa prior to the awarding of hosting 
rights reveals the underlying organisational meaning of security. According to the report of the 2004 
inspection team, which concluded that South Africa would make an excellent host:  
General information indicates that South Africa shows a lack of security, but the Inspection 
Group was not aware of any such claims during the visit, although it was possible to read 
press reports on some violence in marginal areas during our visit. Despite this fact, we can 
say that the people of South Africa were always friendly, very boisterous and constantly 
celebrating during our visit to the country. We therefore came to the conclusion that as long 
as people attending the 2010 FIFA World Cup (FIFA family and spectators) keep within 
certain boundaries, they should not encounter any trouble. With regard to organising security 
for a possible 2010 FIFA World Cup in the country, the Inspection Group received an 
excellent, comprehensive work schedule from one of the high commanders of the national 
police, covering stadiums, media centres and main hotels, that will doubtless satisfy every 
requirement for the event. After the presentation we concluded that they have enough 
experience with this kind of event to handle them without difficulty. We must say that the 
security business is a flourishing industry in the country (FIFA, 2004a).  
This reflects a security preoccupation with creating and fortifying boundaries around World Cup-
related venues, rather than securing the entire country. Along with its ability to safeguard urban 
borders, the government also promised commercial security to FIFA. According to the Bid Book, 
‘South Africa offers FIFA security through its commercial strength and advanced infrastructure and 
the prospect of a joyful, happy and emotional World Cup’ (SAFA, 2003a:1/6). This wording suggests 
a functionally open definition of security: it is a concept which could be applied to the general focus 
on ensuring safe hosting venues and also to the protection of FIFA’s commercial rights. 
In order to protect FIFA’s commercial security, the government signed a raft of agreements and 
legislation which provided sweeping concessions to the association under the rubric of exceptional 
circumstances. Hosting requirements stipulated that the South Africa government provide a 
comprehensive tax exemption to FIFA and its subsidiaries to ensure that revenue from the World Cup 
would not be subjected to the laws relating to income tax and profit (SAFA, 2003a:4.4). This 
extended to the suspension of customs duties and taxes (4.3) and made allowances for the untaxed 
import and export of foreign currency in and out of the country (4.6). Under the guarantees, FIFA and 
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its subsidiaries did not constitute a permanent establishment in South Africa, thus legally exempting 
them from any form of taxation (4.4). Furthermore, the Department of Justice and Constitutional 
Development signed a guarantee: 
To indemnify FIFA and defend and hold it harmless against all proceedings, claims and 
related costs (including professional advisors fees) which may be incurred and suffered by or 
threatened against others against FIFA in relation to the organisation and staging of the 2010 
World Cup (4.15).  
The guarantee of legal indemnity had profound implications for the role of the national security 
services in World Cup governance. Under the guarantees, the government undertook to provide ‘all 
security measures necessary to guarantee the 2010 FIFA World Cup [sic] general safety and 
protection’ (4.5). More specifically, the police and judicial system were tasked with providing laws 
and enforcement measures which would affirm FIFA’s unconditional legal ownership of marketing 
and property rights (4.13). FIFA presented these guarantees as an administrative necessity for 
establishing the exceptional ‘conditions required for organising and staging the World Cup’: all 
requisite ‘special laws, regulation and decrees’ were to be enacted and enforced, ‘irrespective of any 
change in government or its representatives’ (4: Conclusion). For example, under less exceptional 
circumstances, such commercial violations as ticket touting would be considered as civil offences and 
would result in fines. However, during the World Cup this was further enforced by the threat of arrest 
and prison sentences. 
While the security services were mandated to ensure that World Cup related venues were protected 
from crime and disruption, the guarantees also protected FIFA from any changes within the political 
system itself. Gaffney (2010) argues that such arrangements serve to establish temporary and extra-
legal forms of governance, but the guarantees appear to have been even more extensive: in effect they 
mandated that the World Cup was ‘extra political’. For example, despite resigning from government 
when former president Thabo Mbeki was ‘recalled’ from office in 2008, former cabinet members 
Essop Pahad and Jabu Moleketi retained their positions on the LOC board. This temporary 
‘suspension’ of the political resonated with the discourse being used by South African politicians and 
their business partners. Indeed, FIFA secretary general Sepp Blatter claimed that South Africa’s 
domestic politics had proved a challenge to the association ‘What we maybe forgot at the beginning is 
that it’s a very, very young democracy…  There was a change of presidency, there were up to eight 
ministers within the organising committee. It was… a very, very political board’ (Blitz, 2010).  
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 FIFA regulations stipulated that the LOC was responsible for ‘ensuring that order and safety is 
maintained in cooperation with the government of South Africa, particularly in and around stadiums’ 
(FIFA, 2004b: 7). However, this was effectively an artificial distinction, as the same regulations (6) 
state that: 
The Organising Association is subject to the supervision and control of FIFA, which has the 
last word on all matters relevant to the 2010 FIFA World Cup™. The decisions of FIFA are 
final ...  The Regulations and all guidelines and circulars issued by FIFA are binding for all 
parties participating and involved in the preparation, organisation and hosting of the 2010 
FIFA World Cup™.   
As a result, security plans made by the government had to be vetted and approved by FIFA. This has 
two significant impacts on the nature of South Africa’s security measures. Firstly, the wide-ranging 
definition of creating successful conditions involved the government in providing a comprehensive 
security scheme with a scope ranging from likely risks, such as contact crimes, to more diffuse threats 
such as terrorism. Throughout the Bid Book (2003a:9:3), South Africa’s proposed model is presented 
as ‘integrated, seamless and well-resourced’. At the same time, as described in the GSC   
(OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:41) the deployment of the national security apparatus was considered as a 
support initiative to the FIFA owned event. While policing was utilised to pursue domestic and 
international objectives by the state, this was intended to remain in the background: ‘the approach 
therefore is one of football being the main focus with law enforcement present to facilitate the event 
and not the other way around’ (ibid).  
Secondly, FIFA prioritised its commercial interests throughout the initial agreements, thus ensuring 
that its intellectual property rights were included in security measures from the genesis of planning. 
Alongside the specific commercial restrictions, other aspects of the national security plan were 
instrumentalised to provide an additional layer of policing against ambush marketing. For instance, 
the enforcement of restricted flying zones around stadiums was used as a countermeasure against ‘the 
possibility of the utilisation of aircraft for ambush marketing and terrorist attacks’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 
2008: 47). 
This also allowed FIFA to meet the security requirements of its corporate partners. The exact nature 
of FIFA’s obligations towards its official partners and sponsors is not publicly available, although it is 
clear that the association offers ‘maximum return on investment for the sponsors’ through opening up 
hosting environments for its partners’ logos and signage (FIFA, 2012). Through its commercial rights 
programme, a complex series of interactions lead to the policing of its partners’ brands. With FIFA 
guaranteeing the protection of corporate interests, the LOC with the host state as its primary backer 
works to ensure a legislative and policing environment which promotes certain brands. The 
combination of laws and enforcement uses security  agencies and customs officials as part of a set of  
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‘tools’ against infringements on commercial property rights (FIFA Rights Protection Programme, 
2010:7).  
Furthermore, hosting agreements entailed a sweeping definition of security which promised to ‘set up 
every possible safety and security measure’ (SAFA, 2003b: A12). As Boyle and Haggerty (2011) 
have argued, it is this concept of total security which is characteristic of the planning environment of 
mega-events, in which authorities promote their ability to counteract all risk. Under the conditions 
stipulated by the guarantees, the government agreed to draft a detailed and comprehensive security 
concept, at its own cost, and to enforce all national security measures relevant to the 2010 World Cup. 
This functionally open definition of security chimed with the rhetoric of South African politicians 
who suggested that the World Cup transcended issues of cost or restraint (PMG, 2010b). However, it 
also allowed FIFA to align the protection of its commercial interests with an overarching definition of 
national security.  
FIFA’s developmental rhetoric 
The association also cultivated a public image as a philanthropic organisation which aimed to benefit 
both South Africa and the continent at large (Maharaj, 2011:51). Sepp Blatter felt empowered to claim 
that: ‘The FIFA Soccer World Cup in Africa is a love story and I am happy that this love story is 
coming together and is becoming a real wedding party. Africans have waited for a very long time; the 
dream is now a reality’ (BuaNews, 2010b). Blatter (2010:27) also publically misrepresented the role 
of FIFA in South Africa through claiming that the association was in some way funding public works 
developments in South Africa:  
It was a historic moment. Over the past few years projects of this kind have been 
implemented throughout Africa to ensure that the 2010 World Cup leaves a lasting legacy. 
While the construction of new stadiums and training pitches, the introduction of modern 
telecommunications systems and the improvement of traffic infrastructures are vital, our work 
does not end there.  
Such statements belied the fact that the World Cup was effectively bankrolled by South African 
public spending but Blatter also argued that the intangible benefits of the 2010 World Cup 
transcended cost: ‘what do people need in a situation like this? As the ancient Romans used to say 
give them bread and give them entertainment. Football is modern entertainment and provides the 
emotions we need ... leave a legacy by showing the world you are capable of organising such a 
competition. You have the confidence and trust ... of FIFA’ (Skymedia, 2009:35). FIFA’s rhetoric 
was given further legitimacy by the support afforded by such iconic public figures as Desmond Tutu, 
who told the association’s official magazine: ‘The country has come so far. We were once a country 
with apartheid, but we are now the proud hosts of a FIFA World Cup. The children who died or were 
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wounded during our struggle will now be smiling – wherever they are. This is all the fruit of their 
work. Their blood was not spilt in vain’ (FIFA World Magazine, 2010a:41).  
However, FIFA’s self-presentation as a philanthropic sporting body is at odds with the organisation’s 
actual practices. Much of its ‘faith’ in South Africa was bound up with the governments’ ability to 
provide an environment for profit maximisation. At the same time it, is also arguable that any sports 
legacy which FIFA contributed towards in Africa, through channelling funds back into member 
associations, is substantially outweighed by the amount of profit it extracted due to the government 
measures which supported the 2010 World Cup. According to FIFA’s (2011b) post-2010 financial 
report, the football association earned a tax-free $3 billion from the marketing and branding rights of 
the 2010 World Cup. By contrast, the South African government, who funded the venues in which the 
tournament took place and provided the logistical and administrative support which ensured a 
controlled and safe environment, made a far more modest return. Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan 
admitted that the tournament had directly added R38 billion to the national economy, roughly 
breaking even with the direct national state expenditure (Finance24, 2010). Gordhan did not include 
the spending of provincial and municipal governments, but claimed that the long-term impacts of 
infrastructural improvements and the increased international esteem of South Africa were ultimately 
worth the expenditure (ibid). But, leaving the issue of intangible benefits aside for the time being, this 
appears to present a striking disparity between public expenditure and private profit.  
Blatter’s Pan-African rhetoric also stands in stark contrast with the alliances FIFA has formed with 
despotic regimes on the continent. For example, Blatter personally accepted a medal of honour from 
Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia who in April 2012 was convicted of crimes against 
humanity (The New Democrat, 2011). After his official visit to Zimbabwe in 2011, photos emerged of 
Blatter warmly holding hands with President Robert Mugabe (The Zimbabwean, 2011). Indeed, 
during the bidding process for the 2010 World Cup, FIFA’s assessment report concluded that 
prospective hosts Libya, Tunisia and Egypt had ‘good’ to ‘excellent’ internal security (FIFA, 2004a). 
But by the end of 2011, governments in all  three of these countries had been overthrown in  
revolutions which exposed the nature of this  ‘internal security’, which was achieved through the 
systematic use of torture, the suppression of dissent, and rule by overbearing national security 
apparatuses. While FIFA promotes vaguely defined concepts of legacy within host countries, hosting 
arrangements actively work to distance the organisation from the content and wider ramifications of 
security plans. Although FIFA cannot be blamed for the authoritarian and brutal policing practices of 
governments, it can be argued that through its choice of hosting applicants it may give unwarranted 
legitimacy to regimes with poor human rights records. It could also be speculated that when it comes 
to a choice between business security and human rights, the association is much more likely to err on 
the side of the former.  
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Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector  
The international exception 
The involvement of foreign security services and transnational institutions signalled the status of the 
2010 World Cup as an exceptional event. Because of the event’s status and profile, in which South 
Africa, was ‘hosting the world’ (Mththewa,2010b), officials claimed that the country was more 
exposed to international security challenges than in normal circumstance, requiring the cooperation of 
transnational institutions.  
As a self-consciously ‘African’ event, the involvement of SADC structures and regional neighbours 
was used to convey the image of continental cooperation and prestige. In turn, neighbouring 
governments used the World Cup to call for a tightening of their internal security.   For example, the 
Mozambican police claimed to be on high alert for armed gangs attempting to migrate north ahead of 
police clampdowns within South Africa (AllAfrica, 2010b). Namibia used the opportunity to upgrade 
its passport management system and installed new radar surveillance to monitor the country’s airspace 
(Mulubwa, 2009).  
The involvement of foreign police agencies accorded with both FIFA’s commercial plans and with the 
government’s security strategy. Along with sending observers to the 2006 German World Cup, 
members of the SAPS were briefed by Helmut Bayerl (2007:18) of the Munich police. Among the 
topics discussed was ensuring that ‘conceptual preparations’ were in place for enforcing commercial 
restrictions on ticket sales and product piracy (18). While these exchanges were not organised by 
FIFA, they did increase the exposure of the South African authorities to the forms of policing used at 
association-owned events. At the same time, these forms of collaboration accorded with the official 
SAPS discourse of capacity building through importing conceptual security expertise. FIFA (2010) 
also played a direct role in facilitating transnational policing links through organising the 2010 World 
Cup security workshop at its headquarters in Zurich in March 2010, which was attended by Bheki 
Cele, Danny Jordaan and police delegates from the countries participating in the tournament. While 
the details of the workshop were not made public, the subsequent press conference eschewed the issue 
of FIFA’s commercial restrictions and instead focused on how the 2010 World Cup presented an 
opportunity to strengthen and enhance international law enforcement (ibid). However, it can be 
speculated that such events increased both personal and institutional bonds between FIFA and police 
agencies within their member nations, consolidating a shared set of security interests and reference 
points.  
While security exchanges worked to share institutional knowledge and practices on concerns such as 
terrorism, illegal betting and hooliganism, they may also have served as a platform for participating 
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countries to transfer domestic policing models into the South African context. It also presented an 
opportunity for the South African security services to further entrench their institutional standing 
within ‘transnational security networks’ (Gill, 2006). 
Through collaboration with host governments, INTERPOL promotes its capacity to assist in securing 
against potential crisis and disruption during international sporting events. In the case of South Africa, 
this offered an augmentation to national security measures while giving additional surety to the state’s 
guarantees to FIFA through increasing the exposure of the SAPS to security practices honed at 
previous FIFA events. The prestige afforded by managing an event as large as the FIFA World Cup 
provided a chance for the higher echelons of the SAPS to publically recalibrate their personal 
positions within international policing circuits. For example, in the lead-up to the tournament, Bheki 
Cele conducted several site checks of key infrastructure with INTERPOL president Ronald Noble 
(Times Live Multimedia, 2010). At each of these stops, with Cele at his side, Noble assured the 
gathered press contingents that the preparations demonstrated that the SAPS had become a respected 
security player through its demonstrable expertise in policing major events. Such testimonials aided 
the SAPS’s attempts to define itself as a police force from the global South which can provide world 
class logistics and planning. 
For example, at the level of crowd control techniques, SAPS experiments with the practices of the 
French gendarmes resonate with Graham’s description of security ‘boomerangs’. However, this was 
not necessarily marked by the ‘flat’ (Boyle, 2011) circulation of best practise. In the case of France, 
Graham (2010, xx) suggests that domestic security has been influenced by an ‘orientalism’, which 
views policing in the banlieues [which directly translates as suburb but has come to be a euphemism 
for low income housing projects outside of French cities] as a kind of internal colonialism over 
potential domestic  ‘insurgents’. This becomes a self-reinforcing logic, as heavy-handed and 
aggressive policing generates social upheaval thus providing a justification for even ‘tougher 
policing’: ‘The 2005 riots were only the latest in a long line of reactions towards the increasing 
militarisation and securitisation of this form of internal colonisation and enforced peripherality’ (ibid). 
The linkage to the 2010 World Cup would suggest that French government may be attempting to 
market aspects of its own security strategies in other countries, marking an example of an exchange of 
Northern security procedures to the global South.  
Joint preparatory operations, such as the training simulations between US and South African forces 
also served to advance strategic objectives. The involvement of US Special Operations highlights a 
broader strategy of US military power, in which SOCOM uses its linkages to foreign governments as 
a platform from which to perform ‘rapid response’ and often highly clandestine missions (Turse, 
2011). Furthermore, as the one of the largest and best equipped military forces in Africa, the SANDF 
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provides an important security link for the United States. In turn, the exercises focused on using 
specialised response teams which can be rapidly deployed in urban terrain, which accords with 
internal SANDF military doctrine. Although the military’s ‘Vision 2020 Strategy’ is not publicly 
available, selected quotes from the document used within an in-house army journal (Olivier, 2010:35)  
note that this strategy is focused on ‘joint, interagency, departmental and multinational (JIM) 
operations’ within ‘complex’ urban environments.  
The exceptionality associated with the World Cup also provided opportunities for private operators. 
However, this was utilised in different ways. While some companies affiliated their projects with the 
wider manoeuvrings of the state security services, others promoted fears about the inadequacy of 
government preparations. For example, the local security contractor Nicholls Steyn & Associates 
(2010), whose director Rob Steyn is the former section head of the SAPS VIP Protection Division, 
performed ‘executive protection’ for representatives of three of FIFA commercial partners. According 
to the company’s report on the World Cup, these services were conceptualised as an adjunct to the 
government’s preparations: as ‘good ambassadors for South Africa’ they ‘developed an excellent 
working relationship with the South African Police Force’ (8) in changing ‘the reality and perception 
of threats to safety’ (7). While the report suggests that the LOC was ineffective in providing security 
planning and information, it is effusive about the SAPS’s ‘perceptible presence’ (6) and concludes 
that: ‘the NSA [company] is particularly proud of the manner in which South Africa hosted the World 
Cup. We were gracious and magnificent hosts’ (8).  
The discourse of exceptionality and legacy also provided an entrance point for international security 
technology firms, whose local distributors provided the security hardware purchased as part of the 
SAPS’ procurement drive. For example, the surveillance and IT technology used in mobile command 
centres was purchased from the domestic branch of the Taiwanese company GeoVision (2010). 
According to a press release, the company was proud to offer its support in assisting the SAPS sustain 
‘full coverage of the event’ and offered the assurance that its products would ‘serve valiantly’ during 
the World Cup (ibid). The US-based company Robinson (2008:4) claimed of their equipment that  
‘While the R44 Raven II Police Helicopters will play integral roles in the security effort for the World 
Cup, they are also part of a sustained effort to create a safer environment that will continue to benefit 
the citizens of South Africa long after the World Cup concludes’. However, there was an underlying 
ambiguity in private security’s alignment with the government’s preparations. While the World Cup 
was used to showcase the government’s capacity to enforce security, these operations were 
augmented by private institutions whose success is dependent on anxieties about the state’s 
capabilities.  
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As a result, other companies attempted to capitalise on the fears about crime which surrounded South 
Africa’s hosting. For example, along with donating vehicles to SAFA, the local subsidiary of 
Mercedes Benz used the tournament as an opportunity to promote its latest ranges of luxury armour-
plated vehicles: 
... [the] Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard and Mercedes-Benz E-Guard, which provide occupants 
with protection from attacks by firearms and explosives. The Mercedes-Benz S600 Guard has 
armour to resist military standard small-arms projectiles that have almost twice the velocity of 
bullets fired by a revolver, and provides protection against fragments from hand grenades 
(IOL, 2009a). 
Furthermore, there is at least one case of security contractors distorting and exaggerating their 
involvement in security operations. In early 2010, a report in the Jerusalem Post (Lappin, 2010) 
claimed that over 30 Israeli homeland security firms were providing equipment to the South African 
government, ranging from ‘rocket-proof shields’ to automated cameras that ‘can climb up poles’. 
According to Marc Kahlberg, a former police official and current president of MK Security 
Consulting, he had been personally approached by SAPS officials in 2006:  
In June 2006, I was approached by the South African Police (A special unit tasked with the 
initial security preparations for the Soccer World Cup) and asked to assist them with 
preparing a complete plan of action in providing the Loftus Stadium in Pretoria with a 
comprehensive security solution for an event where the local soccer champions Kaiser Chiefs 
would play the famous English team Manchester United. Integrating the existing security 
infrastructure (which was really minimal), with amongst other things, the unique technology 
that I was able to import to South Africa, I put into place the exact Secure Zone Concept that I 
used in the City of Netanya, Israel after the Park Hotel terror attack, which cut the crime rate 
by over 70% for a period of a year and prevented any further attacks in the sensitive area, 
which was constantly targeted by terror groups at the time ...There is no doubt that since 2006 
the South African security infrastructure has gone from strength to strength. Millions have 
been spent on technology and training, manpower has been beefed up and international 
cooperation with other countries is in place. The initial Secure Zone Concept has been 
implemented and even though I slightly changed the format because of a different culture and 
different problems, such as extreme violent crime, it is really working in those places that it 
has been implemented. The stadium security plan that I passed on to the South African Police 
in 2006 and 2007 is in place and working (the Secure Zone Concept with various layers of 
proactive defence and a simple Detect, Delay and Deter concept which has also been 
integrated into the contingency plans and well as policy and standard procedure of the 
authorities) (Interview, 9 March 2010).  
In effect, Kahlberg suggested that his security plan for the Loftus stadium had provided the 
conceptual blueprint for national security plans. These claims were vehemently denied by the LOC, 
whose spokesman Rich Mkhondo asserted that comprehensive security measures had been 
implemented by the government and the LOC: ‘We do not need any help from any security 
companies, including those from Israel’ (Sport24, 2010). However, after the World Cup, one list of 
police acquisitions revealed that the SAPS did in fact purchase 10 Israeli-made water cannons 
(defenceWeb, 2011). The LOC’s denunciations therefore seemed to have been partly based on 
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asserting the government’s capacity to implement security measures through refuting claims that it 
would be outsourcing its security functions to foreign companies.  
However, it seems that Kahlberg lied about his own involvement in drafting security planning and 
misrepresented the actual structure of policing measures, in implying that it would primarily be run by 
private security firms. Indeed, at a 2011 counter-terrorism conference in Massachusetts, Kahlberg 
claimed that ‘the success of the security concept throughout the 2010 soccer world cup [sic] in South 
Africa is a prime example of the concept’s accomplishments’ (International Security Consulting,  
2011). While the SAPS may have consulted with Kahlberg and others, security plans were based on 
prior event templates from other FIFA tournaments and previous events in South Africa. It is 
therefore suspicious, to say the least, that the ‘Kahlberg plan’ was never publically referenced by 
government and FIFA officials or cited within the available planning documents. As a result, it seems 
likely that Kahlberg’s statements betrayed a tendency on the part of contractors to deliberately 
overstate their involvement in mega-event security (Boyle, 2011:344). At the same time, the reaction 
by the LOC also reveals sensitivity about maintaining a public focus on the security measures as a 
state-centred project.  
National and Urban Security  
Within national, provincial and local government, the wide-ranging definition of national security was 
used to pursue parallel projects. Although the previous chapter discussed how World Cup 
preparations were used to augment existing security resources, this section will provide a few 
examples of how different authorities affixed additional meanings onto the security preparations.  
SANDF  
SANDF officials were vocal in suggesting that their role in security preparations had been 
underfunded. For example, the Air Force publicly stated that it wanted the government to adjust the 
delivery of jet fighters purchased as a result of the controversial 1999 arms procurement deal to 
include Saab JAS39C advanced light fighter jets in its World Cup deployment (Engelbrecht, 2009a). 
This was in addition to the Saab manufactured  Gripen fighters, which alongside ‘cannon-fitted Hawk 
advanced trainers and gun-toting Rooivalk attack helicopters’, were used to secure airspace during the 
tournament (Wingrin, 2010). In July 2011 the Saab company publicly admitted that it had paid R24 
million in ‘secret payments’ to one of the SANDF advisors consulting on the procurement: a 
revelation which in turn contributed to the government’s reopening of an investigation into the deal, 
an on-going political scandal in which both President Zuma and former President Mbeki have been 
accused of receiving bribes from defence companies (Sole and Brummer, 2011).  
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Defence Minister Lindiwe Sisulu (2010) has maintained that SANDF is ‘woefully underfunded’ and 
that current defence spending undermines the military’s capacity to be a ‘critical and credible partner 
in influencing events in our region, and the international community’.  
At the same time, Sisulu has attempted to blame unionisation within SANDF as a major cause of 
decline and has gone so far as to suggest that the South African National Defence Union (SANDU) is 
a threat to national security through encouraging a ‘mutinous’ influence within the ranks (Duncan, 
2010a). In the build-up period to the tournament, relationships between the government and the union 
deteriorated to the extent that at a march to the Pretoria Union Buildings in 2009, protesting soldiers 
broke through a barricade and were pushed back by riot police using tear gas. The result was running 
battles between the police and military on the edge of the verdant lawns of the official seat of 
government. However, SANDU has argued that the Minister is attempting to institute a draconian 
clampdown on soldiers’ basic labour rights. Indeed, after the World Cup, the SANDF attempted to 
withhold back-pay owed to soldiers for tournament deployment, but was forced to release these funds 
after public pressure from the union (News24, 2010a). The security preparations coincided with these 
struggles within the military and were used by its leadership to leverage greater funding as part of a 
wider vision of resupplying national defence.  
Prestige projects  
At the urban scale, the World Cup also provided a rationale for authorities to fast-track long gestating 
development projects, such as the Gautrain mass rapid transit system between Pretoria, Johannesburg 
and the Oliver Tambo International Airport as well as the construction of the King Shaka International 
Airport outside Durban. Both of these major infrastructural projects were designed with prominent 
security features, which were presented as long-term urban legacies arising from World Cup 
spending. Furthermore, the exceptional conditions of the World Cup provided an impetus for these 
projects to be rapidly planned, resourced and completed before the event. Security and 
communications systems at the new airport were installed by the South African branch of the Saab 
defence group (defenceWeb, 2010b). The King Shaka airport was also used as a showpiece for the 
SAPS, who deployed tactical teams during the tournament to further highlight the police as the 
‘leading agents’ in security operations (Mthethwa, 2010e). Indeed, Minister Mthethwa suggested that 
the newness of the airport made it a ‘leap forward’ in the policing of ports of entry (Ibid).  
The Gautrain was rolled out with a network of CCTV cameras and ‘Israeli-developed military-grade 
thermal imaging equipment to protect its assets … imported from and endorsed by the Israeli Defence 
Force’ (Venter, 2010). However, the launch of the Rea Valley bus rapid transit system (BRT)  in 
Johannesburg in 2009 saw the SANDF deployed alongside the SAPS, owing to violent resistance 
142 
 
from the minibus taxi industry, who regarded the BRT as a threat to their monopoly on public 
transport. Indeed, in the months before the World Cup, shots were fired at buses and one BRT driver 
had his house petrol-bombed (Berger, 2010). At the same time, the Defence Force declared the 
SANDU march on the Union Building illegal because it diverted force numbers needed to protect the 
rollout of the Gautrain (Duncan, 2010a). The rollout of such prestige projects added an additional 
seam of security to host cities through creating heavily guarded and monitored entry and transport 
points, which applied defence technology to the maintenance of everyday urban infrastructure 
(Graham, 2010).  
Evictions? 
Internationally, the security measures adopted by mega-event hosts have been accompanied by 
beautification measures which overtly target the urban poor and homeless. As a result, there was a 
significant amount of media and NGO speculation about the possibility of forced removals in the lead 
up to 2010. In South Africa, government worked to maintain the image of a ‘developmental’ World 
Cup which would benefit all South Africans. For example, in 2009 Housing Minister Tokyo Sexwale 
claimed that there would be no evictions of informal settlements as a result of the 2010 World Cup 
(Ndawonde, 2009). However, a report conducted by the UN Human Rights Council (2009:9) argued 
that the KwaZulu-Natal provincial government had in fact tried to eliminate slums and put the 
residents of informal settlements in ‘transit camps’ ahead of the World Cup through the adoption of 
the Elimination and Prevention of Re-Emergence of Slums Act. After a sustained legal campaign by 
the shackdwellers’ movement Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Act was struck down by the Constitutional 
Court in September 2009.  
But while the press was eager to link evictions to the World Cup, many of the removals which were 
undertaken in cities in the lead-up period were not directly connected to the tournament. As Richard 
Pithouse argued, ‘people were being evicted long before we got the World Cup, and they will be 
evicted for a long time afterward’ (interviewed by Werth, 2010). However, at the local level, the 
proximity of the World Cup appears to have provided an impetus and accelerator to on-going 
gentrification projects. For example, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign (2010) noted that 
localised evictions increased in Cape Town ahead of the tournament, particularly around the Green 
Point stadium and transport hubs. Long-term projects were fast-tracked by the proximity of the World 
Cup, such as the N2 Gateway housing project, which aimed to reduce the presence of slums near the 
Cape Town international airport (Newton, 2009). However, it is unclear if this was imposed by the 
external pressures of the World Cup rather than being incorporated into long-standing plans. As a 
result, this question will be more thoroughly addressed in the next chapter.  
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However, there is some evidence which suggests that existing spatial inequalities were viewed as 
having positive security ramifications by organisers. According to Destination 2010 (2009:28), an  
LOC endorsed publication covering planning and preparation a year prior to the tournament, tourists 
had little to fear from a ‘high violent crime rate and safety issues ... most analysts blame crime on 
poverty and unemployment and point to the fact that the bulk of cases occur in teeming, poverty 
stricken townships’. Although this contrasts sharply with the promoted image of a developmental 
World Cup, such a statement aligns with some of the observations the FIFA inspection team (2004a) 
made about the spatial dispersion of violent crime in South Africa. In particular, the team noted that 
one of the attractive features about prospective host cities was that criminal violence was overtly 
concentrated in ‘marginal areas’ (ibid).  
Outcomes  
For the South African government and its security partners in FIFA, tangible augmentations in the 
policing apparatus were only one among several objectives which the security measures aimed to 
achieve. While the World Cup was used to increase the resources available to the police and military 
and to fast-track the installation of security technology at key infrastructure, the main focus was on 
ensuring that the government was able to promote an image of total security during the tournament 
itself.  
The SAPS (2011b) has conceded that this visible policing strategy was probably a factor in reducing 
some areas of the national crime rate, which is a far more limited policing legacy than the one 
promoted ahead of the World Cup. Furthermore, in the official remarks which accompanied the 
release of the National Crime Statistics in 2011, Minster Mthethwa (2011a) made no reference to the 
World Cup security measures, which is a surprising omission considering how the tournament served 
as a major platform for the SAPS to display its security prowess to the international community. The 
official ANC statement on the tournament also did not make any mention of the World Cup as a 
contributing factor to a reduction in crime rates (Polticsweb, 2011). This silence was contrasted by the 
statements made by opposition parties like the Democratic Alliance, Freedom Front and Inkatha 
Freedom Party, who all lauded the World Cup security measures as an operational template which 
should be extended into everyday policing (ibid). That the SAPS and the ruling party did not mention 
the World Cup at all, may suggest that many of the publicly-made assertions about the security legacy 
of the tournament were scaled back in the ensuing period, hence its disappearance from official 
security rhetoric.  
Government officials presented the security measures as part of a heroic struggle to reclaim South 
Africa from out-of-control criminals (Mouton, 2009). However, the actual success of security 
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measures was arguably contingent on factors other than the mass mobilisation of state forces. 
Notably, as Cornelissen (2011) observes, tournament venues were spatially centred in urban areas 
which are already gentrified and heavily policed by both the state and private security. This ensured 
that the tournament-related events were kept away from urban and peripheral areas which experience 
far higher rates of crime. Furthermore, the extent to which tourists have to a large degree been 
insulated from victimisation (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, 2010), would suggest that urban 
authorities drew upon an institutional experience of ensuring that foreign visitors and prestige sites are 
kept well-guarded and secure. Indeed, as the SAPS (2011b) annual report on crime figures shows, the 
preparation and staging of the World Cup occurred against an on-going reduction in rates of violent 
crime. 
Despite all the rhetoric of an exceptional national project and logistical preparations comparable to 
war, the 2010 World Cup ultimately amounted to various teams playing football for a month. 
However, for supporters of the government’s efforts, the precise lack of any ‘security story’ served as 
proof of the necessity of exceptional measures. According to John Carlin (2011:37), who wrote the 
book upon which the Hollywood film about South Africa’s victory in the 1995 Rugby World Cup 
Invictus was based: 
Those most disappointed were the foreign media, who had predicted that to stage a World 
Cup in SA was an exercise in criminal irresponsibility. They waited for the bloodbath to 
materialise, for the lights to go out, for the games not to start on time, for stadiums to 
collapse, for the Gautrain to crash, for the epidemics of killer diseases, for Julius Malema and 
the AWB to ignite a race war. And then what? Nothing happened. There was no bloody story. 
Not off the field, anyway…Least disappointing of all was South Africa and its people. We 
gave the world our best in 2010, and the world was impressed. A fabulous platform has been 
provided for prosperity and social peace.  
Conclusion  
The securitisation of the 2010 World Cup involved a public/private ‘complex’ (Boyle and Haggerty, 
2009) which was coordinated around a specific goal: to ensure that the World Cup was the most 
secured and policed to date. While not denying that security planners did work to ensure a high level 
of safety for attending publics (Bernhard and Martin, 2011) this chapter has argued that security has 
flexible institutional meanings for the mega-event security complex. In particular, this prioritised the 
image of national security and social cohesion. The discursive framing of preparations by the South 
African government presented this as a goal which went above ‘normal’ politics. Security operations 
were presented as having a meaning far beyond the exigencies of policing a large event. Using often 
bombastic, feverish language, the governance preparations were portrayed as an unprecedented 
platform to boldly assert South Africa’s excellence and modernity. As a result, this saw official calls 
for a full social mobilisation, as in times of war, to capitalise on this once-off opportunity.  
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But the FIFA World Cup is also a commercially owned franchise. FIFA, in particular, used the wide-
ranging definition of national security to outline the framework for measures which thoroughly 
incorporated the protection of their financial and symbolic interests. Although they used their 
ownership of the brand to approve and vet security measures, it appears that the open-ended definition 
of tournament-related security included within hosting guarantees and by-laws ensured that they 
would not have to maintain a vigilantly interventionist stance on preparations. Instead, as a national 
security event and a source of considerable international prestige, the association could safely leave 
the enforcement of a massive, inter-urban policing regime up to the South African government.  
From this perspective, it may be speculated that the open-ended definition of security outlined in 
FIFA World Cup hosting requirements caters to the interests of both the association and police and 
military establishments. The wide-ranging requirements of creating ‘secure conditions’ for the 
tournament provided scope for substantial policing expenditures and equipment purchases. This may 
also make the financial concessions to FIFA more palatable to host governments. While authorities 
are obliged to sign away possible revenue streams, they are also able to leverage additional funding 
for tournament-related projects which can be used after the event has ended. Indeed, it may be further 
speculated that FIFA is emboldened in obligating such comprehensive concessions from host 
governments because they are aware that this will be adapted for additional projects by its government 
‘partners’. FIFA is also experienced in capitalising on the symbolic potency of the World Cup brand. 
Because governments have demonstrated their willingness to agree to the bid conditions for hosting 
rights, the association has scaled up its requirements in response. Years of institutional experience 
have created a successful template for ensuring the securitisation of commercialism with each World 
Cup cycle.  
The resultant ‘complex’ resembles the often cited idea of the ‘military-industrial complex’ in which 
the state and private sector perpetuate an economy based upon permanent war and crisis mobilisation 
(Turse, 2008). As with that complex, the mega-event variant also uses the concept of national security 
to pursue projects which the public has little choice in or say over. In the case of the 2010 World Cup,   
this was used to legitimate both wide-scale state funding of a privately owned event and the 
transference of billions of dollars of untaxed revenue out of the country.  
The manufacturing of security exception combined two built-in legitimations for these projects. 
Firstly, as a national endeavour, the issue of cost was presented as a banal consideration, outweighed 
by the symbolic importance of South Africa’s hosting. Secondly, this was discursively attached to the 
concept of legacy. As a communicative strategy, security measures were presented as laying the 
foundation for an exhaustive overhaul of state institutions. However, the apparent ambivalence about 
this legacy displayed by the SAPS in the post-World Cup period suggests a different conclusion. 
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Charitably, it could be argued that police management overestimated the benefits of the tournament. 
However, it could also be suggested that the diffusion of an enticing, but vaguely defined idea of 
legacy, worked as a public relations endeavour that was used to convince South African’s of the 
absolute necessity of the securitisation of the World Cup.  
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Chapter Eight: The 2010 World Cup – Occupation or Convergence?  
Introduction  
As suggested in the previous chapter, the construction of security at mega-events is indicative of 
wider debates about the relationship between government power and commercialism and the ways in 
which this is reflected through urban space. Recent decades have seen various academic models 
which argue that the ‘neoliberalisation’ of security has seen the creation of more ‘fragmented’  
(Welch, 2008) forms of governance in which the state is only one of the forces in society which 
‘steers’ security. Eick (2010) identifies this as a key factor in the relationship between host states and 
FIFA. While governments administer and subsidise World Cups, the real power – albeit for the period 
of hosting – lies elsewhere, as it is FIFA who exerts the final authority over security measures. In 
contrast, Klauser (2011) argues that there may be a temptation to place too much focus upon the idea 
of powerful, shadowy, transnational sporting bodies imposing their will on nation states. As a result, 
he proposes that event models are translated into different contexts because of their adaptability to on-
going institutional concerns. 
However, both of these accounts downplay the political aspects of security. Although Eick positions 
FIFA’s increased power as a product of the neoliberal turn in global political economy, it is unclear 
how the idea of ‘steering security’ for corporate interests squares with the ‘hyper-productivist’ 
(Brenner, 2001) role played by the state in organising World Cups. This is doubly surprising, because 
Eick’s article (279-280) starts with a discussion of how FIFA’s current rise to political and financial 
influence began at the same time as the neoliberal experiments of the Pinochet military dictatorship in 
Chile. While this is not to suggest that FIFA requires the assistance of authoritarian states to ensure its 
revenue stream, Eick does not convince that neoliberalism entails the subjugation of state power to 
external forces.  
At the same time, Klauser (2011:8) appears to narrow the ‘meaning’ of security for participating 
police forces to the question of concentrating and regulating fans within defined security zones. While 
he does not claim to offer a comprehensive model of security meanings (9), this gap begs the question 
of how security may also entail additional aspects of social regulation, control and repression. These 
omissions may also reflect something about the nature of mega-events:  how do we square the 
apparent dominance of private institutions over national governments with the accompanying displays 
of the power of the security state in full mobilisation? Or to generalise the question, how do we 
reconcile the perception that commercial interests control urban space with increasingly extensive, 
even militarised, state policing apparatuses? (Graham, 2010:89)  
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From within radical criminology, some scholars have argued that framing these relationships in terms 
of imposition and hierarchy underestimates the collaborative nature of security governance. O’Reilly 
(2011:29) suggests that contemporary security governance can be positioned within the nexus 
between ‘high politics’ and ‘high finance’. This ‘state–corporate symbiosis’ entails a shared outlook 
towards a global discourse of insecurity, which pivots around the conception of an increasingly risky 
future, which in turn is used to increase the power of both the state and private security in the present. 
However, this relationship is often characterised by dysfunction and parasitism (191) as egregious 
behaviour on the part of the private sector is hidden behind the institutional ‘shield’ of the state 
(Bassey, 2008). Snider (2000) argues that the knowledge claims of neoliberalism have created a built-
in set of legitimations for such security relationships through the deployment of a developmental 
rhetoric which argues that governments can only create economic growth through sustained 
concessions to big business. Under this dominant ‘reality system’ (Fisher, 2009), states may pursue 
elite projects which are presented to the public as being forced by the ‘supposed external constraints’ 
(Brenner, 2001: 802) of the market. Indeed, the idea of corporate actors as ‘partners’ or ‘stakeholders’ 
in security (Zedner, 2006:83) is indicative of how the state is no longer in the business of ‘the 
hierarchical imposition’ of regulation on private actors. 
In practice, the alliances between governments and sporting associations may thus use state power to 
leverage ‘liminal and relatively hidden spaces’ (Whyte, 2007:180) which provide locations for both 
private enrichment and extensions in government power. While this model of state–corporate alliance 
draws upon the theoretical taxonomy of criminology, as Gaffney argues (2010:27), such forms of 
temporary governance also bear a striking resemblance to the structures of mega-event governance. In 
particular, the US led invasion of Iraq and the post-war rule by the CPA, have been cited as an 
exemplar of ‘shock’ governance (Klein, 2007) as a result of a ‘reconstruction’ process that was 
characterised by extra-legal forms of governance which portioned off substantial parts of the Iraqi 
economy to corporate actors.  
While more historically specific and more focused on economic restructuring, Klein’s concept of the 
‘shock doctrine’ echoes the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) in that it proposes that times of 
perceived crisis are used to radically alter societies. Moreover, what is notable is that most of the 
historical examples she cites – from the Thatcher government’s conflict with the miners in the United 
Kingdom to the rise of the homeland security industry in the United States – have paired deregulation 
and privatisation with dramatic augmentations in the power and reach of state security and 
surveillance.  
As a result, we do not necessarily have to turn to the extreme end of inter-state conflicts to find 
comparisons between mega-events and the logic of warfare. In particular, mega-event governance has 
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parallels with the more quotidian ‘public safety wars’ (Feldman, 2004), or ‘pacification security jobs’ 
(Neocleous, 2011) which increasingly characterise domestic policing throughout the world. These are 
also reflective of an ‘insecurity discourse’ which is shared and translated between political and 
economic centres of power (O’Reilly, 2011) and finds its expression in open-ended ‘wars’ on drugs, 
crime and terror. And unlike the exceptional circumstances of mega-events, these are permanent, on-
going conflicts. For Hallsworth and Lea (2011), this tendency to securitise social policy combines to 
produce an increasingly powerful state ‘Leviathan’, which enforces both political and economic order. 
This is accompanied by developments in the global economy, such as the growth in the security 
industry and the increased computational power of digital surveillance, which augment the arsenals of 
governments.  
The adaptability of security models, in which sporting associations push for the creation of ‘clean 
sites’ (Klauser, 2011:12) throughout host cities is increased by its resonance with an on-going set of 
security preoccupations which involves the creation of differentiated and highly securitised urban 
spaces that are used for both branding and security. The state security apparatus serves to enforce the 
walls, barricades and security zones used to make urban space safe for capital. From the perspective 
of a sporting authority, access-controlled security sites ‘temporarily re-territorialise particularly 
attractive parts of ... host cities in the interest of visibility and branding for its commercial partners’ 
(Klauser, 2011: 6). Weizman (2007:9) suggests that the ubiquity of walls and fortified enclaves can be 
understood as part of a continuum of global developments, from gated communities in the USA to 
illegal settlements on the West Bank, which extend physical and virtual borders set against ‘poverty 
and violence’. From this, it is possible to trace techniques, technologies and geographies of 
‘occupation’ (ibid) throughout the world. This may be especially pertinent in the case of mega-events, 
as domestic policing and security is aligned with international processes. In particular, the planning 
for mega-events may pivot around a rendering of host environments as ‘security-scapes’ (Wall and 
Monahan, 2011) which entail an official perception of broadly homogenous threats and which 
demand comparably similar counter-measures.  
For Graham (2010:xxiii), this is characteristic of the attempts to manage flows of people and capital 
through enclosures and exclusion zones as part of a broader accumulative geography in which the 
exploitation of resources in the global South sustains wealth in the North. The deployment of security 
measures in aid of a process of neocolonial extraction echoes many of the criticisms levelled against 
FIFA’s relationship with the South African state, which depicted the organisation as a latter-day 
colonial power engaged in the 21st century plunder of an African country. However, in the case of 
South Africa, this is complicated by FIFA’s reliance on the power of the South African state. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that World Cup security measures were aligned with a project of state 
marketing which actively tried to recalibrate South Africa’s international status as an emergent power. 
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Indeed, as Abourahme (2009) implies, post-colonial and third world elites may be pioneers in 
managing forms of exclusion and ‘occupation’ which are later translated and replicated in Northern 
countries.  
This raises a wider question about the philosophical nature of security. Eick (2010) argues that mega-
events represent the outer point of the neoliberalisation of state security in which policing measures 
are wedded to commercialism. This implies that security and commercialism can be separated and 
distinguished from each other. However, another approach may hold that at a fundamental level, the 
politics of security is itself a product of capitalist order. For Neocleous (2011:192), this need to 
‘secure insecurity’ is the mechanism for structuring, administrating and controlling disruptions, 
disturbances and the ‘constant revolutionising of production’ inherent within capitalism. In this sense, 
rather than distinct areas of mega-event security being captured or instrumentalised for commercial 
purposes, they are intrinsically constitutive in the fabrication of capitalist order: the war machine and 
consumerism in tandem.  
Finally, the interzone between national security and spectacle may also entail another series of 
exchanges between policing and commerce. While security measures work to preserve the symbolic 
image of a mega-event, security services deploy policing tactics which seek to project a desired image 
of competency and strength (Debord, 1988, Martin, 2011) and embrace a ‘self-conscious semiotics of 
policing’ (Boyle and Haggerty: 2009:259). As commercial bodies exert a greater influence upon state 
security, this suggests another exchange, as policing and military institutions incorporate techniques 
associated with commercial advertising within their governance repertoires. However, as Hagemann 
(2010) has argued, the alignment of security and spectacle can also serve to produce a concentrated 
version of security preoccupations which exposes processes and tactics which are less overt than in 
‘normal’ conditions.  
As this chapter argues, the relationship between FIFA and the South African state has often been 
understood in terms of invasion, occupation and colonisation. However, in contrast, this chapter will 
argue that this perception was in fact enabled and leveraged by state power. Rather than serving as an 
operational platform for an assault on South African sovereignty, FIFA’s institutional objectives 
complemented the security preoccupations of the South African government. This was in turn 
reflected in the spatial governance of the tournament, which revolved around creating a mobile 
security apparatus (Rodgers, 2007) across host cities. Rather than being a novel imposition, it will be 
argued that this represented an intensification of a well-established security trajectory within South 
African cities. While the concept of ‘occupation’ provides a useful axiom (Weizman, 2007) through 
which to frame security governance, it will be maintained that not only was this internally managed 
but that it has its origins in ‘everyday’ security practices. Finally, developing the concept of spectacle 
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as articulated by Hagemann (2010) and Martin (2011), it will be suggested that the display of dual 
state/corporate power also exposes facets of security which are less than complementary to the 
branding initiatives of its organisers. In particular, it will be argued that the World Cup revealed how, 
under the conditions of exception, the state security apparatus becomes a force for the entrenchment 
and fortification of power and privilege. The implication for South African society may be that this 
convergence goes beyond ‘interpretive flexibility’ (Klauser, 2011) and presents an image of national 
security in extremis, in which corporate interest and state policy are increasingly indistinguishable. 
While the knowledge claims of neoliberalism present this arrangement as harmonious and beneficial 
to the public, in practice this symbiosis has become parasitical and dysfunctional (O’Reilly, 2010).  
Chapter Structure 
The chapter will begin by discussing how FIFA’s role in the governance of the World Cup was 
perceived by the media and civil society as a kind of imposed regime. This was given further credence 
by the statements of political officials which presented FIFA as a colonial power. In reaction, the state 
was quick to present itself as an equal stakeholder with FIFA and depicted the enforcement of its 
obligations to the association as an assertion, rather than subversion, of national sovereignty.  
It will than turn to a discussion of the political nature of FIFA and suggest that the framing of the 
association as a ‘shadow government’ is misleading. While the organisation reserved the right to 
approve security measures, it will be suggested that much of its popular status as a globally dominant 
football ‘mafia’ is leveraged through the concessions provided to it by host states. 
In turn, the involvement of foreign policing establishments and private security companies will be 
discussed as adding an additional layer of security to the state’s plans. This was linked into the 
broader spatial strategy of the South African state, which worked through the creation of a series of 
linked, temporary ‘green zones’. While this was aligned with FIFA’s financial strategy, it was also 
used to pursue a series of additional measures, not specifically mandated by FIFA. However, it will be 
argued that the functionally open definition of World Cup ‘security’ was used to intensify continued 
efforts to sanitise urban space. 
Finally, it will be argued that, in practice, host cities were for a brief period the ultimate expression of 
the convergence of commercialism and security, in which saturation advertising blurred into 
saturation policing.  
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State Branding 
The occupation of South Africa  
In May 2010, the parody news site Haiybo (2010) ran an ‘article’ with the headline ‘FIFA buys South 
Africa for R750 million’. According to the satire: 
Danny Jordaan announced that Sepp Blatter will be inaugurated as President during the 
closing ceremony on July 12th, with the country’s name to be changed to The Bureaucrats’ 
Republic of Fifania®…  The governmental seat of power in Fifania® will be transferred from 
Pretoria to Camps Bay, where Blatter is building a “cosy little lock-up-and-go president’s 
crib” spanning 17 blocks. All current governmental departments will be disbanded except for 
the Ministry of Defence. The armed forces are to be expanded to accommodate the 44 million 
men, women and children over the age of seven who will be conscripted to serve in Blatter’s 
elite defence corps, the Soccer Soldiers (SS). The SS’s primary function will be to “seek out 
and destroy” people infringing FIFA copyright the world over. Children under the age of 
seven are expected to be put to work in state-of-the-art production facilities manufacturing 
FIFA-branded clothing, pens and cups. 
While humorous, this absurdist piece is also indicative of some of the negative sentiments expressed 
throughout the media and civil society towards FIFA’s relationship with the South African 
government. These criticisms became particularly noticeable as the police and judicial system began 
to implement FIFA’s commercial restrictions in the lead-up to the tournament. By April 2010, FIFA 
was investigating over 50,000 cases of alleged ambush marketing in South Africa, and filing interdicts 
for a range of cases, from the advertising campaign of the budget airliner Kulula to keyring holders 
which allegedly breached marketing rights (Seale, 2010).  
The enforcement of the commercial measures was often framed as draconian and suggestive of how 
FIFA was using the state machinery to advance its own internal agendas. The enactments of host city 
by-laws also became controversial and led some commentators to suggest that spatial restrictions only 
served to benefit FIFA and its corporate sponsors through creating citadels of profit extraction 
(Rangongo, 2010). Sophie Nakueira (cited in Tolsi, 2010a) argued that the creation of commercial 
zones and restrictions on public space inhibited people’s constitutional right to freedom of movement. 
FIFA’s apparent influence over the lives of citizens was even seen to extend to issues of health, with 
the emergence of allegations that the emergency preparations of the KZN Health Department involved 
keeping designated public hospitals half full for the duration of the tournament (Ndaliso, 2010). The 
extent of security measures was thus often perceived as evidence of a private institution imposing its 
imprint over host cities and asserting its capacity to shape and micromanage urban form according to 
its interests (Klauser, 2007:7).  
FIFA was thus presented as an invasive force which had captured the state and turned the country into 
a temporary colony or fiefdom, with one editorial column concluding that ‘we have surrendered 
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national sovereignty to a gang of old, white men in Geneva who conceive of South Africa principally 
as a sound stage on which a month-long commercial for their sponsors is to be filmed’ (Dawes, 2010). 
Popular depictions of FIFA described the association as capable of overriding the autonomy of the 
state, which included representations of the body as the ‘masters of the universe’ (Eliseev, 2010) and 
claims that ‘for most football fans the World Cup will take place in FIFA-land and not South Africa’ 
(Curnow, 2010).  
Even politicians who were involved in the implementation of restrictions appeared to be critical of the 
organisation, with the Premier of the Western Cape Helen Zille claiming, ‘I should have flexed my 
muscles in response to FIFA’s demands a long time ago. They are not a colonial power’ (Tolsi, 
2010b). Along with the imperialist connotations, FIFA was also depicted as a quasi-criminal 
organisation, with one widely disseminated article in the City Press newspaper quoting an unnamed 
‘senior government official’ as saying ‘FIFA are a bunch of thugs. Not even the UN expects you to 
sign away your tax base. These mafiosos do’ (Rademeyer, Prince and Lombard, 2010). This metaphor 
appeared to resonate with the public. For example, during a march in Durban on June 16 2010, which 
included former stadium stewards, protesters’ chanted ‘Get out FIFA mafia’ (Veith, 2010). After the 
World Cup itself, other officials claimed that security planning had been constrained by the conditions 
demanded by FIFA. The head of 2010 strategic planning for Durban, Julie-May Ellingson, said that 
the greatest challenge of hosting the tournament was  
accepting that while we would be held accountable for the hosting, we in fact had no control 
or say over what FIFA did. In the build-up, there were too many role-players with conflicting 
agendas, lack of clarity as to who was responsible for what and who would have to pay for 
what (Dardagan, 2011:10). 
At the same time, the government and the LOC were presented as betraying the developmental 
aspirations of ordinary South Africans through pandering to FIFA’s demands. An exposé on the 
hosting arrangements in one national newspaper was titled ‘FIFA called the shots and we said yes’ 
(Tolsi, 2010a), suggesting that the state had failed to limit the organisation’s demands and had 
committed public funds to a wasteful private project. Indeed, such criticisms became so pervasive in 
the build-up to the World Cup that Danny Jordaan publically denied that South Africa had been ‘sold 
out’ and stated: ‘The fact of the matter is that more countries are making bids ... If you make a bid 
then you accept the terms and conditions of the event’ (Sapa, 2010b). Indeed, not all commentary saw 
FIFA’s ‘colonial’ rule as negative, with Kane-Berman (2010) arguing that the government would 
have been unable to create the conditions for a successful World Cup without external control.  
The criticisms of FIFA’s role in South Africa particularly focused on the contrast between the 
developmental rhetoric used by the government and the practical implementation of governance 
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mandates, including the security measures, which appeared to aggressively ring-fence financial 
benefits for FIFA. Implicit within these critiques is the idea of the ‘rollback’ of state sovereignty, in 
which private bodies can rapidly transform political institutions into platforms for the purveyance of 
their own economic objectives. Cornelissen (2010: 141) argues that, as a result, the political 
aspirations of the South African government had to navigate around the proprietary framework 
established by FIFA, which limited the opportunity for development. In effect, South Africa’s nation 
branding initiatives had been overwritten by a wider process in which ‘the larger forces of commerce 
and politics of global football steer the agenda’ (ibid). 
FIFA, the state and alignment  
According to the security concept, the main objective of joint planning was to ‘ensure integration of 
the national security plan and event safety plans’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:9). The regulatory 
framework for security measures was ‘informed’ (ibid) by a combination of existing security 
legislation, the government guarantees and city and stadium use agreements. The national security 
component of World Cup measures meant that this was aligned with the constitutional obligations of 
the security forces to maintain domestic safety within South Africa.  
 
As Bheki Cele claimed, the exceptional size and scale of the tournament made it a responsibility of 
government regardless of the hierarchy of ownership (SAPA, 2010a). While the World Cup remained 
a privately owned event, its international status and the large concentrations of crowds in host cities 
effectively translated into a matter of public safety.   This approach entailed a wide-ranging definition 
of the government’s overall security mandate, which according to the Deputy Minister of Police 
(Mbalula, 2009) entailed that the SAPS would work to ‘prevent and combat crime, to maintain public 
order, even to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and visitors and protect their 
property; and uphold and enforce of the [sic] law’.   
From this perspective, the management of a privately-owned event was incorporated as a declaration 
of state power and prowess. The police’s proclamation of total protection during the World Cup can 
be regarded as a public assertion of sovereignty in that it publicised the security services’ capacity to 
enforce territorial dominance over South Africa’s land, sea and airspace. For example, Bheki Cele 
was quick to claim that the takeover of stadiums by the SAPS did not entail a clash between public 
and private interests and argued that government’s response met both the guarantees to FIFA and the 
constitutional obligation of the SAPS to protect South Africa’s citizens (Sapa, 2010a).  
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Because these resources were available to the SAPS after the tournament, it is undeniable that the 
procurement drive did result in a legacy of increased armaments. For example, at the local scale, the 
traffic vehicles purchased for the World Cup are still in use. However, what makes them noticeable is 
that they include FIFA’s official 2010 World Cup slogan alongside the host city emblem (Figure 
Five). 
 
Figure Five: Metro police vehicle purchased for the 2010 World Cup 
The criminalisation of ambush marketing through government guarantees and the Special Measures 
Act meant that commercial restrictions became part of the state’s overall ‘war on crime’. For example, 
a series of clampdowns on unofficial World Cup merchandise in June 2010 was described as both 
protecting the copyright of World Cup sponsors and the local manufacturing industry through 
preventing the importation of illegal goods (Barnes and Luhanga, 2010). Commercial restriction and 
exclusion zones in host cities were said to be informed as much by functional security concerns as an 
exclusive focus on protecting intellectual copyright. According to a briefing produced by the City of 
Cape Town (2010a), restrictions were necessary to ‘avoid uncontrolled distribution or vending which 
may disturb spectator flows, operational activities as well as safety and security’, while measures 
against unauthorised street trading, signage and ‘any political and religious demonstrations’ were 
pivotal to the ‘smooth functioning and running of FIFA World Cup matches’. In terms of the actual 
enforcement of commercial restrictions, there is some anecdotal evidence which suggests that it 
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accorded with parallel efforts to militarise the police. The accounts of supporters who were arrested 
for alleged ambush marketing offences claim that SAPS officers involved used heavy-handed tactics 
and threatened them with jail sentences (Laing, 2010, Cwilich Gil, 2010). Arrestees noted that they 
were surprised to be treated as serious criminals, and in fact were unsure of what restrictions they had 
broken, which suggests that some individual officers internalised the idea of ‘zero tolerance’ during 
their stadium duties.  
According to SAFA’s head of risk management, Mlungisi Ncame, security measures used the ‘2010 
Special Measures Act, a law which specified the expectations of FIFA from the South African 
government and the commitments that we’re making’, in conjunction with the special courts system to  
‘send a strong message to international visitors ... the purpose of that was to arrest, prosecute, and 
effect a sentence within a 24-hour period, and that was a major deterrent to deal with any incidents 
that were committed in the official event’ (Roller, 2011). This combination is significant, as it 
suggests that security planners regarded commercial restrictions and national security measures as 
mutually compatible. The special courts system allowed for rapid administration of FIFA’s 
commercial rights while aligning with the government’s project of projecting South Africa as the 
safest World Cup ‘ever’. Commercial prescriptions against other activities, such as political 
demonstrations, also serviced the government’s security strategy of reducing the visibility of protest 
actions. 
Indeed, SAPS management suggested that the specific policing of intellectual property rights was 
only part of the wider continuum of showpiece security: ‘We have an obligation and we will ensure 
we protect all the people, from the ordinary people who will be at homes, fan parks, stadiums to the 
very, very important people (VVIPs)’ (Ministry of Police,2010). But while the Minister suggested that 
policing would not be ‘influenced by one’s political stature or one’s economic stature’, throughout the 
accompanying press release the tournament is referred to as the ‘2010 FIFA World Cup ™’ (ibid). 
The addition of an official trademark within a police press release may reveal the extent to which 
FIFA aims to place the stamp of its ownership on the World Cup (Klauser, 2007).  
FIFA as validation  
In his post-World Cup national address, President Zuma (2010) said: 
It truly is an emotional moment for a nation that had doomsayers warning football fans to 
avoid coming to South Africa ...  We thank FIFA, under the leadership of President Sepp 
Blatter, for the confidence shown in our country and people over the past six years. Our 
hosting of this historic first FIFA World Cup on African soil vindicates Mr. Blatter’s strong 
conviction that we were capable of delivering a spectacular and successful event.  
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FIFA’s choice of South Africa as a host country was presented as a validation for South Africa’s 
security services in that it proved their ability to secure such a  ‘prestigious’ event (Mbalula, 2009). 
The capacity to enforce security measures which accorded with FIFA’s criteria was highlighted as 
evidence of the state’s adherence to international ‘best practice’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:5). And in 
line with the discourse of building long-term security capacity through World Cup spending, one 
SAPS (SAPS Strategic Management 2010:60) report singled out the provision of ‘FIFA rights 
protection’ as a training legacy, although the applicability or relevance of this to everyday policing is 
not explained.  
In parliamentary discussions on the preparations for the World Cup, political representatives also 
described security measures as part of the state’s ‘contractual obligations to FIFA’ (Hansard, 2009). 
This presented the image of government as a ‘service provider’ offering security as a product to its 
primary customer, FIFA (Weizman, 2007: 143). The idea of service provision appears to draw upon 
the ideological claims of neoliberalism in which pliability and openness to transnational capital is 
regarded as one of the central criteria of a state’s modernity (Snider, 2000). In effect, South African 
politicians suggested that enforcing its guarantees with FIFA would project the country as a 
‘responsible’ global citizen capable of enforcing its obligations to big business. While the government 
acknowledged that it was engaged in policing FIFA’s symbolic assets, this was welded to tropes of 
nation building and social advancement. The paired discourse of legacy and exceptionality attempted 
to collapse distinctions between private and public interest through presenting security measures as a 
national project which superseded issue of ownership.  
 Commercialism and Security 
FIFA: A new world power?  
FIFA was founded as a relatively loose series of national football associations in 1904. As an 
organisation, FIFA has grown dramatically since the 1970s when under the tenure of former president 
Joao Havelange it began to pursue the wide-scale commercialisation and professionalisation of 
international football (Darby, 2003, Galeano, 2003). Using its ownership of the World Cup brand, 
FIFA began to attract sponsorship from multinational companies through selling lucrative 
broadcasting and marketing rights. As one the most widely televised international sporting events, the 
FIFA World Cup offers major opportunities for corporate marketing, entailing an audience of billions 
of potential customers. While FIFA remains listed as a non-profit organisation under Swiss law, it 
presides over a revenue stream which is in the billions of dollars. The majority of FIFA’s expenditure 
is ploughed back into its 208 member associations and confederations. In particular, this benefits less 
wealthy football bodies, as FIFA provides a windfall to subsidise their operational expenditures. It 
also increases their loyalty and dependency on the FIFA ‘family’ (Darby, 2003).  
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However, FIFA’s financial success has been accompanied by serious allegations of corruption, 
bribery and interference with the voting for World Cup hosting rights (Jennings, 2006). Indeed, 
FIFA’s reputation has been increasingly tarnished by such allegations, with even some of its corporate 
partners expressing serious reservations about the association’s administration and negative 
international image (Al Jazeera, 2011). In operation, FIFA appears to combine the legal benefits of 
both a corporation and a non-profit organisation. Its ownership of branding rights results in earnings 
which are greater than the nominal GDPs of some of the world’s most impoverished nations. At the 
same time, its non-profit status protects it from taxation and other financial liabilities. FIFA maintains 
a profoundly ambiguous political status. While the association claims to be neutral in political and 
religious matters, the social and cultural significance and geographical reach of international football 
(FIFA has 208 national member associations, while the UN represents 192 members) means that it 
invariably does become involved in some aspects of the politics of member nations (Goldblatt, 2006).  
But historian of international soccer David Goldblatt (2011) argues that it is this publicly apolitical 
stance that allows the association to function with a lack of accountability. As a result: 
The organisation is legally constituted as the equivalent of a village angling society in Zug, 
Switzerland. The Swiss criminal code on embezzlement and corruption doesn’t apply, the 
organisation pays almost no taxes and FIFA’s obligations to disclose its accounts and 
workings are pitiable. ... Imagine, for a moment, that FIFA were a publicly traded company or 
a government department or a prominent national charity. Imagine that one-third of its board 
had been subject to these kinds of allegations: Would it be acceptable for the boss to be 
blithely re-elected or reconfirmed in his post? Would it be possible to keep the matter out of 
the courts or away from the police? Could any elite in even the most minimally democratic 
polity shrug off so much scandal, strife and dubious behaviour? (ibid). 
For Eick (2010:283), FIFA’s success is a product of its international ‘conquest’ of the cosmopolitan, 
civil society activity of football. Its dominance over the rules and brands of international football 
creates the impression that FIFA can dictate terms to nation-states. But this conquest has not been 
enabled by state withdrawal or failure so much as ‘shaped by the neoliberal market logic and the 
respective state restructuring underway’ (ibid). In turn, the corporatisation of FIFA did not emerge 
exclusively from institutional prerogatives but was informed by ‘demands of the media and market 
partners who insisted on reliable administrators for their respective contracts’ (ibid).  
At the same time, commercialisation has not altered the symbolic association of the World Cup as a 
nationalist event and a sign of prestige for host countries (ibid). Eick (284) argues that FIFA’s 
economic success and political influence are the results of a ‘neocommunitarian’ strategy which 
combines deregulation of its internal practice with efforts to ensure state regulation which favour its 
commercial interests. On the one hand, FIFA sets internal rules for international football such as 
threatening to expel national associations if their governments are perceived to be interfering in 
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administration. On the other, FIFA uses the state to regulate competition, as well as using Swiss non-
profit legislation to minimise taxation within its base of operations.  
FIFA under the state shield  
State intervention serves to enforce the commodification and commercialisation of public space for 
FIFA interests in a ‘self-aggrandising’ (294) display of a ‘non-profit’ sporting association’s ability to 
determine the form and outcome of security policies. This intervention does not just directly benefit 
FIFA but also creates opportunities for the commercial expansion of its corporate sponsors. On 
FIFA’s official website, the page on marketing promises that the association will ‘ensure maximum 
return on investment for its sponsors’ through ensuring a ‘consistent and aspirational brand image’ 
(FIFA, 2012). The enforcement of security measures through government guarantees therefore creates 
an attractive investment for corporate partners. While this allows FIFA to offer the assurance that 
their commercial rights will be policed without additional cost, it includes the additional cachet that 
participating corporations’ symbolic association with the World Cup will not be tarnished by any 
‘incident’.  
FIFA’s ability to enforce its pecuniary objectives upon hosting arrangements is most apparent in the 
government guarantees, which, as noted above, were alleged to have ‘signed away’ the country’s tax 
base (Rademeyer, Prince and Lombard, 2010). As outlined in previous sections, this entailed a 
suspension of normal taxation and foreign exchange restrictions. Furthermore, it entailed a 
criminalisation of ambush marketing offences. More specifically, the government was obliged to 
commit substantial police resources to buildings, infrastructure and areas which hosted matches or 
were used in the administration of the tournament, such as at FIFA’s temporary headquarters in 
Johannesburg. These obligations and regulations worked to create an all-encompassing state ‘shield’ 
which immunised the association’s event from social volatility (Bassey, 2008). The upshot for FIFA 
was a double layer of state insurance. The exhaustive and spatially concentrated security measures 
which the government promised for the World Cup pre-emptively reduced the risk of any security 
incidents which may have negatively impacted upon the tournament’s international image. Under 
these agreements, FIFA was able to socialise the costs of risk management to the state, while ensuring 
an almost certain return on its branding rights. This was further buffered by government regulation 
which both wavered taxation and offered pre-emptive immunity against unforeseen externalities, such 
as potential legal costs. 
The audacious suspension of normal legal restraints and conditions bears parallels with economic 
‘shock therapy’ (Klein, 2007). Most strikingly, this echoes the various legally binding administrative 
orders issued during the CPA’s rule of Iraq which included the eradication of import tariffs, allowed 
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foreign firms to move income out of the country and granted legal immunity to foreign contractors 
(Whyte, 2007). This particular ‘experiment’ entailed the removal of regulatory controls and the rapid 
creation of a new set of rules which gave structural advantages to Western firms looking to privatise 
Iraq’s oil industry, facilitated by the use of military force (191). For Whyte (ibid), economic re-
regulation and political violence combined to establish a ‘neoliberal colonial order’.   
The ‘economic occupation’ of Iraq was achieved at the barrels of guns and through the targeting 
sights of F-18 fighter jets and relied on the initial destruction of the administrative and coercive 
capacities of the state, such as the disbandment of the Iraqi military. By contrast, FIFA relied on the 
centralised power of the South African state, rather than regime change to facilitate its accumulation 
of World Cup profit. Instead of attempting to impose permanent re-regulation through reforming the 
state, FIFA stipulations were intended to be temporary and exceptional. Instead, FIFA used the 
suspension of certain legislation as a mechanism for ensuring that the organisation would in fact have 
no permanent legal status within South Africa.  
However, many of the criticisms which emerged of FIFA from within South Africa pivoted around 
concepts of occupation and invasion, citing the enforcement of marketing laws as evidence of the 
‘takeover’ of national sovereignty (Dawes, 2010). From this perspective, it appeared that FIFA had 
effectively invaded both public policy and urban space, using state mechanisms to enforce an otiose 
set of rules which penalised local enterprise. During my field research at the time of the tournament, I 
overheard a notable comment by a person who made a joke about their fear of suddenly being arrested 
and carried away in a FIFA van for unknowingly transgressing ambush marketing restrictions. This 
Kafkaesque aside reveals a more profound sense of anxiety engendered by the apparent ability of 
private bodies to rapidly reconfigure urban space (Klauser, 2007). The lack of effective public 
communication about the content of restrictions entailed that these revelations came as a kind of 
shock, adding impetus to the perception that cities were being placed under the rule of a shadowy 
international cabal. Notably, while the commercial restrictions were planned before South Africa 
gained hosting rights, the nature of the prescriptions outlined in the Bid Book were only made public 
through media reports in the months before the tournament. Indeed, it appeared that the Bid Book and 
the contained guarantees had been unofficially embargoed by host cities (Tolsi, 2010a). For Robin 
(2004), fears about the consequence of such arrangements are not necessarily the product of an 
irrational, hyperbolic panic but are informed by the very real threat of coercion which waits in the 
background. But in the case of the World Cup, the agent of coercion was not FIFA but the 
government: one could be arrested by SAPS officers and tried in South African courts rather than by 
imagined FIFA mercenaries.  
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Symbiosis  
Indeed, the reliance on state security services is arguably central to FIFA’s profit-making model. 
Using the state to administer the World Cup avoids the costs which would arise if the association was 
required to install its own policing measures, had to lobby for the right to arm private security 
companies, had to pay contractors and so forth. From a cost-saving perspective, the administrative and 
operational fortifications offered by the state provide a platform to maximise income through 
minimising expenditure. And from the wording used in the letters of ministerial support (SAFA, 
2003b) which accompanied the guarantees prior to the winning of hosting rights, it would appear that 
the heads of state security had no hesitation about such a relationship. On the 16th of July 2003, 
Charles Nqakula, the former Minister of the Department of Safety and Security (now the Department 
of Police), wrote that he was personally aware of the need for the ‘peaceful and orderly running of the 
2010 World Cup’ (SAFA, 2003b: A12) and that the department was ‘delighted to contribute towards 
efforts to promote South Africa’s bid to host the 2010 World Cup’. The SAPS commissioner offered 
the personal assurance ‘that all necessary arrangements will be made... [to] ensure sufficient security 
measures’ (A13) and promised to share security intelligence with FIFA. 
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development offered indemnities against future claims in 
support of ‘the country’s efforts to secure the opportunity to host the Soccer World Cup in 2010’ 
(A27). All of the letters presented guarantees as a procedural necessity to achieve the goal of winning 
the hosting bid for South Africa. It would appear that from the ministerial standpoint the guarantees 
were not forced upon them by FIFA but were the price of access for the opportunity of hosting the 
World Cup, signed as a patriotic contribution towards a wider national project.  
During the World Cup, these initial agreements translated into the policing of internal borders which 
became a pivotal mechanism for an accumulative geography (Graham, 2010: xxiii) which moved 
billions of dollars, taxation free, out of the country. In the exclusion zones, authorities enforced 
‘sterilised’ (SAFA, 2003a:9.3.15) advertising space for FIFA and its commercial partners. This was 
accompanied by the creation of commercial restrictions zones around host cities. For example, in the 
enforcement of the Cape Town (2010a) rights protection programme, a FIFA ‘rights protection 
manager’ was assigned to a designated police group of 38 officers. From one perspective, this may 
appear like a private actor dictating the mobilisation of law enforcement personal, but it also cohered 
with the SAPS strategy of deploying concentrations of officers around tournament venues to highlight 
the country’s safety.  
The state’s enforcement of commercial restrictions which prioritised FIFA linked into another aspect 
of security, as close protection services were provided to executive members of the FIFA ‘family’ 
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(OA/ NATJOINTS, 2008). This so-called ‘VVIP security’ was intended to offer 24 hour protection to 
‘football teams, the delegations from participating nations, the officials and the FIFA Leadership, 
Heads of State and VIPs’ (Chikunga,2010). Priority treatment for FIFA delegates began at the 
country’s borders, as the Department of Home Affairs established special dedicated express lanes 
within King Shaka, Oliver Tambo and Cape Town international airports (Apleni, 2010). Physical 
safety for FIFA delegates was provided by the Security and Protection Services of the SAPS, while 
NATJOINTS registered their movement details for ‘coordination and threat assessment purposes’ 
(OA/NATJOINTS, 2008:27). Executive members were also offered ‘blue light’ cavalcades of SAPS 
vehicles when travelling around the country (ibid). Such services are normally reserved for high-
ranking government officials such as the State President, cabinet members and foreign dignitaries and 
heads of state. From a symbolic perspective, VVIP security reinforced the idea that FIFA was a kind 
of state without borders through affording members the diplomatic prestige usually reserved for 
political elites. Practically, the operational deployment of policing prioritised the individual safety of 
the executive, creating a continuous security cocoon from possible danger.  
The ultimate green zone? 
It would appear that from FIFA’s perspective the barometer of an aspirant host state’s security is its 
ability to ensure that the World Cup can take place in a sanitised environment and that government 
will comply with its commercial requirements. Rather than a genuine concern for the wellbeing of 
ordinary citizens, FIFA interprets security as the capacity to throw up temporary borders and 
restrictions around its events rather than the social consequences of these measures. In effect, FIFA 
uses security arrangements to ensure that both the association and its officials are constantly protected 
through a multi-scalar set of state interventions. As a condition of organising agreements, the 
association effectively exists above the law and under a taxation bubble.  
Furthermore, close protection ensures that its senior personal move through host nations and cities 
under a continually watchful security ‘blanket’. It could be suggested that this entails an additional  
parallel with the occupation of Iraq. Graham’s (2010:121) argument that the security rings and 
roadblocks which spring up around host cities are reminiscent of the Baghdad ‘Green Zone’ has a 
dual applicability to FIFA. As a result of security agreements, FIFA has created what we can perhaps 
call the ultimate ‘mobile Green Zone’ (121). But instead of just protecting its hierarchy from violence 
outside, this flexible, continuous zone is more durable, as it creates walls against laws, taxation and 
accountability to the citizens of the countries whose governments are ever-eager to contribute to the 
profitability of the World Cup.  
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In its enforcement, this meant that South African police officers and military personal were also 
prioritising and guarding the interests of Coca Cola, McDonalds, Adidas and the other officially 
recognised partners. This worked on two mutually reinforcing levels. Firstly, through the 
criminalisation of ambush marketing, security forces enforced the primacy and visibility of official 
trademarks. Secondly, national security measures protected the association of corporate groups with 
the World Cup through minimising the chances of security incidents. To put it another way, security 
enforced the association of brands with football and festival, rather than globally relayed images of 
crowd stampedes or the bloody aftermath of a car bombing (Figure Six).  
At the same time, these advertising initiatives were accompanied by the state’s branding strategy. A 
fan entering a stadium through the exclusion zones would not only have seen well recognised 
corporate logos but massed elite units of the SAPS and SANDF. This opens two other issues which 
call for further study. Firstly it suggests that the host state’s embrace of ‘self-conscious’ (Boyle and 
Haggerty, 2009) mega-event security overlaps with forms of corporate marketing and in fact may 
serve as its own form of advertising. Secondly, it also alludes to wider questions about the fusions 
between consumerism, policing and militarism. This phenomenon has been studied within the context 
of what Nick Turse (2008) describes as the US ‘military-industrial-entertainment complex’, such as in 
the involvement of the Pentagon in the production of Hollywood films. In the case of South Africa, 
this opens up new terrain about the overlaps between policing and entertainment. For the time being, 
this question will be left open as I return to the issue of non-state security actors’ involvement in 
building ‘sanitised’ environments.  
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Figure Six: Security checkpoint at Cape Town stadium 
Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector  
The varying degree of private sector involvement has been discussed in the previous chapters. Instead 
of repeating this material, this section will offer one brief observation. Rather than capitalising on a 
state withdrawal from security functions, private companies linked their own projects into the wider 
affirmation of state power. And while this aligned private security with a nationalistic project, it also 
did little to restrict the scope of their activities. While the government could hone in on high profile 
actions such as protecting crowds and stadiums, private companies focused on more discrete areas of 
security through personally guarding corporate elites. The exceptional requirements of the World Cup 
security measures established a further point of convergence. The array of security organisations 
which explicitly catered to perceived needs of the very wealthy provided an ‘added layer of 
securitised protection’ (Graham, 2010:96) to the government’s operation, while the event provided 
growth opportunities for this specialist sector. In this sense, it appears that for the duration of the 
World Cup private groups, partnered with the state, served to extend the coverage of security within 
host cities.  
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 National and Urban security  
The South African government’s measures centered on two primary security preoccupations. Visible 
deployments of the police and military in host cities were intended to both fulfil the state’s guarantees 
to FIFA and to counteract scepticism about South Africa’s viability as a suitable host. At the same 
time, security measures were used to support a major sporting event rather than as the primary area of 
focus. In other words, it was intended that spectators should remember the sport and not the complex 
security systems arranged around and above them. This focused on strategies which were ‘effective 
but unobtrusive’ and kept within ‘an acceptable level of public exposure’ (SAFA, 2003a:9.3.11).  
For Klauser (2011), these dual preoccupations are indicative of ever-strengthening alliances between 
security politics and commercialism which are mobilised around the predominant imperatives of 
sporting bodies. But the case of South Africa’s security measures disrupts the idea of an imposed 
hierarchy. While the use of governance frameworks to facilitate both urban and state branding is a 
global phenomenon, this was arguably more prominent than usual in the South African context 
because of negative international perceptions about the country’s safety. The government discursively 
packaged the security measures as part of a broader national security exercise. As a result, it is 
possible to argue that most urban policing in the six-year period between the awarding of hosting 
rights and the event linked into security measures through working to facilitate the desired image of 
safe, controlled cities. 
Accredited space 
Under the hosting agreements the state was obliged to ‘guarantee ... general safety and personal 
protection, especially at airports, inside and outside hotels, stadiums, training, the international 
broadcasting centre, media centres, any official areas and other areas where accredited persons and/or 
spectators are present’ (SAFA, 2003a:4:5). This was abetted by an additional guarantee of close 
protection services for FIFA delegates and other accredited ‘VVIPS’. But what is striking about the 
guarantee is that rather than stipulating the exact form of security measures it required the government 
to draft its own plan with reference to benchmarks and guidelines ‘gained at previous major sporting 
events, as well as national security guidelines’ (ibid). While the guarantees include explicit 
stipulations about enforcing commercial rights, ensuring that stadiums met FIFA security 
requirements and reserved the right to approve all government measures, the actual planning and 
implementation of security measures is presented as the prerogative of the host state.  
The 2008 General Security Concept thus describes the security measures as a ‘joint planning 
initiative’ (5) between the organising committee and NATJOINTS ‘developed and agreed to by senior 
role players of both entities’ rather than an imposed framework. It lists the organising association 
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agreements, FIFA safety and security guidelines and the ‘major events security model of South 
Africa’ as the basis of the security measures. The document makes a further planning distinction 
between ‘national security’ as the responsibility of government and tasks event safety at stadiums to 
the LOC. According to the publicly available version of FIFA’s security guidelines (2004b), stadium 
regulations, for example, about the level of access control and fencing, only apply to its member 
associations. However, this distinction is complicated by national and local government’s subsidising 
of stadium construction, which followed these guidelines. For example, during a research trip to the 
almost completed Nelson Mandela Bay stadium in August 2009, it was evident that the stadium had 
been designed to include the requisite fencing, turnstiles and CCTV equipment.  
Although the scale and characteristics of the 2010 World Cup may have made planning more 
extensive, SAPS management depicted the measures as a continuation of national security procedures 
at previous major events (Kempen, 2010). In particular, this referenced the security measures 
established at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. While the actual 
documentation of the event’s ‘security model’ is not publically accessible, media reports from that 
time show substantial continuities with the measures promised for the 2010 World Cup. These 
included joint operations between the SAPS, Johannesburg Metro Police and SANDF, airspace 
restrictions, the cancellation of police leave, the establishment of barricades and the declaration of 
traffic restriction zones (SAFA, 2002). As with the World Cup stadiums, a security zone was 
established around the Sandton Convention Centre, and hotels where delegates were staying were put 
under guard. The convention centre itself was handed over to the United Nations for exclusive use, 
which included access control accreditation and a ban on protests within the ‘security zone’ (Aydin, 
2002). SAPS management also announced that they were on high alert for ‘militant anti-privatisation 
demonstrators’ and other ‘extremist groups’ (Sebelebele, 2002). Even official statements about the 
exceptionality of security measures appear familiar:  
All security measures are geared towards ensuring that the Summit takes place in a tranquil 
atmosphere and peaceful environment where delegates can participate freely. We aim to 
change misperceptions about safety and security in South Africa in general and in Gauteng in 
particular and hope that our efforts will help to attract the attention of foreign tourists and 
investors (News24, 2002).  
The notable difference between this security array and the World Cup measures was in the nature of 
the event being protected. While the World Cup was a sporting and commercial event, the Summit 
was a political gathering. Indeed, the presence of police was intended to be more overtly intimidating, 
due to the presence of a large number of protesters. But despite this difference of emphasis the model 
implemented seemed to be a harbinger of the security measures for 2010. As with the World Cup, 
policing created pacified spaces for accredited delegates, while deterring potential ‘trouble makers’. 
Spatially, this focused on creating a series of temporary enclaves through the host city of 
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Johannesburg. And, as with the World Cup, this was communicated to the public as a development 
necessity. 
What is notable is the apparent contextual durability of the security model. While initially planned 
and implemented for an international political summit, it could be readily adapted for use at a 
commercial event. In both cases, security was bundled with the projection of South Africa as an 
attractive opportunity for future investment. For Martin (2011), the controlling of protest at political 
events and the creation of peaceful environments for spectators at mega-events are based around the 
same structuring logic of ‘selling’ host cities. In both cases, security provides the logistical support to 
create such environments while becoming a showpiece of state power in its own right. This proves to 
be a readily applicable organisational model. As the example of the WSSD shows, commercial 
restrictions could be rapidly assimilated into forms of institutional governance and police mobilisation 
already existent in South Africa.  
In the case of South Africa, planners actively aligned guarantees to FIFA with an overall project of 
marketing the safety of host cities. Under the initial agreement, the state was obliged to enforce a set 
of concentric security rings around stadiums, while maintaining various restriction zones and ‘island 
sites’ throughout participating metropolises. In addition, the host city by-laws empowered 
municipalities to designate any area within their territorial jurisdiction as ‘controlled access sites’ 
(eThekwini, n.d.: 7) for the duration of the tournament. While the initial guarantees stipulated the 
necessity for protection of ‘official areas’, such as stadiums, fan parks and training venues, the GSC 
document presented a far more geographically comprehensive approach. This aimed at creating 
simultaneous layers of security at borders and within ‘land, air, rail and maritime domains’ 
(OA/NATJOINTS, 2008: 11).  
In effect, this promised a continuously linked security environment between host cities, venues and 
‘the geographical area linking’ them with the ‘border environment’ (ibid). Using a series of concentric 
security zones, this enforced barriers and fences which radiated from stadiums outwards. Zones 1-6, 
which were also the areas of FIFA exclusive usage, extended from the inner stadium bowl to outside 
the entrance of stadiums (24). Zone 6 was referred to both as the ‘traffic free zone’ and the FIFA outer 
perimeter. This was partly fenced off from the surrounding environments and on match days included 
a large contingent of officers from the various state security structures. Zone 7, the ‘traffic warning 
zone’, moved substantially beyond the perimeters of the stadia and into surrounding roads. According 
to public information sheet released in Port Elizabeth, this was enforced by security control points in 
operation from five hours before a match to six hours after kick-off (Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality, 2010). In order to enter this zone, residents and businesses had to apply for vehicle 
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access permits, further exposing how these sites created temporary, micromanaged borders throughout 
host cities.  
The final demarcation, zone 8, or the ‘city security zone’, referred to the entire metropolitan area of 
host cities. Although this implies that the state was attempting to ensure total spatial control over 
hosting environments NATJOINTS proposed a model that would apply full-time visible policing 
within a series of ‘smaller managerial areas’ (27). The following sites were identified as arenas of 
deployment: ‘accommodation (official and public), tourist attractions, restaurants, bars, routes, 
railway stations, taxi ranks, markets, event sectors, shopping complexes, entertainment venues, red 
light districts’ (26).  
This operational strategy focused on using space as a ‘pre-emptive security element’ through 
securitising particular parts of host cities (Klauser, 2011:8). As a result, designated areas such as fan 
parks become a medium of security through ensuring that concentrations of fans were corralled into 
specific sites, which allowed the security forces to focus their activity. Along with the fan park model, 
inherited from previous FIFA events, the national security strategy focused on other key areas of 
public activity. In particular, the targeted deployment of security officers at designated areas reduced 
the chances of tourists becoming victims of crime. As the reference to ‘red light districts’ suggests, 
this may also have entailed protecting tourists from risks incurred by breaking the law.  
Marketing security  
Operational deployment reflected the perception management ethos of security measures. According 
to the security concept, state marketing began at border entrances where the first impression of safety 
was considered ‘paramount’ (OA/NATJOINTS, 2008: 30). In this vision of security, tourists would 
enter world class airports with a reassuring presence of police before being whisked across highways 
guarded by traffic police and into city centres. Some transport routes into host cities were declared 
‘high risk areas’, such as the N2 from Cape Town International Airport, in the wake of attacks on 
motorists, and were allocated additional contingents of anti-hijacking units (Jones, 2010). But rather 
than attempting to restrict the flow of tourists, such interventions aimed to direct and facilitate their 
movement through cities. For example, the City of Durban instituted a ‘people mover system’ of 
buses within the inner city, ‘linking all event venues and facilities with city attractions’, such as the 
beachfront (Durban Host City, 2010). Notably, in a city where public transport infrastructure is poorly 
funded, the people mover system was air conditioned and provided with security guards at each of its 
stops. This dichotomy was noted in a memorandum of grievance issued by civil society groups which 
argued that the system was a cosmetic endeavour which catered exclusively to tourists (Durban Social 
Forum, 2010).  
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The establishment of these zones aimed to instil an idealised vision of South African cities. Equally, 
these focused sites of visible policing also served as a platform to display an idealised version of the 
police and military (Figures Seven and Eight). For example, the deployment of officers in and around 
stadiums displayed a self-conscious focus on the symbolism of policing (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009). 
Based on his experiences at matches in Johannesburg, the journalist David Durbach wrote that (2010):  
For those attending a game, some of the most eye-catching police officers have been those 
clad in Robocop-style riot gear. 8,500 of these ‘crowd management’ types were trained by the 
French police to be the first line of defence should anything go wrong at the game. Those not 
intimidated by their insect-like body armour would’ve been subdued by the humour in it all, 
particularly when watching some of the less athletic cops trying to walk with these unwieldy 
exoskeletons strapped too tightly to their legs. One can see why most of these guys would 
rather just stand around looking tough. … One night I even got pulled over while driving 
home from a game by cops with sirens and automatic weapons. They threatened to search my 
car for no discernible reason, beyond letting me know that these guys mean business. 
Besides police officers, stadiums were also surrounded by the full police and military arsenal 
available to the SAPS and SANDF. This included mechanised units such as police pursuit vehicles 
and motorbikes, Casspir armoured personal carriers, Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, mobile 
command centres, emergency ambulances and helicopters. Practically, this concentration of 
‘humanware’ and hardware created a staging post for an expeditious response to any incidents. The 
high visibility of these displays was complemented by the adoption of less overt high-end security 
technology. For instance, the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban became the first sporting venue in 
the world to install a quantum computer encryption system (Hennig, 2010). The Bid Book went even 
further in proposing security innovations, including the euphemistic ‘community processing centres’ 
for ‘non-compliant match spectators’, which were ultimately not utilised (SAFA, 2003a:9.4) 
.  
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Figure Seven: SANDF armoured personal carriers outside Soccer City 
 
Figure Eight: SAPS officers in ‘Robocop’ body armour 
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For Graham, these densely policed deployments are ‘theatrical’ by constructing ‘new highly saleable, 
exemplars of state of the art security solutions’ to ‘snare global media exposure for particular brand 
cultures’ (2010:148). But while it mobilised forces to protect the brands of FIFA and its associated 
commercial partners, the government was also projecting its own ‘brand culture’: state security. While 
Durbach (2010) notes the humorous incongruity of some of the officers struggling with their body 
armour, it is clear that the overall impression was one of efficiency, power and an undercurrent of 
intimidation.  
Although this was constrained by the considerations of maintaining an acceptable public appearance 
for the benefit of the fans, the image created resonates with the official discourse which was being 
used to legitimate the concurrent militarisation of the SAPS. In particular, the World Cup was used as 
public stage to reiterate the image of the service as a hierarchically organised, disciplined force. Cele 
made this connection explicit when he addressed crowd control officers, their armour gleaming in the 
sun, outside the Soccer City stadium on the day of the final match (When Duty Calls, 2010). In his 
speech to the column of police he suggested that the display of state power at World Cup stadiums 
would not end with the conclusion of the tournament but would be applied to everyday crime control.  
The adaptation of security measures at the local scale 
The scale of security measures enlisted the national, provincial and local tiers of government into an 
overall programme of securitisation. This, combined with the length of preparations, makes it 
impossible to maintain a synoptic view of how ‘exceptional security’ was applied in all hosting 
environments and in participating state institutions (Gaffney, 2010).  
With this restriction in mind, the following section will illustrate how World Cup security mandates, 
and in particular the declaration of controlled sites throughout host cities, gave an impetus to on-going 
local security projects in the cities of Cape Town and Durban.  
Besides applying specific World Cup-related security restrictions, each host municipality used the 
event as an opportunity for place marketing. In particular, this focused on highlighting the world class 
status of cities by displaying first-rate tourist attractions, such as stadiums, and infrastructure, 
including security systems. This accorded with a well-established development path of creating 
ordered and upmarket prestige spaces, such as major sporting venues and international convention 
venues. The underside of these developments, however, has often been the stigmatisation of certain 
groups and spaces. In many cases, developers and planners regard spaces such as informal settlements 
(Gibson, 2011) or groups such as the homeless (Samara, 2010) as security risks. This may have as 
much to do with aesthetics as with the threat of violence: such visible signs of poverty are regarded by 
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administrators as a chaotic intrusion into the image of the ‘fantasy city’ (Samara, 2010). Housing 
evictions and removals are often accompanied by aggressive and confrontational police tactics 
(McMichael, 2008). Of course, this cannot be described as an exclusive ‘symptom’ of the ‘world 
class’ mind-set (McDonald, 2008). In different cities, police actions against the urban poor are also 
embedded in particular institutional cultures, micro struggles between developers, local state brokers 
and communities and other specificities, which may be legitimated through security discourses used 
throughout the world. In particular, this bears trace of revanchist style policing (Smith, 1996), which 
treats the problems that arise from unemployment and poverty as matters of law enforcement calling 
for security solutions.  
The 2010 municipal by-laws (eThekeweni, n.d) reflected this ethos in providing an open-ended 
definition of beautification and access control, which could be interpreted as a call to minimise the 
presence of the poverty. Most overtly, this included provisions against begging in ‘public open spaces 
controlled or managed by municipalities’ (32) and placed incredibly stringent restrictions on street 
trading (43). In a more subtle manner, it also employed a wide-ranging definition of prohibited 
‘nuisances’ near access controlled and special event sites. These included any ‘public building which 
is so situated, constructed, used or kept so as to be unsafe or to be injurious or dangerous to health’, 
‘any occupied dwelling for which no proper and sufficient supply of pure water is available under a 
reasonable distance’ and ‘any area of land kept or permitted to remain in such a state as to be 
offensive’ (13). While this responds to legitimate public health concerns it also implies that squatter 
camps and illegally occupied buildings, which often lack on-site amenities, could be defined as 
nuisances, as has often been the case with other urban redevelopments (Samara, 2010).  
Cape Town 
As a result, the security preparations for the 2010 World Cup displayed an undercurrent of coercive 
exclusion, as host cities rushed to install world class measures. As early as 2007, street children 
marched against their perceived criminalisation ahead of the World Cup, claiming that the police and 
private security guards were attempting to push them out of Cape Town’s CBD (Majid and York, 
2007). In the lead-up to the tournament, activists from Cape Town civic movements linked evictions 
in Woodstock, Gugulethu, Salt River and around the stadium in Green Point to the preparations for 
the World Cup (Western Cape Ant-Eviction Campaign, 2010). Furthermore, people occupying run-
down houses near the Athlone stadium, which was used as a training venue for the World Cup, were 
informed that their houses would be bulldozed for the tournament to make way for a parking lot 
extension (Inter Press Service, 2010).  
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The issue of evictions in Cape Town garnered unwanted attention for city management. In particular, 
activists and journalist began to label the N2 Gateway Housing Project, which was a joint project 
between the national government, the DA controlled Cape Town municipality and a private company, 
as a beautification initiative which was attempting to disguise poverty near the international airport. In 
particular, media scrutiny fell upon the Symphony Way Temporary Relocation Area (TRA) in Delft, a 
transit camp connected to the N2 Gateway project. According to residents, who referred to the camp 
as ‘Blikkiesdorp’ [Afrikaans for Tin Town] in reference to the government built corrugated iron 
shacks, the area had become a dumping ground for poor people ahead of the World Cup (Smith, 
2010b). While the city claimed that this was only a temporary settlement, residents argued  that while 
the camp itself was surrounded by barbed-wired fencing, they were subjected to regular police raids 
and beatings, access control by the SAPS, regular patrols by apartheid-era Casspir armed carriers [the 
same vehicles displayed outside stadiums] and curfews (Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign, 
2009). As a result, many media outlets compared the area to the titular camp in the South African 
science fiction movie District 9, which had become an unexpected international hit in the year before 
the 2010 World Cup (Smith, 2010b). 
But while people in Symphony Way claimed that the camp was being filled with newcomers in the 
months before the tournament began, City spokespeople denied that there was any correlation 
between the World Cup and these displacements. For example, the proposed 2010 ‘Readiness Plan’ 
for street people was criticised as at attempt at social warehousing by civil society groups, but when I 
raised this question in an email correspondence with the acting head of 2010 operations for Cape 
Town, Pam Naidoo, she claimed to have no knowledge of any controversy (Interview, 17 March ). 
Thereafter, all my follow-up questions went unanswered.     
City officials maintained that there was no World Cup clampdown. However, the city’s annual Winter 
Readiness Plan for Street People was activated earlier than usual because of the World Cup (City of 
Cape Town, 2010b). Although the plan was presented as a philanthropic drive to reunite indigents 
with their families and to offer them protection from the harsh winter climate in the Western Cape, 
many homeless people claimed that they had been rounded up from visible areas of the city and 
removed to far-flung locations such as Blikkiesdorp (Jooste and Johns, 2010. Ntsaluba, 2010). An 
internal security document of the cities ‘improvement district’ project also repeatedly stated that 
vagrants were being removed from certain areas (Bosworth, 2010: 18). Furthermore, community 
activists alleged that the World Cup was the pretext for a ‘hasty cleaning up campaign’ (Ntsaluba, 
2010) while Bosworth (2010:19) argues that city officials were vocal about strict enforcement of 
nuisance by-laws in proximity to the event.  
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Durban  
Comparable allegations about removals were levelled against the municipal government in Durban. In 
2005, City Manager Mike Sutcliffe (2005) claimed that media stories about street children being 
rounded up and removed to areas far outside of the city before major events were ‘tabloid trash’. 
However, when the World Cup preliminary draw was held in the city in 2007, allegations emerged 
that street children had been rounded on charges of loitering and sent to Westville Prison on the 
suburban outskirts of the city (Packree and De Boer, 2007). While Sutcliffe again denied the validity 
of these reports, Metropolitan Police officials told journalists that removing children from visible 
areas such as the beachfront was a ‘routine operation’ (ibid). In a 2009 reversal, Sutcliffe confirmed 
that removals had been taking place: ‘When the heads of state are going to appear at conferences, the 
first thing that security does is move the street children out of the way so they can’t be seen. Four 
years ago we used to deal with it that way, but we are not going to deal with it like that anymore’ 
(Comins, 2009).  
Despite the assurances that these operations would cease, in early 2010 new evidence emerged that 
they were still occurring, with one teenager saying that ‘[The police] say we can’t be here [in the city] 
for the World Cup’ (Tolsi, 2010c). However, in 2011 the spokesman for the Durban Metro Police 
inadvertently confirmed that removals had taken place as a result of the 2010 World Cup (The 
Mercury, 2011). In the light of round-ups ahead of the COP 17 climate talks, Eugene Msomi said: 
‘We often remove them from the streets when there are big events like the World Cup and major 
conferences, because some of them mug tourists and damage the image of the country’ (ibid).  
Street children were not the only group of people targeted by security preparations. For example, 
street traders at the Warwick Junction early morning market alleged that the city was attempting to 
fast-track a mall ahead of the World Cup, which would have deprived them of their livelihoods. 
Despite the Durban High Court ruling that vendors were allowed to trade in the area, the Metro Police 
attempted to forcibly evict them, which left several traders injured by rubber bullets (Daily News, 
2009). The city also attempted to ban marches by social movements such as Abahlali baseMjondolo 
in the lead-up to the tournament. Although they rescinded on this position and allowed marches, this 
was accompanied by the imposition of restrictions which kept these marches out of city centres 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo, 2010).  
While such restrictive measures were officially legitimated by the proximity to the World Cup, they 
were not a novel development. In particular, the response of local and provincial government in 
KwaZulu-Natal since the shackdwellers’ movement emerged in 2005 has often been aggressive and 
confrontational. The Abahlali movement has made serious allegations of police harassment against 
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city officials, including torture and complicity with the 2009 violence against its membership, and 
these claims have been sustained by human rights groups. For example, the Freedom of Expression 
Institute (2006) has maintained that ‘the high-handed police action’ of the municipality has been 
illegal and unconstitutional. This official hostility has been observed to take on conflict-like 
dimensions, with one Abahlali (2008) press statement describing police disconnections of illegal 
electricity cables in these terms: ‘They arrived with the South African Police Services, including the 
dog unit, and the Municipal security. They were very heavily armed. It was clear that they were 
prepared for a war’.  
FIFA’s stance towards issues of housing evictions and forced removals was characteristic of their 
official approach towards security: namely, it was presented as an initiative of South African 
authorities. The organisation did not respond to repeated requests from the United Nations Human 
Rights Council to cooperate with a report on evictions and mega-events, and told the American 
magazine Newsweek that it ‘never requested any move or cleaning-up of areas in any host city’ 
(Werth, 2010). This may be true to the extent that clampdowns on social movements in Durban or 
forced removals in Cape Town drew upon local dynamics and reflected on-going social conflicts. For 
example, heavy-handed policing in Durban predated the World Cup preparations and continued long 
after the local authorities had completed its obligations to FIFA.  
However, the allegations made by street children (‘we can’t be here [in the city] for the World Cup’) 
reveals how narrow the difference was between FIFA’s desired image of host cites and the branding 
strategies adopted by urban authorities. These policing actions were driven by the idea that world 
class and modern cities do not include protest or panhandling. In particular, the focus on reducing 
public disorder contained in the special city by-laws provided a legal justification for consequent 
clampdowns. At the same time, national and municipal government maintained that, as an exceptional 
event, it was imperative to ensure that all these measures were implemented for the World Cup. This 
confluence of external frameworks and local security dispositions may have providing a legitimation 
to local institutional policing cultures which criminalise the poor and political protest.  
Outcomes 
In its final form, World Cup security combined entertainment and emergency. As Bheki Cele put it an 
interview with FIFA, ‘[as] security agents we must behave in a way that that ensures a peaceful time 
for entertainment and enjoyment that visitors enjoy to the maximum’ (FIFA World Magazine, 2010b). 
Because of the apparent domestic and international risks faced by the 2010 World Cup, the state 
articulated this as a situation which warranted the establishment of temporary exclusion zones, 
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controlled access sites and other security repertoires to fortify against danger. Furthermore, this served 
to legitimate localised efforts to control ‘dangerous parts’ of the population (Neocleous, 2011:202).  
The idea of pacification allows a useful conceptual point from which to think through the complex 
security procedures which accompanied the 2010 World Cup, such as the linkages between 
commercialism and security and the use of an open-ended security discourse to pursue variegated 
state projects. However, as a ‘broad’ (Neocleous, 2011) project, it was not exclusively marked by 
efforts to enforce social control. For example, if we return to the scale of the deployments around 
stadiums and other controlled sites, it notable that these combined efforts to secure urban space with 
the facilitation of mobility. The templates and procedures, which used security at prior FIFA events as 
a benchmark, echoed many of the spatial controls and fortifications used against crime and terrorism. 
Indeed, they also bore parallels to the security ‘green zones’ found in war zones. Graham (2010:121) 
argues that these ‘mobile’ descendent of the Baghdad Green Zone are ubiquitous at high profile 
events, as urban space is carved up into temporary secure enclaves. In this sense, they are mobile 
because they can be translated across different national and urban hosting environments, as a security 
procedure which can be reassembled within multiple contexts. 
However, this mobility had an additional meaning within the South African context. The policing 
deployment was intended to service tourist mobility through host environments and to allow for 
exploration of host cities under monitored conditions. For example, the map of Durban (Durban Host 
City, 2010) provided by hosting authorities breaks the terrain of the city into a series of suggested 
attractions linked by transportation routes. Rather than being promised a series of enclaves fortified 
against external violence, this promoted the idea of host cities as the ultimate site of festival, in which 
potential risks had been accounted for and (temporarily) neutralised. Security was thus bound up with 
the projection of conviviality. Tourists were not only encouraged to feel safe but, to a certain extent, 
at home. For instance, the deployment of foreign officials was promoted as offering assistance with 
language and cultural differences by greeting tourists with security officers in familiar national 
uniforms (GCIS, 2010). 
This was accompanied by a conceptual focus on ‘saturation policing’ at designated routes and venues, 
with additional panoptic aerial surveillance by the SAPS air wing (ESPN, 2009) According to SAPS 
Superintendent Vish Naidoo: 
We expect people to go anywhere in South Africa, not necessarily those areas concentrated 
around stadiums. Whichever areas people want to venture into there would be that saturation 
of uniformed police officers. To restrict anybody’s movements is unconstitutional first and 
foremost ... We are in the business of making sure people who have to venture into any areas 
will be safe and secure. (ibid)  
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Saturation policing was accompanied by an additional form of ‘saturation’: the advertising signage, 
logos, billboards and posters of the officially recognised commercial brands. For example, a month 
before the World Cup it was evident that the area around the Nelson Mandela Stadium in Port 
Elizabeth had been ‘sanitised’ as a result of commercial restrictions. In particular, the tea rooms and 
offices around the stadium were exclusively displaying Coca-Cola banners. During the World Cup 
itself, it would have been almost impossible for anyone in South Africa to watch television, listen to 
the radio, read a newspaper or go online without being exposed to official advertisers to some degree.  
However, the policing mobilisation also served to project the national ‘brand’ alongside commercial 
signs and symbols. The establishment of physical exclusion zones and temporary legal barricades has 
some parallels with ‘quasi-autonomous realms’ (Graham, 2010:101) such as export processing zones, 
in that designated sites were part of a broader political economy in which regular taxation and legal 
requirements were suspended for FIFA. However, whereas comparable enclaves provide a ‘territorial 
secession’ (ibid) from host cities or nations, the World Cup stadiums and fan parks were intended to 
display concentrated images of South African national prowess and prestige to the rest of the world. 
The positioning of police officers in slick body armour and the surrounding of stadiums with military 
and police vehicles was used to showcase the size and capabilities of the state’s security apparatus.  
But this was not intended as a hyper-militaristic display of South African nationalism. Rather than 
resonating with the fascist imagery of massed ranks of troops, flags and marches (Boyle and 
Haggerty, 2009), security measures aimed to offer reassurance about the safety of a civilian event. 
Indeed, while security planners promoted South Africa as offering the safest and most secure World 
Cup of all time, this should not be viewed as a chauvinistic assertion of national exceptionalism. 
Instead the government aligned their security measures with those of previous hosts with the intention 
of showing a well-established series of imagery and rhetoric that was intended to convey world class 
preparations: bomb disposal equipment, large numbers of police officers, a discursive promotion of 
the ability to counter all threats and so forth (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009:264). Indeed, it can be 
suggested that much of the specific nationalist prestige of security blurred into a homogenous set of 
procedures and tactics which have come to symbolise ‘successful’ mega-event governance. In the 
South African case, this was bundled with government’s efforts to showcase security institutions as 
being able to compete with their counterparts in the global North. For example, an attentive fan may 
have noticed that security checks and deployments at fan parks and stadiums were comparable to 
similar arrays at the 2006 World Cup, suggesting that the South African security services could keep 
apace with its better funded and equipped counterparts in Germany.  
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Conclusion  
However, others argued that the success of these measures were contingent on replicating an 
exclusionary security logic already existent in host cities. For Tolsi (2010d), the sense of national 
cohesion which appeared during the tournament was fleeting. Moreover this reproduced an 
exclusionary security landscape, allowing for ‘the middle classes [to feel] part of a country they are 
otherwise completely dislocated from with their gated communities, private healthcare and 
exorbitantly priced schools’.  
During the World Cup, the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign held a parallel ‘poor people’s 
World Cup’ next to Athlone stadium. According to one of the organisers (Cassiem, 2010), this aimed 
to show the disparity between the government and FIFA’s ‘privatisation’ of the ‘people’s game’ and a 
reality in which:  
While the poor people in Cape Town and in South Africa as a whole are suffering, the rich are 
enjoying themselves in the expensive stadiums at the expense of the poor… All the traders 
and communities – that were negatively affected by FIFA-related urban renewal projects and 
by the implemented by-laws – were invited to this tournament: a tournament that is FREE 
[emphasis in original] and open to everybody  
Indeed the invitation was extended: ‘To all the tourists: don’t stay only in the controlled spaces 
bounded by FIFA rules and regulations, but move beyond these areas to experience the true spirit of 
what the game of soccer is all about!’ (Ibid). 
As this chapter has argued, these ‘controlled spaces’ were a reflection of on-going governance 
fixations within South African cities. While the focus with which the state mobilised to protect a 
commercial event was unprecedented, the extent to which this relied on police actions to enforce 
sanitised consumer space was not. Although much commentary depicted the World Cup as an 
occupation, it is arguable that this was merely an intensification of established processes. The 
‘occupation’ is not so much the radical, but temporary alterations to urban form which occurred 
during the event. Instead, this is the occupation of everyday life, in which policing is used to 
warehouse unwanted parts of the population and to fortify spaces considered valuable.  
However, while the South African government and FIFA shared a security outlook, the flow of 
benefits was not equalised. Security mobilisations worked to fortify an accumulative regime, which 
removed enormous profits derived from government interventions out of the country. In this sense, 
FIFA was ‘parasitic’ on the state (O’Reilly, 2010). While the association was totally dependent on the 
outcome of government planned and enforced measures, it also ensured that hosting conditions 
protected it from any comparable reciprocity. It seems, however, that domestic political elites were 
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prepared to collude in such an unequal relationship. In particular, the symbolic opportunities provided 
by the World Cup created a stage set for a massed theatre of the state’s security capacity. The 
government’s focus on security as spectacle suggests an addition to the figuring of the securitisation 
of commercialism advanced in the previous chapter. In the case of the World Cup, the extent to which 
security measures were used to advertise South Africa speaks to an emergent commercialisation of 
securitisation. Packaged like a marketing campaign, focusing on a visual predominance and keeping 
‘on message’, the security forces were presented like the unveiling of a new commercial product. 
Most specifically, the World Cup served as a chance for the state to highlight its security brand.  
However, this official focus on creating spectacle reveals dimensions of state power which may 
otherwise appear hidden or unconnected. Firstly, following Martin (2011), it can be suggested that the 
extraordinary pressures of the World Cup expose how, under conditions of exception, security forces 
become the coercive mechanism  which structures power relationships in society. In the case of South 
Africa, the security services worked as the bailiffs of FIFA’s commercial regimes and as the main tool 
to ensure that cities were governed in line with the image desired by political elites.  
The meaning of this is not confined to the domestic context. The World Cup was administered along 
established security templates which appear globally. In particular, this encouraged national and local 
officials to govern cities as a kind of ‘security-scape’ (Wall and Monahan, 2011), protecting valuable 
spaces by reducing or disguising the visibility of people and behaviour which were considered not to 
belong. As Hagemann argues (2010), this indicates how world class urban governance pivots around 
enforcing an access-controlled, fortified urban aesthetic. The upshot may be that commercial interests 
and the police power of the state are, in times of ‘emergency’, fundamentally indistinguishable.  
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Chapter Nine: The Militarisation of the 2010 World Cup  
Introduction 
The preceding chapters have suggested that the security measures for the 2010 World Cup were 
permeated by the logic of war. Governance structures used a military command and control structure, 
while President Jacob Zuma described the spending on security operations as a ‘war chest’. As in 
wartime, South African politicians presented the tournament as a nationalist state of exception and 
urged all citizens to rally around the flag. The inverse of this sentiment was the perception that the 
country had been invaded and occupied by FIFA.  
The thesis has maintained that this ‘emergency’ was politically managed and responsive to the 
interests of a complex of public/private actors and institutions, rather than a predetermined outcome of 
the extraordinary security challenges presented by the World Cup. Using Graham’s (2010) work on a 
military urbanism as a recurring theme, it has been suggested that this was intrumentalised through 
security operations which twinned mobility and restriction. Instead of emerging as a novel intrusion 
into South African cities, the World Cup solidified, in a highly public but temporary form, a series of 
on-going security methods and prerogatives played out within everyday urban life.  
The most urgent, problematic aspect of this overlap with entrenched security developments would 
appear to be the parallel efforts to remilitarise the SAPS. The security operations for the World Cup 
were presented by the government, the media and within academic policing studies as a forward-
thinking model inspired by international best practise. By contrast, the state’s experiments with a new 
SAPS ranking system and the reinforcement of ‘discipline’ was often described as an atavistic 
holdover from the apartheid regime. For example, former government minister Kader Asmal 
suggested that the return to old policing appellations was indicative of an institutional amnesia about 
the state violence of the recent past (Graham, 2009). Dianne Kohler Barnard (2010), the DA Shadow 
Minister of Police, echoed this sentiment and suggested that remilitarisation was a reactive move 
which failed to take crime combatting in South Africa forward. From these perspectives, it could be 
argued that remilitarisation was the antithesis of the policing operations at the 2010 World Cup. While 
the organisational acumen of the event displayed the modernity of the democratic dispensation, 
parallels developments within the police suggested that the government was readily invoking the 
practices and strategies of its authoritarian predecessors.  
However, somewhat ironically, within critical urban theory South Africa’s recent past has become a 
dystopian metaphor for the future trajectory of urban securitisation. In his seminal City of Quartz 
(1990: 224-227), Mike Davis described the ‘militarisation of city life’ and the creation of fortified 
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enclaves of affluence in Los Angeles as the ‘increasing South Africanisation of its spatial relations’.  
Extrapolating from ‘actually existing trends’ he also included an allusion to ‘urban Bantustans’ (224). 
More recently, Weizman (2007:171, 123) notes how the concept of apartheid has been associated with 
the occupation of Palestine and suggests that South Africa is one of the exemplars of ‘the global 
phenomenon of metropolitan sprawl and segregation into ethnically and religiously homogenous 
communities’. Graham (2010, 49) observes that neoconservative thinkers have approvingly viewed 
‘apartheid as a model’ for ‘urban lockdowns’ (ibid). He also speculates that South Africa’s past could 
be a conceptual template for developments in global political geography: ‘are the three-dimensional 
archipelagos of apartheid-style splintering, connection, fortification, and militarisation ... a grim 
exemplar of the future?’ (143). It could also be noted that, at the level of popular culture, one of South 
Africa’s [albeit American-funded] most successful film exports has been the aforementioned District 
9. In the year before the World Cup, the movie appeared to resonate with audiences throughout the 
world by taking security trends evident in the country to a science fiction extreme, with its depiction 
of heavily armed corporate mercenaries and the military controlled slum of the title.  
Indeed, Hansen (2006) suggests that policing in South Africa was historically influenced both by the 
need to maintain a harsh, inequitable order and the desire of political elites to appear modern and 
internationally ‘respectable’. The apartheid government was thus a police state in two senses of the 
word. It was preoccupied with security and repression, engaged in a perpetual war with its 
‘subversive’ population (281) and at the same time this was based on the justification that modernity 
and prosperity would be ensured through segregation: ‘the object of policing was first and foremost to 
control the reproduction of labour’ and  movement (ibid). This was reflected in the apartheid state’s 
obsession with maintaining a veneer of legality. As Hansen (282) vividly puts it, ‘The dingy 
interrogation room, the torture chamber and the random arrest’ were ‘supplemented by the courtroom, 
the hygienic and monitored detention cell, orderly arrests and so on’.  
This suggests that the recuperation of aspects of apartheid identified by Davis, Weizman and Graham 
has to do with the combination of internal militarisation and sophisticated apparatuses of spatial 
control and segregation observed throughout the world. As this chapter will argue, the interface 
between past and future, between local and international is central to the extension of contemporary 
militarisation. As an intensified site of international security developments and cooperation, mega-
events may expose these preoccupations in an especially concentrated and heightened manner. But 
while Graham (2010), Neocleous (2011) and Souza (2011) agree that architectural fortification and 
authoritarian social policy converge into the increased militarisation of cities, the origins and extent of 
these developments remain a matter of debate.  
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For Graham, the driving force behind the continuous relocation of military techniques and tactics into 
the governance of urban space is the protection of areas and populations of value from dangerous 
‘intrusion’. As his use (12) of Foucault’s ‘boomerang effect’ suggests, this draws upon a long-
standing back and forth between ‘colonial heartlands’ and ‘frontiers’, in which political authorities 
were engaged in simultaneously fighting insurgencies abroad and rebellions and class conflict at 
‘home’ . However, the current era is marked by an unprecedented militarisation of civil spaces. For 
Graham (74), the replacement of the Keynesian post-war settlement by ‘market fundamentalism’ 
results in polarised cities, and this combines with the technologies made available on the international 
security market and ideologies of social domestication to entrench urban militarisation. The result is 
that in many cities security has become a euphemism for protecting archipelagos of privilege, in 
which dangerous or unwanted sections of the public become a target (96). ‘Neoliberal globalisation’ 
rapidly morphs ‘into permanent war: the architectures of globalisation merge seamlessly into the 
architectures of control and warfare’ (78).  
The ‘paranoia and neurosis’ (93) embedded within security policies and architectures reflect the 
failure of political and economic elites to create an equitable form of globalisation. Security is both 
self-fulfilling, in that the construction of security zones and islands ‘recreates’ the perception of 
danger and threats (150), and illusory, as it draws on ‘myths’ of technical precision and seamless, 24-
7 ‘surveillance, targeting and killing systems’ (177). However, this obsession with control fails to 
address the real challenges of contemporary cities, such as ‘intensifying global interconnections, rapid 
urbanisation, extreme financial volatility, increasing demographic pressure and resource depletion’, or 
the ultimate challenge of the ‘Anthropocene’, a new geological era created by the human impact upon 
the natural environment (382-3). 
Military urbanism thus distracts attention and resources away from such pressing problems into 
fearful projects of pre-emption. And following Carr (2010:30), the linked state–corporate logic of 
‘military futurism’ actively works to impose a bleak ‘weaponised’ future in the name of preserving 
the international state system and consumer capitalism. But the attempts to securitise ways of life 
which are reliant on economic and ecological exploitation are paradoxical as they weaponise a socio-
economic system which perpetuates and deepens ‘current and future crises and insecurities’ (Graham, 
2010:310). For Graham, this necessitates ‘a radical politics of security’ (383) which can deal with 
these threats and which understands ‘the continually deepening transnational and cosmopolitan 
connections that so mark our age, in all their complexity and ambivalence’ (ibid) 
However, Graham’s proposed solutions to modern environmental and social crisis appear to be 
politically naïve. While calling for ‘a resurgent conception of Keynesian state politics’(382) to roll 
back the excesses of neoliberalism, he admits that states are ‘so woven into the circuits of dominant 
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capitalism, so complicit in their own politics of public spectacle and private secrecy, that such a 
reworking is unlikely to come from them’ (382-3). In response, Cities Under Siege concludes with a 
call for unified challenges to the status quo by ‘the Left’ (381), organised through ‘global civil 
society’. But as Graham’s use of capitalisation suggests, this implies that ‘the Left’ is a homogenous 
block, which clearly collapses vast differences in ideologies, tactics and world views , as well as fault 
lines of race, gender and class. Furthermore, self-consciously left-wing governments in countries such 
as Brazil and South Africa have embraced ‘technocratic and authoritarian’ (Souza, 2011:14) forms of 
security and governance, while civil society is not immune from its own anti-democratic tendencies. 
Indeed, Souza (2010b:318) suggests that the call for ‘resurgent’ Keynesianism is effectively a 
reformist strategy for the continuation of capitalism with ‘minimum horror’. However such efforts to 
‘tame’ the social and ecological destruction of capitalism ignores how it is ‘mode of production’ that 
is ‘intrinsically and essentially anti-ecological’ and crisis prone (316).  
For Neocleous (2011), the attempt to offer a more cosmopolitan conception of security glosses over   
the militarism inherent in the very concept of ‘security’. More exactly, ‘wars’ of various kinds are the 
structuring logic around which the state and capital organise and sustain bourgeoisie order in the 
‘work’ of security, which oscillates between different countries and back again (2011: 201). From this 
standpoint, contemporary militarisation is the latest ratcheting up of a historical lineage stretching 
from colonial manhunts with ‘mastiffs and knives’ (198) and the creation of pacified labour forces 
(194) which fuelled the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital, through to contemporary wars on drugs 
and terror. Whether through knives or drones, dogs or night-vision scopes, the underlying impetus 
behind increasingly ‘elaborate security systems targeting civilian populations in general and suspect 
communities or the enemy within in particular’ is ordering the political relations necessary for 
accumulation by ‘facilitating a functional integration of the pacifying powers of the modern state’ 
(200). 
From this standpoint, the militarised spatial assemblages which ‘pop up’ (Warren, 2002) in such 
spectacular fashion during mega-events are a particularly concentrated ‘front’ in the on-going class 
war that shapes capitalist society. The call for measures to protect sporting events from external 
threats such as terrorism is not a reaction against pressing dangers but is part of a broader, continuous 
strategy of remodelling and extending police powers in order to manage ‘problem subjects’ (204). To 
extend Neocleous’ critique of security politics into Graham’s work, it can be argued that military 
urbanism is not so much the product of the world-historic urban changes wrought by neoliberalism 
but is instead the latest configuration of ‘police power’. Indeed, it could be further speculated that 
neoliberalism has served to strip the state of its social democratic façade, revealing the endoskeleton 
of the ‘war machine’. And, from the perspective of the global South, this may not even appear a novel 
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development, as the Keynesian post-war settlement was never strongly installed in most parts of the 
world (Abourahme, 2009).  
The concept of ‘pacification’ suggests that there is no incongruity in the militarisation of civilian 
mega-events. As a central articulation of the ethos of capitalist society (Smith, 2011), mega-events are 
sites of densely concentrated value. Because they contain such vast financial and symbolic prestige, it 
would seem logical that they would be governed with extraordinary security displays which make 
visible their political and economic worth (Munoz, cited in Marcuse, 2007). From the perspective 
outlined by Neocleous, it is not that the logic of war has redefined urbanism so much as that the ever-
present wars of pacification and class are more overt under the conditions of neoliberalism.  
In contrast with Graham, Neocleous argues that militarisation is not a distraction from real security 
concerns but is part of a larger repertoire of policing actions which support bourgeois order, a 
repertoire which also includes welfare and other governmental efforts to manage society. To attempt 
to find a cosmopolitan, alternative conception of security, as Graham proposes, is to fall into the ‘trap’ 
of security and replicates the same inequitable politico-economic system which is the real base of 
anxiety and fear.  
Neocleous focuses upon how security works as a projection of elite power, and particularly on the use 
of the often phantasmagoric and exaggerated threat of terrorism. But he has little to say on the issue of 
public safety and violent crime. This underplays the lived and situational fear of violence which 
Souza (2011) identifies as the driving force behind ‘phobopolisation’. In Southern countries, violence 
is a socially complex but real threat. For instance, in a discussion of drug gangs in Brazil Souza (11) 
identifies the tense interactions between these groups and the other residents of favelas .While these 
gangs may be the targets of state-led pacifications, they are themselves implicated in violence against 
residents through exerting their own forms of ‘tyranny’ (ibid). Souza (2) resists the ahistorical 
tendency to present our era as uniquely violent, citing the fear of urban violence found in Ancient 
Rome and eighteenth-century London, but argues (2009:29) that what stands out today is the intensity 
and omnipresence of security concerns throughout differing urban contexts.  
In particular, he (2011:2) identifies three crucial aspects which combine to entrench such a ‘quasi-
Hobbesian’ view of urban life. Unlike Neocleous, who suggests that elites have long viewed the 
‘domestic’ and the ‘frontier’ as one continuous colony, Souza argues that the contemporary period is 
marked by the obsolescence of long standing borders between policing and warfare.  Firstly, the 
‘traditional conservative’ (3) idea of policing as an internal practice and warfare as carried out abroad 
against defined enemies has been supplanted. Political establishments talk about their foreign military 
engagements as variants of international policing, while internal policing uses ‘military methods and 
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personal’ (4). Secondly, this is entrenched through the linked coordinates of the political, commercial 
and media ‘industry of fear’ (ibid). Finally, while military and police planners often view capitalism 
as being threatened by toxic miasmas of crime and terrorism, he suggests that this perception of chaos 
is really the ‘emergence of a new order, or of new orders, both legal and illegal one and at many 
scales’ (5). Within contemporary capitalism, this includes the erosion of the welfare state in the global 
North, the ‘collapse’ (ibid) of the developmental state in parts of the global South, increasingly 
precarious employment, and the flourishing of trade in illegal commodities and money laundering, 
which have been aided by deregulation.  
Mirroring Standing’s (2004:53) comments on how organised crime functions as a form of predatory 
capitalism Souza (2009:47-8) argues that capitalism contains its own ‘criminogenous’ tendencies. 
These include the propagation of desires, which many people cannot afford to satiate through legal 
means; the dissemination of competitive, individualistic values which entrench the perception of 
social life as a continuous war; and a culture industry which feeds off lurid narratives of violence and 
the belief that ‘everything can be transformed into a commodity and that everything has a price’ 
(ibid). In turn, this propagates the idea that individual self-worth is dependent on property and wealth, 
which in the South African context has been viewed as a major motivating factor for criminality 
(Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009). The cumulative product is the perpetual 
reinforcement of a widespread sense of fear, both through physical violence and the continual 
turbulence of the economy. And this is a fear which permeates society: referring to gated 
communities,  Souza (2011:6) uses the metaphor of the prison to observe that ‘middle class citizens 
live in prisons and it is only in prisons that they feel themselves free ... this kind of statement gives us 
a taste of the socio-psychological atmosphere in a phobopolis’ . 
This makes the ‘militarisation of the urban question’ (2009) an increasingly common phenomenon. 
Souza suggests that the only way to replace this with a less fearful politics is to combine egalitarian 
urban development with a progressive public safety strategy (2011:16). But he remains sceptical 
about what the state can achieve in this regard: ‘structurally seen the state apparatus is ultimately 
always a heteronomous instance of power, no matter how sincerely committed to (re)distributive 
measures and popular participation particular governments can be’ (ibid). At best, under the current 
conditions of capitalism, public policies can mitigate certain problems but as a product of the local, 
national and international challenges arising through the criminogenous dynamics of the geo-political 
and economic order: ‘phobopolisation is  a challenge that the capitalist state is very probably not able 
to overcome… The state apparatus seems to be part of the problem rather than the solution’ (18).  
Finally, as an international challenge, Souza (2010a:461) suggests that Graham inadvertently 
simplifies the asymmetries between North and South and oversubscribes to distinctions between rich 
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and poor, frontier and metropole. Most particularly, this underestimates how ‘semi-peripheral’ 
countries such as South Africa, Mexico and Brazil are sites of both great wealth and poverty. While 
profoundly unequal, they are by no means poor (ibid), with advanced capitalist infrastructures and 
strong states existing amidst structural underdevelopment.  
What this suggests is that semi-peripheral countries like South Africa represent the ultimate example 
of military urbanism’s twinning of movement and control. With First and Third world conditions 
continually overlapping within the territorial boundaries of one country, security may serve as the 
political technique which manages the tension and fractions incubated by constant social 
contradictions. Rather than being neocolonial war zones, countries such as Brazil and South Africa 
are major political and economic forces in which sophisticated consumer societies flourish amidst on-
going  crime ‘wars’. As a consequence of this, it may be the case that South Africa is a pioneer in the 
‘crisis management’ which Peters (2011) observes in increasingly polarised societies in the global 
North.  
Despite differences in approach, focus and proposal, the work detailed above shares a material 
conception of security. Rather than a transcendent good, arising from the urgent need for public 
protection, it has been argued that the ‘militarisation of the urban question’ (Souza, 2009) is a product 
of broader political and social processes. This clearly extrapolates into wider questions of economy 
and power far beyond the parameters of this thesis.  
With the aim of identifying a track through this complex terrain, this chapter will focus upon how 
military urbanism works through the interface between the domestic and international, the past and 
future, and is undergirded by a dark imaginative rendering of urban space. Samara (2005) suggests 
that the influence of internationally used doctrines and tactics on the post-apartheid government’s war 
on crime may reinforce a localised culture of militarised policing and security. The chapter will 
develop this argument in a different direction and suggest that the policing of South Africa’s complex 
social environment also provides a concrete example of the tensions and anxieties embedded 
throughout transnational security developments, an international dimension especially pertinent to the 
security operations at the 2010 World Cup. Finally, Souza (2010:461) suggests that, despite local and 
national differences, the international dimensions of urban militarisation require a global focus. This 
chapter aims to go some way towards developing this kind of critique.  
Chapter Structure 
The chapter will begin by discussing how the government offered a technologically advanced security 
apparatus for meeting the presumed challenges of the 2010 World Cup. However, it will be suggested 
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that this inadvertently revealed paranoia about urban space which contrasted with the desired image of 
South African cities that the state worked so hard to project. The chapter will than discuss how 
FIFA’s own security concerns reflect a ‘weaponised’ (Carr, 2010) view of the future, with an 
emphasis on how the association regards commercial violations as an existential threat akin to 
terrorism. Moving to transnational and private security collaboration, it will be argued that such 
involvement further highlights the normalisation of military urbanism through both policing 
exchanges and private sector involvement. The chapter will than discuss how the state’s militarisation 
of the World Cup reflects a broader strategy of applying military solutions to crime and social control. 
While this was less overtly violent than many of the abuses which have been linked to the 
remilitarisation of the SAPS, it will be argued that the World Cup can be understood as a significant 
event in the ‘tooling up’ (Hallsworth and Lea,2011) of the security ‘forces’. In conclusion, it will be 
speculated that this reveals emergent developments within both domestic and international security.  
 State Branding 
Assurance/Anxiety  
Throughout the build-up to the 2010 World Cup, officials reiterated the stance that the exactitude of 
security operations ensured that tourists had nothing to fear when in South Africa. The Deputy 
Minister of Police told the press that ‘We are not Afghanistan or Baghdad. South Africa is a peaceful 
country and people coming here for the Cup will enjoy themselves’ (Moholoa, 2010). Such 
assurances began at an early stage of planning. In 2007, the Deputy SAPS Commissioner predicted 
that crime would be a fairly minor issue at the tournament ‘Where the soccer is going to take place, 
where the stadiums are, where the police are, there will be low crime levels’, due to crime being 
spatially concentrated ‘in areas really still suffering from the past of our country, in underprivileged 
areas’ (Westall, 2007). Closer to the onset of the event, Jacob Zuma said at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos that ‘South Africa has a clear plan in terms of security. Our police force, aided by the 
army and other security elements, are very clear and ready. Nothing will happen’ (Reuters, 2010a).  
As Zuma’s statement suggests, this strategy of assurance was underpinned by the precautionary 
deployment of ‘security elements’. One of the planning mantras articulated by various police officials 
was that ‘South Africa was hosting the world’ (Westall, 2007), entailing that security plans had to 
account not only for domestic risks but also for transnational threats. For example, the Minister of 
State Security (Cwele, 2010), told a parliamentary committee that: 
Once more, we want to reassure the world that we are ready to host the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup. Our assessment to date does not indicate any security threat to the event including the 
cancer of global terrorism. However, we are not lowering our guard. We are grateful to our 
partners in the Southern African Development Community, Africa and the rest of the world 
who continue to share intelligence regarding the security of the tournament. As the 
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intelligence community, we are conducting daily threat assessments including the appraisal of 
routes, base camps, hotels and screening of service providers. This information is fed into the 
National Joint Operations Centre to guide operations. 
A similar stance was reiterated by Police Lieutenant General Andre Pruis, who said that ‘SA is not a 
terror target, but as many playing countries will be represented, we have various contingency plans in 
place to counter any real or potential threat’ (Delano, 2010). But this reveals a paradox in security 
planning. On the one hand, as a country ‘hosting the world’ the government proclaimed that the threat 
of terrorism, a ‘cancer’ which could erupt at any scale or place, necessitated vast resource allocations. 
This implies that terrorism is a profoundly unknowable threat requiring a continual, anxious posture 
of pre-emption. But simultaneously, officials claimed that robust intelligence coordinated with 
international authorities allowed the state to confidently assess that there was no security threat to the 
World Cup.  
For Graham, this combination of anxiety and confidence is indicative of one of the key security 
preoccupations of military urbanism: the merging of assurance with ‘the seeding of anxiety’ (Graham 
2010: 147). While ‘theatrical’ (ibid) security measures are used to assure publics about their safety, 
such dense assemblages also reinforce the belief that mega-events are sites of exceptional danger. 
This combination was embodied within the various operations and displays held before the World 
Cup. As suggested in Chapters Six and Eight, these exhibitions were used for both practical and 
marketing reasons. While they allowed the police and military to test their response to various 
imagined scenarios, they were also used to showpiece the extent of preparations to the media and the 
general public. For Brigadier Sally De Beer, the simulations were necessary to ‘allow our security 
forces to merge their expertise to ensure that we can deal with any crime or terror related threat, as 
well as any natural or non-crime related disaster, during major events’ and allowed ‘some of the most 
elite members and units within the security forces [to] engage in simulated scenarios and enact certain 
aspects of our emergency contingency plans in order to neutralise any form of ... threat’ (Ndawonde, 
2009d).  
But while these exercises were intended to demonstrate that South Africa was a congenial 
environment for hosting, the simulated scenarios pivoted around images of social chaos and violence. 
A crowd management exercise in 2009 showed what specially trained officers could do ‘... during 
unrest at soccer matches scheduled to be played at the Green Point and Athlone stadiums during the 
soccer tournament. Blue lights flashed, sirens blared, smoke billowed into the air, stun grenades shook 
onlookers and armed members of all ranks ran in all directions during a simulation of drills and 
exercises ... [in preparation for the police] to display their ability at the right time’ (Joseph, 2009). 
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While officials were presenting these security operations as unobtrusive support to a civilian event, 
the aesthetic of the displays was notably violent and confrontational.  
In what an official release described as an ‘action packed’ display (Ndawonde, 2009e), an anti-
hijacking/ counter-terror training simulation in 2009 entailed the following: 
Heavily armed criminals tried to flee the scene, but no sooner had the thought emerged when 
they stopped in their tracks thanks to an armed response team, with one arrested and another 
fatally wounded, all in the space of ten minutes. Armed criminals were then chased as they 
fled their vehicle, into a building, where a shootout ensued as members of the Special Task 
Force intervened – but the criminals refused to surrender. It was time to call in the members 
of the National Intervention Unit. Fully armed and protected they arrived on the scene by 
helicopter, as well as parachutes, to assist the officers on the ground. Live ammunition lit up 
the sky while the SAPS units apprehended the criminals who surrendered after one was shot 
dead on the scene (ibid).  
The same exercise included ‘members of the Special Task Force, together with the Intervention Unit, 
cracking down on the terrorists by firing live missiles .... After a gun battle ensued, all suspects were 
shot and arrested within 15 minutes after refusing to cooperate’. And, according to the press 
statement, ‘Mthethwa, Cele and Mbalula looked clearly blown away by the end of the morning’s 
drama’ (ibid).  
The dramatised depictions of crime and terrorism were accompanied by preparations which assessed 
everyday life as the breeding ground of urban apocalypse. Phillip Coleman, head of a subsidiary of 
the state owned defence manufacturer Armscor, claimed that off-the-shelf industrial chemicals could 
be used to launch a chemical or biological attack during the tournament (Global Security Newswire, 
2008). In preparation for this, the military introduced scanning and detection protocols at stadiums 
(ibid). The perceived risk of weapons of mass destruction led the government to promote a range of 
exotic countermeasures alongside the more common details about securing against crime and hostage 
situations. In 2007, the SANDF conducted an emergency chemical response exercise with several 
other African countries (Global Security Newswire, 2007), which was overseen by Ben Steyn, former 
head of the apartheid government’s notorious ‘Project Coast’ biological weapons project (Child, 
2011). According to Steyn, the threat of WMDs was made more likely by ordinary commercial 
transactions: ‘This is because of the huge amounts of chemicals transported throughout Africa at any 
given time; you have to know what to do long before the incident occurs.’ (Global Security 
Newswire, 2007). In response, the exercise taught: 
... principles of command and control and the management of a disaster area. In the 
beginning, the emphasis of the exercise was on the battlefield, but then we moved to the 
civilian area, which is where terrorists could or would strike (ibid).   
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Abroad, the government discussed its ability to avert ‘dirty bombs’ built from stolen fissile material 
(BBC Sport, 2006), while officials told USA Today that despite South Africa having no ‘known 
adversaries’ they were ready for ‘biological, chemical and radiation strikes, while hospitals have 
prepared to deal with a surge of victims of an attack’ (Bryson, 2010).  
Worst case scenarios 
While foreign tabloids claimed that tourists were threatened by ‘low-tech’ machete-wielding mobs 
and  natural threats from ‘killer pythons, spitting cobras, puff adders and black mambas’ ( Daily Mail 
Online, 2010a), the South African government was actively promoting its capacity to respond to high-
tech, scientifically advanced menaces.  In particular, this was based upon the perception that terrorist 
groups would use tools already available in cities to launch attacks (Graham, 2010:135). Contingency 
planning for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) attack was intended 
to communicate the message that the state was ready for all possibilities. But as Dan Hancock (2011) 
has noted with reference to the London Olympics, the application of such protocols are  
... designed not for protesters, or football fans, but for the Britain of 28 Days Later [a 2002 
post-apocalyptic movie]. The reason they look so terrifying, is they were designed to be used 
in genuinely terrifying situations. Here is your state of exception, already in place: steel 
cordons which were purchased to deal with the unthinkable, to deal with a nuclear holocaust.  
 This kind of planning indicates how preparing for the ‘unthinkable’ (Bennet and Haggerty, 2011) is 
underpinned by an apocalyptic and dystopian vision of the future (Carr, 2010). For instance, while 
promoting its security operations, the South African government liberally used metaphors drawn from 
the science fiction genre to convey the futuristic nature of its equipment and technological resources. 
However, the choice of reference unintentionally conveyed an ambiguous message about the security 
measures. In 2008, the SAPS described the body armour purchased for the tournament as a  
... Robocop protective outfit [which] will be used in riot situations, and is made of black 
plastic. The hardened plastic shin guards, arm guards and gloves, together with helmets and 
bullet-proof vests will help protect police in the worst crowd control situations – even when 
criminals pelt them with petrol bombs (Joseph, 2008).  
While this was intended to display machine-like precision, the 1987 film Robocop which inspired the 
SAPS appellation is a violent satire of Reagan-era corporate greed and political bellicosity. Ironically, 
in light of criticisms of the government’s relationship with FIFA, in the film’s narrative the titular 
character is a product of a corporation which attempts to privatise the city of Detroit’s police 
department. In the Western Cape, the SAPS also piloted ten ‘war rooms’ designed to coordinate Cape 
Town’s CCTV systems in ‘places at risk’ (News 24, 2009), which unironically (Graham, 2010:70)  
used a term derived from Dr Strangelove, Stanley Kubrick’s 1963 black comedy film about  Cold 
War militarism and nuclear annihilation.    
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To promote the augmentation of its existing CCTV network, local government in Cape Town issued a 
press statement titled ‘Big Brother is making our City safer’ (Hamilton, 2010), while another 
communiqué noted, ‘Criminals beware: Big Brother is watching’ (City of Cape Town, 2010c). The 
reference to ‘Big Brother’ comes straight from the pages of George Orwell’s 1984 (1949), a 
nightmarish vision of a totalitarian state which is arguably the most famous literary dystopia of all 
time. But while the term ‘Orwellian’ has become cultural shorthand for the dangers of mass 
surveillance, the city’s press releases used one of the book’s central images as a positive term to refer 
to its ability to control crime.  
Security and Commercialism 
The previous chapters have argued that FIFA’s commercial interests were well served by the logic of 
war. Along with legitimating a political state of exception which protected the association’s branding 
rights, FIFA’s extractive project was complimented by existent techniques of urban pacification. As 
this section will argue, the policing operations at the 2010 World Cup display a further element of 
convergence as the association’s security preoccupations reveal a paranoid, anxious reading of urban 
space which mirrors wars on terrorism and crime. 
Dangerous platforms  
In South Africa, FIFA’s international management and its domestic representatives presented 
commercial violations as an invasive threat to the stability of the World Cup. While the police and 
military were testing out scenarios of criminals and terrorists hijacking planes and VVIPS, FIFA’s 
rights protection manager Mpumi Mazibuko said that ‘We plan to have teams in each of the cities 
looking out ... for brand hijackers. We protect the brand that is FIFA’ (Business Day, 2010). In order 
to prevent efforts to dilute the centrality of the FIFA brand, measures at stadiums included a ban on 
newspaper sales and restricted food and beverages to ‘neutral, clear’ packaging (ibid). FIFA 
marketing director Thierry Weil claimed that such measures were necessary to make sure that ambush 
marketing was not ‘harming anyone. ... We need to be strong. We need to protect our brand’ (ibid).  
FIFA representatives therefore presented commercial infringements as both opportunistic and 
criminal, with General Secretary Jerome Valcke telling a press conference that ‘You are in or you are 
out. ...We can send people to jail if they try and profit from the World Cup when they have no right to 
do so’ (Bloomberg News, 2010). Owen Dean (2007), of the domestically based Spoor and Fisher 
legal firm which represented FIFA’s intellectual property rights, wrote that:  
The main objective of Federation Internationale de Football Association  for the 2010 World 
Cup Tournament is to make it a success not only for the players, the football fans and the 
game of soccer, but also from a financial point of view and in particular for the sponsors of 
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the event. Sponsorship is an integral and essential part of a World Cup tournament and 
without the funds provided by sponsors the enormous costs involved in running an event such 
as a Soccer World Cup could not be met. FIFA therefore sets itself the goal of giving its 
sponsors value for money so that sponsors will continue to support the event in the future and 
thus make it viable. ... In consequence it behoves FIFA to strictly control and police the use of 
the Soccer World Cup as a promotional platform. FIFA must ensure that non-sponsors do not 
ride on the back of the World Cup and bask in its limelight to the detriment of the sponsors.  
At a later press conference, Dean also said that infringements would ‘be shown no mercy’ (Barnes, 
2010). Donovan Neale-May, executive of the director of the Chief Marketing Officer Council, which 
has offered to assist FIFA in ‘doing away with foul play in sports marketing’ (CMO Council, 2010) 
suggested that ambush marketing could have the same negative consequences for FIFA-associated 
brands as violent crime or terrorism:  
Connecting with consumers through passion-brands like sports franchises and events can have 
huge repercussions on brand image, value and promise should brand hijackers diminish or 
destroy customer trust. The goal of this programme will be to sensitise marketers to these 
threats and challenges.  
Moreover, the South African public was urged to be ‘sensitised’ to the ‘threat’ posed by ambush 
marketing. According to FIFA (2007:17), it was not the association’s responsibility to ‘illustrate every 
possible scenario of acceptable use’ and as a result local businesses were asked to ‘respect’ FIFA’s 
exclusive rights: ‘we trust that you will cooperate with FIFA’s requests’. The calls for societal 
vigilance were combined with the presentation of ambush marketing as an intrusive presence which 
could emerge at any size or scale, from large billboards to labels on bottles.  
FIFA’s fear about how the World Cup could be used as a platform for unlicensed commercial displays 
replicated the belief that political extremists would use the World Cup to ‘market’ their causes. As 
noted in Chapter Seven, Minister Mthethwa warned that groups aiming to use the World Cup as a 
platform to express political grievances could expect a harsh reaction: ‘any type of deviant behaviour 
be it criminality or terrorism will be dealt with swiftly and with no mercy’ (SAPS, 2010b). President 
Zuma also told striking public sector workers and taxi operators to not use the event as a political 
stage: ‘That is why I made the point [that] if you have visitors in your house you don’t start fighting in 
the house, particularly if you know the visitor is just here overnight’ (Reuters, 2010b).  
Security think tanks offered a similar rationale for the perceived susceptibility of the 2010 World to 
spectacular acts of terrorism. For Frans Cronje (2010b) of the SAIRR, the threat of terror revolved 
‘around the possibility that an al-Qaeda aligned movement may use the tournament as a platform upon 
which to launch a massive strike against a Western target in South Africa’. The NEFA foundation, an 
American based ‘terror research group’, offered that because of the ‘huge attention even a small 
attack would get during the tournament’ there was an ‘80 percent chance’ of ‘strike teams’ targeting 
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the hosting venue (Reuters, 2010c). Pundits even referred to the danger posed by al-Qaeda and ‘other 
franchises’ (Bryson, 2010).  
Although the intentions and effects of ambush marketing and violent political attacks are clearly very 
different, FIFA’s rights protection programme was based on a rendering of urban space comparable 
with counter-terror procedures. Both the association and the South African government viewed the 
World Cup as a potential site of risk, because it could bring attention to the causes and products of 
both commercial ‘enemies’ and dangerous political groups. Under this logic, the event was in an 
existential ‘condition of vulnerability ... perilously transparent and facing unprecedented assault by a 
proliferating range of mobile incursions, threats or ruptures‘(Graham, 2010:93). And, as with efforts 
to ‘educate’ the public about the risks of ambush marketing, this sense of threat was used to keep local 
businesses in a state of vigilance. But rather than looking for an elusive, ‘ill defined’ (ibid) enemy, 
they were asked to ‘respect’ FIFA’s (2007:17) intellectual property rights by policing their own 
behaviour and commercial aspirations. For example, an official fact sheet on ‘understanding’ 
commercial restrictions gave suggestions on the approach the public should adopt: ‘Most often, if you 
think that something you are planning may be considered ambush marketing, it probably is’ (City of 
Cape Town Partnership, 2009). This approach mirrored the police logic of the war on terror, in which 
‘because the suspect communities are always already among us, we are all under suspicion, all 
potentially guilty’ (Neocleous, 2011:204).  
However, it seems that even such exhaustive measures do little to prevent ambush marketing by large, 
well-funded corporate rivals. For instance, Nike the main footwear and apparel rival of official partner 
Adidas, garnered more online mentions on social networks and blogs in the lead-up to the tournament 
than official partners through a successful campaign which included sponsoring the kits of nine of the 
participating teams and using soccer icons such as David Beckham and Cristiano Ronaldo in its 
advertisements (Nielsen Wire, 2010). Furthermore, no amount of policing measures could insulate 
sponsors from negative publicity brought about through internal corporate practice. BP Africa reduced 
its tournament advertising due to the public fallout from its parent company’s responsibility for the 
Gulf of Mexico oil spill, the largest human-caused environmental disaster in US history: at the time of 
the tournament, millions of gallons of oil a day were leaking into the Gulf from the Deepwater 
Horizon rig (Notte, 2010).  
Contingency events 
The previous chapter observed that the security measures represented the cross-pollination of 
commercial and governmental interests, as policing operations and spatial restrictions responded to a 
consensual state-FIFA vision of idealised cities.  
194 
 
But while the micromanagement of mobile security zones served to fortify FIFA’s revenue stream, it 
simultaneously revealed the association’s institutional paranoia about both the potential loss of profit 
and violence from crowds. Under the host city by-laws, the association was empowered to declare all 
the routes to and from airports, training venues and designated hotels as ‘exclusion zones’ (The 
Mercury, 2009), thus effectively imposing commercial restrictions on all the major transport arteries 
of host cities. However, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that such a complete commercial 
ban was implemented during the World Cup. Instead, practical measures focused on the finely honed 
spatial control of FIFA-managed spaces within host cities. These cordons and restrictions around 
stadiums and other venues were geared for worst case scenarios. For example, the creation of remote 
search parks prevented unlicensed commercial material from entering the exclusion zone, but these 
were also used for the deployment of vehicle checks as countermeasures to improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) (SAFA, 2003a: 9.4.7) (Figure Nine)  
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Figure Nine: Security stop and search at the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium, May 2010  
 This was managed through a stringent, colour-coded perimeter system which required accreditation 
for drivers to move into different protection zones within stadium complexes (Berrong, 2010). FIFA 
also mandated an automated accreditation system which controlled access to ‘sky boxes’ and other 
executive suites. These restrictions were finely detailed so that for instance, emergency vehicles that 
had been ‘retained privately’ were not allowed to enter certain parts of the stadium (ibid). As one 
private security contractor explained,  
So if someone were to become ill, for example, and they’re in the general seating area of a 
95,000-person stadium or even in the sky boxes that are going to be available in some of the 
larger stadiums, that immediate response will be provided by the security and the 
[government’s] emergency medical services in the stadium. We have people that we’re 
providing protection for, if they become ill at some point, we are going to want to take control 
of that and get them to the hospital that ...we feel is most appropriate. That might not match 
up with what the government feels is most appropriate (ibid).  
FIFA included security warnings and lists of prohibited items and behaviour both on printed tickets 
and on signs outside stadiums. These included weapons and fireworks, interference with broadcasting 
equipment, ‘racist or xenophobic material’, umbrellas which could be used as missiles during crowd 
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violence, unlicensed commercial materials, ‘standing on seats’ and a general prohibition on all objects 
‘that could compromise public safety’. (Figures Ten and Eleven).  
Figures Ten and Eleven: Security checklists on official tickets and outside stadiums 
 
 
Partial List of Prohibited 
.""", -
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In particular, the security warnings parallel the ‘passage points’ found at airports throughout the 
world. In the wake of 9/11, this has seen both the ‘hardening’ of airport architecture, with 
sophisticated surveillance and scanners, and increased disciplinary warnings which attempt to 
‘immobilise’ threats before they can travel (Graham, 2010:137). As with the list of prohibited items 
found at ticket check-ins, this ‘encourages’ costumers to police their individual itineraries for 
dangerous and banned materials. In the same way in which everyday items, such as scissors and 
aerosol cans, are prohibited as potential weapons, FIFA’s restrictions included umbrellas, key ring 
laser pointers and helmets as instruments easily mobilised for crowd violence.  
FIFA’s anticipation of emergency is also suggested by the evidence that it pursued contingency plans 
for alternate hosting countries. While Sepp Blatter claimed that this would only be activated in the 
case of a massive natural disaster, LOC chairperson Irvin Khosa revealed the association was also 
prepared to relocate the event in the case of wide-scale civil unrest (Project 2010, 2008). As a pre-
emptive measure, the association identified three undisclosed countries as relocation sites (ibid).  
Along with regarding urban space as a hazardous concentration of risk, FIFA also presented its ‘war’ 
on commercial violations as part of a global struggle for security in an increasingly dangerous world. 
In the lead-up to the tournament, FIFA hired INTERPOL’s operation manager Chris Eaton as their 
new head of security. According to Eaton, the ‘criminal incursion’ of match-fixing syndicates has 
reached endemic proportions, which include syndicates planting a ‘double agent’ within the 
association during the World Cup: ‘In the worst case scenario, he would have had access to FIFA’s 
early warning system, or he would have known which games were being watched by FIFA 
investigators’ (Yusof and Singh, 2011). Eaton’s hiring was intended to signal that the association was 
adopting a tougher stance towards match fixing (Radnedge, 2012), but by 2012 he had left FIFA to 
join a mega-event security consulting firm in Qatar. His rapid hiring and exit prompted speculation 
among soccer journalists that match fixing was being used to detract attention from corruption within 
FIFA itself, but before leaving, Eaton claimed that the association needed to adapt a counter-terror 
approach to illegal betting: ‘We’d still be investigating 9/11 if we had investigated it internationally. 
You have national police operating within national confines but these are international activities 
which are very complex’ (Bloomberg News, 2012).  
Transnational Policing and the Private Security Sector  
Endless borders  
This international approach was also evident in the participation of foreign security services. As part 
of the shared state/FIFA project of controlling and monitoring mobilities in and out of South Africa, 
security procedures at the urban scale were joined by global interventions. Rather than a ‘blockading’ 
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of borders (Graham, 2010:132), participating foreign services linked pre-emptive measures within 
their territorial borders into the operations around and within South African cities. In January 2010, 
the UK government issued an order for 3,000 ‘soccer hooligans’ to hand in their passports (BBC, 
2010b), while immediately prior to the tournament, five ‘troublemakers’ were arrested in dawn raids 
in the English Midlands (Daily Mail Online, 2010b). The Department of Home Affairs posted ‘airport 
liaison officers’ at international hubs in Europe, Asia and Africa, and only six days into the 
tournament had already barred 79 ‘undesirables’, including registered sex offenders, from entering the 
country (BuaNews, 2010c).  
Neighbouring countries became part of a World Cup-related ‘energy security’ network, with  
neighbouring  SADC countries agreeing to reduce electricity use in order to provide surplus power to 
South Africa during both the Confederations Cup and the main tournament (Mogakane, 2009). 
Namibia reduced its electricity imports from South Africa and agreed to provide additional power in 
the event of a generative emergency (Weidlich, 2010).  
Such bilateral programmes worked to extend the security borders of the World Cup beyond South 
Africa’s territorial space and were intended to make foreign points of demarcation and key 
infrastructures the first line of defence in identifying and pre-empting risks. These security operations 
included efforts to ‘extend US homeland-security initiatives through world-wide systems’ (Graham, 
2010:135) through such key mechanisms as the Container Security Initiative  which is intended to 
create rigorous screening and security zones at foreign harbours before shipping reaches destinations 
in the United States. In 2003, Durban became part of the initiative, which substantially reduced public 
access to the harbour, and in the lead-up to the World Cup the South African Revenue Service  
created a Customs Border Control Unit modelled on the US Antiterrorism Contraband Enforcement 
Team (US Department of State, 2011). According to the US State Department, the efforts to improve 
monitoring within the Department of Home Affairs, such as the tracking systems implemented during 
the tournament, made South Africa a more effective partner in counter-terrorism initiatives (ibid). 
Such preparatory measures intensified South Africa’s links to the Department of Homeland Security’s 
attempts to create a US directed ‘global security envelope’ (Graham, 2010:135).  
Sharing pre-emption 
Simultaneously, the South African government used its greater integration into the US-initiated war 
on terror to strengthen its own capacities in the domestically situated war on crime. During the 
preparatory stage, the SAPS and SANDF received training from the State Department’s Antiterrorism 
Assistance (ATA) Programme (Engelbrecht, 2010a). These included joint training operations in which 
South African officers:  
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... received certificates of participation in a three-week training programme designed to 
enhance their ability to respond to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) materials in the run-up to the June-July World Cup. This 
course prepares the students to execute fundamental hazardous material and emergency 
management and response procedures that can mitigate loss of life in a weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) or hazardous material incident....Course topics and activities included a 
focus on human rights, trends in terrorism, explosive device awareness, toxic industrial 
chemicals and materials, CBR risk assessment and awareness, crime scene issues, chemical 
hazard detection and prediction, triage, search and rescue operations and equipment 
maintenance (ibid).  
The US also contributed $10,000 to the purchase of World Cup equipment, donated two CBRNE 
‘Rapid Response Trailers’ to the SAPS and specialised diving equipment to the Navy and orchestrated 
a ‘Tactical Management of Special Events’ training mission in February 2010 (ibid). Since the World 
Cup, regular training missions have continued with SAPS Special Task Force commandos practising  
‘crisis response skills for an urban environment’ in the USA, aimed at simulating ‘high risk 
confrontations with criminals and possible terror situations’ (ibid).  
These exchanges were part of broader efforts within the SAPS to create elite, paramilitary units. As 
noted in previous chapters, this has included a long-running series of training mission and exercises 
with the French gendarmes. In particular, the TRT units established by Bheki Cele were strongly 
influenced by the ‘gendarmerie ... model’ (Mthethwa, 2009). According to a draft Ministry of Police 
report on public order policing (Tait and Marks, 2011: 19), the French model was adopted because it 
allowed for a more confrontational response to public ‘disorder’. In particular, this offered ‘closer 
contact’, allowing for the ‘opportunity to restrain forward movement of the crowd and the possibility 
for snatchers to pick on certain individuals who are thought to be most provocative within the crowd’ 
(ibid).  
The SAPS sought foreign assistance in pre-emptive social surveillance and enrolled British authorities 
to share experience on distinguishing between acceptable and ‘undesirable’ crowd behaviour. British 
experts on hooliganism were deployed to assist SAPS officers monitor the behaviour of fans: 
according to Andrew Holt of the UK based Association of Chief Police Officers (APCO) their role 
was ‘not to police the English fans per se but to assist our South African colleagues to interpret the 
behaviour and mood of the English fans. They have different ways of celebrating and if you are not 
used to that, you might not know how to interpret it’ (Eaton, 2010). The LOC contracted the UK 
based Events Stewarding and Consultancy Ltd. to provide ‘international training qualifications in 
spectator security’ to stewards (Emita, 2010:3).  
Finally, the large-scale presence of private security companies in South Africa provided the LOC with 
a range of operators who could deliver the material and equipment necessary to secure venues against 
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potential disaster. A  LOC (2009) advertisement for the Confederations Cup a year before the World 
Cup highlighted some of these requirements and called for tender applications by:  
... established service providers in the security industry; service providers with ability to 
provide large quantities of speed fence, mobile fence and crowd barrier equipment; service 
providers with a comprehensive access control equipment rental solution and service 
providers to provide the services of static and VIP protection services . 
National and Urban Security 
The World Cup and the war on crime  
However, while the government promoted its efforts to secure against all conceivable threats, the zero 
tolerance rhetoric used by politicians and police officials gained some unwanted press. In 2009, 
foreign media outlets claimed that so-called ‘shoot to kill’ policies were being adopted because of the 
proximity of the World Cup. This was given credence by Kohler Barnard who suggested that the 
‘great fear that visitors will be harmed’ influenced an increasingly aggressive official stance on the 
use of violent force (Smith, 2009).  
But government officials had an inconsistent public position towards the controversies about ‘shoot to 
kill’. For example, after Fikile Mbalula told parliament that bystanders would be killed in ‘combat’ 
with criminals and added, ‘Shoot the bastards. Hard nut to crack, incorrigible criminals’, President 
Zuma said that: 
No police officer has permission to shoot suspects in circumstances other than those provided 
for by law. The law does not give the police a licence to kill... We have stated our position 
very clearly. It is the duty of the police to protect all people against injury or loss of life. But 
when their lives or the lives of innocent civilians are threatened, police sometimes have no 
choice but to use lethal force to defend themselves and others (IOL, 2009b). 
In response to the same statement, the Secretary of Police suggested that the media was 
misrepresenting SAPS violence: ‘Those shootings haven’t just started in the last couple of months. 
Over the last three years the Ministry has noticed an increased number of shootings of civilians by 
police officers. So I don’t think you can attribute those to what is being printed quite sensationally in 
the media’ (ibid). On the one hand, the government claimed that the use of deadly force was 
exclusively reserved for extreme circumstances in which officers and the general public were 
threatened by dangerous criminals. But on the other, officials presented ‘civilian’ loses as an 
acceptable consequence of ‘combat’ (ibid). Indeed, the Secretary of Police’s statement appeared to 
confirm that such ‘collateral damage’ had become an inescapable component of the war on crime.  
Conscious of the negative connotations that the publicity around ‘shoot to kill’ had for the World Cup, 
General Cele said that ‘The security forces will be supporting players, participants, fans and everyone 
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to enjoy the tournament as much as they can with the understanding that they are not there to fight a 
war’, and added that the SAPS were ready for ‘better and brighter’ preparations (Eaton, 2010). 
According to the SAPS, crowd control and contingency preparations were motivated by a ‘people 
orientated’ approach (Joseph, 2009). Minister Mthethwa also suggested that the media was 
overstating the significance of remilitarising the ranks, which he described as only one aspect of a 
broader strategy of being ‘fierce’ on criminals:  
Our approach in the fight against crime is anchored by and large in intelligence work, 
partnerships with communities, review of the Criminal Justice Systems and what we have 
done over the past few months and years. This is not aimed at alienating the police from the 
community, because we cannot win the war against crime without the community (Momberg, 
2010).  
Mthethwa’s comments suggest that the change in the ranking system was a ‘fierce’ and highly public 
component of a wider state project which also utilised penal sentencing, surveillance and intelligence 
gathering.  Souza (2011), Graham (2010) and Neocleous (2011) all suggest that militarisation is not 
exclusively about the application of military tactics or ideas to urban governance but is constituted 
through a pervasive blurring of civil/military boundaries. The statements provided above show how 
this metaphorical importation has been normalised in South Africa: citizens become ‘civilians’, 
policing becomes ‘combat’ and public governance becomes ‘war’. While the SAPS admitted that this 
has been an on-going development (IOL, 2009b), the following section aims to demonstrate that the 
governance measures for the World Cup, designed to ensure that ‘nothing would happen’ (Reuters, 
2010a), played an active part in entrenching the role of the police and military as linked ‘forces 
mobilised for internal securocratic wars’ (Graham,2010: 113).  
The ‘war’ for urban space 
Firstly, the proximity of the tournament gave officials an impetus to appear ‘tough’ on violent crime. 
In October 2006, the Gauteng provincial MEC for Safety and Security claimed that his province 
aimed to decrease crime by ‘7 to 10% a year ... this accumulative process will make a significant 
difference by the time of the World Cup’ (Daniels, 2007:59). In the same year, the government 
allocated an additional R3,5 billion ‘anti-crime budget’ to law enforcement agencies, which Finance 
Minister Trevor Manuel said would aid towards police recruitment and increasing ‘appropriate 
security’ during the tournament (ibid). According to the director general of government’s World Cup 
unit, Joe Phaahla, the event provided a ‘focused deadline for project completion’ (South Africa-The 
Good News, 2007:8) while Vish Naidoo, Senior Superintendent of the SAPS, promoted a ‘stronger 
police force ... we will have a significantly larger police service that is properly trained and ready to 
tackle the crime challenges that hosting the event will present’ (19).  
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Throughout the preparation and hosting periods, police officials maintained a publicly 
‘uncompromising’ stance. Cele said that ‘SAPS members will leave no stone unturned during the 
World Cup tournament to safeguard our visitors and fellow South Africans. We will continue to 
squeeze the space for criminals to zero hence we are ready to deliver a safe and secure World Cup not 
today, not tomorrow but yesterday’ (SAPS, 2010b), and the Minister of Police promised that 
aggressive policing would ‘smoke those who commit crime’ (Hosken, 2010).  
After the event, the police attributed the success of security preparations to their strategy of 
accelerating the on-going war on crime. The Deputy Minister of Police said that the World Cup was,  
... a catalytic imperative to transform the faces and facets of this country. … The legacy of 
this Word Cup will live with us forever. South Africa will never be the same again. … Our 
people, like the warriors, rose to the occasion … inspired by the spirit of great African 
warriors, Moshoeshoe, Shaka, Sekhukhune, Cetshwayo and King Sabata Dalindyebo … in 
defence of the motherland, in defence of mother Africa. … Our people are united as ever. 
Criminals have learnt that when we say ‘Wafa Tsotsi’ [meaning die gangster] we mean 
business. These factors are contributing favourably towards macro social stability, investment 
attraction, economic development and poverty busting (PMG, 2010c).  
Minster Mthethwa (SAPS Journal Online, 2010c) claimed that the police were aiming to maintain 
World Cup ‘best practices ... to deal a deadly blow to crime’. At a 2011 police rally, General Cele said 
that policing had entered into ‘the beginning of the new era in South Africa where criminals will not 
have a space, and the time has come for SAPS to show what it stands for .... We are going to embark 
on a vigorous mission to ensure that we stop criminals in their tracks like we did during the 2010 
FIFA World Cup’ (Mabotja, 2011).  
A central feature of this ‘uncompromising attitude’ has been the control of urban space. In particular, 
police officials presented the war on crime as form of urban combat which aimed at locating and 
eliminating criminals who operated by ‘blending in’ with the wider society (Graham, 2010:163). 
Ahead of the World Cup, Fikile Mbalula, told an ANC dinner that armed criminals had lost their 
rights as citizens and that ‘If you are a criminal and you are gun-toting, our message to law 
enforcement officers is clear, shoot to kill. We are going toe to toe, tooth for tooth, nail for nail. Street 
by street, corner to corner, we will find you’ (Miller, 2009). Along with promising that lunatic 
scoundrels’ would be met with ‘police fire’, Mthethwa (2010b) said the central message of his 
ministry was: 
The police force is ready. This is the message we shared with South Africans over the past 
year and we shall be articulating to our 2010 visitors. As they descend in our shores, we shall 
leave no stone unturned to guarantee their safety. Police will be everywhere, ready for any 
eventuality. This is the epitome of our security plan; we will cover every corner because we 
do not have any no-go-areas.  
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The reference to ‘no-go-areas’ referred to political violence in the 1980s and early 1990s. During 
political conflict between the ANC and the apartheid government-supported Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP), parties ‘blamed each other for establishing “no-go areas”, where members of the opposition 
entered under threat of intimidation, violence and death. This strongly polarized provincial black 
politics, with the conflict carrying all the characteristics of an undeclared civil war’ (SA History 
Online,2012), a phenomenon which in some areas of KwaZulu-Natal continued into the post-
apartheid period. Mthethwa’s relocation of this historical metaphor into the present implied that 
contemporary crime amounted to a comparable crisis, requiring drastic solutions to enforce spatial 
order. For Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, inner cities had to be ‘taken back’ from 
criminals: ‘Johannesburg has to be reclaimed  – inch by inch, street by street, block by block, level by 
level’ with a similar ‘spirit of the World Cup ... that of partnership’ (BuaNews, 2010d). 
The attempts to leverage a ‘combat’ model which could use space to control and pre-empt risks and 
disruptions thus became a central point of conceptual focus within government security planning. 
According to an SAPS presentation, operations aimed to create the ‘safety and sterility’ of 
tournament-related infrastructures and transport nodes by ‘implementing uncompromising security 
measures and limiting the probability of critical incidents occurring, and if they do, limiting the 
impact of such incidents through contingency planning by a multi-agency integrated approach by all 
relevant role players’ (Joint Oversight Report of the Portfolio Committees on Tourism and Home 
Affairs, 2010). At the specific level of airports, the NIA stated that ‘security in all areas required 
constant focus’ but, in particular, anticipated problems within these border spaces as including 
‘possible targeting of customs and immigration officials by syndicates, labour issues, loitering and 
passengers targeting by criminals’ (ibid).  
Enforcing pre-emptive control extended beyond the built environment of host cities and into nautical 
and aerial space. Under air defence protocols, ‘rules of engagement’ were established around stadiums 
allowing SAAF and SAPS aircraft to intercept and force down ‘aggressors’ (Kriegler, 2008:44). 
Security measures stretched even into the biological interstices of urban life. For example, the City of 
Cape Town spent over R200,000 in rat poison in one month, ‘targeting’ breeding areas around the 
stadium and fan sites (Cape Argus, 2010), while Port Elizabeth issued restrictions to ensure a clean 
supply of drinking water during the event (Sunday World, 2010) and distributed two million condoms 
to ensure ‘ultimate safety at the tournament’ (IOL, 2010d). Attention was also paid to fortifying 
electronic communications, evident in the supposedly ‘hacker proof’ quantum encryption system 
installed in Durban (Hennig, 2010). The spirit of pre-emption even crossed over into spiritual 
concerns, with the City of Cape Town hosting a ‘Cape Town for Jesus’ rally at the newly built 
stadium:  
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[The rally] will be attended by the Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille, and the 
Executive Mayor of Cape Town, Alderman Dan Plato. The City of Cape Town is however, 
not involved in the event. It is an initiative of the Body of Christ in Cape Town, and will 
focus on important issues surrounding the city and the World Cup™. It will involve prayers 
and blessings for the stadium, city, province, country and its leaders, as well as all those 
involved in the World Cup™, such as the emergency services and youth (Pollack, 2010).  
While the governments operations focused primarily on densely policed security zones, the national 
and local state marketed their ability to ‘leave no stone unturned’ (Mthethwa, 2010b) and to manage 
cities as a continuous ‘battlespace of linked operations (Blackmore, 2005). Pre-emptive measures 
permeated, from the transmission of disease to pest control to counter-measures against weapons of 
mass destruction: these initiatives had ‘no front and no back, no start and no end’ (Graham, 2010:31). 
Or as SAPS commanders put it ‘ there are no static borders’ (Pruis, 2011: 13). Graham (2010:175) 
argues that the US military has a ‘technophilic’ fascination with surveillance and targeting systems 
which appear to offer omnipresence over the urban battlespace. In the case of the World Cup, the 
government exhibited a comparable fascination with the importation of high-end security products 
into host cities.  
Safety through technology  
The press releases and media statements which accompanied the unveiling of security systems were 
infused with depictions of seamless functioning, total control and omnipotence. According to 
Lieutenant General Andre Pruis (2011:13) technology created a feeling of ‘police omnipresence’ and 
allowed the police to ‘make South Africa a very small country’. The King Shaka airport opened with 
the ‘best, latest security technology’ including X-ray machines ‘capable of detecting everything from 
drugs to bombs’ (News24,2010b), while in the wake of 2009 fears about a global ‘swine flu’ 
pandemic, new thermal imaging scanners were purchased for other airports (Ashbaugh, 2009). A 
particular focus was placed on automated technology, which included the purchase of remote-
operated bomb disposal equipment that ‘had proved itself in Iraq’ and ‘shows no fear’ (Smillie, 2008), 
which the SAPS unveiled at a shopping mall demonstration.  
Surveillance systems were upgraded and implemented through host cities as a pre-emptive measure. 
For example, according to the Limpopo MEC of Safety and Security, Dikeledi Magadzi,  
Criminals will have no place to hide. We are ready. The state-of-the art surveillance and 
monitoring system installed at the stadium will assist a great deal, as law enforcement 
agencies at the Venue Operation Centre will be able to detect potential crime even before it 
occurs and act decisively (Limpopo Business, 2010).  
An SAPS publication claimed the cumulative effect of these purchases was to provide ‘safety through 
technology’ (Nel, 2009: 39). Equipment such as the infrared cameras purchased for the SAPS air 
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wing, were touted as being as ‘effective as 25 police members operating on the ground in tracking a 
suspect’ (ibid) and capable of being  operational ‘24 hours a day, seven days a week’ (Erasmus,2008). 
These were seen to offer perpetual surveillance and monitoring of host cities and to provide ‘a close- 
in, continuous, always-on support’ (Graham, 2010:165) for policing operations.  
The belief that technology would create a seamless and pre-emptive ‘security blanket’ (SAPS Journal 
Online, 2010b) for the World Cup was encouraged by private security companies. One trade website 
claimed that as an international event, tourists would expect a wide diffusion of CCTV in host cities 
(ICT World, 2007) while the director of a domestic firm offered that ‘the international community 
expects South Africa to have CCTV surveillance in place ... CCTV is as vital to the success of the 
World Cup as the country’s plans for transportation, stadia and telecoms’ (Russell, 2009).  
Interoperability  
According to the government, the operation of such systems was intended to ‘link up with all nine 
provinces, ensuring real-time monitoring, collating and reporting on the roll out of ... [the security] 
plan as well as the occurrence of any incidents’ (SA Military Health Service, 2010:39). A key concept 
within the mobilisation was the ‘interoperability’ of different government departments. A defence 
report by the government funded Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (Le Roux, 2008) 
suggested that simulation missions ahead of the tournament demonstrated how interoperable 
functioning was expected to work.  These missions coordinated practices for both civilian and defence 
air control, which included the Air Force using the same radar sites as commercial air hubs (ibid). The 
air exercises were coordinated with off-shore frigates and security ‘elements on the ground’: 
In addition to air situation awareness, tracking of land-based mobile resources are also done 
by the police, army and emergency services. These include tracking of individuals by the 
police, army and emergency services, both within vehicles or dismounted, or vehicles 
themselves ... virtual threats have been injected into real world systems, to prepare and refine 
systems for coordinated, complex exercises (ibid).  
Military and police management both described interoperable missions at the World Cup as a testing 
ground for future operations. According to a SANDF Brigadier General:  
So far, Operation Kgwele has been a huge success. People want to feel safe in the knowledge 
that somewhere someone is taking care of their well-being. They want to know that the 
SANDF as their shield has the capacity, technology and know-how to control who enters our 
country at harbours, airports and border posts (Rakoma, 2010:18).  
For Lieutenant General Andre Pruis of the SAPS: 
The joint interoperability of the security organs of the State and Government Departments is a 
moment in our history that demonstrated our ability to come together to put the country’s 
interest first. ... The vast majority of our security forces deployed for the soccer spectacle 
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were trained to deal with unruly crowds, hooliganism as well as specialised units responsible 
for airspace control, counter terrorism and maritime safety (19).  
Referring to the apartheid government’s wars in Angola and Nambia, one member of the SAAF told a 
defence conference that the World Cup was to be ‘the biggest command and control deployment in 
the history of the Defence Force…That’s inclusive of the Bush War’ (Szabo, 2009). However, this 
was described as a ‘security rather than a defence operation’, in which SANDF supported the police in 
‘non-traditional’ tasks, such as transporting SAPS personal in the incident of civil unrest, disaster 
management and preventing ambush marketing and ‘people with a cause’ from disrupting the event 
(ibid).  
This evidence suggests that interoperability during the World Cup went beyond streamlining 
communications and deployments. The use of the SANDF in the support capacity of internal security 
rather than external defence is indicative of a convergence of law enforcement and military 
operations, in what Graham describes as the parallel militarisation of the police and ‘policisation’ of 
the military (Graham, 2010:96). With reference to World Cup operations, police officials referred to 
the SAPS, SANDF, state intelligence and the emergency services as combined ‘security forces’ with 
integrated tasks (NATJOINTS, 2008b, Mthethwa,Mbalula and Cele, 2010) while preparatory 
exercises saw the police and military operate in tandem.  
The SANDF identifies such joint, interdepartmental and multinational (JIM) operations and exercises 
as one of its key areas of strategic focus. The army describes internal deployments such as World Cup 
operations as part of an on-going ‘partnership’ with the SAPS through its ‘Support the People’ sub-
programme (Department of Defence, 2010:81). In particular this has focused on deployments at major 
events. In the build-up to the World Cup, SANDF was used in a support capacity at the 2009 
Presidential Inauguration, the IPL tournament, the Confederations Cup, the World Cup final draw and 
the opening of Parliament in 2010 (81).  
Subsequent to the World Cup, the Minister of Defence (Sisulu, 2011:7) has suggested that ‘non-
traditional forms of insecurity’ such as cross-border crime requires a future repositioning of the 
internal role of the military (6). She has argued that the military must take a more assertive role in 
ensuring the conditions for economic and social development, ‘alongside the traditional primary and 
secondary functions of defence’ (7).   Furthermore, Brigadier General Les Lombard of the SAAF, 
claimed that the example of the World Cup indicates that military personal and equipment can serve 
as a major asset in the police’s war on crime:  
The police force do not have the ability to troop and rapidly place the reaction forces, whether 
it be the task force or the national intervention forces in numbers, their helicopters don’t have 
the carrying capacity, so the [SAAF] Oryxes play a huge role in rapidly locating these forces 
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to a crime scene or as a prevention to a crime scene or roadblocks or whatever the case may 
be. ... And then there’s the Koiler aircraft with its reconnaissance capability. For poaching, for 
activities in the game reserves, for crime, even traffic management, you name it. With such 
ability to video footage in the different formats and to downlink it in real time to a ground 
station is brilliant, it really gives a commander a very strong capability. What we learnt was 
the close cooperation with the different state departments. You cannot supply safety and 
security as a single state department. You have to work very, very closely with the South 
African Police force, the intelligence services, Home Affairs, SARS [South African Revenue 
Service] and ACSA. All those role players had to work in an integrated manner and during 
this World Cup we showed what could be done if those departments worked together (Szabo, 
2010).  
Within the SAPS itself, much of the World Cup preparations focused on training paramilitary units to 
respond to ‘medium to high risk’ situations. Falling under the Operational Service, these units are 
used to ‘stabilise tense situations when normal policing is not enough’ and to carry out dangerous 
‘operations that fall outside of the scope of classic policing’ (SAPS, 2011a.). The TRT, which was 
established in the lead-up to the World Cup, was trained in  ‘weapons phase, urban phase, rural phase, 
operational simulations, unarmed combat (every day during training), advanced crowd management’ 
(SAPS Journal Online, 2009b), to engage in ‘crime combatting’, restoring ‘public order’ and policing 
at major sporting events (ibid). The TRT was intended to be a permanent legacy of the World Cup 
preparations and by the end of 2009 units were established in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, 
Port Elizabeth, Nelspruit and Durban (LOC, 2010). According to the police the TRTs were intended 
to serve as paramilitary ‘boots on the ground’ to ‘ hunt down criminals’ and  to maintain public order: 
‘These teams are important because the criminals must know we are coming for them hard and fast, 
and residents and visitors to our city must know they will be safe ’ (Hosken, 2009).  
But while these operational forces are designed to operate in civil spaces, their tactics and weaponry 
are military orientated. At a joint training mission with the army, which simulated a World Cup 
hostage scenario, members of the Special Task Force and TRT used army Inyala vehicles, stun 
grenades and Heckler & Koch MP5 submachine guns to ‘assault’ a terrorist ‘target’ (Engelbrecht, 
2010b). Police management were reticent about divulging the exact calibre and size of weaponry 
accessible by these elite units: ‘some weapons and tactics were not being publicly displayed to retain 
security and surprise ... it was taken as granted that potential adversaries would be studying media 
reports and pictures of such events to gauge their opponents‘ (ibid). (Figure Twelve). 
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Figure Twelve: Joint SAPS and SANDF training mission 
Targeting inward 
But the post-World Cup period shows the attendant dangers of applying such assault tactics in 
ordinary policing. Video evidence captured the Gauteng TRT engaged in a military style campaign 
after civil unrest in a township near Johannesburg, including torture and door-to-door raids (Sobiso, 
2011), while the media also acquired CCTV footage of TRT members attacking bar patrons in the city 
(Van Wyk, 2011). The Mpumalanga division has also faced a lawsuit for allegations of severe 
brutality (Moselakgomo, 2012). According to a witness from the province, ‘this TRT is treating every 
member of the community as a criminal and they have harmed even the innocent’ (ibid).  
This mounting evidence suggests that such units can rapidly be targeted inward, with urban publics as 
the main enemy (Graham, 2010: 96). While the police have justified both the preparations for the 
World Cup and the wider militarisation of the service as a response to the dangers posed by armed 
criminals and terrorists, the rhetoric and preparatory tactics used by officials reflected a pronounced 
fear about the public as a potential threat. Such statements as Nathi Mthethwa’s claim that the police 
would ‘show no mercy’ to criminal actions ‘disguised’ as demonstrations (SAPS, 2010b) ominously 
implied that the ‘security forces’ would determine the legitimacy of political protest. Furthermore, the 
violent crowd control scenarios tested out ahead of the event (Joseph, 2009) imagined the public as 
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enraged mobs, ready to fight tooth and nail with the police. While the tournament’s security 
acquisitions were explained as augmentations to the war on crime, much of the itinerary list, which 
included body armour, water cannons and surveillance equipment, is explicitly geared towards 
quelling public disturbance. For example, water cannons were equipped with a special blue dye used 
for the identification and arrest of ‘hooligans’ (Liebenluft, 2008). In 2011, the police unveiled a new 
Public Order Policy (POP) which cited the event acquisitions as providing the equipment base for 
‘meaningful and aggressive implementation’ (Lukani, 2011).  
This also suggests that the SAPS are anticipating a future in which controlling ‘dangerous’ public 
demonstrations is an increasingly central task of policing. In 2005 (SAPS Strategic Management: 23-
24), the police drafted a series of future scenarios aimed at ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and 
‘neutralising and/or preventing the prospects of the undesirable scenarios taking root’ .While it 
imagined positive scenarios in which the country experienced economic growth and social cohesion, 
it also anticipated increased political tension, inequality and conflict ‘placing a high burden on the 
SAPS to maintain public order’ (ibid). Another scenario foresaw a major international depression, 
characterised by domestic marginalisation of the poor, a ‘high crime wave and lawlessness’ (ibid). 
The plan also rejected a scenario in which the country was less economically wealthy but more 
socially unified as ‘tolerable but undesirable’ (ibid). Notably, these imagined futures suggest that the 
chief role of the SAPS is to protect the current capitalist model from social disorder and ‘lawlessness’.  
Outcomes 
The war on crime continues  
However, it would appear that in the period the following the World Cup, it is the SAPS who have 
gained a popular reputation for lawlessness, as the service has increasingly been beleaguered by 
corruption scandals and mounting evidence of systemic violence and brutality. As a result, incidents 
which reveal epidemic police violence throughout the country presents many of the ‘people centred’ 
World Cup preparations and operations in a new light.  
For example, in early 2010, the provincial government in KwaZulu-Natal launched an ‘offensive 
against Durban criminals’ (Mchunu, 2010). According to the MEC for Safety, Willies Mchunu: 
We want Durban to be a liberated zone as a host city for the 2010 Soccer World Cup. Our 
approach will be focused and targeted. .... What I can safely say is that life is going to be very 
tough for criminals. All key elements of the plan have been finalised. We have enough 
resources, and abundance of political will. We will win this war in as short a time as possible. 
As criminals feel the heat in Durban, we will be waiting for them in Pietermaritzburg. As they 
go into hiding in the rural areas, they will find us there. There is no room for error. No room 
for complacency. Criminals must surrender or face the fire (ibid).  
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Notably after the attacks on the Abahlali movement in 2009, Mchunu also claimed that the Kennedy 
Road informal settlement in Durban had been ‘liberated’ (Mchunu, 2009). Furthermore, apart from 
the apparent official sanction for political violence against the perceived enemies of the local state, 
policing in KwaZulu-Natal has very recently come under increased scrutiny over allegations of 
extrajudicial executions. In early 2012, the Cato Manor Organised Crime Unit was shut down, and 
several high-ranking provincial police officials were suspended, due to an on-going investigation 
which has implicated the Unit in at least 51 ‘suspicious’ deaths going back to 2009, including the 
execution of murder and robbery suspects (Hofstatter, Wa Africa and Rose, 2012). While the SAPS 
initially claimed that these deaths were the result of high risk standoffs with armed criminals, 
evidence presented in a national newspaper suggests that in most cases the victims were killed in 
custody or at home. Witness have even alleged that the Unit fabricated evidence of a shootout after 
ambushing ‘taxi boss’ Magojela Ndimande with assault rifles (Hofstatter, Wa Afrika and Rose,2011). 
While national police command has maintained that the incidents were the work of a ‘rogue elements’ 
within the SAPS, these killings occurred simultaneously with the promotion of ‘fight fire with fire’ 
rhetoric. 
The allegations about the Cato Manor ‘death squad’ came alongside a series of unfolding scandals 
which have linked the remilitarisation of the SAPS to a systemic problem of police violence against 
the public. In the period leading up to the World Cup, deaths in police custody and registered 
complaints of assault and torture reached their highest levels in over a decade (Rawoot, 2011). In 
April 2011, the SAPS gained international attention when footage of Ficksburg community activist 
Andries Tatatane being beaten and fatally shot by officers during a municipal protest was screened on 
national television. The police ministry again blamed the killing on ‘rouge officers’ in the service, 
while Minister Mthethwa warned ‘civilians’ to ‘not provoke or insult the police’ (Keehn and Peacock, 
2011). This suggests that the promotion of a militaristic and hyper-masculine institutional culture in 
the police has served to estrange and set the SAPS in opposition to the public (ibid).  
The SAPS’s reputation has also been further damaged by the 2011 suspension of Bheki Cele on 
allegations of maladministration of public funds, which made him the second consecutive 
commissioner to be removed from his position as a result of corruption charges. The violence which 
has been associated with remilitarisation is paralleled by other post-tournament developments in the 
‘security forces’, which suggest that the government is moving in an increasingly authoritarian 
direction. Under the Zuma administration, the intelligence services have attempted to increase their 
powers of surveillance and control, which has included attempts to pass a sweeping Protection of 
State Information Bill, which under the rubric of ‘national security’ would substantially restrict public 
access to government information and documentation. Activists have also claimed that they have been 
subjected to increased surveillance by the SAPS crime intelligence division, including the creation of 
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a national list of identified individuals whose presence at marches results in a heightened police 
presence (Unemployed People’s Movement, 2012). Internal deployment of the military has also 
increased, with soldiers going on joint patrols with the SAPS and performing crowd control at protests 
(de Vos, 2012).  
President Zuma has defended his administration’s policing policy, citing a victimisation survey 
conducted by Statistics South Africa which suggests that 40% of surveyed households believe that 
levels of crime have decreased since 2008 (Hartley,2012). However, while the same report indicates 
that 60% of respondents were satisfied with the conduct of police in their residential areas, 66% of 
households felt that social and economic development is a more effective way of reducing crime than 
increased law enforcement (Statistics SA, 2011:1-3).  
In the wake of Tatane’s death, and several other incidents of fatalities at protests, the Ministry of 
Police has drafted a new Public Order Policy, which as noted above, is reliant upon equipment 
purchased for the World Cup. Some commentators have suggested that the experience of the World 
Cup offers a model for more civil forms of crowd control. At an ISS organised conference on public 
order policing in October 2011, a former SAPS brigadier argued that the equipment and training 
received for the World Cup could be used to install a more human rights-based approach to crowd 
control, speculating that ‘South Africa will see Arab Spring type protests within three years’ (Martin, 
2011). At the same conference, which was also attended by a US diplomat and representatives from 
the Nigerian national security forces, Mthethwa (2011b) said that in the post-apartheid period the 
SAPS could no longer act to suppress political opposition. However, his presentation overwhelmingly 
focused on the potentially violent dimensions of public protest, and cited techniques applied at the 
World Cup such as ‘command and control’, road blocks and security cordons as methods of ‘ensuring 
that citizens express themselves without provocations between police and citizens’ (ibid).  
However, the police interpretation of ‘provocation’ is open to abuse as authorities may capitalise on 
accusations of criminality to delegitimise oppositional groups. An example involving the use of 
World Cup equipment occurred in Cape Town in January 2012, when municipal officials falsely 
claimed that a ‘People’s Land, Housing and Jobs Summit’ or ‘Occupy the Commons’ was the pretext 
for a land invasion of the public Rondebosch Common (Sacks, 2012). The actual event saw a small 
group of protesters met by a much larger contingent of police in which ‘Robocop’ body armour and 
water cannons with the tracking blue dye purchased for the tournament were used together with mass 
pre-emptive arrests and armoured personal carriers to break up the gathering. All charges were later 
dropped (Take Back the Commons Movement, 2012). Despite the SAPS’s efforts to improve their 
image, the methods used to manage crowds often undermine the claims made of a citizen centred 
approach. Mthethwa even suggested that because of historically rooted ‘sensitivities’, South Africa’s 
212 
 
population was too sceptical of the police’s ability to implement crowd control with ‘the human 
touch. ... People criticise us for using water cannons. We have introduced those techniques because 
that’s not your maximum force. But you’ll hear people criticising that, saying these things were used 
under apartheid’ (Ngalwa, 2012:2).  
The future 
The application of World Cup procedures since 2010 also highlights the international dimensions of 
what Peters (2011) has described as ‘crisis management’  in which security forces are instrumental in 
enforcing order in ‘post-growth’ economies in the wake of the on-going global financial crisis. The 
United Nations Cop 17 climate conference, which was held at the International Convention Centre 
(ICC) in Durban in 2011, illustrates some of the dynamics which link the militarised command and 
control measures used at the World Cup with wider ruptures in global politics and economics.  
The policing measures deployed by SAPS at the conference replicated the previous year’s operations. 
The ICC was declared an accreditation controlled UN ‘blue zone’ while the SAPS, supported by the 
SANDF, Metro Police and local emergency services, increased visible policing throughout the city 
‘red zone’ (Yeld,2011), which included the temporary reactivation of the special courts system (IOL 
SciTech,2011). The NATJOINTS structure was used again with heighted security at airports and 
harbours and the drafting of contingency plans for CBRNE attacks: according to Minster Mthethwa 
‘We are under no illusion of the magnitude of COP17, particularly having successfully hosted the 
2010 FIFA World Cup, but neither are we under any pressure to prove anything to the world’ (SAPS 
Journal Online, 2011). The SAPS’s official press release on security plans even reused statements that 
had been made by Mthethwa during the  lead-up to the World Cup, such as, ‘we will cover every 
corner because we do not have any no-go-areas’ and ‘Police will not tolerate criminal acts that are 
disguised as demonstrations, which in some cases include destruction of property and intimidations. 
We will unapologetically deal with such criminal acts decisively and we require no permission from 
anyone’ (ibid). During the conference, it was alleged that the municipal government  had hired agent 
provocateurs to attack members of the DLF and,‘In spite of heavy police presence throughout the 
march, including mounted police, riot police, air-patrol ... snipers and requests to address this 
disruption, police did not take any action’ to stop the disturbance (Tolsi, 2011).  
Inside the ICC itself, governments and NGO’s failed to find binding agreements to reduce carbon 
emissions before global temperatures reach a catastrophic two degrees centigrade increase, which 
would lead to sea level rises, crop failures, the extinction of animal species and water shortages. As 
one scientist at the conference put it,  
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While governments avoided disaster in Durban, they by no means responded adequately to 
the mounting threat of climate change. The decisions adopted here fall well short of what is 
needed. It’s high time governments stopped catering to the needs of corporate polluters, and 
started acting to protect people (Lenferna, 2011).  
As another attendee observed, the ICC functioned as an ‘air-conditioned’ fortress in which some of 
the world’s largest corporate polluters attempted to ‘greenwash’ their involvement in contributing 
towards potentially catastrophic global warming (Durbach, 2011).  
The images of police in ‘Robocop’ armour throughout Durban and snipers above the street level are a 
stark reminder of what Graham (2010:382-3) suggests is the illusory nature of military urbanism 
(Figure Thirteen). While the police and military were put on high alert to protect the conference from 
the threat of disruptive protests, it is arguable that the real existential threat came from inside the 
building, as political and economic elites failed to take decisive action to pre-empt environmental 
catastrophe. While the extent of the militarisation of urban space at such events is exceptional, it is 
also conceivable that as economic and ecological conditions worsen throughout the world, such 
operations in which  state security forces are linked in with other government departments to become 
a machine of pre-emption, targeting and social control will find an intensified application in 
‘ordinary’ policing.  
 
Figure Thirteen: SAPS officers with ‘Robocop’ armour at COP 17, Durban, 2011 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the militarisation of urban security in South Africa goes beyond changes 
in ranks and the official promotion of ‘shoot to kill’ and entails a policing logic based on pre-emption 
and continual anticipation of risk. Following Hansen  (2006:282), it can be proposed that the deaths of 
protesters at the hands of the police and the sophisticated, ‘world class’ assaults simulated by elite 
forces ahead of the 2010 World Cup are supplemental parts of a wider governmental approach 
towards ‘civilian’ space.  
However, while it is clear that state policing in South Africa has taken an authoritarian, militaristic 
turn, this should not be understood in isolation from international developments. It has often been 
suggested that internationally-tested policing models can modernise and democratise the SAPS. For 
example, at the ISS conference on public order policing in October 2011, Dianne Kohler Barnard 
(2011), claimed that the police had fallen behind in the ‘scientific’ methods that are ‘the focus of 
national training in many parts of the world’. But within a month of that conference, police 
departments in the USA, coordinated through the Department of Homeland Security, initiated a 
violent series of clampdowns on ‘Occupy’ protests in 18 cities. In the same week, hundreds of 
protesters in Cairo, demanding an end to the military generals’ ‘hijacking’ of the Egyptian revolution, 
were attacked with US-manufactured weapons and chemical agents. 
According to Graham (Interviewed by Democracy Now, 2011) these clampdowns represented an elite 
fear about the wave of protests in public space, often coordinated through the internet, which occurred 
throughout the world in 2011: 
 .. political and military power is controlled by people who see cities purely as threats, purely as sites 
of unrest, sites that need strong military and security control ... in a world where we have a really 
radical crisis and a radical sense of illegitimacy for the social model that we’re all still having to live 
under.   
 
Two month after the police actions in the United States, local government in Cape Town used 
comparable tactics when responding to the attempts to ‘occupy’ public space at Rondebosch 
Common.  At the least, this suggests that international moves towards paramilitary internal policing 
reinforce historically embedded militarism with the SAPS (Samara, 2005)  
However, as this chapter has argued, militarisation does not exclusively emerge from the state 
security apparatus. The underside of the elite consensus on world class cities, identified in the 
previous chapter is a fearful, even paranoid rendering of urban space. Most notably, FIFA applied 
concepts gleaned from counter-terrorism to police commercial infractions. While the government 
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tried to argue that security concerns were overstated, if not generated by an underlying racism and 
‘afro pessimism’, the security services’ constant reassurance that it was prepared to deal with all 
threats implied that the World Cup was in some way menaced by a demonology of armed criminals 
and of opportunistic terror cells eager to prey on naïve tourists. The combination of assurance with 
‘the seeding of anxiety’ (Graham, 2010: 147) reinforces military urbanism by generating an 
implacable sense of fear: no city can ever be ‘secure’ enough and no policing measures can ever be 
‘comprehensive’ enough to defeat a world of anticipated horror.  
In this sense, security becomes self-radicalising as ‘criminality, protest marches, strikes or riots’ are 
conceived a symptoms of a wider, permanent disorder which demands combat’ (Souza, 2011:4). This 
is reinforced by a wider political and social consensus which has normalised the concept of internal 
wars against crime. As evidenced in the case of the World Cup, while opposition political parties and 
academic specialists may be critical of the remilitarisation of police, they enthusiastically embraced 
the militarisation of the tournament as a model worthy of future emulation in the on-going war on 
crime (Politicsweb, 2011).  
The logic of war which is translated through international exchanges and consolidated across 
governments and the private sector is mobilised around protecting sites and events of value from 
anticipated threat, particularly pertinent in an era of growing inequality and social turmoil within 
cities. It can therefore be offered that the 2010 World Cup showed how South African cities are at the 
forefront of these developments. On one hand, national and urban authorities were financially wealthy 
enough to sponsor and manage large-scale infrastructural developments and comprehensive 
governance measures. But this occurred in tandem with the expansion of a state security apparatus 
increasingly preoccupied with pre-empting and containing social disruptions in a society characterised 
by structural unemployment and inequality. 
While coercive measures were constrained by the considerations of international image, the World 
Cup was used both to restock arsenals and to experiment with the containment and sanitisation of 
urban space as part of a wider reconfiguration of state security. Arguably, the heightened climate of 
repression in South Africa reflects government’s unspoken fear of losing control over a potentially 
volatile powder keg of structural inequality. The advantage of the military urbanism thesis is that it 
highlights the global dimension of developments in South Africa, which have for the most part been 
understood in isolation as a response to the national crime situation. Graham’s work allows for a 
contextualisation of post-apartheid urban security as more than just the continuation of historical 
practice in the present. Rather the entrenchment of the politics of fear has kept apace with 
international developments.  
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Indeed, when applied in the South African context, the military urbanism thesis may entail more of a 
shock of recognition, than of novelty. Centuries of segregated urban development and a long history 
of internal militarisation and pacification were central facets in the creation of an advanced capitalist 
country with networks of wealth overlapping on poverty and repression. The preoccupation of 
colonial and apartheid authorities with movement, control and containment are revisited within the 
security logic of world class planning and events, creating a generalised extension of parallel global 
‘green’ and ‘red’ zones within cities and states (Graham, 2010: 261).  
However, it seems unlikely that a resurgence of socially directed ‘state provision and control’ 
(Graham, 2010:381) can arrest these processes. If anything, the militarisation of urban space is 
mediated and financed through state intervention. Furthermore, as the case of South Africa 
demonstrates, security forces often couch increased militarisation within Keynesian rhetoric. As 
shown in this chapter, SANDF officials have called for a greater role in creating the conditions for 
socio-economic development while SAPS strategic documents discuss an extended war on crime as 
part of the objectives of a ‘developmental state, where crime has severe consequences particularly on 
our ability to deliver programmes to our people’  (SAPS Strategic Management,2010b:2 ) 
For Neocleous, this combination of militarisation and developmental programmes is expressive of the 
underlying structure of capitalist order, in which social safety nets and zero tolerance coexist. As the 
preparations for the World Cup demonstrated, ‘security’ encompasses everything from the quotidian 
to the unthinkable. While the concept of pacification provides a philosophical pivot with which to 
demystify the political and economic drives behind security (and insecurity), Neocleous may 
overestimate the extent to which elites control the ‘meaning’ of security, and downplays how 
securitisation capitalises on legitimate concerns for public safety.  Souza’s work provides a key 
element in that he highlights how fear is used to entrench militarisation. In particular, 
‘phobopolisation’ is seductive, in that appears to offer aggressive, result-orientated solutions to 
feelings of widespread social anxiety. However, this entrenches a Hobbesian view of cities in which 
even sporting festivals are accompanied by anxious preparation for catastrophe. This ‘socio-
psychological’ (Souza, 2011:5) atmosphere of fear lingered over the tournament. For instance, it is 
noticeable that in a different context the stadiums, with their access control, fencing and large 
deployment of police could function as internment camps. Security reveals that, to paraphrase the 
novelist JG Ballard, under the overlit dream of mega-events lies an ambiguous realm of nightmare 
presided over by twin leitmotifs of spectacle and paranoia (Ballard, 1995:4).  
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Conclusion 
Mr President, on Thursday you outlined an infrastructure plan that represents a bold, strategic 
and integrated platform to mobilise the state, private investors and the South African public 
behind a clearly articulated storyline of South Africa’s opportunities..... We identified what 
worked well – such as a 2010 World Cup special law to fast-track regulatory issues – and 
what did not work well – such as cost-over-runs. Above all, the lessons are to have a clear 
project scope, with binding time-frames and clearly identified responsibilities – who does 
what, by when, with what resources – and to solve problems expeditiously when they occur.  
– Minister of Economic Development Ebrahim Patel, 14 February 2012. 
Introduction  
In the speech cited above, which responded to President Zuma’s 2012 State of the Nation Address, 
Minister Patel described the ‘project management’ experience of the World Cup as an example of the 
government’s future approach to infrastructural and development programmes. This chapter will 
argue that Patel’s description of ‘strategic’ projects which mobilise the state, the private sector and the 
public behind a ‘clearly articulated storyline’ is equally applicable to a critical understanding of the 
2010 World Cup security measures and operations.  
This conclusion has three primary aims. It intends to return to the original research question and offer 
a final perspective on the securitisation and militarisation of the tournament in South Africa, framed 
against the international context outlined in the theoretical framework. Secondly, it is intended to 
highlight the implications of this research for the study of policing and security, both in South Africa 
and internationally. Finally, it will offer suggestions for further research. 
From policing to security  
Chapter One began by contrasting theories which deal with the construction of security with the 
narrow focus of the available literature on the 2010 FIFA World Cup. It was maintained that academic 
work on the topic had concentrated almost entirely on two areas. Firstly, it discussed the practical 
issues of deployments such as budgets, personal numbers and the potential long-term applicability of 
equipment purchases to the war on crime. However, despite being presented as a dispassionate 
examination of the special challenges of hosting such a wide-scale event, this was underlain by a 
series of unchallenged assumptions about security. Notably, researchers cohered around a series of 
linked ideas: that it was imperative for the South African government to assure the highest level of 
security and that the World Cup was an exception for which the ‘normal rules’ of policing were 
inadequate. This approach focused on security as a sui generis area of importance.  
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Secondly, despite differences in emphasis, with some writers being more sceptical of the 
government’s security capacity than others, this body of work was overwhelmingly skewed towards 
the role and actions of the South African state. The extent to which security operations were 
determined by FIFA’s commercial projects was underplayed in favour of accounts of how the SAPS, 
with the assistance of other government departments, planned to secure the event. This reflected the 
belief that security is an apolitical social good and that the role of academic research is to identify 
how best the state can ‘deliver’ this ‘service’, and ignored the repressive and exclusionary facets of 
both security discourse and practice. Indeed, in conflating disparate phenomenon such as street crime, 
political violence and popular ‘unrest’ as ‘threats’, this research neatly dovetailed with and reiterated 
the total security planning espoused by the government.  
Such a narrow focus left two major research lacunas. Firstly, it served to present ‘national security’ as 
an area of risk management distinct from commercial concerns and assumed that the militarisation of 
the tournament was an inescapable result of living in an increasingly dangerous, unpredictable world. 
A key component was the presentation of ‘world class’ practices as a cynosure for the ‘war on crime’ 
in South Africa. This missed an opportunity to explore the political ramifications of the state security 
forces working as a delivery system to manage FIFA’s commercial product.  
Notably there was an almost complete silence on parallel security trends within the country such as 
the overt remilitarisation of the SAPS and the more subtle moves towards increasingly fortified urban 
space. As described in Chapter Six, van der Spuy (2010) and Cornelissen (2011) presented more 
sophisticated surveys of the securitisation of the tournament, which at least gestured toward facets of 
space and exclusion. However, in choosing to focus on the applicability of legacies as a barometer of 
success, both these accounts assumed that the expansion of state power is an a priori good. This 
reflected a latent conservatism in which crime and security threats are conceived as forms of 
‘disorder’ which require a reassertion of the authority of the state. For Cornelissen (3226), much of 
crime in post-apartheid South Africa ‘stems from the context of civil disobedience formented by the 
anti-apartheid liberation ideology of the 1970s and 1980s, which in the contemporary era has evolved 
into a widespread questioning of authority and more sinisterly, an endemic culture of social violence’.  
In contrast, Chapter One offered a series of philosophical perspectives which view security as a 
political technology of reproducing and fortifying order, which is structured by underlying material 
concerns and political power. This goes beyond the intricacies of state policing and into wider 
projects of social and spatial control. In particular, Neocleous (2007) argues that the critical potential 
of mainstream security studies is constrained by a ‘myth of balance’ which attempts to negotiate 
between democratic freedoms and the apparently urgent requirements of national security which 
necessitate restrictions on liberty. However, this doctrine of national security is itself a form political 
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power, used to legitimate all forms of state control through an ideological conflation between the 
people and the state (137). Security is the first principle of the modern liberal democratic state, 
leaving little ‘defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, as long as they are 
constructed in the name of security’ (143).  
As a consequence of this historical argument, Neocleous argues that the contemporary philosophical 
interest in ‘exception’ (Agamben, 2005) overstates the novelty of the present era. While the loss of 
liberty for ‘security’ is not as extreme as under fascist or Stalinist regimes in the last century (144), 
historical evidence  
... suggests that far from being aberrational or exceptional to liberal democracies, emergency 
powers have been exercised over and again in the last hundred years and more, becoming so 
fundamental to the political administration of capitalist modernity that they have, to all intents 
and purposes, become a permanent feature of liberal democratic polities (143).  
Exceptional events  
However, mega-events provide an example of political projects that can indeed be considered 
exceptional. For example, it is striking that the question of ‘balance’ was hardly noted within 
academic studies of the 2010 World Cup: the absolute level of security was generally considered self-
evidently desirable. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Two, the security operations at mega-events 
adopt the logic of emergency litigating suspensions of the law, the militarisation of civil spaces and 
draconian sentencing. Moreover, the state and corporate actors involved in planning appear to 
understand these events as exceptions which demand exorbitant budgets and full societal mobilisation 
around a transcendent national project.  
But this is a particular kind of ‘emergency’, pivoting around the governance of festival, consumerism 
and image rather than crisis. What is striking about mega-events is that authoritarian aspects of state 
power, from pre-emptive bans and moral panics to the occupation of urban space, are enrolled in the 
service of entertainment. As discussed in Chapter Three, this resonates with a broader shift within 
cities, marked by close connections between aesthetics and multi-scalar levels of securitisation. 
Weizman suggests (2007: 145) that these layers of urban security, from surveillance systems to zero 
tolerance policing, result in coexistent forms of domination combining ‘direct discipline and indirect 
control’.  
Mega-events introduce the additional element of spectacle, as urban space, movement and legal 
systems are temporarily subsumed under the rule of the image desired by host states and corporate 
power. However, as Hagemann (2010) suggests, this spectacle also exposes the layers of domination 
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which circulate through cities and the shared security templates, practices and ideas translated 
between the state and private sector, which blur distinctions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ policing.  
In turn, mega-event governance provides a concrete reminder of how ‘security’ is organised across 
local, national and transnational scales. This goes beyond the importation of external practices into the 
domestic scale, as mega-events also provide glimpses into global circuits of conflict and power. For 
example, while South Africa’s security forces were policing the commercial rights of BP Africa at the 
World Cup, its parent company was attempting to place some of the blame for the Gulf of Mexico oil 
spill on the malfunction of cement oil-well casing built by the Halliburton. In turn, Halliburton has 
become infamous for allegations of war profiteering from the occupation of Iraq (Hughes, 2007), a 
conflict in which hundreds of ‘retired’ South African policemen and soldiers, including former 
members of apartheid death squads (Perelman, 2004) worked as mercenaries. And finally, to revert 
back the 2010 World Cup, the SAPS was simultaneously promoting its purchase of bomb disposal 
automatons ‘battle tested’ in that war. This is not to suggest that all these events and incidents are 
explicitly connected but rather to highlight the global dimensions of contemporary securitisation. 
Indeed, South Africa’s security establishment explicitly viewed their operations at the 2010 World 
Cup as part of a global mobilisation. In turn, this was believed to require policing measures which 
went beyond the territorial bounds of host cities and into preparations designed for a boundless, 
borderless battlespace.  
In order to calibrate this international background of urban securitisation with the specific elements of 
the South African context, Chapter Four explored Stephen Graham’s analysis of the intensification of 
militarisation within cities. However, while it was argued that the 2010 World Cup can be understood 
as a concretisation of military urbanism, the focus on Northern cities was qualified with specific 
examples of how urban crime has entrenched these developments within South African cities. This 
created a platform from which to view the exchange between local practices and transnational security 
tactics and procedures. Conversely, it allowed for an exploration of how South African cities can be 
understood as ‘laboratories’ (Abourhame, 2009) for globally circulated security practices.  
As a result, the four studies presented in Chapters Six to Nine aimed to respond to the research 
question by arguing that: 
By working through a politically created and managed state of exception, security measures and 
operations were used as part of a shared state and corporate project of securing the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup, which contributed to an on-going militarisation of public policy and civil space in South 
Africa.  
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Security projects and exception  
As argued in Chapter Six, the World Cup resulted in an unprecedented security operation in which the 
state, aided by private security firms and foreign governments, enforced a security network 
throughout the nine host cities, across transportation routes and land, maritime and aerial borders. But 
while this was intended to market South Africa’s opportunities, it was simultaneously a mobilisation 
directed at ensuring the profits and prestige of FIFA. These security measures have been 
conventionally understood (van der Spuy, 2010, Cornelissen, 2011) as both a response to the 
exceptional security demands of the event and as a developmental opportunity which offered security 
‘legacies’. Such perspectives echoed the public legitimations used by the government and attempted 
to suggest how this legacy could be actualised and ensured.  
By contrast, Chapter Seven discussed the 2010 World Cup as an elite political and economic project. 
Rather than focusing on how opportunities to upgrade security apparatus and training were ‘missed’ 
or undermined through political and financial maladministration, the chapter discussed the concept of 
legacies as a political tool. While underpinned by the extractive political economy of the FIFA 
tournament, the government used the declaration of a ‘national security event’ to facilitate a shared 
project of state marketing and commercialism. The political creation and management of a state of 
exception was also highly responsive to a host of additional actors from the private security sector and 
foreign governments. Security was versatile enough to link the aspirations of host cities, major 
corporations and transnational institutions such as INTERPOL, an organisation which is increasingly 
serving as a facilitator between FIFA and national policing bodies.  
This is not to suggest that governance was a seamless, unitary process but rather that the security 
model provided enough coherence for groups, which in other respects may have different political, 
financial and institutional goals, to work together for mutual benefit. The occasional disagreements 
and disputes between FIFA and local and national government which were made public, such as 
Bheki’s Cele’s argument with Jerome Valcke (Chapter Six), were outweighed by the more consistent 
reality of state-corporate symbiosis (O’Reilly, 2010) with the qualifier that FIFA’s relationship 
towards hosting authorities was a particularly ‘parasitic’ variant of this symbiosis.  
As a result, the chapter was marked by a profound scepticism about the academic focus on legacies. 
Firstly, the governance of the World Cup was driven by political and corporate interests rather than 
any serious effort to create substantive forms of public safety governance. And not only were security 
measures shaped by commercial concerns but they were intended to be concentrated, visible and 
temporary, with an overt focus on protecting exclusive ‘islands’ and ‘zones’. Secondly, the meanings 
of security held by involved institutions ranged substantially beyond urban policing and included 
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‘social cohesion’, the penalising of commercial rivals and the opening of new security markets. Once 
again, this suggests that previous research into the World Cup mostly conflated security with state-
driven policing and the prevention of ‘objective’ risk. However, this overlooked how elite 
constructions of World Cup security, both for participating governments and the private sector, 
indicated a much more open-ended focus on social and spatial control, which facilitated the projects 
of these dominant interests.  
However, such security projects have the tendency to sacrifice public accountability, legal procedure 
and financial restraint. The self-legitimating flavour of this is provided in Patel’s (2012) quote at the 
beginning of the chapter, which claimed that ‘binding time-frames’ and ‘fast-track’ regulations, such 
as the 2006 Special Measures Act, create a focused ‘problem-solving’ model which can prevent ‘cost 
over-runs’ and inefficiency. However, it is exactly this concept of temporally bound, exceptional 
projects which creates opportunities for the misappropriation of funds and restrictions on civil 
liberties. At witnessed in the context of the 2010 World Cup, security, along with other areas of 
preparations, became ‘non-negotiable’, where the public was only provided with glimpses into the 
planning and expenditures of possibly the largest security operation in South African history.  
The state, space and occupation  
As a result, Chapter Eight aimed to dispute the belief that FIFA had ‘hijacked’ national security for 
financial gain. Firstly, rather than being a neutral enforcer of public safety, it was argued that the 
government prioritised a specific image of South Africa which was reliant on sanitising space and 
defining political protest as a disruptive threat. But secondly, rather than being ‘privatised’ as the 
armed wing of capital, the World Cup revealed how the government remains the central structuring 
force in South African society. Notably, FIFA’s perceived status as an ‘occupying’ power was in fact 
a product of state intervention. In turn, the government was prepared to subsidise an event with 
uncertain financial returns because it provided an impetus to pursue a variety of national and local 
projects.  
Under the simulated emergency conditions of the 2010 World Cup, the security forces were integrated 
with other government departments into a ‘war machine’, which aimed to combine restriction and 
mobility. This responded to a shared state/corporate logic of vaguely defined ‘world class cities’, in 
which the entertainment and movement of tourists of spectators was prioritised, while an open-ended 
set of risks were ‘pacified’ and contained. As a result, security operations were intensely theatrical. 
Deployments of police and weapons systems were as much about adopting the signature and 
semiotics (Boyle and Haggerty, 2009) of previous events as responding to localised challenges. 
Indeed, this suggests that mega-event security is self-reinforcing, as different hosts are compelled to 
224 
 
replicate the procedures and mobilisations of their predecessors, leading to ever larger operations. But 
while security was used as a theatre of power to signal the strength of the South African state, the 
World Cup was successful precisely because this remained a supporting ‘side show’ to the main 
event.  
However, this was not just simulation, as the adoption of an all-encompassing definition of World 
Cup security had very real consequences. At the local level, the World Cup provided an impetus to 
sanitise space and warehouse unwanted populations, despite official denials of any causal link. The 
issue of evictions and removals was mostly ignored within the mainstream of security studies, partly 
because it appeared not to fall under the parameters of policing. But the evidence presented in chapter 
eight suggests that, at the very least, FIFA restrictions and host city branding combined to create a 
powerful motor for on-going evictions and removal. To put it in another way, the facts preceded the 
legitimations. As a result, the spectacle of the 2010 World Cup puts a spotlight on the violence and 
dislocations which attend the creation of ‘world class cities’. Because it is poor people who are the 
target of such pacification, such events are often glossed over in the media and academia.  
This also reveals a more brutal side to contemporary social reality in that ‘security’ and ‘development’ 
may be used as euphemisms which underplay the extent of  state violence and resegregation through 
the mechanism of class. While a transit camp such as Blikkiesdorp may appear to exist in a different 
world from the high-tech stadiums, the chapter argued that they can be considered different aspects of 
the same security logic of containment and control. The difference is in the focus placed on them by 
the state: the security operations at stadiums were what the world was supposed to see, while 
removals and evictions were intended to disguise and prevent unwanted intrusions into this aesthetic. 
This suggests a further overlap between the security apparatus at mega-events and the tactics 
deployed in war zones and occupied territories. The check points, searches, fences and policing 
procedures during the 2010 World Cup were in part tools of an on-going and effectively one-sided 
class war of gentrification and relocations (Neocleous, 2011) which is continually being fought within 
South African cities.  
Militarisation  
It is these intimate links between different security architectures and tactics which reveal the extent of 
militarisation within urban governance and public policy. While Chapter Nine maintained that the 
state security forces remain the central platform of militarisation in contemporary South Africa, this is 
reinforced by a broader political and corporate consensus which views cities as sites of vague, 
irregular and perpetual ‘threat’ (Graham, 2010). Rather than emerging from a single source, 
militarisation works through overlapping circuits which combine to interpenetrate the logic and tactics 
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of war into everyday civil space. While military urbanism has mostly been studied from the 
perspective of the global North ( Souza, 2011), the example of South Africa shows how the on-going 
war on crime has normalised the use of similar equipment, procedures and strategies. In turn, this has 
been packaged into the state’s fascination with appearing ‘world class’.  
This is why, for instance, the Gautrain could be unveiled with proud statements about its use of 
military grade technology (Chapter Seven) and the militarisation of airspace during the tournament be 
presented as a necessary component of hosting a sporting event (Chapter Nine). An uncritical focus 
on importing ‘modernity’ and ‘expertise’, which is translated across the state, business and within 
security studies, is troubling, considered how recently democracy was achieved in South Africa. Less 
than two decades ago, the country was governed as a white supremacist national security state, and, as 
the continuation of police violence in the current era suggests, this has resulted in a profound legacy 
of basal authoritarianism which has not been fully expunged in the post-apartheid period. By placing 
domestic militarisation in its international context, it can be argued that the extent to which military 
urbanism is becoming an urban ‘best practice’ has a particular danger in the South African context. 
The global normalisation of conceptions of urban life as a perpetual war has ‘boomeranged’ into 
South Africa as ‘world class’ governance techniques, rehabilitating and reinvigorating authoritarian 
tendencies under a new, modern veneer. 
However, following Klein (2007), Graham (2010: 260) argues that the overlapping wars on crime, 
terror and disorder which are pursued throughout the world are ‘not being mobilised to win’. In 
contrast, the militarisation of urban space is designed to maintain, and profit from constant low level 
conflict and turbulence. More especially this is aimed at putting up walls, both visible and invisible, 
around flows and concentrations of wealth and power. While Klein’s (441-2) presentation of a future 
of continuous ‘green zones’ moving through and across ‘red zones’ of exclusion may appear extreme, 
it is evident that the governance of the 2010 World Cup embodied this cocktail of mobility and 
fortification.  
This reflects a profoundly ambiguous security ideology. On the one hand, mega-events are a sign of 
prestige and ‘stability’ which few states can provide, but on the other, planners envision cities where 
order is so tenuous that it can collapse into chaos at any time. While the scenarios detailed by South 
African security establishments were not as intricate as those emerging from inside the Pentagon 
(Carr, 2010), the militarisation of the 2010 World Cup was underpinned by a similar ambience of 
apocalyptic fear. Security planning is conditioned by a dramatised vision which attempts to pre-empt 
future threats (ibid), creating a stark contrast between the dystopian undertow of operations and the 
optimistic image of the 2010 World Cup. As some of the most powerful institutions in society, the 
doctrines and psychologies of the military and police demand greater scrutiny, especially as their 
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focus on crisis management (Peters, 2011) may reveal how the current domestic and geopolitical 
order is far less stable than its presentation within other parts of the political system.  
In conclusion, this thesis has attempted to look behind the justifications of ‘national security’ and 
‘legacies’ to reveal the political ambitions and financial interests which drove the securitisation of the 
2010 World Cup. Rather than militarisation coming from the exclusive source of the state, it has 
argued that under the state of exception, various aspects of urban space, technology and policy were 
melded into a continuous security project unfolding throughout South Africa. In particular, it has 
attempted to disrupt the assumed conflation between national security and the public (Neocleous, 
2007). Instead, it has focused on how ‘security’ is not so much a service provided by the state but 
rather a mechanism through which political and economic power is reproduced and sustained. 
Significance of This Approach  
Such an approach offers a useful platform from which to approach the exchange between 
transnational security developments and domestic policy and space. From this standpoint, the thesis 
has developed an account of the security measures of the 2010 World Cup which focused as much on 
the ‘whys’ as the ‘hows’ of governing the event. This has concentrated on both the material forces 
underlying security and the psychologies of power revealed within the control of space and 
organisational deployments.  
This thesis has argued that the academic studies of the 2010 World Cup were limited by a narrow 
understanding of security which focused almost exclusively on logistics and budgets. Too often such 
work served to merely reiterate the official line and justifications of ‘national security’. This is partly 
a product of the technocratic focus of security and strategic studies in post-apartheid South Africa. In 
particular, this reflects the belief that a unitary phenomenon called security is a ‘service’ provided by 
the state, which through the correct management techniques, training and imported ‘silver bullets’ 
(Graham, 2010) can aid an often hazily mapped  national quest for ‘safety.’ The shared conclusion is 
often that South Africa needs more ‘efficient security’, ‘smarter’ policing and less ‘political 
interference’.  
However, such research is sustained by an artificial separation which divorces the ‘transcendent’ goal 
of security from elements of political power, economic exploitation and social domination. Moreover, 
such a separation considerably obscures how security is by nature a construction of political power. 
While this is not to deny the legitimate urgency of attempting to improve public safety and to find 
ways to reduce criminal violence, an exclusive focus on the elusive entity of ‘security’ mystifies the 
political, social and economic causes of risk and fear. In many cases, security has become a 
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euphemism for attempts to contain the problems caused by the uneven, unjust and even brutal 
trajectory of post-apartheid society.  
More specifically, this suggests that mega-events’ use of overbearing state power in aid of extractive 
political economy can cause further insecurity and social anxiety. A sobering recent example is 
provided in Greece (Samatas interviewed by Molnar,2011), where the security apparatus established 
for the 2004 Athens games has been used to monitor and disrupt the on-going civil unrest resulting 
from the country’s economic collapse, a crisis to which profligate Olympic spending contributed. At 
the very least, events such as the 2010 World Cup are often shielded from public scrutiny by the 
claims of ‘security’, which circumvents much-needed discussions on consequences, expenditures and 
desirability. Academic research can contribute to this discussion by taking a more explicitly political 
approach which demystifies security and its spatial and social manifestations. This requires a more 
critical stance towards official statements about ‘modernity’ and ‘efficiency’ in order to discuss the 
realities and human consequences of what is done in the name of security. In conclusion, this thesis 
calls for a study of security and power which does not rely on the often stupefying and amorphous  
concepts of ‘legacies’, ‘crime control’ and ‘national security’, which are used too frequently by the 
state to contain and pacify  critical analysis.  Instead, this calls for a focus on the structures of security 
politics and its hold over urban space and everyday life. 
 
Further Research  
Such an approach also indicates further avenues of possible research which were not covered within 
the confines of this thesis. For example, there is much need for a comprehensive, city-by-city survey 
of how the security preparations for the 2010 World Cup impacted on on-going local projects and 
political struggles.   For example, in the case of Cape Town, the residents of the Symphony Way 
informal settlement resisted attempts to move them into Blikkiesdorp by occupying a nearby road in 
Delft for 21 months, the longest political action of its kind in South African history (Symphony Way 
Pavement Dwellers, 2011). The city was warned by residents that uprooting people to an anonymous 
settlement with few economic opportunities would lead to an outbreak of gang-related violence, 
which has indeed been the case, suggesting that greater focus can be placed on how security may 
often be bought at the expense of creating insecurity on the ‘periphery’. There is also space to explore 
how mega-events may embolden elite crime, particularly in corruption and abuse of public funds. The 
coming years will also provide further opportunities both to track long-term impacts within South 
African cities and to compare this experience with the procedures which will be unveiled at future 
FIFA World Cup tournaments in Brazil, Russia and Qatar. 
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